NPT/CONF.IV/45/III

Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part III

Geneva, 1992

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III

Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part III

Summary Records

Geneva, 1992

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts:

I. Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/45/I)

II. Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/45/II)

III. Summary Records (NPT/CONF.IV/45/III)

CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 14th PLENARY MEETINGS

Corrigendum 3

1st meeting 5

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 1)

Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 3)

Election of the President (agenda item 2)

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Statement by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Adoption of the rules of procedure (agenda item 4)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (agenda item 5)

Election of Vice-Presidents (agenda item 6)

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General (agenda item 8)

Adoption of the agenda (agenda item 9)

Programme of work (agenda item 10)

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (agenda item 11)

2nd meeting 19

General debate (agenda item 12)

Election of Vice-Presidents (agenda item 6) (continued)

3rd meeting 41

Request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine for observer status

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

3rd meeting (continued)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (agenda item 5) (concluded)

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

4th meeting 59

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

5th meeting 81

Request by Oman for observer status

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

6th meeting 99

Programme of work (agenda item 10) (concluded)

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

7th meeting 119

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

8th meeting 135

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

9th meeting 155

Election of Vice-Presidents (agenda item 6) (concluded)

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

10th meeting 163

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

11th meeting 173

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

12th meeting 191

General debate (agenda item 12) (concluded)

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (agenda item 11) (concluded)

13th meeting 199

Reports of the Main Committees (agenda item 15)

14th meeting 203

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Report of the Drafting Committee

Closure of the Conference

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 7th MEETINGS OF MAIN COMMITTEE I

Corrigendum 215

1st meeting 217

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13)

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

(2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

(3) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues to be considered in the Committee

B. Security assurances:

(1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

1st meeting (continued)

(2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(3) Consideration of proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (proposal by Nigeria)

2nd meeting 223

Organization of work

General exchange of views on agenda items to the Committee

3rd meeting 239

Organization of work (continued)

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued)

B. Security assurances:

(1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council

(2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(3) Consideration of proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (proposal by Nigeria)

4th meeting 253

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued)

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

5th meeting 257

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded)

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

6th meeting 273

Draft report of the Committee

7th meeting 279

Draft report of the Committee (concluded)

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 8th MEETINGS OF MAIN COMMITTEE II

Corrigendum 285

1st meeting 287

Organization of work

2nd meeting 289

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13)

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

3rd meeting 303

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued)

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

3rd meeting (continued)

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

(3) Article VII

4th meeting 313

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued)

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV

(3) Article VII

5th meeting 321

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded)

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV

(3) Article VII

E. Other provisions of the Treaty (agenda item 14)

Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

5th meeting (continued)

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

6th meeting 329

Organization of work (continued)

Draft report of the Committee

7th meeting 333

Organization of work (concluded)

8th meeting 335

Draft report of the Committee (concluded)

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 5th MEETINGS OF MAIN COMMITTEE III

1st meeting 347

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13)

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

  (1) Articles IV and III (3), preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II

  (2) Article V

Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security (agenda item 14)

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

CONTENTS (continued)

Page

2nd meeting 361

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded)

3rd meeting 383

Organization of work (continued)

4th meeting 385

Organization of work (concluded)

5th meeting 387

Draft report of the Committee (concluded)

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III
NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1-14

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 14th PLENARY MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

Note: For the list of participants, see Part I of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.IV/45/I).

**Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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31 January 1992

ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 14th PLENARY MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Corrigendum

The present document contains the corrections received from delegations and from the Secretariat applying to the English text of the summary records of the plenary meetings of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF/IV/SR.1-14).

With the issuance of this corrigendum, the summary records of the above-mentioned meetings are to be considered as final.

5th meeting

Paragraph 34

The name of the speaker should read M. YUSOF BINHITAM

7th meeting

Paragraph 60

The name of the speaker should read Mr. AL-MAATOOK

Paragraph 61

In the second sentence replace the word "All" by "Most".

9th meeting

Paragraph 22

The name of the speaker should read Mr. NGUYEN LUONG

Paragraph 28

The paragraph should read as follows:

28. Concerning the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the NPT, he welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1986. He supported the wish of the South Pacific and other countries that all other nuclear-weapon States would do the same as soon as possible.

Paragraph 30

The paragraph should read as follows:

30. Viet Nam fully supported the IAEA safeguards system which, in accordance with article III of the NPT, was designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. With Viet Nam's only nuclear reactor having always been safeguarded, the signing of the full-scope safeguard agreement only further confirmed his country's commitment to the cause of non-proliferation.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1
28 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 20 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

Acting President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee

Election of the President

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Statement by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Adoption of the rules of procedure

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Election of Vice-Presidents

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

Adoption of the agenda

Programme of work

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference

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Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 1) AND SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 3) (NPT/CONF.IV/1)

1. The Acting PRESIDENT, in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, declared open the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference had been convened in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, a proposal made during the Third Review Conference, and General Assembly resolution 43/82. The significant increase in the number of States Parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference, in 1985, was convincing evidence of the great importance attached to the need to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1985, actual reductions in nuclear weapons had been achieved for the first time as the result of a negotiated agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The international community was now awaiting the finalization of an agreement between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Yet there continued to be very serious concern that not enough had been done, or seemed likely to be done, to proceed towards the complete elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. With those issues in mind, and taking into account the review of the Treaty's future that was to take place in 1995, it was of the utmost importance for the Conference to reaffirm its strong commitment to the purposes of the Treaty's preamble and provisions.

2. Introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1), he said that the Committee had held three sessions, with 106 States Parties - or 36 more States Parties than the number that had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Third Review Conference - participating in the work of one or more of the sessions. The Preparatory Committee had adopted its final report on 2 May 1990.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (agenda item 2)

3. The Acting PRESIDENT drew attention to the statement in paragraph 15 of the final report that the Preparatory Committee had unanimously decided to recommend Mr. de Rivero (Peru) as President of the Fourth Review Conference. He now wished to place the recommendation formally before the Conference for its approval.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

4. The PRESIDENT said that he regarded the election of Peru to the presidency of the Conference as an acknowledgement of Latin America's pioneering action in support of the banning of nuclear weapons, as attested, in particular, by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. On behalf of his country and his region, he wished

to thank all delegations and to pay tribute to his distinguished predecessors, who had so ably conducted the work of the earlier Review Conferences.

5. The ending of the cold war meant that the traditional view of international security based exclusively on ideological and military factors had to be replaced by a concept which encompassed the elimination of critical poverty throughout the world, the preservation of the environment and the protection of human rights, as well as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation - in other words, a global and planetary view of security. The Conference was taking place within a political and strategic context entirely different from that of the three previous Review Conferences, which had been characterized by East-West confrontation. The Conference should not fail to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered and should consolidate and develop the non-proliferation régime as a political and legal institution essential to the restructuring of international relations now taking place.

6. A first agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons had been concluded since the Third Review Conference of 1985, and negotiations for the elimination of other categories of weapons were under way. Those advances were an important first step towards fulfilment of the responsibilities which the NPT imposed on the nuclear-weapon States, and it was to be hoped that the process would continue apace. The non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, for their part, had succeeded in remaining on the sidelines of the nuclear weapons race, their rejection of the nuclear option bearing witness to a more profound and more generous concept of national and international security involving a decision to channel resources towards eliminating poverty and preserving the environment rather than towards producing nuclear weapons.

7. The NPT had come into being as a product of the twentieth century, a century of wars and ideological struggle. It was for the participants in the Conference to convert the NPT into a citizen of the twenty-first century, which would surely be a century of peace.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

8. Mr. AKASHI (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) read out the following message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

> "The close of the 1980s has heralded an end to the cold war and to the escalating arms race between the major Powers that prevailed for 45 years after the Second World War.
>
> The momentous changes in the world, particularly in East-West relationships, have diminished the threat of nuclear confrontation and made it possible to initiate and pursue a process of real reduction in nuclear weapons. The first agreement for actual reductions in nuclear weapons, the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, was signed in 1987. The international community has also welcomed the agreement in June 1990 between the USSR and the United States on the

framework of a START treaty on the reduction of strategic arms, and looks forward with keen anticipation to the completion of that agreement and to its full implementation.

The entire international community has long been convinced that a major nuclear war would be catastrophic for life on this planet. In the spirit of this conviction, the nuclear-weapon Powers have demonstrated, especially during the last decade, their increased determination to avoid a nuclear conflict. Now, negotiations to reduce nuclear arms have been supplemented by a reassessment of the military doctrines of the two major armed alliances. As a consequence, the arms race and military confrontation between them are giving way to disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures. There have also been important steps toward a widely anticipated agreement on conventional forces in Europe and intensive work on the completion of a chemical weapons convention.

While these positive developments in international relations must be sustained, there is a long road before us. Further substantive measures of nuclear disarmament remain a priority for the international community and must be realized.

In this wider process of nuclear arms limitation, the non-proliferation régime has played and will continue to play a critical role. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is central to this régime. Generally recognized as a landmark Treaty, it is the international arms limitation instrument most widely observed. No States have withdrawn from the non-proliferation Treaty and no party has been found to be violating its provisions.

It should be noted, however, that the Treaty imposes asymmetrical obligations on its two groups of States Parties, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In such circumstances, it is of the utmost importance that all its parties should discharge their responsibilities in good faith and to the full. This commitment calls for, among other elements, clear assurances about the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and for energetic endeavours to end all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. At the same time, the right of States to develop nuclear technology for economic benefit must be both assured and reconciled with the overriding need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation remains acute, particularly in the light of technological developments which could facilitate the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by additional States. Therefore the strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime is of fundamental importance. Wider participation in the international non-proliferation régime is equally vital. This régime would also be strengthened if States Parties to the NPT that have not already done so concluded the requisite safeguard agreements with IAEA.

This Fourth Review Conference is the last one before the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty decide in 1995 'whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'. Thus, this Conference will do much to determine the future and success of non-proliferation. Your review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must, therefore, in particular provide a strong impetus and effective support to global and regional efforts to implement fully the Treaty's objectives. I send you my best wishes for every success in your work, whose consequences can affect the whole world."

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

9. Mr. BLIX (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency) said that the Conference was taking place at a moment of dangerous confrontation in a strategic region of the world. Although the attention of Governments was necessarily focused on day-to-day developments in the situation, full consideration had to be given to the central topic before the Conference, that of ensuring that nuclear weapons were not acquired by further States, as well as to the closely linked topics of nuclear disarmament and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. The present conflict provided a stark illustration of the dangers inherent in arms races and armed conflict in the absence of mutual confidence and stability built up by accommodation, co-operation and verified arms control. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was already rendering vital service in many regions of the world towards creating such confidence and stability. Its principal shortcoming resided in its failure thus far to fulfil the aspirations towards universality and nuclear disarmament. Intense efforts would have to be made in both those respects before the crucial Review Conference of 1995.

10. The international scene had undergone tremendous change since the Third Review Conference. On the negative side, threats to the global environment had dramatically increased. Action was required in order to stabilize the world's population, channel additional resources towards development, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and expand the role of energy sources, including nuclear power, which did not threaten the environment. On the positive side, the risk of military confrontation between East and West was currently giving way to opportunities for expanded co-operation, including peaceful nuclear co-operation. Drastically reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons and dramatically increased international co-operation towards the achievement of uniformly high levels of nuclear-power safety were now realistic aims.

11. Both the positive and the negative factors were of relevance in reviewing the NPT. Frustration due to the slow progress and modest results of disarmament negotiations should give way to the hope that the INF agreement, a START agreement and a CFE agreement would signal the dawn of a peaceful era in which large resources previously locked in arms production might be released for development and global environmental protection, a hope that should serve to consolidate commitment to the Treaty. Several non-Party States had explained their failure to join the Treaty by referring to the different

obligations it imposed upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. As disarmament negotiations began to bear fruit, those objections should be correspondingly reduced.

12. Another factor, potentially of equally great importance in terms of adherence to the NPT, was that nuclear weapons were beginning to look obsolescent. Although, as the current conflict in the Middle East showed, the emergence of a well-organized international community invariably using peaceful means to settle disputes was still a dream, the philosophy of mutually assured destruction seemed to be giving way to the realization that nuclear weapons offered no solution to security and that accommodation, resolution of regional conflicts and co-operation offered the only way of resolving differences, especially between great Powers. When that realization became universal, the commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament might do likewise. That line of reasoning attributed special persuasive value to the nuclear disarmament measures at present under way as well as those, such as a complete nuclear test ban and cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, which implied the abandonment of both the qualitative and the quantitative nuclear arms race. Positive results of active co-operation between East and West in defusing regional conflicts could be equally important for non-proliferation, since a peaceful climate lessened interest in nuclear weapons.

13. As to the role played under the Treaty by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA safeguards had come a long way, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since their inception, when on-site inspection by an international organization had been a somewhat revolutionary measure causing a variety of misgivings. It would be wrong to say that all reservations had been dissipated; some still remained, and some new difficulties had been encountered. On the whole, however, the safeguards system had achieved maturity and strength. It was respected, recognized as impartial and accepted by all States, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon or Party or non-Party to the NPT. Moreover, the nuclear industry realized that nuclear trade in the world of today would be severely disrupted if the safeguards and the confidence provided by them were to disappear. The fear that safeguards would impede nuclear research and development had been laid to rest, although at times some concern was still voiced in a small number of States about the cost and burden of safeguards and about the maintenance of commercial and industrial confidentiality. Throughout the system's years of operation, the Agency's Director-General had been able to report every year that he considered it reasonable to conclude that nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. That was encouraging but hardly surprising, since States had accepted and invited the safeguards in order to create confidence in their commitment to non-proliferation.

14. Referring to the background paper prepared by the IAEA on article III of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/12), he said that safeguards agreements were in force with 85 out of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. Negotiations for a safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been proceeding for some time; the latest round of talks had ended recently,

unfortunately without a conclusion satisfactory to all concerned. It had none the less been agreed that contacts would continue and that further efforts would be made to find a satisfactory outcome leading to the conclusion of a safeguards agreement. Periodic reminders were sent to all NPT Parties with outstanding obligations to conclude agreements. The IAEA Secretariat was ready at all times to discuss agreement with those States.

15. Over the past 20 years the number of facilities under inspection had grown from 156 to over 900. While in 1970 there had been no enrichment plants and only one reprocessing plant under safeguards, there were five of each kind today. In 1970, there had been one small fuel-manufacturing plant under safeguards, but now there were 43. Extensive efforts had been made during the five-year period under review to establish effective safeguards arrangements at plutonium fuel manufacturing plants; one such plant had come into operation during the past five years in Japan.

16. A number of key improvements had been made with technical and financial support from several Member States and advice from the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. New technical criteria had been developed which would serve as a basis for safeguards implementation and evaluation. Those criteria would initially be applied from the beginning of 1991 until 1995. Improvements in the quality of safeguards and safeguards implementation had resulted from modifications in the organization of the Safeguards Department. The upgrading of the Agency's offices in Toronto and Tokyo to Regional Offices had led to increased efficiency in the utilization of inspection resources and to improved effectiveness in the safeguards.

17. The question of optimum utilization of resources was of particular significance when, as was now the case, expanded safeguarding duties had to be reconciled with zero real growth budgets. Efforts on the part of the Agency had to be matched by maximum co-operation on the part of Member States. Objections were sometimes raised in individual countries to the use of some equipment or some new method. Better utilization of Agency resources could also be achieved if less effort had to be expended in connection with the designation and acceptance of inspectors. Since 1988, a simplified procedure had been used on a voluntary basis by 22 States, but ceilings on the number of inspectors and restrictions placed by some countries on whole categories of individuals still complicated the organization of inspection teams and travel arrangements. Cautious acceptance of on-site inspection had been understandable in the system's early days, but today, when inspection was seen as a normal element in agreements on disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures, Governments might envisage adopting a more relaxed attitude towards impartial international inspection. Ideally, the acceptance of safeguards should be coupled with the acceptance of an inspector's passport issued for inspection trips without any additional visa requirement.

18. The need for budgetary restraints had prompted various ideas for savings. It had been suggested, for instance, that greater emphasis should be placed on the inspection of bulk-handling facilities and less on that of light-water reactors. The question whether some of the suggestions made could

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1

be acted upon without loss of safeguards credibility might perhaps be examined in the future, e.g. in the context of some major expansion of safeguards. At the present time, however, it would not be judicious to make any major modification which could be perceived as a reduction in the effectiveness of safeguards for the sake of economy. Rather, safeguards should be underpinned by increased resources, so as to sustain their reliability, resilience and responsiveness to new challenges. The system's continued success and viability were of vital importance to further reliance on international verification, and to impose severe budgetary restraints on the system would, in his view, be unwise.

19. Safeguards were a confidence-building measure and should therefore be of a quality which justified and inspired confidence. The annual Safeguards Implementation Report, recently updated and simplified in format and style so as to make for greater transparence, was a frank evaluation which allowed Member Governments to assess the system's quality. The fact that the Report, which was an important factor in establishing confidence in the system, remained a restricted document was perhaps paradoxical, but misinterpretations - accidental or deliberate - could result from leaks when figures were taken out of context or quoted without adequate explanation.

20. All the declared nuclear-weapon States had made voluntary offers to accept safeguards. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, such offers concerned all nuclear installations designed for peaceful uses, while those of France, the Soviet Union and China related to identified installations in that sector. A certain body of opinion held that inspections under those offers were not very meaningful and that the function of safeguards was to promote confidence about the non-nuclear-weapon status of the country inviting inspection. Clearly, safeguards in nuclear-weapon States could not have that function. But in the unanimous view of the Third NPT Review Conference, the Agency should make wider use of the voluntary offers; the Third Conference had also stressed the principle that all peaceful nuclear installations should be under safeguards in all States. Regrettably, no expansion of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States had been possible under current budgetary constraints.

21. Inspection in nuclear-weapon States did not affect the important differences in obligations between nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) under the NPT, but it none the less softened to some extent the dichotomy between the large number of closely inspected NNWS on the one hand and the small number of NWS, otherwise exempt from all inspection, on the other. States possessing nuclear weapons were not "rewarded" by having their nuclear installations exempt from the obligation of continuous accounting and periodic visits of inspectors. Furthermore, safeguards under the voluntary offers accustomed NWS to international on-site inspection. They also gave those and other States a useful external check on the accuracy of the national nuclear material accounting and control system. For the IAEA, inspection in NWS had provided inspectors with practical experience in safeguarding types of installations that had later come under safeguards in other countries.

22. The nuclear disarmament measures taken to date had not had any impact on the operation of safeguards in NWS. However, if enriched uranium or plutonium were to be moved from the military to the peaceful sector as a result of disarmament measures, assurances that that material stayed in the peaceful cycle could be provided by Agency safeguards. Perhaps the NWS could lead the way to a system of international plutonium storage, a system that was contemplated in the IAEA Statute and had already been discussed at length for surplus plutonium originating from the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

23. As far as possible, it would be desirable to use fissionable material recovered through nuclear disarmament measures as safeguarded fuel for generating electricity. The world would undoubtedly feel more at ease if that material was burnt up than if it was stored indefinitely, thus remaining theoretically available for the production of new weapons. It was to be hoped that in their future negotiations, the NWS would consider the potential use of safeguards for materials or installations that were moved into the peaceful nuclear sector either under current or expanded voluntary offers.

24. The fact that NPT-type safeguards currently predominated did not mean that other methods could not also be worked out, consistent with the Agency Statute, to respond to special requirements that might arise in a disarmament context. That also applied to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The main components of any safeguards régime would undoubtedly be the same, but special needs might call for tailor-made solutions, such as random inspection or permanently stationed inspectors.

25. Positive results had been recorded in the promotional activities undertaken by the IAEA in accordance with article IV of the NPT. Owing to the substantial increase in IAEA funds for technical assistance and co-operation, those activities had grown greatly during the years under review. The benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were being made available internationally. Whether in agriculture (for example, mutation breeding), industry (non-destructive testing) or medicine (radiation treatment of cancer), use of nuclear techniques was making steady advances. A current dramatic case that deserved special mention was the use of the sterile-insect technique to combat the New World screw-worm in Northern Africa, an infestation which could have tragic consequences if the large-scale project did not succeed.

26. Reliance on regional mechanisms for the dissemination of nuclear techniques was increasing. The Regional Co-operation Agreement in Asia, long recognized as being of very great practical value, not least in industry, had been followed by the Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Latin America and the recent African Regional Agreement. All would require effective governmental commitment, and additional resources were also vitally needed from the outside. In view of the steady growth in the use of nuclear techniques and radiation sources in developing countries, IAEA was expanding its co-operation there in the fields of safety and waste disposal. With few exceptions, the introduction of non-power nuclear techniques had been well received by the public and experts alike. However, that could change if safety and wastes were not handled responsibly. A few years previously,

African States had sounded the alarm that hazardous wastes were being dumped on their territory. He was pleased to announce that no case had been found in which any nuclear waste had been dumped in Africa. The IAEA had drafted a code of practice with strict rules for the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste, but national and international regulatory restrictions were not enough. Positive action was also needed to establish suitable repositories for nuclear wastes arising in developing countries, for example from hospitals. Several accidents in recent years underlined the urgency of such action, to which the IAEA was giving top priority, inter alia through expert missions. Urgent attention was also being devoted to elaborating nuclear safety regulations and creating authorities responsible for supervising them. Many expert missions were also sent for that purpose.

27. The use of nuclear energy for generating electricity was potentially of tremendous importance for developing countries. The example of the Republic of Korea, where 50 per cent of the electricity was generated by nuclear power, showed how a rapidly developing country could benefit from reliance on nuclear power. By and large, however, such countries had been slow to make use of that alternative. Following a recommendation by the previous Review Conference, the IAEA had set up an expert working group to examine the problems facing those developing countries that wished to use nuclear power. As expected, the financing of large capital-intensive projects in countries with enormous investment needs had been identified as a major problem. However, other bottle-necks relating to the need for industrial infrastructure, a regulatory system and trained manpower had been found to be almost as important.

28. Over the past five years, a number of new factors had emerged with regard to the use of nuclear power in developing countries. First, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 had had a world-wide psychological impact. Second, although only a few advanced industrialized countries had decided not to use nuclear power, there had nevertheless been conspicuous stagnation in the global growth of nuclear power, partly because of a limited need for additional electricity in many industrialized countries, but also because of public reluctance in many of those countries to accept a further expansion of nuclear power. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that several developing countries, although foreseeing sharply increased needs for electricity, hesitated to introduce or expand nuclear power.

29. Another factor that had come sharply into focus since 1985 was the fear that even the current level of use of coal, oil and gas threatened to raise the temperature of the world's atmosphere. While the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO_2) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) from the burning of fossil fuels could, at a cost, be drastically reduced by technical means to avoid further destruction of forests and lakes, there was no economically viable way to avoid carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions from the processes involved. Conservation and greater reliance on renewable resources of energy alone were insufficient to resolve the dilemma of generating more electricity while reducing CO_2 emissions into the atmosphere. Clearly the use of nuclear power was not a panacea, but the significant and technically reliable CO_2-free option could not be ignored.

30. For the developing countries, that perspective must be closely scrutinized. It was not a matter of indifference if China, already the world's largest coal consumer, doubled its use of coal by the year 2000 instead of stepping up its reliance on nuclear power; if India and Pakistan, currently not parties to the NPT, but advanced in nuclear techniques, made much greater use of those techniques to cover their energy needs instead of drawing more heavily upon fossil fuels; if rapidly developing countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, or, for that matter, Egypt and a number of Latin American countries, including the non-NPT States of Argentina and Brazil, turned increasingly to fossil energy rather than to nuclear energy; and if new power plants in industrialized countries were fossil- rather than nuclear-fuelled. Interest in the nuclear power option would inevitably increase if, as seemed likely, the scientific evidence of the greenhouse effect grew. Political events giving rise to uncertainty about oil or gas supplies would also increase awareness that nuclear power, with the small volumes of fuel that it required and that could be stored for long periods of operation, enhanced energy independence.

31. Renewed interest in nuclear power would focus on whether the new technology could be made so safe as to convince the public that accidents involving any significant releases of radioactivity could be virtually ruled out and that high-level waste was being isolated so safely that any significant releases could, for all intents and purposes, be excluded. Promising technological activity was under way in both those crucial areas. Already, much improved nuclear power plant designs existed for the most common reactor types. Efforts were being made to build smaller, less expensive and more simply designed power reactors that would be easier to operate and would rely more heavily on passive safety. Several designs of that nature were being developed, improving the chances of finding a moderate-sized and moderately priced CO_2-free source of electricity for developing countries. Universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime would facilitate world-wide dissemination of such new technology.

32. When looking forward to the crucial date of 1995, the Conference should bear in mind three interrelated factors: the need for universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime and for drastic global disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; the need for an increased transfer of nuclear technology, including simpler and more passively safe nuclear power plants, to promote development; and the need for better protection of the environment, including the importance of counteracting global warming and acid rain, and the relevance of the nuclear option in achieving that goal.

33. A dangerous confrontation was taking place in a strategic region of the world. Conflicts remained in other regions too. However, a new climate of co-operation improved chances for alleviating or resolving many difficult regional disputes and achieving very substantial global disarmament, and it also gave hope that greater and better use would be made of the international institutions, the United Nations and the specialized agencies, including the IAEA, which were indispensable instruments for tackling many global problems. In such a climate, it was not too much to hope that universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime might become a reality. Such

adherence would set the stage for promoting the transfer of nuclear power technology on a universal basis. It would serve the cause of development, and all States and the global environment would benefit as well.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 4)

34. Ms. ESCALER (Philippines) congratulated the Chairman on his election and, speaking on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that, on 7 May 1990, ASEAN had addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee rejecting the reference to the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" in document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/18/Rev.1 and requesting rectification of the situation and circulation for information of copies of the ASEAN letter to the Depositaries and States Parties to the Treaty. ASEAN profoundly regretted that the instrument of accession in question had been accepted in the first place, because the "People's Republic of Kampuchea", which had been installed by foreign armed intervention, was not recognized as the legal representative of Cambodia. Such a decision was unacceptable.

35. ASEAN was actively involved in current efforts to allow the different Cambodian factions to come to an urgent agreement on the creation of a supreme national council as a vehicle for achieving national reconciliation and a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian problem. The supreme national council must consist of representatives of all shades of political opinion which had support among the Cambodian people.

36. Mr. LUONG MINH (Viet Nam) said that his Government recognized the State of Cambodia, formerly the People's Republic of Kampuchea, as the sole legitimate representative of Cambodia, and considered that only the State of Cambodia could represent Cambodia in international relations, including international conferences and treaties. Viet Nam therefore recognized the State of Cambodia as the sole legal Cambodian party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

37. The PRESIDENT said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex IV to document NPT/CONF.IV/1.

It was so decided.

38. The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, that a number of requests had been received for observer status, namely from Argentina, Brazil, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, France, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to accept the requests.

It was so decided.

39. The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 (4) of the rules of procedure, concerning specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, that the following organizations had requested observer

status: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Commission of the European Community. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant the requests.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5)

40. The PRESIDENT said that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, candidacies for the Chair of each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had been approved unanimously, namely Main Committee I: Chairman: Mr. Adeyemi (Nigeria), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Ditchev (Bulgaria) and Mr. Vaerno (Norway); Main Committee II: Chairman: Mr. Strulak (Poland), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Villarroel (Philippines) and Mr. Meerburg (Netherlands); Main Committee III: Chairman: Mr. Yamada (Japan), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and from Egypt; Drafting Committee: Chairman: Mr. Hyltenius (Sweden), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from Canada and from Hungary; Credentials Committee: Chairman: Mr. Groop (Finland), Vice-Chairman: Mr. Grozdanov (Bulgaria). If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to adopt those nominations. The election of the other Vice-Chairman and the other members of the Credentials Committee would be reconsidered under agenda item 7. Consultations on that subject would continue, and he would inform the Conference at the appropriate time.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6)

41. The PRESIDENT said that, under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference must elect 26 Vice-Presidents. As no names had been proposed yet, he suggested waiting until a complete list, which could be expected the next day, was submitted.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 8)

42. The PRESIDENT said that, at the first session of the Preparatory Committee, it had been decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference. On 16 October 1989, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Arpád Prandler to that position, and the Preparatory Committee had taken note of the fact at its third session. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to confirm the nomination.

It was so decided.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1

43. Mr. PRANDLER (Secretary-General of the Fourth Review Conference) thanked the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for confirming his nomination and assured the Conference that he would do everything he could to ensure the smooth operation of work. He was fully conscious of the significance of the Fourth Review Conference, which would affect the implementation of, and commitment to, the objectives and provisions of the Treaty in the years ahead.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (agenda item 9)

44. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved the provisional agenda as contained in annex II to document NPT/CONF.IV/1, including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex III for the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

It was so decided.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10)

45. The PRESIDENT briefly drew attention to matters of procedure concerning the programme of work.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11)

46. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Conference to the communication that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received from the Comptroller's Office in New York stating that, owing to the current financial situation of the Organization and in accordance with Financial Rule 114.3, the United Nations would be unable to incur the financial costs without the corresponding advance contributions from the participating States, as already indicated in paragraph 18 of document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/16, of 28 March 1990. Total revised costs of the Conference and its preparation had been estimated at approximately $2.8 million. To date, a total of $1.1 million had been received. If no additional payments were made, the services for the Conference meetings would have to be adjusted accordingly, and he therefore made an urgent appeal to delegations for the corresponding payment to be made before 27 August. In view of the precarious financial situation, if additional financial contributions were not received he would be unable to prepare an appropriate working programme, and the duration of the Conference would have to be modified as a consequence.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2
21 November 1990

ENGLISH
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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

later: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

General debate

Election of Vice-Presidents (continued)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12)

1. Mr. COLLINS (Ireland) said that his country had been associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the beginning of the debate in the General Assembly in 1958. Ireland had no nuclear weapons or installations for nuclear research, either civil or military, and could therefore speak out frankly on questions of nuclear proliferation. His country's support for the Treaty was unconditional.

2. Since the Third Review Conference in 1985, remarkable changes in the international climate had taken place. Improvements in East-West relations had eradicated the political and ideological bases for the cold war; the INF Treaty, an agreement to eliminate an entire class of missiles, had been signed and implemented; a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) should be signed shortly, a development which his country welcomed because its important political message would strengthen the NPT by demonstrating that important nuclear-weapon States were moving towards one of its most significant objectives. Progress had also been achieved in conventional disarmament; the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Vienna would contribute towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

3. The improvement in international relations might, however, mask a dangerous paradox. The spectacular developments in East-West relations seemed to suggest that the risk of global nuclear confrontation was diminishing. The negotiations which had taken place had resulted in reducing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the realistic possibility of serious reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the super-Powers was offset by the prospect of increases in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Horizontal proliferation was all too likely to have become a reality. The arguments which had made the negotiation of the Treaty a priority more than 20 years previously had lost none of their relevance. In first raising the issue before the General Assembly in 1958, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Frank Aiken, had stressed the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and had expressed the belief that a single resort to those weapons could destroy the whole of mankind. Those concerns remained relevant even in the present considerably improved international situation.

4. True, the worst fears of the Treaty's authors had not been realized: the number of acknowledged nuclear-weapon States had not changed since the signature of the Treaty in July 1968. But the fact that certain States continued actively to seek nuclear-weapons capability ran counter to the Treaty's objectives. Moreover, the activities of those "latent proliferators" made the balance achieved in the field of nuclear-weapons control a precarious one and placed at risk the safety of the present-day world and of future generations. The competition for military nuclear capability was a constant underlying challenge to non-proliferation efforts.

5. The Treaty, which represented the keystone of efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, had come of age. It was a complex agreement

which provided a framework for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Fourth Review Conference must demonstrate realism and imagination to match the new role the Treaty was expected to play in the 1990s and beyond.

6. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be a major foreign policy objective of all States parties. During Ireland's presidency of the European Community, the Twelve had formulated a declaration on nuclear non-proliferation demonstrating their irreducible commitment to that objective. The declaration, issued at Dublin on 26 June 1990, was the first ever on the subject by the 12 Heads of State or Government of the European Community. It illustrated the high priority given to the issue by all the Community's member States and should encourage other States, both parties and non-parties to the NPT, to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

7. With 141 States parties, the Treaty was the most widely-supported arms control agreement in history. However, some significant States still remained outside the Treaty. In order to be effective, the Treaty must be universal. A truly universal non-proliferation régime was the best guarantee of peace and stability throughout the world.

8. The Fourth Review Conference was a pivotal one. Since the question of prolongation of the Treaty was to be considered in 1995, an assessment that was both realistic and visionary was called for in 1990. The Conference faced a Herculean task. First, it should aim at strengthening the non-proliferation régime of which the NPT was the cornerstone. Secondly, it should encourage non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Thirdly, it should demand from all States parties full compliance with the terms of the Treaty. "Good faith" was a key term in that context: negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be pursued in good faith and non-nuclear-weapon States must, in good faith, comply with all their obligations under the Treaty.

9. The objectives being thus clearly defined, how could the Conference achieve them? The NPT represented a compromise among differing points of view, and any review must reflect the same spirit of compromise. There was little to be gained by evaluating how each separate article had been fulfilled; rather, the Conference should evaluate the Treaty as a whole in order to learn how to strengthen its implementation as a whole.

10. The Treaty drew a fundamental distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Like all other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, Ireland had forgone the right to develop a nuclear weapons capability and considered that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. His Government did not believe that nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of a State. The nuclear-weapon States must negotiate reductions of nuclear weapons and eventually their complete elimination. The first step towards the zero option was to stop the development of nuclear weapons, which required an end to nuclear testing.

11. He therefore called on the nuclear Powers to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. In 1980 and 1985, Ireland had advocated a moratorium on

nuclear testing; today, he wished to make the same call with renewed vigour. His Government considered that a halt to tests and the conclusion of a treaty banning them would provide the clearest proof the nuclear-weapon States could offer of their commitment to complete nuclear disarmament and their determination to control the qualitative development of the arms race. In that connection, Ireland welcomed the agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the recent re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban within the Conference on Disarmament. Failure to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty meant that one of the major hopes of non-nuclear-weapon States had not been met. In that regard, Ireland recognized the objectives of the forthcoming negotiations on the amendment of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and hoped that the Conference would lead to a commitment by all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

12. His Government took the view that a lack of credible or effective security assurances could only serve to undermine the Treaty. While recognizing that there could be no satisfactory solution to the problem, it felt that negative security assurances would be better than none at all. His delegation looked forward to a debate on the question at the present Conference. It considered that the process of strengthening the non-proliferation régime must include the exploration of new security initiatives which would reduce the need to acquire nuclear weapons and would contribute towards confidence-building between States.

13. While the NPT was first and foremost aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it also provided for access for all parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government upheld the right of every State party to the Treaty to develop research and to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Ireland had no plans to develop a nuclear-generating capacity, but since half of the world's nuclear reactors and a number of fuel-cycle facilities were located nearby, it was inescapably affected by nuclear safety issues.

14. According to the Brundtland report, nuclear power generation was justifiable only if there were solid solutions to the currently unsolved problems to which it gave rise. Since the previous Review Conference, the events at Chernobyl had shown the potential effects of a nuclear accident and demonstrated that radiation recognized no frontiers. Countries with nuclear power programmes should therefore operate those programmes in accordance with the highest possible safety standards and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. An international nuclear inspection force to verify those standards would, in his view, be of benefit to both nuclear and non-nuclear States. The principles of international inspection which were already in operation in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be applied to safety standards. His Government hoped that the Conference would consider that question, which was of the utmost importance.

15. His delegation welcomed the Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held by IAEA in 1991, which would contribute to the strengthening of international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety.

16. All co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was based on the safeguards implemented in an exemplary manner by IAEA. Those safeguards were in the direct interest of every party to the Treaty. His Government believed that the civil programme of the nuclear-weapon States should be safeguarded, particularly in the context of an eventual freeze on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A marginal extension of the Agency's responsibilities would be sufficient for that purpose.

17. At a time when States were preparing to carry out significant nuclear arms reductions, the question arose of the disposal of the material recovered from nuclear-weapon destruction. His Government hoped that the Conference would explore the Agency's possible role in that area. It should also explore the possible answers to the problems of plutonium storage. Measures should be taken to ensure that any excess of special fissionable materials recovered or produced should be deposited with IAEA. Such an approach could contribute directly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by preventing the stockpiling of materials which could be put to direct use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

18. International nuclear trade must be regulated. There was a need for a legal framework which allowed international trade to flourish while avoiding the risks of nuclear proliferation; such regulation of nuclear export controls would create a climate of confidence between trading partners. The "traditional" nuclear suppliers must promote restraint and encourage emerging nuclear suppliers to accept established nuclear-supply norms. Co-operation in the nuclear field must be conducted in accordance with the strictest non-proliferation standards. His delegation hoped that the Conference would develop the proposal on that question which appeared in the Final Document of the 1985 Review Conference.

19. His Government looked forward with interest to 1995 as an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty's provision and to renew its commitment to the Treaty for an indefinite period. The decision to be taken in 1995 was not whether to prolong the Treaty but for how long to prolong it. His delegation would welcome an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty by consensus.

20. The time might not yet be ripe to foresee the nuclear agenda for the next century, but it was not too soon to begin preparations for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the view of his Government, a renewed and strengthened Non-Proliferation Treaty was the right vehicle for reaching that objective.

21. Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America), said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an ever more vital foundation for international stability in that it created conditions for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons while also creating conditions for co-operation in the field of nuclear technology.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

22. All members of the Preparatory Committee had noted the positive international climate which had emerged since the previous Review Conference and would agree that that general improvement, and particularly the progress achieved in arms control, augured well for the present Conference.

23. He then read out a statement by President Bush, [*] which testified to the importance the United States attached to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Review Conference.

24. The Treaty embodied the desire of States parties to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. His Government acknowledged, in particular, the contribution of the Republic of Ireland, whose proposal in the General Assembly had led to the negotiation of the Treaty in the 18-nation Disarmament Conference from 1965 to 1968. The negotiators had been confronted with many uncertainties, and the Treaty, when introduced in the General Assembly and opened for signature on 1 July 1968, had been received with doubts as well as hopes. Yet by the spring of 1970 over 40 States had deposited instruments of ratification and the Treaty had come into force. From the first, many States had considered the NPT a unique means of affirming their commitment to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

25. Those who questioned the Treaty's value should consider the state of the world today. Tension, confrontation and conflict continued to reign in many regions. The maintenance of international stability was crucial if diplomacy was to have any chance of success. In that context, the Treaty represented a legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, provided mutual assurance of their absence, and reinforced international norms vital to world stability.

26. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe had been the focus of a prolonged, intense political and military confrontation resulting in what was perhaps the most dense concentration of military forces in history. Today, however, unprecedented changes were taking place, and political relationships within and among countries were being fundamentally restructured. All countries concerned needed assurance that the emerging new environment would not threaten their security. There again, the NPT served as a source of security and stability. His Government was therefore in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. In the meantime, it was the task of the present Conference to examine in depth the implementation of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference of 1985.

27. Commenting on the four main results achieved under the Treaty over the past five years, he welcomed, first, the accession of 10 new parties. Those accessions further strengthened the norms of nuclear non-proliferation and co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.

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[*] The full text of the statement was subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.IV/25.

28. Secondly, he was pleased to note that during the past five years the Treaty had continued to facilitate access by parties to the many benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The transfer of appropriate technology was essential to the improvement of the quality of life in all countries, including developing ones; IAEA was to be commended for the central role it played in that field. Much nuclear co-operation also related to routine non-power applications in hospitals, farms, industrial enterprises and universities. The past five years had also seen the commissioning of 86 new nuclear power stations. During that period his Government had paid special attention to operational safety, and its assistance to States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy reflected its commitment to preferential treatment of parties to the NPT.

29. Thirdly, the IAEA safeguards system was the centrepiece of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Despite a zero-growth budget, the Agency had improved the scope and quality of its inspections. The United States had supported international efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by making voluntary contributions of over $30 million since 1985. Under a voluntary safeguards agreement which the United States had concluded with IAEA in 1980, the Agency could exercise the right to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in United States facilities, excluding only those immediately involved in national security. More than 230 public and private nuclear facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards.

30. The United States continued to urge all nuclear suppliers to require the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States as a condition for significant new nuclear supply. Japan had adopted such a policy in 1989.

31. The United States continued firmly to support the work of the Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee, set up within the framework of the Treaty, which ensured that nuclear exports were subject to IAEA safeguards.

32. The United States urged all States parties to the NPT to negotiate safeguards agreements in order to comply with the requirements of article III of the Treaty.

33. Fourthly, the United States had, over the previous five years, conducted intensive negotiations on a broad range of arms-control issues. The list of agreements and negotiations since the Third Review Conference made it clear that the United States was successfully discharging its responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty. Thus, in 1986, the United States had subscribed to the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In 1987, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on establishing nuclear-risk reduction centres and had signed the INF Treaty and an agreement on enhancing the norms established by the Biological Weapons Convention. In 1988, it had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union on advance notification of ballistic-missile launches. In 1989, it had joined in the reaffirmation by the 140 participants in the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons of the need to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical

weapons and to achieve a universal ban on such weapons. In the same year, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on prevention of dangerous military activities, an agreement on implementing trial START verification and stability measures and an agreement on advance notification of major strategic exercises and an agreement with other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in CSCE to open negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. In 1990, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, as well as new verification protocols related to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

34. The United States was currently engaged in bilateral nuclear and space talks with the Soviet Union and in multilateral negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, confidence-building and security measures, and chemical weapons. It was also involved in a number of other discussions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Many of those agreements and negotiations involved nuclear-weapon States, including the other NPT depositary States, namely, the United Kindom and the Soviet Union. Other negotiations, such as the 1986 Stockholm Conference, the Conference on Disarmament or the talks on conventional forces in Europe, involved non-nuclear-weapon States as well, for article VI applied to all countries and not merely the nuclear-weapon States.

35. Stressing the importance of diplomacy in arms control matters, he said that negotiations could progress swiftly at times and slowly at others. Arms-control negotiations involved the most sensitive areas of national security. Progress must be made step by step, and it would be wrong to impose an arbitrary schedule for specific agreements. Only negotiations in good faith offered a chance of rapid progress.

36. Among notable achievements since the Review Conference of 1985 was the fact that the 23 States members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were now making progress in their negotiations - covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals - on conventional forces in Europe. At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded a bilateral agreement to destroy the bulk of United States and Soviet chemical weapons by the year 2002. In December 1987, President Reagan and President Gorbachev had signed a historic agreement - the INF Treaty on the elimination of ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems. The agreement, which had entered into force in 1988, had already resulted in the elimination of 2,257 Soviet and United States missiles and almost 800 Soviet and United States launchers, and in the introduction of an elaborate system of verification, including innovative forms of on-site inspection.

37. At their meeting in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev had indicated that an agreement on strategic arms reduction might be signed by the end of the year. For the first time ever, both sides would carry out significant reductions - up to 50 per cent in certain categories - in the numbers of strategic offensive arms. Those reductions would be designed to make a first strike less plausible, providing greater stability and a lower risk of war. Moreover, the far-reaching reductions of the START Treaty would

be accompanied by innovative provisions for effective verification and information exchange, thus increasing the confidence essential for a sound strategic relationship. When that goal was attained, the United States and the Soviet Union would continue their talks on nuclear and space weapons.

38. At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded new verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which should expedite those treaties' ratification. The United States had a step-by-step approach to further nuclear-testing limitations and to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective. So long as the United States had to rely upon nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, a sensible test programme would be necessary to maintain the reliability of those weapons.

39. The United States welcomed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

40. An issue of concern to the Review Conference was that of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-weapon States would neither use such weapons nor threaten to use such weapons against them. In that connection, his Government wished to restate its policy, which had remained unchanged under three successive Administrations: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT or any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack".

41. The United States was aware of the concern expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and would continue to participate in discussions on negative security assurances. At the same time, it was convinced that the existing negative security assurances provided adequate security.

42. A great deal had been accomplished in the past five years but much still remained to be done. The United States was optimistic but not complacent about the future. It was committed to take the necessary steps to ensure a stable and secure world. It also undertook to work towards universal accession to the NPT in view of the dangers in troubled regions of the world which were populated by nations which had not yet acceded to the NPT. The United States hoped that IAEA would receive sufficiently strong support to enable it to continue its effective role both in facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the area of safeguards. Responsible export controls by nuclear supplier States were needed. It was also necessary to continue to move forward in arms control, especially in troubled regions where diplomacy was an essential means of resolving conflicts. The NPT was central to each of those important and, in some cases, urgent tasks, and must continue to play a major role as a framework for peaceful nuclear co-operation and as a vital and irreplaceable instrument of international security.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) took the Chair.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

43. Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read out a message from Mr. Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, and requested that the text of the message should be issued as an official document of the Conference. */

44. The Soviet Union regarded the NPT as the most important multilateral treaty on the basis of which the international régime for the horizontal limitation of nuclear weapons had taken shape and as a major factor for security and stability in a rapidly changing world. Although born during the period of the Cold War, it testified to the international community's political realism and sense of responsibility. The support given by the General Assembly to the Irish initiative in 1958 demonstrated the world community's recognition of the fact that an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States could only increase international tension, undermine the foundations of peace and place additional obstacles in the way of agreements on disarmament. Today, the NPT was one of the supporting structures of the securer world currently being built. The accession of each new State to the Treaty represented a major step towards mutual understanding and co-operation among States and one of the most reliable means of creating a new infrastructure of international relations in line with the civilized world's current level of maturity. The Soviet Union therefore welcomed the representatives of countries which had become fully-fledged parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and, noting the interest shown in the Treaty by countries which had not yet acceded to it, in particular China and France, also welcomed their representatives who were participating in the Conference as observers. An increase in the number of observers was a notable development reflecting an objective trend towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

45. The period following the Third Review Conference had coincided with revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and had been marked by a transition from an era of confrontation between military blocs to one of co-operation, disarmament and the emergence of control mechanisms designed to ensure security. The world had entered upon a period in which the force of law, humanism and universal values were to enjoy priority over the rule of force. The new political thinking, focused as it was upon the democratization of international relations, had enabled the international community to show that it was capable of taking joint action instead of merely making declarations of intent.

46. The profound changes which had taken place in the interntional situation had had a direct effect on arms control and disarmament; it would be no exaggeration to say that a reliable peace process, accompanied by a gradual reduction of military potential, had already taken shape. That had been the object of the programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction presented by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. The most important step towards the implementation of that

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*/ The full text of the message was subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.IV/26.

programme had been achieved with the entry into force of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, whose main political significance consisted in reversing the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation and destroying the dangerous stereotype according to which the nuclear arms build-up was unavoidable. For the first time, the USSR and the United States had agreed on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles and, according to a joint assessment made at the highest level, the implementation of the agreement was proceeding normally. The elimination of short-range missiles had been completed on both sides. As of 1 June 1990, the Soviet Union had, for its part, eliminated a total of more than 1,500 medium-range and shorter-range missiles, or 90 per cent of the original number. The experience of the INF Treaty in other areas of disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament, especially with regard to verification mechanism, would be extremely valuable to the START agreement at present being negotiated, which was to mark the beginning of major reductions in strategic arsenals measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of charges. As soon as possible after the conclusion of the Treaty, the two countries would hold consultations on future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and on the strengthening of strategic stability.

47. There was now a real opportunity for radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union had already withdrawn 500 nuclear charges stationed in the territory of its allies in 1989 and had refrained from modernizing its tactical nuclear missiles in 1989 or 1990.

48. At the CSCE in Copenhagen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union had announced further reductions in the number of tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. Those measures were being taken by the Soviet Union unilaterally, without any prior condition. Reciprocal steps by NATO countries and their decision to hold negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe should also be noted.

49. The Soviet Union favoured a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials, which should constitute a reliable barrier to both vertical and horizontal proliferation. It had ceased, on a unilateral basis, the production of highly-enriched uranium and had begun to implement a programme of gradual discontinuance of all its industrial reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. It had also proposed the elaboration of a USSR-United States agreement, as well as a multilateral agreement, on verifiable cessation of production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials, compliance with which could be verified with the help of IAEA's experience. Lastly, the Soviet Union had proposed, at the United Nations, that agreement should be reached on the non-use for military purposes of nuclear material made available as a result of reductions in nuclear arsenals, together with a corresponding verification mechanism.

50. One of the Soviet Union's priority goals in the field of nuclear disarmament was the achievement of a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date. From August 1985 to February 1987, the USSR had abided by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States. Recent substantial reductions in its testing programme

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

provided further proof of its serious intentions in that field and its strict compliance with its obligations under the NPT. Since 1989, it had not conducted any nuclear tests, noting with satisfaction that the United States, too, had curtailed its testing activity, at any rate judging by the first half of 1990. A solution to the problem of nuclear testing would largely depend on practical steps taken in that field by the United States.

51. The signing at the Washington Summit of protocols to the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976 now made it possible to ratify those treaties and pave the way for setting further limits on nuclear tests with a view eventually to stopping them altogether. The Soviet Union favoured the continuance, without delay, of full-scale negotations in that field, in accordance with the agreement reached in 1987. However, the nuclear-testing issue called for multilateral efforts in parallel with bilateral efforts, and the Soviet Union therefore consistently advocated that practical work on a test ban should be started, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1987, together with other States, it had submitted draft basic provisions of a treaty on the comprehensive and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. One of the options in that respect would be to extend the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to cover underground testing. The forthcoming conference on that question should make a positive contribution to the search for a solution to the problem of a nuclear test ban.

52. Work on agreements aimed at reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals should be accompanied by the strengthening of guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons, an objective for which the changes taking place in the world situation provided more favourable opportunities.

53. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Its military doctrine was wholly defensive and it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It continued to be prepared to seek a mutually acceptable formula, which could then be included in an international legal instrument, setting forth the nuclear Powers' undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons and not having them on their territory. The possibility of the nuclear Powers' unifying their unilateral guarantees in that field could also be studied.

54. His delegation supported, in principle, the Nigerian initiative on strengthening "negative" security guarantees.

55. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world contributed towards enhanced regional and universal security and reduced the geographical area of nuclear preparations, thus strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The Soviet Union had actively supported the efforts made in that direction, particularly in connection with the creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific. De facto nuclear-free zones had also been declared in the Antarctic and in outer space, and some individual States had also opted for the denuclearization of their territory, a decision welcomed by the international community. The Soviet Union favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones in subregions of

Europe and in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, as well as in the Middle East, Africa, South-East Asia, the Korean peninsula and other regions. It undertook to continue to comply with article VII of the NPT, in particular by providing appropriate guarantees to participants in future agreements on nuclear-free zones.

56. In the area of non-nuclear disarmament, too, there had been a number of positive developments since the Third Review Conference. A USSR-United States agreement on the non-production of chemical weapons and reductions by more than 80 per cent in stockpiles of such weapons had been signed, and a draft Convention on their complete prohibition was taking shape. An agreement on major reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe was expected before the end of the year.

57. The settlement and prevention of regional conflicts called for a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, in order to create a barrier to the dangerous spread of all types of weapons. Disarmament processes must be globalized and international relations demilitarized, all countries - including developing ones - being actively involved in efforts to reduce military arsenals and build confidence; all categories of weapons must be covered by the negotiations.

58. The fact that the threat of nuclear terrorism had today become a reality made it urgently necessary to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, extend the number of parties to that Convention and enhance the effectiveness of its control mechanisms.

59. The control activities of IAEA were a major element in preserving and strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In accordance with article III of the Treaty, the Soviet Union provided nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States only on condition that they applied the IAEA safeguards. Together with other supplier States, it participated in specifying and updating the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export required application of those safeguards, and strictly complied with that list. It supported the proposals for the introduction by major nuclear-supplier States of a requirement whereby IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty importing nuclear items.

60. As stated in the USSR-United States declaration on non-proliferation adopted at the Washington Summit, all States parties to the NPT should strictly fulfil their undertakings under the Treaty concerning IAEA safeguards. The effectiveness and authority of IAEA as a guarantor of the NPT should be given continued support. The Soviet Union, for its part, was ready to make a new contribution to that vital activity.

61. During the period between the Third and Fourth Review Conferences, the USSR had extended the list of peaceful nuclear installations open for IAEA inspection, in particular by including a fast neutron reactor. The voluntary placing of peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA control by nuclear-weapon States was acquiring special significance; as a gesture of goodwill, the

Soviet Union was prepared to increase significantly the list of its nuclear installations placed under IAEA safeguards. All Soviet nuclear power stations and an additional number of research reactors had thus been included in the list which would be officially submitted to the IAEA General Conference in September 1990. That major initiative created an incentive for nuclear-weapon States to place all their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and to establish an accounting system with the Agency to cover all nuclear material used for such activities.

62. Secondly, it was important to continue improving the IAEA safeguards mechanism in order to ensure compliance by States with their obligations under the Treaty. To that end, the Soviet Union had paid over 7 million roubles to IAEA between 1986 and 1989 to support safeguards activities, and in particular to finance scientific research by IAEA. It intended to allocate 5 million roubles in national currency for the period 1991-1992 to finance the IAEA safeguards support programme.

63. Thirdly, the non-proliferation régime represented an unprecedented complex of international confidence-building measures, contributing towards greater international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet Union had learnt a lesson from the Chernobyl disaster, which had revealed mankind's vulnerability to the destructive force of the atom; it attached vital importance to everything relating to the safety of nuclear power plants. The most important area of international co-operation under IAEA auspices was ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production. Four years after the event, the consequences of Chernobyl remained so grave that the Soviet Union could not be humanly expected to cope with them alone. Thanks were due to IAEA for the assistance it had provided. The Soviet Union, for its part, was resolved to participate in the international search for optimum methods of using the potential of nuclear energy.

64. It regarded as inalienable the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate on an equitable basis and without discrimination in international co-operation in that field. It had accordingly made a significant contribution to the development of such co-operation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in particular within the framework of IAEA. The Soviet Union's efforts were specifically concentrated on co-operation with East European countries with a view to ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production and enhancing the reliability of electric power supply, while reducing the use of fossil fuels and protecting the environment.

65. The USSR was consistenty increasing its voluntary contributions to IAEA's Technical Assistance Fund and also made large deliveries of equipment, instruments and materials to the Agency. It had recently decided to allocate for the period from 1991-1994, in addition to its main contribution, an additional sum of 2 million roubles in national currency to the Technical Assistance Fund for the purpose of implementing assistance projects for developing States parties to the NPT. It supported the idea of creating a system of guaranteed nuclear supplies on the basis of principles currently being developed within the appropriate IAEA committee, taking into account the

recommendations of the Third Review Conference, and also favoured the granting of a preferential régime to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in obtaining equipment, material and information in the nuclear sphere.

66. Fourthly, with a view to maintaining a high level of international co-operation in the non-proliferation field, the USSR was prepared to continue bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations on the strengthening of the Treaty in order to make it universal. It valued its reputation as a reliable partner in co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and complied strictly with all its commitments in that area. Legislation on nuclear activity was at present being developed in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Parliament was shortly to enact a comprehensive law on nuclear energy uses and nuclear safety, which would play an important role in the new structure of the State ruled by law now in the process of being established.

67. The political context of the Fourth Review Conference was very different from that of previous Conferences. The present stage of international development offered mankind a real prospect of guaranteed survival without the threat of mutual annihilation. The opportunity to enter upon a peaceful period founded on international law and order was historic. But the creation of such a world called for the defence of the principles of civilized relations between States in all regions of the world and for a new quality of international security structures.

68. The NPT was an indispensable means of achieving a new world order and must be strengthened as a common heritage. Its potential, far from having been fully tapped, was increasing in the post-confrontation era. The Treaty was in the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States. Only a comprehensive agreement on the non-restoration of nuclear weapons following their complete and final elimination from the life of mankind could replace it in the future. For that reason the USSR called for the convening of a single conference in 1995 covering both the review of the operation of the NPT during the period 1990-1995 and the issue of its prolongation. The present Review Conference was called upon to confirm the value of the Treaty as an effective peacemaking mechanism of modern times.

69. His delegation, for its part, was willing to co-operate constructively with all parties to the Treaty with a view to finding solutions to the important tasks before the Conference.

70. Mr. SUJKA (Poland) said that the recent historic upheavals in his country had given rise to far-reaching political, economic and social changes in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The new political situation that had resulted had revived the disarmament process and should make it possible to end the division of Europe once and for all by strengthening security and co-operation. That was also the prime objective of Polish foreign policy, in order to make Europe a genuine bastion of peace which would contribute to world prosperity.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

71. Poland remained one of the unfailing supporters of the NPT, which it considered to be the crucial element of the non-proliferation régime and the cornerstone not only of its own national security but also of peace in Europe and throughout the world. Like all the countries that had participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, it hoped that the NPT would continue to have a positive influence in the European context while remaining one of the pillars of world security.

72. Recent progress in the area of disarmament, the radical improvement in the international situation and the interest of the States parties to the NPT in the area of security and development should make it possible to strengthen the Treaty further during the present Conference, following a constructive examination of all the problems raised by its implementation. The search for common solutions should result in meaningful recommendations on the methods by which the NPT would become genuinely universal and strengthen the common resolve of all countries to make it the pillar of world security and stability beyond 1995. Poland, for its part, saw the continued operation of the NPT as vital and would make every effort to contribute to the achievement of that objective.

73. The first steps taken in the area of nuclear disarmament with the implementation of the Treaty concluded between the United States and the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces, together with the progress made in the START talks, demonstrated the desire of the two super-Powers to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT and gave reason to hope for substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear-weapons arsenals. But the world expected more from the implementation of that crucial article for the viability of the Treaty. Those signs of progress should be only a beginning, and considerable efforts were still needed in order to attain the desired tangible results. Certain urgent problems still needed to be resolved, in particular in the area of a ban on nuclear testing, testing which could only be conducive to the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals in violation of the spirit of the NPT. Although the limited measures adopted by the United States and the USSR to reduce their testing were welcome, they still fell short of the long-standing expectation of the international community that nuclear testing should be brought to a complete halt, which was a fundamental measure aimed at ending the nuclear arms race. It was therefore to be hoped that with the improvement in their relationships, the two major nuclear Powers, followed by other countries, would soon take meaningful steps towards that goal. The Conference on Disarmament should be called upon to play a role in that undertaking, with additional constructive support from the conference currently being prepared on the review of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

74. The accession of 11 more States to the NPT since the previous Review Conference further enhanced the importance of the Treaty as the arms control agreement with the greatest number of adherents, and extended its operation to areas that were vital for international security. It was to be hoped that the many States that had sent observers to the present Conference would subsequently decide to accede to the NPT. The presence of representatives of China and France, two nuclear Powers, was particularly important in that respect.

75. Other positive developments were the high-level political support given to the strengthening of the NPT non-proliferation régime and the IAEA safeguards system resulting from the Washington Summit between the United States and the USSR and that of the 12 European countries in Dublin.

76. Nevertheless, there were still causes for concern. Certain States, including some with nuclear capability, had not yet acceded to the non-proliferation régime. Today more than ever, the risk that they might gain possession of nuclear weapons must be eliminated, for the spread of such weapons to new States would destroy current prospects for nuclear disarmament, especially in view of the growing danger of the proliferation of missile-manufacturing technology. There was therefore an urgent need to strengthen the NPT among the States of the Middle East, southern Asia, southern Africa and the Americas. The current situation in some of those regions was dangerous for world stability and peace.

77. The Conference should provide an opportunity to persuade the major nuclear Powers, whose disagreements now seemed to be over, to combine their efforts in order to set up effective barriers against all risks of nuclear proliferation. As to the non-nuclear-weapon States, it was essential to give them security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft agreement submitted by Nigeria and the suggestions made by other delegations, notably that of Egypt, might serve as a basis for considering that question and making pertinent recommendations for further action - by the Conference on Disarmament, for example - in order to reach a long-awaited solution.

78. With its safeguards system, IAEA was continuing a very useful job which his country fully supported. In particular, it welcomed the fact that in its 1989 safeguards implementation report, the Agency had not detected any case of diversion of safeguarded nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for any other military purpose. It was also a matter of satisfaction that of the States parties to the NPT that conducted nuclear activities, all but one had accepted full-scope safeguards. Poland made an urgent appeal to that State rapidly to conclude a long overdue safeguards agreement with IAEA.

79. One should not, however, be misled by encouraging statistics. While 95 per cent of all fissionable material and nuclear installations in the non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards, the remaining 5 per cent were not subject to IAEA inspection, notably in India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, States with developed nuclear installations and all non-parties to the Treaty. That could not but be a source of concern.

80. His Government greatly appreciated the efforts made by the Director-General of IAEA to explore with the Governments of the Middle Eastern States the possibilities of applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear installations in the region. That would contribute substantially not only to the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime, but also to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in that extremely vulnerable region.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.2

81. In view of the importance of the IAEA safeguards system, it was essential for the entire international community, and in particular the States parties to the Treaty, to extend to the Agency their full support, both political and economic, given the growing complexity of the problems involved in implementing that system.

82. Compliance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty was of the greatest importance in safeguarding the principle of non-proliferation. For that reason, his Government expressed its concern at the increase in transfers of nuclear material, technologies and equipment without safeguards to States that were not parties to the NPT. It welcomed the appeals by the international community for strict controls on all such exports. The strict application of the safeguards would also facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

83. With regard to article IV of the Treaty, his Government wished to pay a tribute to IAEA for its activities to promote co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noted with satisfaction that, during the past five years, the Agency had substantially increased its technical co-operation with the developing States parties to the Treaty. Of course, technical assistance and co-operation could be increased still further, especially within the framework of bilateral or regional agreements, particularly in Europe, and peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field could be stepped up for the benefit of all States parties to the Treaty, but there was now no doubt that the Treaty had stood the test of time and that its implementation had made an inestimable contribution to the maintenance of international peace, security and stability.

84. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) noted with satisfaction that the trend at the end of the twentieth century was for the continuation of the disarmament process begun in 1988, when the two super-Powers had agreed to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and that there were encouraging prospects for the rapid signing of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning a 30-50 per cent reduction in their respective strategic arsenals. There was no doubt that the vigorous activity in that area was the result of international détente, but it also reflected the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty, whose existence had in the past two decades played an essential role in maintaining international security and stability. In that respect, the Conference had played an essential role in the past by providing participants in the arms race with an opportunity to meet and hold discussions at a time when East-West tension had created a diplomatic vacuum and the risks of nuclear war had been growing considerably, forcing the non-nuclear-weapon States to remind the nuclear Powers of their obligations under the Treaty. Now, the spectacular improvement in relations between the two major nuclear Powers, the easing of tensions between the two military alliances and the structural changes in Eastern Europe bore witness to the arrival of a new era characterized by the replacement of confrontation by dialogue and by the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the settlement of numerous regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Fourth Conference was taking place at a critical stage, since it was the last one before the 1995 Conference, which would be called upon to decide whether the Treaty should be extended.

85. By promptly signing the Treaty on 1 July 1968, his country had demonstrated its conviction that that international instrument was likely to strengthen international security and promote multilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had also demonstrated its trust in the nuclear-weapon States which had, as a matter of urgency, pledged to begin negotiations on ending the arms race. More than 20 years later, his delegation noted that the implementation of the Treaty had on the whole been positive, but it shared the concern of the rest of the non-aligned countries as to the occasionally discriminatory exercise of the rights and obligations of the States parties and would like to see a stronger commitment by the nuclear Powers to the international principle of non-proliferation and international co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also hoped that détente and the strengthening of confidence-building measures would lead all countries, and particularly the two nuclear Powers that were not yet members, to accede to the Treaty and make it genuinely universal.

86. He welcomed the fact that the three depositary Powers had on various occasions declared that they had met the obligations deriving from article I of the Treaty, the latest declaration having been the joint declaration made by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1990, in which the two countries had reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such declarations, like those of the other States parties that were pledging to continue to respect the Treaty, were most encouraging.

87. The IAEA safeguards system formed the basis of the international principle of non-proliferation. In that connection, the information supplied by the Agency indicating that it had concluded safeguards agreements with 82 non-nuclear-weapon States was particularly encouraging, as was the fact that no case of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of nuclear installations for military purposes had been reported.

88. Although there were grounds for satisfaction with the responsible attitude of most States, the international community could not but be concerned when it learned that one of the States parties had allegedly refused to allow one of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system. That refusal would set a dangerous precedent, in particular for the non-nuclear-weapon States. China's decision voluntarily to allow some of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system constituted an important landmark for it meant that the Agency had now concluded agreements with all the nuclear-weapon States, including those that were not parties to the Treaty.

89. Article IV on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of crucial importance for the developing countries, in particular with regard to agriculture, industry, prospecting for mineral resources, energy, medicine and research. In that connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be entitled to preferential treatment, in conformity with the provisions of article V. Such co-operation among all States parties was all the more vital because the first Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had not fully met expectations. It was also important to ensure adequate protection

of nuclear installations, not only against military attacks, but also against the consequences of the accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, as had happened at Chernobyl. The negotiations undertaken in that area within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should thus be continued and stepped up.

90. With regard to article VI, his delegation welcomed the progress made in that area by the two super-Powers and the continuation of the negotiations begun with a view to reducing their strategic arsenals by 30-50 per cent. Nevertheless, the new order of international security and peace would not be ushered in as long as the other three nuclear Powers remained outside the disarmament process. Co-operation in that area was all the more necessary because the two military alliances considered themselves no longer to be antagonists but partners in the setting-up of a new security system based on co-operation and dialogue, as proven by the progress made at the latest international conferences. In that connection, his delegation earnestly hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, re-established with the Conference on Disarmament, would benefit from the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations.

91. Concerning article VII of the Treaty, it would be recalled that as far back as 1974 his country had associated itself with the other African countries in freely and unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons in Africa; however, that continent was now facing the nuclear threat posed by South Africa. It was to be hoped that the far-reaching changes that had occurred in that country would lead to a change in the South African Government's position in that respect and would result in South Africa's acceding to the Treaty, submitting its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system and pledging to respect the denuclearization of Africa. In that connection, his delegation regretted that the consensus in the United Nations on the denuclearization of the Middle East was being thwarted by Israeli opposition. The nuclear Powers that bore particular responsibility for maintaining international peace and security must urge Israel to accede to the Treaty, and the Conference should give due attention to Egypt's recent initiative aimed at making that part of the world an area free of any weapon of mass destruction. The unreserved support for that proposal expressed by the countries of the region was a considerable advantage that should be used for the benefit of all peoples seeking peace and stability.

92. Mr. CALDERÓN (Peru) read out a statement addressed to the Conference by Mr. Alberto Fujimori, the President of the Republic of Peru. */

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*/ The full text of the statement was subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.IV/27.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6) (continued)

93. The PRESIDENT announced the following candidatures for the posts of Vice-President: for the Group of Eastern European and other States: Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Romania and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the Group of Western European and other States: Canada, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

94. The CHAIRMAN announced that Mr. Jan Chandoga (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) and Mrs. Tallawy (Egypt) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of Main Committee III, and that Mr. Plamen Grozdanov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Kongsiri (Thailand) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

95. The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, Zimbabwe had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant it observer status. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to that request.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3
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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine for observer status

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

REQUEST FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF PALESTINE FOR OBSERVER STATUS

1. The PRESIDENT said that a request had been received from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to participate in the Conference as an observer and, in accordance with rule 44.2 (b) of the rules of procedure, he recommended that the request should be granted.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5) (continued)

2. The PRESIDENT announced that the representative of Poland had been nominated to fill the remaining post of Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to the nomination.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

3. Mr. GROS ESPIELL (Uruguay), after congratulating the President on his election, said that the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be placed in the general context of disarmament, its successes and failures, of efforts to restrict and regulate the use of other weapons of mass destruction or a particularly inhuman and destructive nature, of the right of every State to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of the new criteria arising from the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. His country therefore believed that the Conference should analyse implementation of the NPT in recent years in the light of progress and frustrations in disarmament over the same period, bearing in mind the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy of every State, whether or not it was a party to the Treaty.

4. The Conference, which was taking place under the terms of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, followed a period of five particularly rich years in which the acceleration of history had made for changes hardly envisaged in 1985. Progress in disarmament, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, the new concept of security in Europe, the reunification of Germany, the current significance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the cold war were all aspects to be taken into account in considering what the Treaty was to represent for the years ahead.

5. There were now 142 parties to the Treaty, a figure which conveyed the impression that it was one of the few international instruments approaching universality. However, it was not sufficient simply to count numbers; the nuclear capacity of the countries which were not parties to the Treaty was also an important element for consideration. A matter of concern to his country was that, among those non-nuclear-weapon States which had made the greatest progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, several were not

party to the Treaty. Of the nuclear-weapon States, as defined in article IX, paragraph 3, only three were parties to the Treaty. At the same time, the considerable importance of the non-nuclear-weapon States must be borne in mind as it became evident that the technical capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons lay within the reach of a growing number of countries. Such a situation must be faced with frankness and open-mindedness. The claim that the Treaty was discriminatory and violated the principle of the equality of States before the law was not entirely devoid of significance; Uruguay did not share that view, yet recognized that it was held by States which deserved attention and respect. Of the Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba were not parties to the Treaty - an anomalous but not irrational situation, the causes and effects of which called for analysis. It had become essential to achieve a formulation by which full peaceful use of nuclear energy could be permitted, without interference or condition. Only thus could the NPT or any similar instrument become fully universal. For that reason, individual and collective dialogue between the States Parties to the Treaty and other States was essential.

6. As to articles I and II of the Treaty and the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons, was everyone absolutely convinced that such was the case and that it could be asserted that no such State had made progress towards the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons? The present situation with respect to non-party States must also be considered. The Conference must examine matters as they really stood, with a genuine wish to find a solution. Articles IV and V should be examined in the context of new realities, so that the right recognized in article IV should not be discriminatory or subordinated to limitation requirements. The same could be said for article V.

7. Was the Treaty the only possible way to combat and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Actually, it was the most important, but not the sole or exclusive, means. Non-proliferation also had its basis in other treaties - those of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga - by which nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established. Such treaties did not have the discriminatory nature which some States found in the NPT, as they drew no distinction between States Parties in relation to the prohibition on receiving, manufacturing, importing or using nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and IAEA safeguards agreements as well as unilateral and bilateral declarations represented different approaches to the common and universal objective of combating all forms of nuclear-weapon proliferation. Uruguay, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was making every effort to see that texts were adopted which would enable Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba also to become parties to that Treaty, so that the whole of Latin America might become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

8. As to Security Council resolution 255 (1968), of 19 June 1968, and the "negative" guarantee by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, there could be no doubt about the legitimacy of such a requirement on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States, yet no legally binding convention had yet been elaborated. It was for that reason that the proposal by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17) was so important.

His country supported the proposal in principle, although the text was unnecessarily complicated in structure, and hoped that in final form it might be approved and open for signature, ratification and accession by nuclear-weapon States. It should further be recalled that the "negative" guarantee was also contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were parties, and in Protocols II and III of the Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified by China and the Soviet Union.

9. The international non-proliferation régime was necessarily closely connected with the safeguards agreements provided for in the NPT, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga and of the Statutes of the IAEA. The latter organization had reported that on 31 December 1987 safeguards agreements were in force with nine non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to any of the three major treaties and which were engaged in significant nuclear activities, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. It was important to note that fact as it showed that there was a will to accept international inspections even outside the context of the three treaties. It might thus be appropriate to examine, through a genuine process of self-criticism, the substantive reason why some States were not parties to any of the three treaties.

10. Lastly, Uruguay confirmed its readiness to co-operate realistically in an integral, just and non-discriminatory manner, in activities to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It wished to see such action truly integrated into a complete head-on struggle against all forms of armament, particularly weapons of mass destruction and chemical, bacteriological, radiological and space weapons - action which respected the peaceful use of nuclear energy and guaranteed the use of modern technologies and took into account the situations of those States which, in good faith and without warlike intent, had not yet signed the NPT. Only thus, within the broader framework of international law to combat nuclear proliferation could the Treaty continue in an age so different from that in which it had come into being in 1970.

11. Mr. VAERNO (Norway) said that the Treaty was the most important multilateral agreement on disarament and arms limitations concluded so far and its successful operation was of vital importance to the world community. The Conference had an important task before it in reviewing the operation of the Treaty over the past five years and in suggesting new measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The constructive atmosphere which had prevailed during the preparatory process leading up to the Conference augured well for a successful outcome stemming from a full and fair assessment of the operation of the Treaty leading to a balanced, substantive and forward-looking final document.

12. The current review exercise was taking place in a period of revolutionary change and upheaval; East-West relations had undergone a fundamental improvement and as a result of the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe and the departure from previous policies, Europe was moving from an era of containment to an era of co-operation. Physical and political barriers had

been dismantled, the painful post-War division of Europe was being overcome, as the imminent unification of Germany demonstrated, through the CSCE process and through existing institutions such as NATO, the European Communities and the Council of Europe; and the nations of Europe were endeavouring to develop co-operative structures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of misunderstanding.

13. In no other field had the new era in East-West relations made more impact than in arms control. Major progress - the INF Treaty and the Stockholm Document - had already been made and more significant achievements were within reach. The prospects of an early START Treaty, providing for sizeable reductions in strategic nuclear weapons were promising and it was to be hoped that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would be successfully concluded in the near future. In Vienna, the end-game in the negotiations on conventional forces was about to begin and his country was confident that, given the necessary political will, the major issues that remained outstanding could be sorted out in time for the first CFE treaty to be signed at the CSCE summit in November 1990. Together with a meaningful package on confidence- and security-building measures, such a CFE agreement could dramatically improve security and stability in Europe by eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations and would help consolidate the recent political changes and serve as a barrier against any attempt to re-establish the previous status quo. Such an agreement would also pave the way for significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals in Europe and new negotiations could be started on the reduction of Soviet and United States short-range nuclear forces. In addition, at the July summit in London, the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that they intended, in response to reciprocal action on the part of the Soviet Union, to eliminate all the Alliance's nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

14. However, events in the Gulf were casting a shadow over the positive developments in East-West relations and in the arms control field. The situation was aggravated by the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction and the crisis could be solved only by full adherence to the recent unanimous Security Council resolutions.

15. The issues before the Conference were global in nature. Concerted action by all countries was required to solve the problems facing them. In that context he reiterated his country's unequivocal support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its willingness to participate in all constructive efforts towards a strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. To illustrate its priorities, Norway, together with the other Nordic countries had submitted a memorandum (NPT/CONF.IV/18) listing a set of objectives and measures which they considered important. They had stated universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its obligations as the best way of achieving the Treaty's primary goals. It was therefore a most positive development that 141 countries were now parties to it.

16. The increasing number of adherents to the Treaty did not give grounds for complacency. As everyone was aware, some members of the world community, both

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3

nuclear and non-nuclear, had not yet become Parties. Some of them were on record as pursuing a policy in accordance with the basic principles of the Treaty. Others, however, continued to state their reservations about the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime. That some of the non-Party States were present as observers at the Conference was an encouraging sign.

17. In considering compliance with articles I, II and III, the Conference would be reminded that the danger of proliferation was a very real one. The development of nuclear technology and the spread of technological knowledge and of nuclear installations to different parts of the world had meant that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had acquired the scientific and technological basis for developing nuclear-weapon programmes. It could thus be assumed that the number of States with a nuclear potential was greater than was openly acknowledged. Furthermore, a number of countries had, or could acquire, a reasonably effective nuclear delivery capability. The spread of such capabilities was of great concern to the world at large. Those issues should be adequately addressed at the present review.

18. Some non-Party States with substantial nuclear programmes seemed to feel that they were best served by keeping the nuclear option open. Such an approach was likely to create uncertainty and to exercise a negative influence on regional stability. A stabilizing and confidence-building effect would be achieved if the countries concerned at least concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA for all their nuclear facilities. But the situation also underlined the importance of continued efforts in support of universal adherence to the Treaty. His Government was convinced that no country's interest was served by pursuing a policy in favour of a nuclear-weapon capability.

19. The objectives of ending the nuclear arms race and implementing effective measures for nuclear disarmament were a major and integral part of the Treaty. It was gratifying to note that considerable progress had taken place during the period under review and that the prospects for further advances were good. In that connection, he referred in particular to the agreement on basic provisions of the START Treaty achieved at the United States-Soviet summit in June 1990. He also noted with satisfaction that the two parties were to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically to achieve a more stable strategic balance after the Treaty was completed. The signing of verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty opened the way for the ratification of those instruments and thus represented a step towards a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing.

20. A total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions remained an important objective. His country was convinced that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was an essential pre-condition for effectively halting the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it was a positive development that the Conference on Disarmament had in July 1990 finally reached agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In accordance with that mandate, the Committee had, as a first step, initiated substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues,

including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban had to be seen in conjunction with efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it was worth noting that the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that, upon the total withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Europe and the implementation of a CFE agreement, they were prepared to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. In its London declaration the Alliance had made it clear that, in the new Europe, nuclear forces would only be weapons of last resort.

21. Norway was also very concerned about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing, especially in vulnerable environments, and regarded those risks as an additional reason for discontinuing all test explosions. An effective verification system was of the utmost importance in any international arms control and disarmament agreement. In a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, international co-operation in the exchange and analysis of seismic data would be one of the main prerequisites for adequate monitoring of compliance. His country had consistently supported the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament to develop a global seismological system to assist in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and considered that the outstanding problems of verification could be solved.

22. The Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty was to take place at the beginning of 1991. Norway would be participating in it and thought that one of the main objectives should be to give impetus to work being done on the test ban issue within the Conference on Disarmament.

23. The subject of negative security assurances had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for many years, and successive resolutions had also been adopted by the General Assembly. There was a patent need for an agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, little progress had been made on that issue in the past few years. Negative security assurances involved questions relating to the fundamental security of States. Given the wide range of security concerns and the variety of means available for dealing with them, it was difficult to arrive at a decision on a single common formula. Nigeria's proposal (NPT/CONF.IV/17) for an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should, in his delegation's view, be discussed in the light of the development of the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States.

24. An effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for expanded international co-operation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA safeguards played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. However, the international safeguards régime needed to be further strengthened in order to develop measures to ensure a predictable long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Norway was concerned that a number of countries, including some with substantial nuclear programmes, had not yet concluded the

required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. That fact, together with disturbing reports of activities in some non-nuclear-weapon States, underlined the paramount importance of giving the IAEA the opportunity to verify the compliance of every non-nuclear-weapon State Party with its obligation not to divert peaceful nuclear material and equipment to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. That could be done only when all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as stipulated by the Treaty. His Government regarded as a positive development the fact that all nuclear-weapon States accepted limited voluntary IAEA safeguards on some of their civil nuclear facilities. Adequate safeguards were indeed one of the significant challenges facing the present non-proliferation régime. Effective strengthening of the régime implied that emerging nuclear suppliers and nuclear threshold countries had to be included in existing or new international export arrangements.

25. His Government continued to attach great importance to the obligations deriving from the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime as it existed at present, and considered that the application of full-scope safeguards by the recipient country should be a minimum condition for allowing export. Norway practised such control and was actively engaged in international co-operation towards making it effective. Lastly, he hoped that the present review exercise would lay firm foundations for an indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

26. Mr. VITALONE (Italy) said that the Conference was opening at a time when the international community, faced with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was threatened by events of unprecedented gravity and danger. The intolerable annexation of a free, sovereign State by another member of the United Nations, which as such was required to respect the sovereignty and independence of others, Iraq's brutal military aggression against Kuwait, were unacceptable to the international community, which had categorically condemned the invasion. International legality should now be restored by ensuring full observance of United Nations resolutions and putting an immediate end to a situation which represented a flagrant violation of human rights.

27. Against such a background, the overwhelming importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was self-evident. The Treaty's status as the principal multilateral instrument in the field of arms control was reflected by the fact that over 140 States had acceded to it in the desire not only to prevent a recurrence of the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also to contain the possibility of generalized conflict. Recent developments in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe had radically transformed the international scene, so that the Second World War and the ensuing cold war could be said to have come definitively to an end. In that connection he referred in particular to the London declaration of the NATO countries, as well as to the conclusion of the INF agreement and the agreements concerning the reduction by one-half of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers. He also stressed the importance of the adoption of verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the ongoing Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of the forthcoming Paris

summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Italian Government, in its capacity as current President of the European Community, was actively engaged in all those endeavours.

28. While it represented an enormous improvement over the cold war era, the present situation was not, however, without its attendant dangers. In the first place, the process of East-West détente was accompanied by a potentially explosive growth of national ambitions. Such a development, especially in areas traditionally beset by regional conflicts, could be a threat to international peace and regional stability. In that connection, he wished again to refer to the situation in the Gulf, on which Italy unconditionally shared the position of the other EEC countries. A second danger inherent in the international situation lay in the contrasting economic and demographic circumstances of different parts of the world. A third danger, dramatically evidenced by the problem of international drug trafficking, was related to the economic and social fields. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be seen against that background. His Government took the view that the efficacy of the Treaty should be safeguarded and improved in the interests of all - even in the presence of intolerable events such as those now taking place - through meticulous observance of its provisions and strict fulfilment of its objectives. Italy would make every effort to ensure that the Conference succeeded in laying the foundations for the decisive Conference of 1995 with a view to further consolidating the non-proliferation régime.

29. Participation in the IAEA safeguards system should represent an indispensable addition to adherence to the Treaty, particularly in the case of countries which, like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had signed the Treaty and possessed nuclear installations of some importance. At the same time, everything should be done to optimize that system of international control, which had already produced highly positive results and constituted a most useful example for other arms control agreements.

30. A number of States had acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference. It was to be hoped that others would follow, so that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons might become a truly universal objective. It was important that doubts in connection with nuclear programmes pursued by certain States should be dispelled and that agreements facilitating the effective performance of the IAEA's inspection functions should be generalized.

31. Gradual growth of co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy undoubtedly formed an essential element of the system established under the non-proliferation régime. Since the previous Conference, prospects of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy had been profoundly shaken by the Chernobyl accident which had tragically brought out the crucial importance of nuclear safety arrangements. Italy was actively involved in international efforts in that field and was convinced that safety considerations should occupy a position of priority in all new technological research. In particular, it was determined to contribute towards the IAEA programme of verification of the safety of nuclear facilities in

Eastern Europe, to support all initiatives aimed at improving safety standards at nuclear power stations, and to encourage the dissemination of research on a new generation of fail-safe reactors.

32. Direct co-operation on ensuring maximum safety of nuclear facilities must begin by applying the types of technical assistance provided for in article IV. The IAEA agreements on the general procedures and mechanisms for meeting emergency situations must also be enhanced. Inspection missions undertaken at nuclear facilities by the Agency at the request of the States concerned must be stepped up. Consideration must be given to reconverting for peaceful uses the nuclear material used in the military sector. That meant not only reducing the overall quantity of fissionable material but also verifying whether such material had actually been reconverted, something which would thus prevent it from being diverted. One proposal, first put forward by Italy in 1967, would be to harness the fissionable material recovered from nuclear warheads scrapped by the super-Powers for peaceful uses in the least developed countries.

33. Italy had made a tangible contribution to the IAEA's technical assistance activities. A number of projects in agriculture and medicine had been of particular importance in improving the quality of life. Furthermore, Italy made regular financial contributions, amounting to $US 68 million in the past five years, to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, in Trieste, run jointly by the IAEA and UNESCO. With regard to international security and disarmament, an area in which the Treaty had its main impact, progress could still be made on a comprehensive test ban, negative assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the creation of denuclearized zones. Multilateral negotiations must also be pursued to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.

34. The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was to maintain and strengthen an efficient international nuclear non-proliferation régime, which other countries must be encouraged to join. The past five years showed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had produced positive results.

35. Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the Conference should serve as an occasion to reaffirm the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in maintaining peace and security. With more than 140 States Parties, the NPT was the most widely accepted agreement in the history of international arms control. Japan was pleased that observers had been sent by two nuclear-weapon States not parties to the NPT régime, France and China and it was also encouraged by the smooth implementation of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union and by the progress made in recent START negotiations towards reaching mutually acceptable solutions on major issues.

36. Nuclear energy currently generated 17 per cent of the world's electricity, a share that was on the increase, for its value as an energy source which did not produce carbon dioxide had attracted increased attention. Clearly, the NPT was functioning well as a basic framework for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation had doubts, however, about the NPT régime's success in preventing the development and

possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also a matter of major concern for many countries that some States Parties still failed to fulfil their obligations under the NPT to conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA for their nuclear facilities.

37. Japan had been undertaking various diplomatic steps to ensure the universality of the NPT. Appeals had been made to a number of non-Parties to join the Treaty. It was to be hoped that China and France would accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Until such time, Japan appealed to those two countries to continue to abide by the spirit of the NPT. It was gratifying that, at the Houston Economic Summit in July 1990, a joint statement on proliferation had been issued and all participants, including France, had supported a broad-ranging agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. Japan also called upon those non-nuclear-weapon States with major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to join the NPT régime as soon as possible. In the meantime, they must take concrete action to accept full-scope safeguards, thereby dispelling any suspicion regarding their motivations for not joining the NPT régime.

38. As to the export of nuclear-related equipment and materials to non-nuclear-weapon States, Japan had strict regulations for issuing export licences only when the recipient country adhered to the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards under the IAEA. It was to be hoped that other exporting countries would implement equally strict regulations.

39. Although nuclear-weapon States were not required to accept IAEA safeguards under the NPT régime, they should be on an equal footing with non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan therefore welcomed the conclusion in 1989 of the safeguards agreement between China and the IAEA, following the example of other nuclear-weapon States. Clearly, IAEA safeguards should be applied to nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

40. Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT must accept the full-scope safeguards applied to all nuclear activities on their territory. Since that comprehensive safeguards system lay at the core of the non-proliferation régime, the need for further technical and institutional improvement to ensure efficient implementation could not be over-emphasized. In view of the increase in both number and size of nuclear facilities throughout the world, and bearing in mind the financial constraints on the IAEA, efforts must be pursued to improve the cost-effectiveness of the safeguards procedures. The severe financial constraints placed upon a number of States Parties made it wise to begin streamlining the inspection activities by developing simplified safeguard methods. The established procedures for safeguards and inspections should be reviewed, with a view to enhancing the work of the system. The IAEA safeguards system had functioned smoothly for many years and could serve as a valuable example in developing a verification system for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

41. Japan was determined to continue to extend co-operation to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, yet at the same time work

towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that context, it greatly valued the important role played by the IAEA. His country placed emphasis on multilateral co-operation through the IAEA, and had increased its contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1990 to $5,120,000, or 11.27 per cent of the total, a figure that represented an increase of 193 per cent compared with that of five years earlier. Using its advanced technology in the nuclear field, Japan had been playing a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of regional co-operation programmes. Despite increasingly severe budgetary constraints, it would continue to contribute as much as possible towards expanding multilateral co-operation through the IAEA. Japan intended to enhance its bilateral co-operation with developing countries through technical and research co-operation activities. Such co-operation would be carried out only with those countries that had acceded to the NPT and had accepted the full-scope safeguards agreement.

42. At the Third Review Conference, his delegation had stressed the need for appropriate nuclear disarmament efforts by nuclear-weapon States, and Japan greatly appreciated the efforts made by those countries in the past five years. In particular, it hoped that the recent signing of the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty would pave the way for ratification of the two test-ban treaties at an early date. Japan was encouraged by the inclusion in the two protocols of provisions for verification through the hydrodynamic method, the seismological method and on-site inspections, and it hoped that the combined use of such techniques would help resolve the complex technical problems related to nuclear test-ban verification. His delegation urged the United States and the Soviet Union to draw upon the experience gained through the implementation of the two treaties to prepare the ground for the next stage of negotiations in the test-ban field as soon as possible.

43. Further nuclear disarmament could be achieved only if efforts were also made towards conventional arms control, for example, by removing the imbalance in conventional forces. His Government therefore welcomed the endeavours by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries to reach an agreement on the reduction on conventional forces in Europe.

44. The Conference on Disarmament was an eminently suitable forum for considering the issue of a nuclear test ban. The Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee, currently chaired by Japan, had a number of important items before it, such as the political and security implications of the continuance or discontinuance of nuclear tests, the modalities of a test ban to take into account such implications and technical problems relating to verification. In his opinion, the Conference on Disarmament had taken a significant step forward by initiating substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. A step-by-step approach was the most realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban. His delegation hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee would be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

45. Obviously, some countries might still have reservations about strengthening the NPT régime, but a reluctance to accede to the Treaty and a reluctance to abide by its obligations by some States Parties because of the discriminatory nature of the NPT régime or because other countries failed to fulfil their obligations would delay the realization of the NPT's goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT should be viewed as part of a dynamic process aimed at an ultimate objective rather than as a static collection of obligatory norms. Failure of the NPT régime would have serious consequences for international peace and security. Japan supported the NPT régime because of its unique role, its intrinsic discriminatory character notwithstanding. It was to be hoped that the international community also shared that view and would continue its efforts to strengthen the régime. Japan was convinced that the Conference would be a useful occasion for enhancing the requisite co-operation.

46. Mr. MacKAY (New Zealand) said it was particularly fitting that the Conference should be presided over by a citizen of a country which was a party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The task of the Conference involved a backward look over the five years since 1985 to see how the NPT had been fulfilled and also, implicitly, a look forward at what more could be done. It was also an occasion to look again at the bargain struck between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States in 1968 and see how the bargain was being kept.

47. The past five years had seen many positive developments: reduced tension in Europe, progress made in some areas of arms control and the fact that the NPT had gained greater support than ever before. The Treaty and its non-proliferation goal, had also been enhanced in other ways. At the time of the 1985 Review Conference, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone had just been established by the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty was now in force and there were 11 States Parties. It established a nuclear-free zone which bordered on that created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that established by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Thus, a large part of the southern hemisphere had declared its determination to be free of nuclear weapons.

48. The Treaty of Rarotonga was intended to complement the NPT and specifically referred to article VII of the NPT in the preamble. It required the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities by the Parties. Like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it also provided for a system of special - or challenge - inspections in the event of a suspected breach. The Treaty had protocols open to signature by the five nuclear-weapon States and China and the Soviet Union had signed them. The United States and the United Kingdom had affirmed that their actions were compatible with the protocols and his Government hoped that they would be able to transform those statements into a formal commitment by signing the protocols. It was a matter of deep concern for New Zealand that one nuclear-weapon State, France, continued to test nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. His delegation welcomed the presence of both France and China as observers at the Conference and hoped that, in the light of recent

developments in arms control, France would decide to act in keeping with the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, in accordance with the wishes of the peoples of the South Pacific.

49. New Zealand, faithful to its undertakings under the Treaty of Rarotonga and the NPT, would never acquire nuclear weapons and such weapons had no part to play in its defence policies. In 1987, those principles were firmly embodied in legislation which established New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone. The law prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons to New Zealand and the provisions of the NPT were explicitly incorporated into the country's legislation.

50. In the five years since the previous Review Conference, there had been unprecedented progress in nuclear disarmament as between the major Powers. The conclusion of the INF treaty had eliminated a whole category of weapons, agreement on significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons was close and there were grounds for optimism with regard to short-range nuclear forces. Welcome developments in the conventional area had also had an impact upon the nuclear arms race. The chemical weapons agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the progress towards an agreement on conventional forces in Europe showed a new willingness to achieve concrete and major disarmament measures.

51. The level of nuclear weapons, however, continued to be unacceptable and would remain so once all the agreements in prospect were completed. One arms control measure - specifically referred to in the preamble to the NPT - was a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, and little progress had been made in that regard. A comprehensive test ban was an essential and urgent step towards ending horizontal and vertical proliferation. That view had received overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations. As pointed out by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control: "Any nuclear test, by any nation, for whatever expressed purpose, is deeply offensive to New Zealand. Each new weapons system begets another. Each new test weakens the moral strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and increases the chances that another country will blast its way into the nuclear weapons club". The recent commencement of discussions on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on Disarmament was to be welcomed but it did not involve the commencement of negotiations. Even with that limited mandate, one of the nuclear-weapon States - which was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty - would not participate. His delegation believed it essential for the Conference on Disarmament to remain seized of the issue of nuclear testing.

52. Securing universal adherence to, and ensuring full compliance with, the NPT constituted vital goals for all countries, since all of them benefited from the Treaty and not only the States Parties. The Treaty would, however, be immeasurably strengthened if every country became a party. In particular, membership by all nuclear-weapon States would lend even greater authority to the Treaty and to the norm of non-proliferation.

53. With or without universal adherence, however, non-proliferation could be effective only if States Parties complied scrupulously with their

obligations. In particular, it was essential that mandatory safeguard agreements should be entered into in accordance with the clear requirements of the NPT. Instances of non-compliance were of the greatest concern to New Zealand, all the more so when the country concerned had significant nuclear activities. Only through the effective application of safeguards could the international community have confidence that the most fundamental of the obligations under the NPT was being met.

54. New Zealand fully supported efforts to strengthen the safeguards régime still further. It would like to see all nuclear-weapon States extend their voluntary offers to include all their peaceful nuclear facilities. It also strongly supported full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

55. It was important for all States Parties to have confidence that their security was enhanced by the NPT, something that was reflected in the search for a legally binding common formula on negative security assurances. His delegation shared the hope that the positive changes in the international scene would bring that possibility much closer.

56. Within the past five years the world had been given a stark - and appallingly tragic - reminder of the consequences of the atom unleashed. At the same time it had been reminded of the value of the Treaty. In the next five years, efforts should be made to strengthen commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in all its forms. For New Zealand, that objective remained vital.

57. Mr. OGADA (Kenya) said that the NPT continued to be cherished by many States 20 years after its entry into force, as was eloquently reflected by the fact that the Treaty now had more than 140 Parties and there were indications that the number would rise. The NPT continued to be a popular international document because the danger posed to international peace and security by the existence of nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of such weapons, had not diminished. That danger remained as long as nuclear weapons existed in the arsenals of some States and as long as a few other States gave hints that they sought to acquire or develop such destructive weapons. In the changing international political situation, the NPT had become more relevant than ever before. At a time when political and ideological divisions were dissolving, the potential for fulfilment of all the rights and obligations established by the Treaty had increased.

58. It was a fact that the Treaty had delineated two categories of States Parties: those States which possessed nuclear weapons and those which did not possess such weapons, with each category of States assuming different rights and obligations.

59. In his delegation's opinion, which was undoubtedly shared by many others, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to maintain international peace and stability, it had prevented the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had observed the undertaking not to facilitate the emergence of other nuclear-weapon States. It was important to note that no

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3

other nuclear-weapon State had clearly come into existence since the NPT had entered into force. The nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT had, in declarations made in various international forums, committed themselves to the purposes and objectives of the NPT, and their actions, which were not legally constrained, had bolstered efforts to promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT had provided an opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce legally their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons. Such renunciation by a majority of non-nuclear-weapon States was a direct contribution to the security and stability of the world and a strong rejection of weapons of mass destruction.

60. Again, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it did not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or international co-operation in such uses.

61. The Treaty sought to prohibit not only horizontal proliferation but also vertical proliferation. Article VI of the Treaty still remained to be totally fulfilled. Two of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued to be engaged in bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations that had already culminated in the destruction of a whole category of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, those weapons continued to exist in the arsenals of a few States. The negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons should encompass all those States which possessed such weapons. The world could not be safe until all nuclear weapons, wherever they existed, were effectively and verifiably destroyed. The banning of all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time was long overdue. Under the present favourable international circumstances, there was no justification for the continuation of those tests.

62. The NPT had not limited the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones in their regions. The establishment of such zones had strengthened efforts against proliferation. It would be an important step if all nuclear weapon States were legally to recognize those zones in international treaties and lend their support to all efforts aimed at creating them in various parts of the world. In Africa, the legal recognition of such a zone would be most welcome.

63. Since non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had given up their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons, it was essential to give them credible guarantees, in a legally binding international instrument, that they would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, the most effective guarantee for the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States would be total elimination and destruction of all nuclear weapons.

64. At the Second and Third Review Conferences criticisms had been levelled against the NPT and would no doubt be levelled again on the present occasion and prior to the 1995 Conference to decide whether the Treaty was to continue in force indefinitely or to be extended for an additional fixed period. The inequalities inherent in the NPT with regard to the rights and obligations of the States Parties had largely contributed to some States choosing to remain outside the Treaty. Any process that could lead to such States joining the

NPT would be commendable. In the perspective of 1995, his Government was in favour of extending the NPT until its main objective, namely the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both vertically and horizontally, was completely fulfilled.

65. Political problems required political solutions and not military solutions. The faulty logic of regarding nuclear weapons as instruments to achieve political aims would only encourage other States to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons did not offer security; they offered total destruction. Total elimination of those weapons would discourage others from desiring to acquire them.

66. The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to rule 19 of the rules of procedure, he would give the floor to the representative of Iraq to exercise the right of reply.

67. Mr. AL-KOTAL (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Italy had referred in his statement to the legality of recent events in the Middle East and to what that representative had called certain "humanitarian" aspects. Actually, it was perfectly clear that those events fell within the competence of other international bodies and any mention of them was out of place at the present Review Conference on the operation of the NPT.

68. There was one point, however, arising out of the Italian representative's remarks which was indeed relevant to the present proceedings and it was one to which that representative had deliberately omitted any reference. It was the negative repercussion on the purposes of the NPT of the presence in the Gulf of warships with nuclear weapons on board. That situation seriously affected the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region. An illegal blockade had been imposed on Iraq with the aim of starving its 18 million inhabitants, thereby turning the Iraqi people into hostages.

69. The selective approach of the Italian delegation was clear. He wished to know what Italy had done when Israel had invaded Lebanon, part of whose territory Israel still occupied. He also wished to know what Italy had done over the period of more than 20 years in which Israel had been in occupation of Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Facts such as the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel were being ignored. Resort was being had to military measures in which Italy was participating; measures that would make it impossible for a peaceful solution to be reached to the Arab problem. Such a solution was the sole responsibility of the Arabs themselves and could not be the subject of bargaining or of foreign interference. Lastly, it was his hope that the Italian statement would not have any adverse repercussions on the Conference and on the NPT itself.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4
16 November 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

General debate (continued)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

1. The PRESIDENT said that Algeria and the United Arab Emirates had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant them Observer status. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved that request.

It was so decided.

2. The PRESIDENT said that nominations for the posts of Vice-President for the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States had been submitted by Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mexico, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those nominations.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

3. Mrs. von GRUNIGEN (Switzerland) noted with satisfaction that new States had acceded to the Treaty since 1985 and that the number of participants in the Review Conferences was steadily growing. In particular, she welcomed the presence for the first time of observers for the two nuclear-weapon Powers that were not yet parties to the Treaty, namely, the People's Republic of China and France. It was hoped that they would accede to the Treaty rapidly.

4. Since 1985, the situation had evolved positively in certain regions of the world, especially owing to the unprecedented improvement in East-West relations, which had reduced the risk of nuclear war and was making it possible to negotiate important arms control agreements. Détente had also brought about rapid political changes in several European countries, which was also helping to decrease the risk of armed conflict. Nevertheless, although positive that evolution involved certain dangers. First of all, certain States that no longer enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-weapon Power might well be tempted to acquire their own nuclear defence capability. New international security systems should be developed to provide for such a possibility. Second, the opening-up of the markets of the Eastern European countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should not have the effect of diminishing interest in the countries of the third world, whose needs for assistance remained the same and whose situation, as shown by recent events, remained precarious. The international non-proliferation system should therefore be adapted to a changing international situation, and the Treaty might possibly be supplemented by other instruments.

5. Regarding the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, her delegation welcomed the substantial progress made in recent years by the two super-Powers in the area of arms reduction, especially in Europe. The signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987 represented unprecedented progress in the area of arms control, since the Treaty provided for genuine reduction of both States' potential nuclear capabilities, together with an entirely new verification system, which might

serve as a precedent for the elimination of other military imbalances. However, the INF Treaty should be followed by other agreements on conventional and chemical weapons. It seemed that an agreement on conventional forces in Europe might be concluded before the next Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Her delegation hoped that the negotiations on a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would produce a new agreement in 1990, and, like most States, it considered that the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was essential for guaranteeing compliance with the commitments made under article VI of the Treaty.

6. Her delegation also welcomed the signature by the two super-Powers of the verification protocols, which had enabled the United States Senate to ratify the two bilateral treaties of the 1970s on the limitation of nuclear testing. It also felt that the Conference on Disarmament could play a useful role in negotiating an instrument on a nuclear test ban, which was why it was participating actively in the work of the Conference.

7. It was important to avoid a situation where certain States, in view of the lack of formal guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States, would come to the conclusion that they could ensure their security only by creating a nuclear force. It was true that the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers provided some guarantees, but they did not have the weight of a treaty. On the other hand, a multilateral treaty might give rise to reservations by certain parties, which was why the negative security assurances proposal seemed to have been made at an appropriate time. However, that proposal raised some technical problems since it presupposed the conclusion of a multilateral agreement linked to the Treaty, while the Conference was not empowered to negotiate such an instrument.

8. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a positive role in the process of reducing military arsenals, from both the psychological and political points of view. However, given the great mobility and range of the vectors, the establishment of such zones did not necessarily offer absolute safeguards at the military level.

9. Although the information received indicated that the provisions of article I of the Treaty had not been violated, it must be acknowledged that new dangers were threatening the effectiveness of the current system. For the first time, States parties to the Treaty had reportedly attempted secretly to obtain equipment that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which was all the more disturbing because one of the States in question had already employed other weapons of mass destruction, was in possession of missiles with a considerable range and had not hesitated to attack neighbouring countries. The proliferation of missiles, which was a new development, was therefore particularly dangerous in the case of States possessing weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the fact that certain parties to the Treaty had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the stipulated time was particularly alarming, especially when the States in question were using nuclear facilities that were not subject to control and making their signature conditional on demands for which the Treaty made no provision.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

10. Her delegation welcomed the fact that three non-party States, namely, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, had apparently abandoned any intention of pursuing their military nuclear programmes, and it hoped that those countries would rapidly become parties to the Treaty. It had the same hope with regard to Israel, India and Pakistan, whose uncontrolled nuclear facilities continued to be a source of very serious concern to the international community as a whole.

11. With regard to article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, the fact that even a depositary State had recenty delivered major nuclear facilities to a State that was not a party to the Treaty without requiring those facilities to be placed under the control of the Agency proved that unanimous agreement did not exist on the question of safeguards. A policy of refusal to deliver nuclear material or restrictions on its delivery might in certain cases lead the States concerned to take the path of uncontrolled autarky. Switzerland, for its part, had not recently had to take a decision on such a delivery to a non-nuclear-weapon State that was not a party to the Treaty. However, if such a case were to arise, it might consider requiring all nuclear facilities in the receiving country to be placed under international safeguards.

12. The system of safeguards under IAEA control had proved to be effective for the past 20 years or so, but it seemed that the Agency, whose budget was also subject to the zero-growth principle, would not be able to cope with its increasingly heavy inspection work-load in future. Since few countries were prepared to increase their financial contribution to that sector of the Agency's activities, it might be useful to consider a different conception of the system itself, without calling into question the effectiveness and credibility of the non-proliferation régime. The Conference might look into that question of principle, while respecting the Agency's decision-making autonomy in that area.

13. Concerning article IV of the Treaty, she said that the Swiss Government intended to keep the nuclear option open so that Switzerland could have access to an adequate energy supply as well as for ecological reasons. Since the political, economic and social impact of the accident at the Chernobyl power station had raised doubts about the future of the nuclear option, international co-operation on the technological safety of nuclear facilities was more necessary than ever. In addition, since the costs of a new nuclear programme had become prohibitive for most of the developing countries, it had to be acknowledged that, for a large number of States, the exercise of the rights set forth in article IV remained theoretical.

14. The basic objectives of the Treaty had always given rise to animated discussion, namely, whether priority should be given to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the development of nuclear energy in the countries of the third world or action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In her delegation's opinion, the Treaty, signed by each of the parties in the interest of a common cause, should be considered as a whole, the goal being to attain all the objectives it set forth. In the long term, however, purely technical measures such as the implementation of IAEA safeguards were not sufficient to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, and all States would have to show all the political will necessary to work towards that goal. In fact, many States now openly recognized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would threaten their own security and thus that it was in their own interest to respect the provisions of the Treaty.

15. Finally, in her delegation's opinion, it was not for the Fourth Review Conference to look into the question of extending the Treaty in 1995, for in conformity with article X of the Treaty, extension would be considered at a special conference to be held in 1995. The organization of that conference might be entrusted to a preparatory committee that could meet in 1993.

16. Mr. WALDEGRAVE (United Kingdom) noted that the Conference was taking place at a time when the divisions between East and West were dissolving, but when there were great tensions in other areas of the world, especially in the Gulf. The illegal annexation of Kuwait was putting the whole fabric of law to the test. In that connection, his delegation associated itself with the remarks made by the Italian delegation about the treatment of innocent civilians, including a large number of United Kingdom citizens.

17. Since 1986, the last four States that had signed but not ratified the Treaty had finally deposited their instruments of ratification, and five more States - Malawi, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar - had acceded. His delegation also welcomed the fact that the two nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty, China and France, were attending the Conference for the first time as observers.

18. The assurance which the Treaty gave enhanced the security of all the States parties and of the whole world, but the threat of poliferation remained very real, which was why all States should be called on to accede to the Treaty as the principal international instrument in that area. The Treaty also constituted an important foundation for the international system of safeguards operated by IAEA, which made possible the peaceful use of atomic energy, in conformity with article IV. In that connection his delegation did not believe that a distinction should be made between the Agency's promotional and safeguarding activities; it fully acknowledged the importance of the Agency's role in both areas. The United Kingdom, for its part, had steadily been increasing its contribution to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund as well as its financial contribution to the projects specifically aimed at helping NPT developing member States.

19. Turning to the question of compliance with the obligations incumbent on States parties to the Treaty, he said that the nuclear-weapon States had a special obligation to ensure that they did not in any way, even inadvertently, contribute to the development of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon State. In that connection, the United Kingdom continued to work together with other nuclear supplier States to define exactly what was entailed by the obligations contained in article III and was scrupulous in complying with export regulations in that area.

20. He acknowledged that the United Kingdom did discriminate: in favour of parties to the Treaty and in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

His country was prepared to join a consensus of other major suppliers to insist on full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States.

21. Nuclear-weapon States were not required by the Treaty to accept safeguards on their civil nuclear activities. However, it was recognized that some safeguarding was desirable, and the Third Review Conference had recommended the universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. Although his delegation had some hesitation about the priority that should be given to that question, he wished to make it clear that the United Kingdom reported fully to IAEA on all civil nuclear material and authorized the Agency to designate for inspection any civil nuclear installation on the country's facilities list. All United Kingdom civil nuclear activities were inspected by EURATOM.

22. Concerning the implementation of article VI, he welcomed the progress made since 1985. East-West tensions had been reduced, and the threat of global nuclear war had receded. At the previous month's NATO summit meeting in London, the member States had proposed to the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration solemnly stating that they were no longer adversaries and reaffirming their intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

23. With regard to nuclear disarmament, he congratulated the United States and the Soviet Union on the INF Treaty, which had come into force in 1988, and on the progress achieved in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The two States had also reached agreement on verification protocols for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The United Kingdom would respect the new régime for nuclear testing established by those Treaties, but it would have to continue to conduct underground tests to ensure that its nuclear weapons remained effective and safe. A comprehensive test-ban treaty remained a long-term goal. The number of land-based nuclear warheads in Europe had also declined significantly as a result of NATO's unilateral withdrawal of some 2,400 weapons since 1979.

24. The Alliance had agreed that, shortly after the signature of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, negotiations should begin between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces. The Alliance had also proposed that, once those negotiations had begun, they should eliminate all nuclear artillery shells in Europe in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. That having been said, the ultimate objective of article VI was a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. There, too, some satisfactory results had been recorded. The period since 1985 had seen agreement on a series of far-reaching measures to promote confidence and stability in Europe and rapid progress towards the reduction of conventional forces, and there had been progress towards a global ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom had played an important role in the negotiations in those areas and would continue to do so,

and it called on all the States represented at the Conference to join it in working to promote the further easing of tensions, the strengthening of trust and international peace and security.

25. Regarding the implementation of the Treaty by other States parties, he said his delegation was extremely concerned. It noted, first of all, that a considerable number of States parties to the Treaty had not fulfilled their obligation under article III, paragraph 4, to negotiate a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Some of those States had significant nuclear facilities on their territory. For example, North Korea had deposited its instrument of accession in December 1985 and had still not concluded a safeguards agreement. There were other States which had concluded safeguards agreements but whose behaviour gave cause for concern. There was also the question of clandestine procurement. Clandestine procurement of sensitive items inevitably aroused suspicions about the intentions of the States concerned. To combat such activities, exports of nuclear products must be monitored. Moreover, under article 73 of its Statute, the Agency could propose additional inspections, and under article 77 it could obtain access to information or locations in addition to that specified in the agreement. Finally, under article 19, if the Board of Governors found that the Agency was unable to verify that nuclear material was indeed being used for peaceful purposes, it could take a number of steps described in the Agency's Statute. Those provisions might be used if there were grounds for suspicion that any State party to the Treaty was accumulating unsafeguarded nuclear material.

26. If all States parties could pledge to comply with their obligations and guard against any actions that were contrary to the Treaty, they would be contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty. As for States not parties to the Treaty, the United Kingdom urged them to accede to it. It addressed that call particularly to India and Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, all States that had significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It also invited all the other non-parties to accede to the Treaty.

27. Finally, he asked delegations to keep two goals in mind: first, to concentrate on the real tasks of the Conference, and second, to send a signal to the world that the Treaty was in good shape and that all the States parties supported its noble objectives.

28. Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia) said that the Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the NPT provided an opportunity for a sober assessment of the Treaty's implementation. His delegation hoped that the Conference, which was taking place in an atmosphere characterized by improved relations in various regions of the world and the progress made by the United States and the Soviet Union in the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, would become a landmark on the road to the total cessation of the nuclear arms race, horizontal as well as vertical. The Treaty would be credible only if its three cardinal principles, namely, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were respected. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would furnish an opportunity of enhancing that credibility.

29. Turning to an evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty, he said that the three nuclear-weapon States parties had observed the provisions of article I but had not been able fully to implement the provisions of the eighth to eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI. Since the Treaty's entry into force, progress towards halting the nuclear arms race and vertical proliferation had been meagre. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, for their part, had fully discharged their obligations under article II. Indonesia believed that the factors that had led to the inability of States parties fully to implement the Treaty's provisions should be reviewed regularly to enhance its credibility. The United States and the Soviet Union had concluded agreements aimed at halting the arms race, but that was insufficient. His delegation was of the view that the most decisive measure to halt the nuclear arms race was a total ban on nuclear testing. Moreover, under the provisions of article VI, all parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Thus the Treaty should not be considered merely as an instrument to encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. Indonesia was also worried by the fact that the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons was being accompanied by improvements in the quality, accuracy and reliability of nuclear weapon systems. With regard to nuclear disarmament, an assessment of the position also revealed a certain degree of dissatisfaction. It was true that the INF Treaty had initiated a reduction in nuclear arsenals. However, even a 30 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would still leave them with arsenals far exceeding those they had had in 1970, which was contrary to the spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

30. Turning to the implementation of article III, he noted with satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards system had effectively served the goal of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the system had been operating under the principle of a "zero growth" budget, and Indonesia believed that that might jeopardize its effectiveness. It was only just that the contributions of the nuclear-weapon States or the most advanced nuclear States should continuously be increased and that the Agency should not use budgetary restrictions as a pretext to lessen safeguard coverage. The Government of Indonesia was also concerned by the growing demands of the heavily safeguarded industrial countries to limit the safeguards system operating in their nuclear facilities. Any relaxation of present standards would seriously erode the effectiveness of the system. Placing the civilian nuclear facilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on an equal footing would certainly help to encourage transparency, which was a crucial element in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, during the mid-1980s nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily submitted their civilian nuclear

facilities to the safeguards system. But that was insufficient: the system should be in operation in all civilian nuclear facilities and fuel cycles in all countries.

31. Since the last Review Conference, efforts had been made and concrete measures taken to implement article IV, and particularly paragraph 2. However, there was much more to be done if the developing countries parties to the Treaty were fully to enjoy all its benefits. It should be noted that, instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, some States parties continued to give assistance in the nuclear field to States that were not parties, thus applying discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States parties to the Treaty. The implementation of article IV in the last few years had been affected to a great extent by the world-wide slow-down in the growth of civilian nuclear power owing to environmental, safety and economic factors. In addition, after a series of serious nuclear accidents, efforts had been made to maximize safety in nuclear power plants. Since the cost of modern nuclear power plants with new safety features was very high, many developing countries encountered problems in financing them. For that reason, he fully supported the statement made by the representative of the non-aligned and neutral States which called upon States parties that were in a position to do so to expand their assistance through IAEA and to promote favourable financing by international institutions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

32. Regarding the implementation of article VII, Indonesia had always emphasized the importance of the regional approach to peace and security, in particular through the establishment of zones of peace or nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Indonesian Government believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, based on decisions freely arrived at by the States of the region, would promote peace, stability and security in the areas concerned and curb the spread of nuclear weapons. At their summit meeting in December 1987, the ASEAN States had emphasized that ASEAN should intensify its efforts aimed at the early establishment of south-east Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Despite the strong determination of the countries in the region, the ASEAN nations had encountered insurmountable obstacles. His delegation therefore repeated its earnest call to all parties to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

33. The question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States that had undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons had always been one of the central issues in the debates on non-proliferation. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fourth session also indicated the urgency of having an international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indonesia was convinced that the most effective way to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should give an unconditional guarantee not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances to

non-nuclear-weapon States were one of the incentives nuclear-weapon States could provide in exchange for the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States not to produce, acquire or possess nuclear weapons. Indonesia supported a number of concrete proposals tabled during the preparations for the Conference.

34. The Fourth Review Conference was a crucial one. In view of the 1995 Conference, it could not afford to fail. It should therefore reaffirm the need to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty, and the parties should reaffirm their commitment to its purposes; but that was not sufficient. The Conference must spell out the measures to be taken, particularly by the parties that had not implemented the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia would continue to demand a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used or held out as threats against non-nuclear countries. Indonesia also requested that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be accorded greater assistance in the development of their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

35. Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) said it was gratifying that representatives of the international community were gathered at Geneva for the fourth time to review the 1968 NPT. The fact that the number of participating countries, member States and observers had grown was a sign of the continuing confidence in the Treaty. The NPT had proved to be a corner-stone of international stability and had performed its function of fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proving that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were fully compatible with the goal of non-proliferation. In that connection, the European Council, meeting at Dublin, and the economic summit at Houston had emphasized the need to make every effort to contribute to strengthening non-proliferation and encouraging the participation of further countries. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, had expressed its unconditional support for all initiatives aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It had undertaken to contribute actively to the successful outcome of the Fourth Review Conference and had appealed to all countries to make joint efforts to avert the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

36. Considerable progress had been made in the five years since the last Review Conference in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. A new political setting had emerged in recent years, characterized by the following: Europe was at a turning-point in history; the elimination of ideological confrontation had paved the way for eliminating military confrontation and reducing military arsenals; parallel to reductions of armaments, new co-operative security structures were emerging; and German unification was proving to be a pace-maker for the coalescence of Europe. Democracy and a social market economy, co-operation and an awareness of interdependence characterized the new Europe as it headed for a pan-European peaceful order.

37. The NPT was a central instrument for the maintenance of international peace, and the Federal Republic of Germany therefore advocated the long-term extension of the Treaty beyond 1995. It had consistently pursued an effective

policy of non-proliferation and the comprehensive renunciation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus it had renounced nuclear weapons on acceding to the Western European Union in 1954, introduced a system of extensive controls for the use of nuclear energy in the European Atomic Energy Community founded in 1957, joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 and acceded to the NPT in 1975, thus confirming at a global level its renunciation of nuclear weapons.

38. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system and made every effort to increase their effectiveness. Strict compliance with the international nuclear suppliers group guidelines was an essential element of German non-proliferation policy. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had adopted more stringent foreign trade regulations to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and encourage international co-operation in the civilian use of nuclear energy. Above all, that meant that exports of nuclear goods to non-NPT countries would in principle be authorized only if those countries subjected all source and special fissionable materials to IAEA full-scope safeguards. In addition, it had been decided to codify principles of German nuclear export policy that were already being observed. Efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must not overlook missile technology. The Federal Government strongly supported all activities designed to make the missile technology control régime established in 1987 more effective. It called upon all countries to do the same.

39. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took export controls very seriously, despite the fact that military exports had accounted for only 0.2 per cent of the Federal Republic's total exports in 1989, and it had adopted some very severe and restrictive export control measures to avert the danger of proliferation of militarily-usable technology and to prevent illegal arms exports. However, the best contribution to nulcear non-proliferation was accession by all countries to the NPT, and the Federal Republic therefore appealed once more to all countries that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

40. He welcomed regional efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such efforts were an important contribution to maintaining regional stability - the Tlatelolco Treaty being a good example.

41. As long as the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States for guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons remained legitimate. The strengthening of negative security assurances could have a positive impact on the universality of the Treaty.

42. The NPT was not intended merely to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. It combined the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the commitment to disarmament and arms control. Since its accession to the Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany had emphasized the commitment to nuclear disarmament contained in article VI, and it had strengthened its commitment since the last Review Conference. It had accordingly played a

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

significant part in bringing about the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, which provided for the world-wide elimination of an entire category of weapons, and it had strongly supported the START negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which aimed at reducing their strategic nuclear weapon systems. It welcomed the negotiations on confidence-building and security measures and the Geneva negotiations on defensive and space weapons.

43. Further nuclear disarmament was necessary and indeed possible. The changed security situation in Europe would permit less and less reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose of preventing war. In that connection, he mentioned the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, which would be started soon after the signing of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The signing of the verification protocols to the threshold Treaties at the United States-Soviet summit in Washington would constitute a further stage along the road to a ban on nuclear tests.

44. The Federal Republic of Germany advocated agreement on an effectively verifiable nuclear test ban as soon as possible within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It also advocated a step-by-step approach to that goal, like that taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations on nuclear test matters. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Federal Republic of Germany focused on developing, together with other countries, reliable verification procedures for nuclear explosions. It welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The Conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty, scheduled for January 1991, reflected the serious endeavour of many countries to achieve faster progress on that question.

45. The NPT applied not only to nuclear disarmament but to all kinds of weapons. All military equipment must be reduced. That was the goal of the arms control negotiations taking place in Vienna. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe were aimed at establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and at eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. That goal, which was now within reach, would establish a qualitatively new basis for peace and security in Europe by the end of 1990 and oblige participating countries to destroy thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and other military equipment.

46. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarded the reallocation of arms resources to peaceful purposes as a major new international challenge. That question had recently been the subject of a United Nations Conference in Moscow. The aim was to limit the arms production potential and at the same time to create capacity for industrial development that would benefit all countries.

47. Further progress in arms control was needed, not only in Europe but also world-wide, and weapons exports to third world countries should be reduced. The third world must not become a dump for weapons no longer needed in

Europe. The proliferation of chemical weapons in those countries would be particularly tragic. The conclusion of a world-wide, comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons was long overdue. Only a convention of that nature, containing effective verification rules, could reliably and lastingly prevent the spread of such weapons. The events of the past few weeks had made it clear that there was an urgent need for world-wide agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as solemly reaffirmed by the vast majority of the international community at the Paris Conference in January 1989. The United States and the Soviet Union had already reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. Like its Western partners, the Federal Republic of Germany had stated that it intended to be one of the original signatories of the world-wide chemical weapons convention and appealed to all countries to do the same.

48. The international community was experiencing a period of new opportunities and new challenges, for the East-West conflict was now a thing of the past. The new development of the relationship between the two super-Powers made the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations ever more effective, as illustrated by the successful efforts made in southern Africa and Central America. However, the positive changes in Europe and other regions did not automatically lead to world peace. Iraq's aggression had confronted the world and hence the United Nations with a new crucial test. The United Nations had demonstrated its firmness on that question by adopting various resolutions which very clearly indicated that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security. Iraq must withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. As long as it refused to do so, it was essential for all countries jointly to implement the economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 661. Every effort must be made to contribute to a peaceful solution on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

49. More than ever before the world must seek peaceful solutions to its conflicts. The Charter of the United Nations and the institution of confidence-building measures were essential components of the peace process.

50. Soon there would be only one German State. That development illustrated the end of the cold war and of the antagonism and political rivalry that had divided East and West for over 40 years. After the achievement of unity, the German nation would face the task of eliminating the consequences of long-standing divisions in the political, economic and social spheres. But unification would also stimulate the united Germany to devote even greater efforts to global problems whose solution no longer brooked any delay. It would also make every effort to achieve the unity of Europe as a whole.

51. The united Germany's commitment to deep cuts in its forces would serve as an example of how swords were turned into ploughshares. Disarmament and arms control policy would be a central element of the peace policy pursued by a united Germany. In that spirit, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic had decided to make a joint declaration before the representatives of the international community.

52. The two Governments reaffirmed their contractual and unilateral undertaking not to manufacture, possess or have control over nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. They declared that the united Germany, too, would abide by that obligation. Rights and obligations under the instruments of the NPT would continue to apply to the United Germany, which would seek the continued validity of the Treaty beyond 1995. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the united Germany would strive for a comprehensive, world-wide and verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible date, and it intended to be one of the original signatories of the convention.

53. The international community was at a particularly critical but promising threshold in the final decade of the second millennium. It must be crossed jointly with a firm dedication to peaceful co-operation and international solidarity. The participants in the Conference were called upon to conduct joint efforts to enhance the authority and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

54. Mr. DOMKE (German Democratic Republic) referred to the joint declaration of the Governments of the two German States on the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons which showed that the two Governments were agreed that the united Germany would act in a constructive spirit for comprehensive disarmament and for the promotion of international peace. It would be appropriate for those principles of renunciation to become embodied in the future Constitution of the united Germany, and he noted that the recent talks between President Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Kohl had reaffirmed the hope that a nuclear-weapon-free territory would emerge in the very place where the highest density of nuclear weapons was still to be found.

55. The recent changes in the German Democratic Republic, German unification and the democratization of Eastern Europe had paved the way for pan-European security and co-operation structures. The positive developments that had taken place in Europe and in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States offered an unprecedented opportunity to reduce nuclear arsenals and to meet the obligations incumbent on States possessing nuclear weapons under article VI of the NPT. That would make peace more secure and considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons.

56. The events taking place in the Middle East showed how fragile peace was. It would take efforts on all sides to settle that conflict, which illustrated once again the crucial importance of the NPT. In that context, there was an urgent need for the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons.

57. The NPT made an important contribution to both universal and regional security. It promoted both international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. Although non-proliferation had come to be an established norm of international law, the Treaty was by no means perfect. However, he appealed to all delegations to leave aside the Treaty's weaknesses to seek consensus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It was encouraging to note that further States had

acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and that China and France were attending the Conference as observers. He hoped that those and other States would consider acceding to the Treaty.

58. Looking back over the period under review, he said that the basic commitments contained in articles I and II of the Treaty had been observed. But times had changed and there was a need to strengthen existing international rules against the proliferation of those weapons. Efforts must be made to prevent the spread of ballistic means of delivery and of certain components for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

59. While the non-proliferation régime could hinder the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the long run the question could be solved only by political means, by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and by nuclear disarmament. That relationship was reflected in article VI of the NPT and had also inspired the joint non-proliferation statement made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their Washington summit. The implementation of the INF Treaty, the envisaged signing of a START agreement between the United States and the USSR by the end of the year, and the beginning of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons were the next steps in the nuclear disarmament process. No nuclear-weapon State should remain aloof from that process.

60. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remained a matter of priority. The progress recently achieved in Soviet-American negotiations should be continued by further bilateral measures to reduce such tests quickly in number and yield. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was a positive step. The Conference to amend the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 was an expression of the world-wide interest in the early cessation of all test explosions.

61. Regional measures such as nuclear-weapon-free zones effectively complemented the NPT. The Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga should therefore be followed by further agreements establishing such zones. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty rightly expected guarantees of their security. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons would enhance the security of those States. Major steps in that direction had been the unilateral statements of the USSR and China on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. The current review of the security concepts of the nuclear-weapon States and of the alliances opened up new prospects in that area.

62. The IAEA safeguards system was an essential guarantee for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The IAEA's inspectorate was making an important contribution to the effective implementation of the NPT. Modern nuclear technologies made novel demands on safeguards. The German Democratic Republic was certain that the future Germany would support IAEA in the further development of its safeguards system. What was also needed was the conclusion of safeguards agreements between IAEA and the States parties to the NPT, in particular those with significant nuclear activities.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

63. The experience gathered from the well-functioning system of verification constituted by IAEA safeguards should be taken into account in future arms limitation and disarmament accords, especially regarding the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The German Democratic Republic supported the proposal to separate military from civilian nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, measures to control the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies continued to be of great importance. The German Democratic Republic endorsed the decisions recently taken by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.

64. The NPT and its safeguards system had created the necessary basis of trust for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA, which had proved its competence, should continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries through its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme.

65. The German Democratic Republic, which had learned the lessons of Chernobyl, was convinced of the need for the renunciation of nuclear energy as the primary source of energy in the long-term future, and it used nuclear energy to produce only 10 per cent of the electric power it needed. The bulk of its energy was derived from lignite processing with all its ecologically harmful consequences. The 5.2 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide and 2.2 million tonnes of dust discharged into the atmosphere in his country annually explained why nuclear energy, in the short and medium term, would remain part and parcel of German energy policy until it was possible to reduce the environmentally harmful effects of conventional electric power generation. In the area of nuclear energy use, top priority was given to nuclear safety and radiation protection. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Federal Republic and with the services of Soviet and French experts, had submitted all its power reactors in operation or under construction to a thorough safety evaluation, which had resulted in the shutting-down of some nuclear power reactors.

66. In conclusion, he recalled that, in the weeks to come, the Conference would have to set the course for the extension of the NPT in 1995. That would require co-operation from all sides, as Egypt had suggested in its proposal on an international dialogue on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference would best live up to the expectations placed in it if it adopted a comprehensive final document calling, in particular, for further nuclear arms limitation and disarmament measures, achieving the universality of the NPT, promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference should not merely strengthen the Treaty but also make an important contribution to world-wide security.

67. Mr. PERPIÑÁ-ROBERT (Spain) said that the Conference was opening at a time when mankind, which had begun to believe in a new and hopeful way in peace, freedom and common ideals in many countries, had been harshly brought back to reality. Facing the spectre of war, injustice and violence, Spain wished to make a new appeal in favour of peace and international legality on the basis

of strict compliance with recent Security Council resolutions on the current crisis. In that context, he associated himself with the statement made at the previous meeting by the Under-Secretary of State of Italy.

68. In becoming a signatory of the NPT on 5 November 1987, Spain had encapsuled in a legal framework the strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation that its Government, aware of its own security requirements and of the changes needed to ensure collective security in the world, had applied until then. A climate of trust among States must be created through the reformulation of doctrines and military strategies in order for them not to have war as their goal, but the avoidance of war. Coherent disarmament processes endowed with adequate verification mechanisms would allow for the creation of balances of forces at lower levels, on an unrelinquishable security threshold. The benefits of disarmament would be reflected in development and people's welfare, by which the disarmament-development-security trilogy would acquire its full significance.

69. Spain's current non-proliferation policy remained based on the NPT, which it continued to consider not as a point of arrival but as a corner-stone on which a safer world could be built, based on confidence, co-operation and mutual respect among all States, as Spain had declared on acceding to the Treaty.

70. At a time when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were making rapid progress towards freedom and democracy, which would lead to the strengthening of peace and security, nuclear non-proliferation was a challenge to be met by all mankind. The gradual disappearance of East-West tensions had opened up new prospects for the nuclear non-proliferation policy and for disarmament.

71. The NPT was an essential instrument for achieving two indissociable objectives: the control of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international co-operation. With regard to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, national measures, whether bilateral or multilateral, of a technical, commercial or even military nature, were no substitute for the willing consent given by potential donors and recipients of nuclear technology, based on the conviction that the proliferation and multiplication of nuclear weapons did not contribute to national security but had the opposite effect. For Spain, however, the promotion of international co-operation and technology transfer for peaceful uses of nuclear energy was just as vital in order for the Treaty to attain the necessary credibility and to be universally applied.

72. A system should be conceived at the Conference, as well as in other United Nations bodies, that respected countries' legitimate interests, so that those who so wished might have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

73. Although it was not perfect, the NPT had served to achieve the purposes for which it had been devised. It should be mentioned that at the previous Review Conference, in 1985, 132 countries had renewed their support for the

Treaty, thereby strengthening it politically. Since then, the accession of nine new member States, including Spain, had underscored its vitality and universal nature.

74. Although observance of the Treaty since 1985 could be deemed satisfactory, there were still important areas in which improvements must be made. In the past few years, and very recently, there had been serious cause for concern in territories where tensions had increased. Strict compliance with the safeguards provided for under article III of the Treaty was more necessary than ever, together with the signing by those States which had not yet done so of safeguard agreements with IAEA, as they had undertaken to do when they had entered into the Treaty.

75. In that connection, IAEA with its safeguards system was a major factor for non-proliferation and must play a leading role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, Spain attached enormous importance to IAEA's activities in the field of technical co-operation for peaceful purposes. Its role must therefore be strengthened and its efforts given maximum support by all countries.

76. The observance of articles IV and V of the Treaty was vital in order to attract new signatories and to strengthen the NPT's credibility with a view to extending it in 1995.

77. Spain also attached great importance to compliance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty which was intended to put an end to the arms race and to advance towards nuclear disarmament. In that connection the Government of Spain welcomed the conclusion of the INF Treaty which for the first time in history eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons, and it unreservedly supported the rapid conclusion of a START treaty, which would provide for the elimination of 50 per cent of the super-Powers' strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the agreement in principle recently concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union in that respect. He was convinced that the conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty, the advances in the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and prospects for immediate negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons based in Europe would have a considerable impact on the work of the Conference.

78. Nuclear testing should gradually be reduced, with a view, when the time came, to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which were weapons of mass destruction par excellence. The international community appeared to be willing to move in that direction. The best ally of the disarmament process was a realistic, and therefore gradual, approach. If the necessary joint efforts were made to reduce nuclear weapons until they had been completely eliminated, a total ban on nuclear testing would be achieved as a matter of course. In that way transformation of the partial test-ban Treaty, which was a legitimate cause of concern for many countries, would be carried out.

79. Another pillar of Spain's non-proliferation policy was control of the technology likely to be used for the manufacture of missiles, especially those that could be fitted with nuclear warheads.

80. Recent regional conflicts that had taken place in different areas of the world, and the use in some cases of weapons of mass destruction with indiscriminate effects, had shown the need for the international community to take steps to prevent such things from happening again. Co-operating with a group of countries that had also expressed concern at the proliferation of missiles with multiple capacities, Spain had in 1989 joined the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR) set up in 1987 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada. The régime, which did not hamper technology transfer for peaceful uses, was an irreplaceable instrument for preventing the proliferation of missiles. The Government of Spain was satisfied with the operation of those control mechanisms and hoped that a growing number of countries would join; in its view the MTCR was an adequate instrument for completing a rigorous nuclear non-proliferation policy.

81. Discussions would also focus on the problem of the renewal of the Treaty, which would be decided at the 1995 Conference. Neither article X nor any weighty reason whatsoever militated in favour of ending the NPT. In five years, when the States parties were called upon to decide how to extend the Treaty, a fresh review of the status of nuclear proliferation would probably reveal compelling reasons to extend an instrument whose usefulness had been amply demonstrated. A large number of organizational aspects would have to be taken into consideration at the present Conference and up to 1995, but that should be done without casting any doubt on the need for maintaining the Treaty in force. For the Government of Spain, 1995 would be the year not of the Treaty's expiry, but of its extension by the Conference for an indefinite period or for the longest possible period.

82. The survival of mankind depended on the rational use of the new force represented by nuclear energy, and its possible non-peaceful use was a grave concern for which the international community must find an adequate solution. The continuation of nuclear disarmament, improvement of the Treaty control mechanisms and safeguards and better systems of transfer and co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were reasons for which the Spanish Government would like to see the NPT not only maintained, but also strengthened and enlarged. The accession of new parties with a view to making the Treaty universal would be desirable. His delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to ensure the success of the Fourth Review Conference, which would also mean success for all peace-loving countries.

83. Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not taking part in the East European or Western groups, said that the NPT was a legally binding multilateral instrument that had confirmed the urgency of putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Its full implementation was an important step towards nuclear disarmament, world peace and regional security. Yet implementation was not an end in itself, since the aim of the Treaty was also to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The number of signatory countries had increased significantly since the Treaty's entry into force, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had established

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.4

an international norm of non-acquisition and non-possession of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty.

84. Recent political developments further underscored the importance of strict and faithful compliance with the NPT in its entirety. It had become evident that the enhancement of peace and international security could be achieved by political means and through the widest possible international co-operation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Attempts to justify nuclear deterrence and the nuclear arms race ran contrary to those positive developments and the spirit of the NPT.

85. Although they recognized the positive elements and effects brought about by recent agreements and ongoing negotiations in the nuclear disarmament field, the countries he represented regretted that the modernization and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States continued contrary to the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. As for horizontal proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons capability among certain States not parties to the NPT posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation régime and underlined the gravity of the problem.

86. In the circumstances, the non-aligned and other States parties underlined the importance of the basic goals of and the commitments undertaken under the NPT towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, namely, to avert the danger of nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples; to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race by taking effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and hence to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear testing for all time by undertaking negotiations to that end without further delay; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, finally, to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their vectors.

87. The possibility of a significant extension of the NPT would be enhanced by the effective implementation of the Treaty by 1995 and in particular that of the obligations relating to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it was urgent to take the necessary steps to consolidate the effectiveness of the NPT by reaffirming its authority, and to ensure its universality and the implementation of its provisions, especially by the depository States. Such steps included instituting an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; fully supporting the PTBT amendment Conference and undertaking full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee established in 1990 by the Conference on Disarmament; starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on items 2 and 3 of its agenda with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States; declaring an immediate moratorium on and an immediate cessation of production of

weapons-grade fissionable material and, finally, beginning immediate negotiations within the context of the NPT with a view to the early conclusion of a legally binding multilateral instrument of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

88. At the same time, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear-weapon States should be stopped and the nuclear weapons already deployed there withdrawn, existing agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be respected and regional efforts aimed at establishing such zones supported; negotiations with a view to the further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their vectors should be intensified, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; the arms race in outer space should be prevented and immediate negotiations undertaken to that end and the commitment not to supply with nuclear-weapons-related material, technology and services the States not parties to the Treaty which had nuclear facilities not safeguarded by IAEA should be strictly respected.

89. For the non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty, peaceful nuclear co-operation including technology transfer was a commitment laid down in article IV of the NPT, and they regretted the unsatisfactory realization of that commitment and the many unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties. They believed that those States parties that were in a position to do so should promote co-operation between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; reaffirm their acceptance that all States parties were entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information and to contribute to the further development of applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the right of all States parties to participate in it; enhance the role of IAEA and provide better assistance through IAEA to developing countries, and favourable financing by international institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology applications. The States parties to the NPT should also provide adequate IAEA funding for both its assistance and safeguards functions. In addition, they should offer economic incentives to the developing countries parties to the NPT, not only in respect of nuclear energy but also other energy sources and accord special attention to the least developed countries. Finally, they should give priority to the NPT member developing countries in nuclear energy applications to food and agriculture, health, industry, physical and chemical sciences, nuclear safety, etc.

90. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs.

91. Finally, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

92. Mr. MADHOUR (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the United Kingdom had referred to the illegal annexation of Kuwait and certain aspects of the Gulf crisis. However, reflection on the events of recent days or even those of the past century led to the conclusion that the problems raised in the Gulf, as in other regions, were the result of British colonialism. The peoples that had suffered from it in the past were aware of the nature of the relations that the United Kingdom had allowed to persist in the colonial countries after having been forced to leave them when they became liberated. The United Kingdom's colonial history in Kuwait and its establishment of dispersed entities whose purpose was to continue to divide the region were primarily responsible for that situation. The United Kingdom was not a policeman responsible for restoring order and enforcing international law, which it persisted in violating daily by its military presence in the Gulf. The embargo that had been imposed to starve the populations of those countries was in itself a breach of international law. The Gulf problem could only be solved after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and other foreign forces from the region; that course of action offered the sole possibility of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in those countries.

93. He also reminded the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that the Security Council resolutions in question had been adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and that their implementation in no way required the use of armed force. The military measures that had been taken had absolutely no justification under international law.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5
30 August 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5TH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Ms. MASON (Canada)

CONTENTS

Request by Oman for observer status

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

REQUEST BY OMAN FOR OBSERVER STATUS

1. The PRESIDENT said that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received a request by Oman for observer status. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant the request.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

2. Mr. KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (Denmark) said that, with its world-wide support and more than 140 States Parties, the NPT was the most successful multilateral agreement in the disarmament and arms limitation field. It had a unique position in the matter of nuclear arms control, because its subject was the nuclear weapon itself and because it covered not only East and West but also North and South aspects. It was, however, a matter for concern that some nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-capable States continued to remain outside the NPT. His delegation urged them to accede to it as soon as possible in order to make it a fully global treaty.

3. The NPT had been successful in fulfilling its primary goal of non-proliferation. Since its entry into force, no non-nuclear-weapon State Party had changed status with regard to nuclear weapons. At the same time, the possibility that some non-nuclear-weapons States had acquired, or were trying to acquire, nuclear weapon capabilities posed a threat to the non-proliferation régime and, together with the spread of missile technology, a potential danger to international peace and security.

4. His delegation had hoped that the Conference would meet in an international climate characterized by a high degree of optimism, brought about by the very positive developments in East-West relations. Recent developments elsewhere, however, had cast a deep shadow over the world political situation. He hoped that the Conference could nevertheless be conducted in a constructive atmosphere and that its outcome would make an important contribution to achieving the NPT's three main goals: to avert the spread of nuclear weapons, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. There had been promising developments in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament called for under article VI of the NPT. Remarkable progress had been achieved in the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union with the conclusion of the INF treaty and the declared intention of both States to conclude a START treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms - a development very much in the spirit of the NPT. Those important first steps should be followed by further substantial cuts in the nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate aim of completely eliminating nuclear weapons. Again, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty would be a very effective measure in support of the purposes of the NPT and would make it more attractive for

non-Parties to accede to it. Denmark had consistently supported the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban on all nuclear tests in all environments by all States and for all time. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for multilateral negotiations on that issue and he welcomed the agreement it had reached on a mandate for the *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Another multilateral effort in the same field was the convening in January 1991 of an Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

6. In the bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the Soviet Union, the agreement on the verification of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and on the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty had expanded the area of verification procedures. He urged the two parties to continue their negotiations aiming at substantial constraints on nuclear testing, with the final objective of a comprehensive test ban. The establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones also helped to strengthen the concept of non-proliferation, and another very important measure would be effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

7. The NPT had formed the basis for international nuclear trade as well as international co-operation in peaceful uses of atomic energy under the IAEA. The IAEA full-scope safeguards system was a crucial element in the non-proliferation régime and his delegation would urge all States which had not yet done so to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The obligation for Parties to the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement under article III was unequivocal. The final objective must be that all civil nuclear facilities in the world should become subject to the IAEA safeguards. In view of the progress in nuclear technology and the substantial increase in nuclear material on a world-wide basis, the continued effectiveness and credibility of the IAEA safeguards had to be ensured.

8. The strong commitment of the five Nordic countries to further strengthening the non-proliferation régime had been reflected in a number of initiatives during the years in relation to the NPT. A memorandum stating their views had been issued as an official document of the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/18). Moreover, earlier in 1990, the Nordic Governments had approached all non-NPT Parties appealing to the Governments concerned to accede to the NPT without delay. In a declaration issued in June 1990 by the European Council, the Member States of the European Community had stressed the great importance they attached to the maintenance of an effective international nuclear non-proliferation régime and their determination to work actively to secure a successful outcome for the present Review Conference.

9. Since the NPT helped to assure the security of all nations, both Parties and non-Parties, the world was a safer place. It was therefore vital for the Treaty to remain in force and for the 1995 Conference to decide that it should continue to be operative indefinitely. A positive outcome to the present Review Conference would further strengthen the NPT up to 1995 when the crucial decision would be made.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5

10. The Conference should strive to make a complete and balanced review of the implementation of the NPT over the past five years. It should also consider means to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime and the implementation of the NPT. Above all, it should reaffirm the support of the Parties for the NPT and stress the contribution it made to international and regional security and stability. The goal should be to produce a final document that was constructive and offered a relevant and significant contribution to future international nuclear non-proliferation efforts within the framework of the NPT.

11. Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) said that seldom had the world begun a year in such a hopeful mood as in 1990, but equally seldom had the dangers been more apparent as the result of regional conflict. Advances in democracy, human rights and arms control were not limited to Europe but were also visible elsewhere. A world free of aggression and violence was coming a step closer, but the events of the past few weeks had shown how remote that goal was and, at the same time, how well the Charter of the United Nations could work when political unanimity in the Security Council was sustained.

12. The aim of the Parties to the NPT was to avert the danger of a nuclear war as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT had been the result of a growing awareness that the greater the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of those weapons being used. There could be no doubt that regional conflicts would become far more serious if the non-proliferation policy was less scrupulously followed. The NPT had effectively promoted international stability and thereby fulfilled one of its principal objectives.

13. The NPT had also been of crucial importance as the major post-war multilateral arms control agreement. It had strengthened the belief that the spread of nuclear weapons could not be allowed to go unchecked. The preamble noted the intention of the Parties "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" and article VI reflected that same undertaking. In the past five years considerable progress had been made in the field of arms control and more tangible results could be expected in the near future. Important agreements had been reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on major outstanding issues in that connection. There had also been considerable advances in regional and world-wide disarmament over the past five years and the negotiations in Vienna on conventional stability in Europe could be expected to lead to an agreement within a few months. The discussions on a treaty on chemical weapons had reached an advanced stage. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, one of the aims of the NPT, still seemed rather remote, but there was some indication of movement in the right direction. After years of stagnation, some progress had been achieved on the subject of nuclear-weapon testing and discussion on that item had been resumed in the Conference on Disarmament. It was important that the number and yield of nuclear tests should be reduced to a minimum level, thereby offering the prospect of a comprehensive test ban at the appropriate moment.

14. Together with Hungary and Sweden, the Netherlands had submitted a working paper on the subject of a "Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities" (NPT/CONF.IV/22), in the hope that it would lead to enhanced awareness of the issue in question. That awareness should be expressed in the final document of the present Review Conference.

15. While arms control served the security of the Parties well, the issue could be looked at in a broader context. A few years previously, nuclear-weapon States had issued assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Those welcome assurances were still valid. The discussion on security assurances towards non-nuclear-weapon States would certainly be influenced by the recent political and military developments. His country supported efforts to arrive at appropriate effective international arrangements on that matter.

16. His delegation looked forward to decisive progress in arms control and an overall reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it was fully aware of the dangers which could affect the NPT. There were still some 20 non-party States, including some which had the capacity to make nuclear weapons. The success of the NPT would depend on the willingness of threshold States and other States outside the NPT to accede to it, or at least to comply with its provisions. He appealed to all those States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so.

17. Another danger arose from within: the Treaty obliged non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to refrain from any activity which might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The system of safeguards set up to verify that obligation, however, applied only to "source or special fissionable material". Other materials and equipment, even those which were essential for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, did not fall under that system and, unfortunately, there has been attempts to acquire such material and equipment. The Conference could not ignore that fundamental issue, and should, in addition, make it clear that Parties must not assist non-nuclear-weapon States in any possible way to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should refrain from providing such assistance. Countries exporting nuclear technology had a special responsibility in that regard. His country's policy was that exports of nuclear material to non-Parties to the NPT, as well as specially designed or prepared equipment, were allowed only if all nuclear activities in the recipient State were under IAEA safeguards.

18. Yet another danger arose from the fact that not all signatory States had complied with the obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within two years of accession. As recognized in the European Council's declaration on nuclear proliferation, in June 1990, IAEA safeguards were the corner-stone of an effective non-proliferation régime.

19. The NPT established a close connecton between non-proliferation, arms control and co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In recent years, co-operation had taken many different forms, both within the framework of the IAEA and outside it. In that connection, the IAEA had submitted a

background paper on its activities relevant to article IV of the NPT (NPT/CONF.IV/13). It was important that such co-operation should be further developed over the coming years. The global energy supply, in which nuclear energy played a role, required co-operation, and safe use of nuclear energy also called for fresh initiatives involving international co-operation.

20. In 1995, the States Parties would have to decide for how long they wished the Treaty to be extended, thus giving an implicit indication of the value they attached to the NPT. The forthcoming discussions in the present Conference would set the course for the review, and the extension of the NPT, which it was to be hoped would take place in a single conference in 1995.

21. It should be stressed that the NPT had proved its value by making a significant and indispensable contribution to international stability. There was no real alternative which could command the support of important nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. While what had been achieved gave cause for satisfaction, it was essential to continue the work on the task set by the NPT, namely a further strengthening of the international norm against proliferation. The next five years might well be decisive in that regard.

22. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) said that his Government regarded the NPT as irreplaceable: it was a corner-stone of security for everyone, whether or not a State Party, and it was also the foundation for international nuclear trade and for the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

23. Finland welcomed the fact that, since the previous Conference in 1985, awareness of the indispensability of the NPT had grown. It was pleased to see China and France participate as observers for the first time and hoped that those two States would soon accede to the NPT. As stated in their memorandum (NPT/CONF.IV/18), the Nordic Governments were convinced that universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations were the best approach to achieving the goals of the NPT, namely to avert the spread of nuclear weapons, to eliminate and reduce nuclear weapons, and to promote international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

24. The period under review had seen a fundamental change for the better in East-West relations and the danger of global nuclear war was at its lowest level ever. The changing role of nuclear weapons in military strategy was even more important in the long run than reductions in numbers and types of nuclear weapons. With the crumbling of East-West confrontation, it had become possible to reduce nuclear forces to a minimum. In Europe, a process was under way whereby the adversaries of yesterday were becoming tomorrow's partners in security. For Finland, a European neutral, that development was a source of profound satisfaction.

25. The present crisis in the Gulf area underlined the importance of effective barriers against the spread and use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and it also testified to the urgency of a total ban on nuclear weapons. In Finland's view, the basic obligations of non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices, as embodied in articles I and II of the NPT, had been complied with. The letter of the NPT had been observed but there was reason for concern as to the spirit. Article I might not dictate, but it certainly implied, unflagging and consistent efforts by nuclear-weapon States to deny potential proliferators any assistance and to persuade them to cease all suspect activities.

26. A grave danger to international peace and security persisted inasmuch as some non-nuclear-weapon States might have already acquired or be actively pursuing nuclear-weapon capability; such danger was particularly acute in regions where tensions were already running high. Where there were doubts, States should make known their situation and become Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The acceptance of safeguards in accordance with article III gave effect and expression to the fundamental commitment by each non-nuclear-weapon State Party under article II. Prompt conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA was a sine qua non for the credibility of the commitments under article II.

27. The period since the previous Conference had seen a change with far-reaching implications. As a result of the incident at Chernobyl, peaceful use of nuclear energy had come under a cloud. Assuring nuclear safety should be viewed not only as a national but also as an international obligation, something that the States Parties should bear in mind when implementing the provisions of article IV. Since the Treaty had come into force, world production of nuclear energy had grown more than twenty-fold, and a development of such magnitude would not have been possible without the Treaty and related safeguards agreement. For the energy economies of many countries, such as Finland, dependent on the availability of nuclear fuel or services from abroad, the continued functioning of international trade and the arrangements based on the Treaty must be guaranteed.

28. Effective safeguards were a prerequisite for the implementation of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards system had been functioning successfully but, in order to continue to do so, the Parties to the Treaty must co-operate more fully with the Agency. Inspection efforts could be facilitated and information provided more promptly. Despite the financing problems being faced by the Agency the necessary resources must be provided so that it could administer growing safeguards activities. At the same time, more attention should be paid to improving safeguards methods. His country considered that all non-nuclear-weapon States should accept full-scope safeguards for their nuclear activities and, to that end, urged all States to require such safeguards as a condition for their nuclear exports.

29. As to the ultimate purpose of the Treaty in contributing to the prevention of nuclear war, for the first time in history some nuclear weapons had actually been eliminated and more substantial cuts were foreseen for the future. Other ancilliary measures to improve stability and prevent nuclear miscalculation had also been agreed on. However, the same could not be said for efforts to achieve a nuclear-test ban, which Finland considered to be the surest means of slowing down the development of nuclear weapons. A complete ban on nuclear testing would also remove the related environental risks;

environmental concerns had contributed considerably to the decision to ban atmospheric tests under the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and scientific evidence suggested that there was no such thing as environmentally safe underground testing either.

30. His country was particularly concerned about tests in the Arctic, which was a singularly vulnerable environment and where the utmost care was needed to avoid the risks of radioactive pollution. The adequacy of safety measures at test sites was being questioned by countries, including his own, which feared that they were receiving radioactivity from test explosions in their vicinity. Nuclear-weapon States should invite independent experts from affected States to familiarize themselves with safety measures at test sites. Finland welcomed the signing of the verification protocols to the United States-Soviet Threshold Treaties, which should lead to further constraints in testing. The Amendment Conference for the Partial Test Ban Treaty afforded an opportunity for all States to discuss issues relating to the banning of nuclear tests and it was to be hoped that it would narrow the differences enough to enable real progress to be made at the appropriate forum - the recently established *Ad hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

31. States which had refrained from the option of acquiring nuclear weapons by joining the Treaty had the right to expect the nuclear-weapon States to renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. As political perceptions and military doctrines changed favourably, a new look at the issue of security assurances would be justified. His delegation appreciated the proposals made in that respect by Nigeria and Egypt. In its view, security assurances should be binding and comprehensive and should ensure respect for the equality and integrity of all non-nuclear-weapon States having committed themselves to non-proliferation. While recent developments had helped to enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, they did not obviate the need for effective security assurances as long as nuclear weapons existed.

32. The regional approach to non-proliferation, acknowledged by article VII of the Treaty, could effectively complement the global undertaking. Indeed, the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco were intended to do just that. Finland itself had long sought to consolidate the existing nuclear-weapon-free status of the Nordic countries and considered that the changing security situation in Europe had further strengthened that status. It would therefore continue to co-operate closely with the other Nordic countries on that matter.

33. The NPT was the most widely accepted international security agreement. It served to stabilize the world with respect to the most destructive weapons in existence, acted as a spur to disarmament efforts and provided the safest available means to derive peaceful benefits from nuclear technology. The Nordic Governments therefore supported efforts aimed at ensuring the prolongation of the Treaty indefinitely and thus the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. His delegation believed that such efforts should begin soon after the current Review Conference.

Ms. Mason (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.

34. Mr. DATO BIN HITAM (Malaysia) said that more than any other instrument in international relations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealt with a very crucial concern of mankind: to ensure survival by preventing mass destruction. There was, however, a gulf between the lofty purposes of the Treaty and the provisions of its implementing articles. In a practical manner, the Treaty accepted the notion that a small number of States already in possession of nuclear weapons could keep them, whereas others had undertaken not to acquire or develop them. Nuclear weapons had thus assumed a decisive role as the "weapons of deterrence" of the super-Powers and, for over two decades, the Treaty had been caught up in super-Power rivalries, resulting in inadequate implementation of the provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the one hand and the potential development of nuclear-weapon capability by other States on the other.

35. Malaysia had earlier subscribed to the Treaty, in the conviction that it provided a sound beginning for global denuclearization and a foundation for the establishment of a régime of international co-operation for the development of nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses, thus ultimately becoming a framework for the development of nuclear science and technology for the well-being and safety of mankind. However, from such a standpoint, the achievements of the Treaty over the past 20 years had not been encouraging. Indeed, the many United Nations and international resolutions concerning the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability were a manifestation of well-founded concern about nuclear proliferation, compounded by the very urgent and real threats of other forms of mass destruction - from chemical, radiological and biological weapons, for example.

36. However, despite such weaknesses, the NPT's importance to the safety and well-being of mankind had not diminished. The Conference was an opportunity to reaffirm adherence to it and renew determination to support the programmes which had been adopted to achieve its objectives. It was one of the earliest international instruments to have recognized that mankind shared a common destiny, and the full attainment of its objectives was of concern to all States. It was gratifying to note the growing realization by the international community of that common concern and of global interdependence among States and peoples. For that reason, his delegation called for a clear programme of action to secure universal accession to the Treaty under the terms of international law and practice. It was undesirable that large sectors of humanity should not be covered by security standards adhered to by the Parties to the Treaty.

37. His delegation also regarded the Conference as an occasion to reaffirm the call to continue and strengthen the Treaty beyond 1995. Deep changes that were positive and fostered international peace and co-operation were taking place in the international scene. His delegation was encouraged by the largely positive stands taken by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union towards outstanding NPT issues and urged other developed countries to do likewise.

38. Such positive trends were, however, accompanied by signs of instability as societies grappled with political, economic and social reforms following

the reduction of East-West tensions and rivalry. The Conference must clearly call for an end to such tendencies and for the initiation of remedial measures with proper regard for the long-term interests of mankind, societies and individuals. Once a common human destiny was accepted as a clear basic strategy of the Treaty in its next phase of development, the Conference would have taken a very important decision. To that end, the Conference should find the political will to call in a final document for the continuation of the Treaty as a precursor of complete nuclear disarmament and of international co-operation in nuclear science and technology for the safety and well-being of mankind.

39. In addition to such basic considerations, other important issues should also be addressed. International developments suggested that the Treaty could not stand alone if it was to retain its pivotal role in global peace and stability and that fresh approaches must be made to reinforce it. Threats of the use of nuclear weapons must not be available to any State and no State should feel compelled to seek security in nuclear deterrence. All countries, must rely on the guarantee of the United Nations collective security system as the only fair and just system that would not undermine the safety and well-being of mankind. International efforts and wisdom must be focused on examining that system and the Parties to the Treaty must move ahead towards the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament and develop the widest application of nuclear science for peaceful uses.

40. Areas declared as nuclear-weapon-free zones now made up more than a quarter of the earth's surface. In South-East Asia, members of ASEAN had declared their determination to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, which would be free from nuclear weapons. His country was pleased that no regional State had objected to such an effort and hoped that all obstacles to the establishment of the zone would be removed in the near future. In that context it would be useful if the Review Conference would take cognizance of the ASEAN effort and urge States Parties to the NPT and others to encourage its realization.

41. It was also necessary to strengthen the safeguards system and programmes in order to enhance confidence in the Treaty and incentives for its universal acceptance. He therefore supported the call by the IAEA's Director-General at the opening meeting of the Conference for an enhanced system of safeguards that would cover areas of weakness inherent in the Treaty. Another, equally important aspect of safeguards as a confidence-building instrument was adherence by all Parties. The Treaty should not be weakened in any manner through non-compliance or conditionality.

42. As the agenda of the Conference suggested, a great deal of work on the Treaty remained to be done. In that respect his delegation felt that fresh impetus should be injected into efforts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; transfer of technology was not only an incentive for universalization of the Treaty but was also a disincentive for recourse to the nuclear weapons option. His delegation agreed with others that special significance was attached to the current Conference, implying greater willingness to proceed earnestly to discharge obligations and responsibilities and vigorously pursue

the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, the elimination of all tactical nuclear forces, the prevention of an arms race in space, and a prohibition on the production and trade of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In the context of improved East-West relations, he called upon Parties to the Treaty to rise to the challenges of the day and fulfil the great expectations of all mankind.

43. Mr. PIREK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said that his country's two nations, engaged in rediscovering the ideals and principles of pluralistic democracy and the authentic values of European civilization, were eager to assist in introducing new viable international structures. Together with other European nations, the United States and Canada, Czechoslovakia was endeavouring to devise an original concept for a reliable security system in Europe and the adequate institutionalization of the Helsinki process. It was confident that the results of the two sets of negotiations taking place in Vienna, as well as the Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, would make a significant contribution to the attainment of those goals. Unfortunately, the prevailing positive trends were disrupted by irresponsible power ambitions. In his opinion, the solution to the current explosive situation in the Gulf lay in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

44. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had stood the test of time and would undoubtedly count among the foundation stones of the new security system emerging in Europe and the world at large, constituted an important norm of international law, exerting considerable influence on the development of international relations in the field of arms reduction and disarmament. The Treaty enjoyed prestige among States and, in terms of the number of States Parties, ranked among the most representative disarmament instruments adopted since the Second World War. His Government was convinced of the Treaty's continuing viability beyond the year 1995 and was opposed to any pointless revision aimed at weakening or devaluing the Treaty.

45. It was gratified to note, that in the past five years, there had been no breach of the Treaty and that all States Parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear, had continued to comply with their commitments. That fact was important above all for the review of the Treaty's key provisions contained in articles I and II. Although reports were received from time to time concerning attempts - generally by non-party States - to manufacture a nuclear weapon, there had so far been no direct official evidence to confirm such activities. Notwithstanding the substantial growth of trade in nuclear technology and the world-wide utilization of nuclear energy, the official list of countries possessing nuclear weapons remained unchanged. That, however, should not diminish the world's vigilance and alertness, particularly with regard to efforts by some States gradually to build up a base for the development and manufacture of components of nuclear weapons. The same applied to the sensitive and increasingly topical issue of procurement of delivery systems and their technology. The presence of nuclear weapons, especially in conflict-ridden regions, would pose a serious threat to strategic stability and universal peace.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5

46. His Government was pleased to note that the number of non-nuclear-States Parties to the Treaty had progressively increased over the years, a positive trend which attested to the Treaty's importance and credibility, and joined in the appeal to countries still outside the Treaty to review their position and accede to it as soon as possible.

47. The system of safeguards developed on the basis of article III and applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency offered a possibility of objectively reviewing the question of compliance with the NPT. In recent years the Agency had developed and verified a system of safeguards for nuclear equipment of all kinds, and its experienced inspectors added to the credibility of the results of verification activities. Nevertheless, his delegation was not fully satisfied with those activities. The basic document of the safeguards system dated back more than 20 years and some of its parameters no longer corresponded to current needs. After carrying out a thorough analysis of the situation, his Government had, within the framework of IAEA, put forward a proposal for a modified approach to the application of safeguards. Flexible implementation of that proposal would eliminate existing shortcomings, ease the financial implications and contribute towards development of safeguards that could ensure effective as well as reliable control of the development of nuclear energy into the twenty-first century. At the same time, his Government was convinced that the Treaty's prestige would be substantially enhanced if the nuclear Powers subjected all of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Again, it recommended the most economical approach while stressing practical aspects. In its view, the submission and verification of exhaustive reports on the materials balance should be combined with the gradual expansion of a new system of random inspections.

48. Despite the tragic accident at Chernobyl, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had continued to expand, attention being mainly focused on improving the quality of safety measures. Nuclear energy remained the most promising resource for meeting the energy needs of many countries. His Government therefore advocated further mutually beneficial development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy subject to the observance of the international safeguards in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. In that context, it appreciated the conclusions of the PUNE Conference held in Geneva in 1986. In his country, the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was unthinkable without international co-operation. Environmental and economic considerations had led his Government to the decision to utilize the country's uranium deposits in order to launch a relatively extensive nuclear energy programme. Eight blocks of light-water reactors with outputs of 440 MW per unit were currently in operation and another four blocks of the same capacity, as well as two 1,000 MW blocks, were under construction. All those power stations had been built according to Soviet designs and the fuel elements had also been supplied by the USSR until the present. For many years, his country had also enjoyed co-operation with Western producers of nuclear plant and equipment; all the blocks in operation included diagnostic systems supplied by Siemens, and a Western-made comprehensive control system was to be installed at the nuclear power plant being built at Mochovce. So far as the construction of new nuclear plants was concerned, Czechoslovakia

had established contacts with firms in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Finland, Italy, the Soviet Union and other countries, with a view to acquiring the most advanced technical equipment so as to guarantee maximum security.

49. The new situation also called for fundamental changes in the fuel cycle. Czechoslovakia was at present studying the possibility of long-term storage in its own territory of spent fuel which, in the past, had been returned to the USSR, as well as the possibility of its being processed by a suitable partner. The preparation of co-operation agreements with other States in the nuclear field involved certain problems of a legislative nature. Czechoslovakia's export and import policy had hitherto been based exclusively on the non-proliferation principle embodied in the NPT. Issues relating to ensuring safeguards outside the Treaty framework or in the event of IAEA being unable to discharge its duties under article III were not as yet regulated by the national legislation. Such regulation was, however, indispensable in order to conclude agreements with a number of States. His Government intended to look to the best solutions and experience of other States Parties in preparing the necessary legal adjustments.

50. As to the review of articles V, VI and VII, he wished to emphasize that the gradual and consistent construction of a world free of nuclear weapons was a priority in his country's foreign policy. Like most other participants in the Conference, Czechoslovakia was not fully satisfied with the implementation of the provisions of article VI, although it was true that more had been done in that field since the 1985 Review Conference than in all previous years taken together. His country expected that process to continue and hoped to see it advance to the stage of multilateral negotiations in the near future. In that context, it greatly appreciated the Soviet-United States INF Agreement, in whose implementation it was partly involved. The Agreement, which had launched a process of real disarmament in the nuclear field, should be supplemented in the foreseeable future by a radical reduction in the two Powers' offensive strategic weapons, something his Government strongly favoured. In view of the London Declaration of the NATO countries in July 1990, the start of negotiations on the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe seemed promising. The time was approaching when the process of nuclear disarmament should be joined by the other nuclear Powers. It was to be hoped that their participation in the relevant negotiations would not be linked to any preconditions. The first step towards that end might be the adoption of so-called negative assurances.

51. General and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was the most effective way of halting the escalation of armaments and achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the results expected had not been achieved; although the additional protocols to the Soviet-United States agreements on nuclear-weapon tests of 1974 and 1976 had been signed at the Soviet-United States summit in Washington earlier in 1990, they had not yet been ratified. It was to be hoped that resumed negotiations would result in a significant limitation by both Powers of the number and energy yield of their nuclear tests. At the Conference on Disarmament, the matter had remained in a state of protracted stagnation. The Czechoslovak delegation was among those

trying to find ways of overcoming the impasse. It was to be hoped that the recently established Ad Hoc Committee would at long last produce tangible results. One possible solution might be found in the non-aligned countries' proposal that the validity of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty should be extended to cover underground testing. Czechoslovakia, for its part, was making responsible and serious preparations for the United Nations conference to be held in New York at the beginning of 1991.

52. An essential element in strengthening the non-proliferation régime was respect for the status of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including those established under the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties. Czechoslovakia supported all constructive proposals for the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

53. His Government considered that all international institutions and forums concerned should energetically step up their efforts to solve the whole set of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and was strongly in favour of enhancing the role of the United Nations in that regard. At the same time, it also advocated a radical improvement in the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament mechanisms, including the Conference on Disarmament.

54. Lastly the Treaty had fully proved itself in the 20 years since its coming into force. It was to be hoped that the present Conference and its final document would help to preserve and strengthen that important instrument at the threshold of a new millenium.

55. Mr. ENE (Romania) said that the present Review Conference, even more than its predecessors, afforded an opportunity to assess the results achieved both individually and collectively in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, with special emphasis on what still remained to be done. The profound changes taking place in international life, including both positive developments and alarming convulsions, the progress achieved and the efforts in making headway towards the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the fact that the present Conference was in many ways a prelude to the crucial Review Conference of 1995 made the occasion a special one. His country approached the issues on the agenda with realism and hoped that the Conference's work would be conducted in a positive and constructive spirit so as to give fresh impetus to the implementation of the NPT in its entirety.

56. Romania was fulfilling in good faith the obligations it had assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and it co-operated with other States Parties in achieving the NPT's objectives. Soon after the Revolution of December 1989, his Government had issued a statement declaring null and void any agreements concluded by the former dictatorial régime that might be in contradiction with the international obligations assumed by Romania in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, as, indeed, in any other field. Romania had also joined the group of countries exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies by officially accepting the non-proliferation standards agreed upon by those countries. At the beginning of August 1990, it had formally joined the IAEA's Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers. Other similar measures in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were under way.

Romania was ready to join international arrangements with regard to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, and action had been taken at national level to provide the necessary regulations and machinery which would guarantee strict non-proliferation controls and co-operation with other States on that issue under conditions of privatization and a market economy.

57. Against a background of positive developments in Europe and other parts of the world, the past five years had also been marked by notable developments in regard to non-proliferation. Horizontal and vertical nuclear non-proliferation had become one of the international community's central concerns. Positive experience acquired in that field had extended to chemical and biological weapons and, more recently, to the means of delivery of such weapons. The agreements reached, as well as the fact that other important agreements were being negotiated, were to be welcomed.

58. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy enjoyed widespread recognition as an important instrument of economic and social development. His Government welcomed the increased IAEA concern for nuclear power-plant safety and the Agency's active contribution in promoting international co-operation. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, both of which had been ratified by Romania three months previously, offered a firm legal foundation for such activities. Another step in the right direction would be to assure the physical security of nuclear plants against military attack, and his Government welcomed the initiative taken by Sweden, the Netherlands and Hungary in bringing that issue before the Conference.

59. The positive results achieved since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demonstrated the important role that the NPT played in maintaining international peace and security and promoting development, something that must be borne in mind in 1995 when the States Parties met to decide on the Treaty's further duration. In view of the recent positive developments in international relations and the democratization and improved human rights situation in Europe, the coming five years offered a unique opportunity to prepare the groundwork for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Conference sought to give fresh impetus to that goal by improving upon the inadequacies of the non-proliferation régime so as to make the spread of nuclear weapons more difficult. The Conference must also attach priority to the early completion of the Soviet-United States negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the beginning of a new series of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a re-evaluation of nuclear weapons strategy in the light of new political realities. It was also important to give legal force to the obligation of States not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The issue of security assurances for non-nuclear States should no longer create difficulties. The steps taken to reduce nuclear weapons were most gratifying, but such efforts must also help achieve another objective of the Treaty - a ban on all nuclear tests. Romania welcomed the recent initiative by six non-aligned States in that matter.

60. To be effective, any non-proliferation régime must also include measures to prevent access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5

non-peaceful uses. In that connection, Romania fully supported the IAEA safeguards and other international arrangements in the field of transfers, an essential part of the non-proliferation régime that should be valid for all States. By the same token, the peaceful use of nuclear materials and technology should be encouraged without discrimination.

61. Lastly, it was satisfying to see that a number of non-States Parties were participating in the Confernece, for the NPT was one of the main pillars of international peace and stability.

62. Mr. STEPHANOU (Greece) welcomed the presence of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, as observers and called upon them to accede to the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the NPT, with its increasing acceptance by the international community, would continue to dissuade non-nuclear-weapon States from seeking nuclear-weapon capability. Greece, one of the first States to have signed and ratified the Treaty, was firmly committed to the NPT's goals and to implementation of the Treaty, which still played a crucial role in maintaining international peace and security.

63. Greece had always recognized the right of every State to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Unfortunately, that right had not always been realized under credible and effective international safeguards. An equitable and stable framework for international nuclear trade was essential. International co-operation would be severely disrupted if the safeguards system were to be abandoned. Greece therefore strongly supported the application of IAEA safeguards on a universal basis and acknowledged the indispensable role played by the Agency through its safeguards controls, which helped ensure the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. On the European level, the Euratom safeguards were applied within the European Community, and the results were verified by the IAEA.

64. His delegation reaffirmed its full support of IAEA activities in the fields of nuclear safety and co-operation on nuclear research and development. Studies conducted by the Agency on the impact of the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated that national and international nuclear safety were inextricably linked. The same applied to problems of nuclear waste disposal. In that context, Greece would also support any efforts to remove the current lacunae in the international safeguards and the non-proliferation régime.

65. Despite the continuing risk that yet more countries might acquire nuclear weapons and the fact that a number of States continued to remain outside the non-proliferation régime, important progress had been achieved in recent years: the INF Treaty, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe agreement, the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, and the agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to destroy chemical weapons were all encouraging signs that the two super-Powers were on the right path towards genuine nuclear disarmament and a reduction in vertical proliferation. His delegation looked forward to further progress towards the

completion by the end of 1990 of a number of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.

66. A comprehensive test ban would have special meaning for the non-proliferation régime and should remain a long-term objective of the nuclear-weapon States. The step-by-step approach undertaken by the two super-Powers towards achieving further limitations on nuclear testing and their commitment to a prompt ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions should not be regarded as being a negative aspect of the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. Another positive development was the establishment in July 1990 at the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear tests.

67. It was regrettable that not all States had become Parties to the NPT which continued to be of vital importance in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thus enhancing international security and stability. The present Conference must be used to ensure that, in 1995, the Treaty was extended for an indefinite period.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Programme of work (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10) (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1)

1. The PRESIDENT suggested that the participants should adopt the programme of work (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1) relating to the organization of the work of the Plenary and Main Committees over the following days. If there was no objection, he would take it that the programme of work was adopted.

It was so decided.

2. The PRESIDENT said that at the first plenary meeting the Secretary-General of the Conference had read out a statement describing the serious financial situation of the Conference. He in turn wished to make an urgent appeal to all States parties to pay their contributions in advance. Delegations should contact the Conference secretariat for information on the appropriate means of payment.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (*continued*)

3. Mr. TCHEUL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the work of the Conference would be of historic importance, in view of developments in the international political situation during the past five years and in view of the 1995 deadline, when it would have to be decided whether to extend the Treaty. The Fourth Review Conference also provided the opportunity, for the first time, to consider the NPT's operation in the light of the new trend towards reconciliation and détente, and to take a number of indispensable measures in the area of nuclear disarmament in order to ensure that the Treaty was kept in force.

4. The NPT had already played a significant role in that no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged in recent years. Since the Third Review Conference efforts had been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and progress had been made towards that goal. The 1987 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the prospects for strategic arms reductions and the unilateral reduction of certain tactical nuclear weapons aroused hopes that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would extricate themselves from their three-decade-long stagnation. It was for the Conference to see that those hopes were fulfilled.

5. It was essential, first of all, to evaluate the situation correctly. The NPT had more contracting parties than any other international instrument, but although 20 years had passed since its entry into force, its implementation had not led to the expected levels of reduction. The nuclear weapons whose reduction was currently being planned represented less than 4 per cent of the total arsenal, and even if strategic arms were reduced by 50 per cent as against the 30 per cent currently proposed, their number would still be higher than when the Treaty had been concluded. The only difference was that the visible quantitative arms race, had been replaced by an invisible qualitative race that was even affecting outer space. The progress in the negotiations on

nuclear disarmament in recent years seemed to be attributable more to the change in East-West relations than to an awareness by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty. There was a continuing imbalance between the latter and the other States with respect to the implementation of the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. It was regrettable that the efforts by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to implement its provisions continued to fail because the nuclear-weapon States that were also parties did not implement them.

6. The current détente and co-operation provided a favourable opportunity for adopting decisive measures to attain the Treaty's fundamental objectives. To adapt the Treaty to a constantly-changing situation, it should be complemented by effective measures enabling it to fulfil its mission more satisfactorily. First of all, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT must be prohibited from deploying their weapons outside their territory. Twenty years before, the Cold War and the confrontation between States had made it impossible to conclude an agreement on that question, but the current situation provided a fundamentally different climate. Now that the nuclear-weapon States were moving towards co-operation and abandoning the idea of confrontation, there was no longer any objection to banning such deployment in other countries. That type of measure would also reflect the will of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to attain its basic objectives and to contribute effectively to the elimination of the risk of nuclear war.

7. The creation of nuclear-free zones was one of the most effective ways to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but reality had shown that the treaties already concluded in that area were not complied with by the nuclear-weapon States. Yet it should not be such a great sacrifice for them to acknowledge the importance of establishing such zones and express their intention to respect them. As to the nuclear-free zones established by the non-nuclear-weapon States to prevent nuclear proliferation, it would be sufficient for the nuclear-weapon States not to impede their establishment.

8. A comprehensive nuclear test ban was absolutely essential to stop the nuclear arms race and put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which aroused as many fears as their numerical increase, since it maintained their destructive capacity at the same level and aggravated the risk of nuclear war. Until the nuclear-weapon States showed their political will to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible, their commitment to ending the nuclear arms race would remain doubtful and the authority of the NPT uncertain. In that connection, his delegation endorsed the proposals for a moratorium on nuclear testing, if only through 1995.

9. The most effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon countries was obviously complete nuclear disarmament, but it was no less obvious that until that became a reality, legally-binding guarantees prohibiting such use would be more valid than a mere unilateral and conditional declaration. The non-aligned and neutral countries had called for the adoption of an international instrument of that type, as had Nigeria, Egypt and many other countries.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6

10. An agreement in principle during the present Conference on the above-mentioned problems would be of decisive importance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and ushering in a climate favourable to the Treaty's extension.

11. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had acceded to the NPT in very particular circumstances. The Korean people was one of the only peoples to have experienced the threat of nuclear weapons. In the early 1950s, threats to use the atomic bomb against it had led to the separation of the families of several million inhabitants. In early 1957, when the question of non-proliferation had first been raised, nuclear weapons had been deployed in the southern part of the peninsula. Beginning in 1976, joint military exercises known as "Team Spirit", in which one nuclear-weapon State had participated, had begun in the same region. The exercises had grown even bigger in size in the mid-1980s, with the participation of 200,000 soldiers as opposed to 60,000 at the outset and the execution of nuclear war manoeuvres with the mobilization of airborne command posts and vectors. His Government had thus found itself obliged to seek a decisive measure of protection. That was what had prompted it to consider acceding to the NPT, the only international instrument at that time explicity to call for as rapid a halt as possible to the nuclear arms race and to set nuclear disarmament as its basic objective. By contributing to the Treaty's universality and to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, it had encouraged general nuclear disarmament while consolidating its own security. Furthermore, the legal commitment it had undertaken not to manufacture or import nuclear weapons had helped to reduce the imminent nuclear threat.

12. Unfortunately, events had not come up to its expectations. Whereas considerable progress had been made in other areas in reducing nuclear weapons, none of those weapons had disappeared from the Korean peninsula and no sign of a reduction had been noted. Every year, nuclear war exercises in the peninsula took on an increasingly menacing dimension. In addition, there had never been a favourable response to its proposals for a considerable reduction in conventional forces in northern and southern Korea with a view to creating a climate conducive to the dismantling of nuclear weapons, or for negotiations aimed at making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone. His country had thus had to be more circumspect in dealing with the problem of concluding a safeguards agreement, anxious as it was to comply with its obligations under the Treaty but also to safeguard its national security.

13. The safeguards negotiations begun with IAEA the main agreement concluded in July 1990 on all points, with the exception of one provision concerning the entry into force of the safeguards, and the agreement to continue the negotiations indicated that his Government was fully determined to meet its obligations under article III of the Treaty.

14. Regarding national security, his Government was concerned about eliminating the current nuclear threat, which presupposed the satisfactory implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The problem of concluding a safeguards agreement would be resolved as soon as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been given a legal guarantee that its security would be

ensured until such time as nuclear disarmament had been achieved. His delegation was convinced that the international trend towards détente and co-operation should enable such a solution to be reached. In addition, the encouraging remarks by the party concerned regarding the elimination of the nuclear threat to the country increased confidence that a solution to that problem would be found.

15. It should also be noted that it had been agreed to begin North-South political-military talks in September. Those would be the first of their kind in the history of the Korean peninsula and would be attended by both delegations headed by their Prime Ministers. The disarmament of the peninsula would be one of the priority items on the agenda for those talks. The presence of huge armed forces in the north and south was a major concern for the Korean people and for the neighbouring countries. That military confrontation had often been referred to to justify the deployment of nuclear weapons in the peninsula, but the disarmament talks should create the necessary trust between north and south and in neighbouring countries, and reduce the nuclear threat hanging over the peninsula. Declaring the peninsula a nuclear-free zone would remove one of the potential foci of nuclear war in the world and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

16. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Conference would make all the parties to the Treaty fully aware of their obligations and enable them to take joint action to implement the Treaty's provisions.

17. Mr. STAIKOV (Bulgaria) said that the atmosphere in which the Fourth Review Conference was being held could not be more favourable for attainment of the Treaty's main objectives. The democratic process that had begun in Eastern Europe was creating an entirely new international climate in which relations between States were gradually shedding their ideological yoke. The division of Europe was in the process of being overcome, and the blocs, which stated that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries, were preparing to change their military structures and defence policies, thus creating favourable conditions for disarmament over an extended front. In addition, efforts aimed at setting up a European system of collective security were becoming institutionalized, and the bases for world peace were being strengthened.

18. In Bulgaria, rapid democratic changes and the transition to a market economy were broadening the foreign policy horizon, and the country was firmly committed to economic and political integration with Europe, while preserving the advantages of the relations it had until then maintained with other countries and alliances. His Government would continue to support all efforts aimed at consolidating the foundations of international peace and security, and converting military potential to meet the needs of society. It was precisely in order to achieve those objectives that it remained committed to implementing the principles of the NPT, which it considered to be one of mankind's principal achievements.

19. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the pillars of any nuclear disarmament activity. At a time when the two major nuclear Powers

were drastically reducing their arsenals, guaranteeing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would create favourable conditions for freely continuing such a process. The participation of the other nuclear States would be absolutely essential in order to go beyond certain limits in those reductions. However, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States would entail new risks and exacerbate the problems. That was a further reason why the principles of the NPT should be resolutely supported.

20. His Government considered that horizontal non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals should not be systematically linked. Horizontal non-proliferation played an important part in concerted efforts to ensure mutual security and promote disarmament. Effectively and durably preventing new States from acquiring nuclear weapons would be one of the prerequisites for preventing the aggravation of tensions in international relations and crises that might have fateful consequences for mankind. The NPT was the indispensable basis for international efforts to limit the risk of nuclear war, strengthen stability at the regional and global levels, and develop international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty should maintain those same objectives in the future.

21. There was no doubt that the Treaty was an effective instrument for, since its entry into force, no signatory State had acquired nuclear weapons; it was also the most universal international legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, since nearly 90 per cent of the States Members of the United Nations had acceded to it. For that reason, his delegation, which reaffirmed its full support for the purposes and principles of the Treaty, hoped that a constructive approach would be adopted at the 1995 Conference, when the States parties would decide whether to extend it.

22. His Government was deeply concerned at the fact that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty were seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, and hoped that they would be more emphatically urged to accede to the Treaty. It nevertheless noted with satisfaction that some nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty were despite everything taking a definite interest in the non-proliferation régime, as witnessed by the presence of observers for China and France at the Conference.

23. Bulgaria had been among the first States to sign and ratify the Treaty and to have concluded with IAEA a safeguards agreement on its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Since the conclusion of that agreement, the Agency's inspectors had not observed any breach of the régime established under the Treaty, and in order to make the inspectors' work easier his Government had now eliminated the procedure of prior notification of inspection, provided that the experts appointed by IAEA were citizens of countries with which Bulgaria maintained diplomatic relations.

24. His Government complied strictly with the guidelines for exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and in the context of its transition to a market economy and economic liberalization, it was attempting to exercise more rigorous control over the nuclear sector. In the international sphere, his country was actively co-operating in the use o

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and contributed to the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation fund. It received specialists from other IAEA member countries, offered the services of Bulgarian experts and also took advantage of the technical assistance extended by the Agency in the civilian uses of nuclear energy.

25. Public opinion in Bulgaria was seriously concerned about the direct effects on the population and the environment, of the radioactive contamination resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl power station, and all the necessary studies were being conducted. Bulgaria had signed and ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. A regional agreement on that question had been concluded among the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in 1989 his Government had signed an agreement with the Greek Government on notification of a nuclear accident and the exchange of information on nuclear facilities.

26. In Bulgaria, a third of all electric energy was derived from one nuclear power station. The construction of a second power station was being considered, but because of public opposition, expert opinions had been sought with the help of IAEA on the choice of location and the technical specifications of the planned installation, and there was a possibility that construction plans might be dropped. That question was also the subject of bilateral negotiations between Bulgaria and Romania, and of a detailed study by several bodies representing the interests of the population and scientific circles.

27. His Government was convinced that continued nuclear disarmament efforts would contribute significantly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The elimination of thousands of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States represented considerable progress towards that end, and it was to be hoped that the agreement concluded in June on a framework for reducing strategic nuclear arsenals would lead to the rapid conclusion of a treaty on the subject and that negotiations on future reductions would begin immediately after the conclusion of the START-I Treaty, which would be fully in keeping with the States parties' commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The unilateral withdrawal of hundreds of tactical nuclear charges by the USSR and the United States was another encouraging sign of full compliance with the provisions of article VI. His Government also welcomed the progress in the negotiations on conventional arms reductions, confidence-building measures in Europe and the prohibition of chemical weapons. And it welcomed the recent signing of the protocols on the control mechanism of the agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1974 and 1976, and hoped that those agreements would be ratified shortly.

28. In the final document of the Conference, which his delegation hoped would be adopted unanimously, the nuclear-weapon States should make a clear commitment to comply with their obligations under the Treaty. The establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, which

should make it possible to begin concrete work on a multilateral treaty on a comprehensive test ban, was another welcome development. The creation of nuclear-free zones in accordance with article VII of the Treaty would also have a positive effect. In the Balkans, Bulgaria's own region, some encouraging progress had been made towards that goal during the past five years, and international arrangements of that type should be formulated and fully implemented. Regarding negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which would appear in a legally binding international instrument, his delegation believed that the proposals on that subject should be given thorough consideration in view of the opportunity they offered to strengthen the international régime set forth by the Treaty, which was particularly important at a time of rapid and unprecedented changes throughout the world.

29. Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) noted that since the previous Review Conference, a new era of dialogue and understanding had been ushered in and was already helping to reduce tensions throughout the world. With such prospects for progress, compliance with the fundamental principles of international law was all the more essential.

30. In the area of disarmament, the INF Agreement, the first since the Second World War to be accompanied by effective verification measures, was being implemented satisfactorily by all the parties. The signing of the START Agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons, which would have a strong impact on the capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, appeared to be imminent, and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, for its part, had repeated its will to begin negotiations on short-range weapons as soon as an agreement on conventional forces in Europe was signed. Similarly, at their London summit, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance countries had taken full account of the new relations between the countries of Europe, which aroused hopes that the new NATO strategy would be less dependent on nuclear weapons. The United States had in turn announced its intention to refrain from modernizing its LANCE missiles and to withdraw its nuclear artillery from Europe. In the area of the cessation of nuclear testing, too, a welcome sign was the imminent ratification of the protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on thresholds and peaceful nuclear explosions by the two nuclear super-Powers. In that connection, the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban proved that the final objective, to which Belgium was strongly committed, namely, a permanent and verifiable halt to nuclear testing, could finally be achieved.

31. Noting that negotiations were continuing in the Conference on Disarmament on a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons, his Government hoped that a treaty on the subject would shortly be opened for signature by all States. It also hoped that the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of another agreement on confidence-building and security measures would make a major contribution towards creating conditions in which peace in Europe would be based less on fear of weapons and more on well-founded trust in mutual renouncement of the threat or use of armed force.

32. In that particularly promising disarmament process, the Treaty continued to occupy an essential position. Having effectively and verifiably renounced nuclear weapons, the States parties were entitled to expect real progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the fact that, since the previous Review Conference in 1985, over 10 new members, including Spain, which had a significant nuclear programme, had signed the Treaty. It also welcomed the presence at the Fourth Conference of observers for the two nuclear Powers that were not parties to the Treaty, France and China, which, it was hoped, would rapidly consider acceding to the Treaty.

33. There were still certain grounds for concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular with respect to the States that had not yet made binding and verifiable legal commitments in that area. The proliferation of ballistic missiles was also a source of concern, which was why Belgium, together with other States, had acceded to an international non-proliferation régime in that field and hoped that a growing number of States would support that régime.

34. It was unfortunate and at times worrying that certain States parties had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, as they were required to do under article III of the Treaty. Such a failure to meet obligations might raise doubts as to the actual political commitment of those States or their genuine will to renounce nuclear weapons, especially when the States involved were ones that had significant nuclear facilities. In that connection, his delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had signed the Treaty in 1985, rapidly to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, in conformity with the promise that that country's representative had recently made at the Conference. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agency had not observed any flagrant violations of the provisions of article III of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference. Belgium, for its part, fully supported the Agency in its implementation of safeguards, and in that context, with the co-operation of the members of the European Atomic Energy Community, it had set up a programme aimed at optimizing their implementation.

35. In his delegation's opinion, widespread safeguards should be applied to all civilian nuclear activities throughout the world, in the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States that were not parties to the Treaty. Belgium would be more inclined to require safeguards as a condition for exporting nuclear material and equipment if all the exporting States decided to apply that policy; it did not wish to see States that followed less strict rules gain an economic advantage.

36. There had been continued large-scale international co-operation in the nuclear field during the past five years, and Belgium had continued to contribute to such co-operation, especially by admitting trainees from all regions of the world to its laboratories and companies, by sending its experts and technicians to IAEA meetings and by ensuring that its nuclear industrial sector made a maximum contribution to the safety of its installations.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6

37. In that positive context, the disarmament process could no doubt be enhanced if enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which formed the basis for manufacturing nuclear bombs, were placed under IAEA control. That would make it possible to know the exact quantities of fissionable material that States were using to build their military nuclear arsenals, it being understood that controls would cease as soon as the material entered the nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities. Controls would make it possible to verify whether nuclear-weapon States were exceeding the limits they had set themselves and would also eliminate the discrimination argument put forward by certain States that did not wish to accede to the Treaty or refused to place their facilities under IAEA control.

38. His delegation regretted that the results of the work of the Contact Group entrusted with preparing a draft convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities had not come up to expectations, and it would support any proposal aimed at remedying the lack of progress in that area.

39. The 1995 Conference would be an important landmark in the non-proliferation régime, since it would be called upon to decide the Treaty's future. His delegation believed that it would be both irresponsible and very dangerous to allow a régime that had already clearly proved itself to weaken, and it hoped that all States parties, without distinction, would place their facilities under IAEA safeguards. Lastly, considering the positive developments since the previous Review Conference, the work of the Fourth Conference should lead to the adoption of a constructive final document illustrating the ever-increasing importance of the Treaty, which remained the corner-stone of the non-proliferation system.

40. Mr. CALDERÓN (Peru) said that it had probably been out of fear of the consequences of a nuclear conflict that the super-Powers had begun negotiations on a treaty to check the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction. The NPT had been an important initial stage on the road to reason. It was simply one way of creating conditions that would make it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth once and for all. Non-proliferation did not mean elimination or reduction, but non-reproduction. That was why the Treaty was discriminatory, in two respects. First, it was the first international instrument legally to recognize five States as being the sole nuclear Powers under article IX, paragraph 3. It was perhaps that discriminatory nature that explained the existence of article VI. Indeed, since it was not a nuclear disarmament treaty, its moral authority and universalization depended on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, two processes leading to general and complete disarmament. Secondly, the Treaty gave preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Article IV provided that non-nuclear-weapon States should benefit from the development of the many uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

41. The evaluation of the Treaty's implementation showed that the situation was quite different from that imagined by the negotiators in 1968. To a considerable increase in nuclear weapons and their destructive power had been

added latent horizontal proliferation, partly due to a certain flexibility on the part of the few supplier States in the nuclear products trade. But perhaps most surprisingly, the non-proliferation measures applied to other complementary technological fields might endanger security in more than one region of the world and, as a result, peace.

42. Peru had renounced nuclear weapons when it had acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; it had done so to preserve world peace, and to devote itself to economic and social development and the struggle against poverty, two priority areas. It was for the same reasons that his Government advocated strengthening the NPT in order to guarantee its extension beyond 1995 and to promote its universalization.

43. The successful implementation of the 1987 Washington Treaty, on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles, and the announcement that the super-Powers would be concluding a treaty on the elimination of certain categories of strategic offensive weapons by the end of the year were examples of the measures that must be taken in order to lessen the disappointment of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties at the implementation of article VI.

44. However, his Government could not understand why States were still hesitating to enter into multilateral negotiations aimed at prohibiting all nuclear tests. Continued testing for the purpose of further refining weapons or making technological innovations would have a destabilizing effect. A halt to testing would be an appopriate measure for increasing trust among the nuclear Powers. In addition, the large-scale, verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals and the prohibition of all tests were not incompatible and could be considered top-priority objectives. Giving one precedence over the other would be something new, for article VI drew no distinction in that respect.

45. His delegation accordingly hoped that the Conference would reach an agreement that fulfilled the international community's demands. The time had come to set a deadline for States parties to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests. States might set the 1990s as a deadline and focus their efforts on gradually reducing the number and strength of the tests until they were banned completely. The negotiations might initially be bilateral, between the two super-Powers, then among three or five parties, and finally multilateral. Lastly, a national verification mechanism might be set up and implemented by each of the nuclear Powers; it would be linked to an international verification network under the control of an international body.

46. It was to be hoped that, at the present Review Conference, the super-Powers would take specific measures to extend the de facto moratorium on the production of special fissionable material intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That would be the best way of strengthening States' trust in the process of world military denuclearization. The United States and the Soviet Union should reaffirm the commitments they had made at the recent Washington summit. The negotiations should include the dismantling of a

number of nuclear warheads that appeared in the announced treaty on strategic offensive weapons, as well as providing for the use of recovered fissionable material for civilian purposes.

47. The universalization of the NPT would depend on how the States parties managed to resolve the problem of latent horizontal proliferation. For the time being, certain suppliers of nuclear material, technology and services were not requiring the importing State to agree to submit all its nuclear facilities to safeguards. Since the measures taken by the London suppliers group or by the Zangger Committee to check horizontal proliferation had not been sufficient, the only remaining option was greater compliance with the provisions of the Treaty in nuclear trade. What was to be avoided was the creation of an imbalance between the importing States parties to the Treaty and the importing States that were not parties. The same restrictions could not be imposed on both categories without requiring in return that they meet the same obligations. Putting them on an equal footing would amount to ascribing the same intentions to them, which would lessen the Treaty's importance. It was absolutely essential to set up a consultation mechanism that was limited to States parties in order to settle the question of the supply of nuclear products. The adoption of a code of conduct would be the best solution, provided it did not accord the same treatment to States parties and non-parties. The States parties to the Treaty should also consider concluding agreements on negative security assurances and prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities.

48. Although the situation in certain regions of the world was disturbing, the international climate was extremely favourable for considering the Treaty's extension. It was in the interests of all States parties to continue to work towards peace.

49. Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka) said that the Fourth Review Conference was of particular significance. The assessment of two decades of Treaty operation would set the stage for the States parties to decide in 1995 whether to extend it. Profound changes had taken place in the world: security was becoming less weaponized and more political, and inter-State relations among traditional adversaries had improved. New tensions and dangers continued to arise within and among States, but some of the seemingly intractable regional problems were in the process of being solved, and the United Nations had been able to reassert its peace-keeping role. Thus the Conference should focus on the question how the NPT might serve peace and the well-being of States parties in the future.

50. Developments since 1985 provided material for assessing the extent to which problems had been solved or aggravated. The encouraging positive developments should not be allowed to mask what remained to be done. Everyone must work collectively and constructively to address the genuine concerns of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty.

51. The political compromise that had given birth to the Treaty had envisaged that it should not only prevent more nuclear-weapon States and new nuclear weapons from emerging, but that it should also propel the nuclear disarmament

process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka was gratified to note that the number of States parties had increased from 130 in 1985 to some 140 at present. Nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race had been the sine qua non of the cold war, but the time had now come to move away from nuclear terror and to find alternative means of security. His Government earnestly hoped that all States parties, particularly the depositary States, would develop a framework that would support progressive disarmament and alternative means of security through international co-operation.

52. Sri Lanka had become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the conviction that the Treaty would contribute to international peace and security if implemented in good faith. It had thus joined the group of States that did not believe that the possession of nuclear weapons was a means of ensuring national security. His Government had fulfilled all its obligations and contributed to the efforts to implement the Treaty. It had also reminded the States parties of the collective nature of the obligations entered into under the Treaty. As a non-aligned country, Sri Lanka had not acceded to any nuclear-weapons-related security agreement or any other military alliance system; rather it had sought to ensure its national security through political and diplomatic means. His Government had continued to refuse to allow foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter Sri Lankan ports. It supported international efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including zones in south Asia.

53. The NPT was the most widely accepted arms control treaty. Sri Lanka was particularly pleased to see greater participation by observers at the current Review Conference. All States parties should explore all possibilities of encouraging other States to become interested in the Treaty, in order that its purposes and provisions might enjoy universal acceptance. His delegation believed that the multilateral review of nuclear issues would help to create incentives for wider adherence to the Treaty. Exclusiveness in negotiating nuclear issues should give way to multilateral negotiations in which all concerned parties could play a role in defining the principles and stages of nuclear disarmament.

54. His Government welcomed the recent progress in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations. Multilateral work on nuclear disarmament issues did not mean that all countries should participate in the START negotiations. Bilateral and multilateral approaches were complementary.

55. There were a number of reasons why the nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate the political will to make greater use of the multilateral approach to nuclear issues. First, nuclear weapons by their very nature were of concern to all countries, not only to their possessors. Secondly, at a time of considerable progress in bilateral arms negotiations, efforts in that area should be globalized. The development of a framework for multilateral negotiation would be a confidence-building measure, as it could involve not only the existing nuclear-weapon States, but also the non-nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-capable States. Certain regional nuclear ambiguities could be given some transparency and the problem of latent proliferation addressed. Thirdly, the great majority of States parties saw the NPT not as

an end in itself, but as a step in the process of disarmament which must be pursued in a multilateral framework. Like many other States parties, Sri Lanka wished to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty, and wider adherence would be an important step in that direction. Certain countries hesitated to accede to the Treaty for conceptual, legal, political and other reasons.

56. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT believed that parallel ways should be explored to strengthen the Treaty by involving the "threshold countries", which were prepared to manufacture nuclear weapons, in a multilateral process that would make it easier for them to gravitate towards the purposes and provisions of the NPT. A multilateral process in which all nuclear-weapon States and the "threshold States" could participate would be a constructive approach to the desired objective. It derived from the letter and spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

57. There were many nuclear issues ripe for multilateral treatment. One was the cessation of fissionable material production and the negotiation of a multilaterally verifiable treaty on the subject. A de facto moratorium appeared to exist on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes in the two major nuclear-weapon States. Concern about nuclear safety had brought to the fore the environmental hazards of both civilian and military nuclear activities. The cessation of fissionable material production for weapons purposes would substantially reduce such hazards and save billions of dollars needed for the safe revival of aging military nuclear plants. Such a measure might be made multilateral and therefore non-discriminatory. It would also help to address the problem of latent proliferation. That would amount to strong reinforcement of the NPT and an effective parallel measure towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

58. Turning to the implementation of the Treaty, he was gratified to note, in connection with articles I and II, that IAEA safeguard reports had not recorded any violation of Treaty commitments. He would, however, prefer IAEA safeguard reports to be more transparent, in order to enable States parties and the international community to assess IAEA safeguards activities. He expressed concern at the nuclear trade and the indirect assistance given to nuclear programmes not subject to IAEA safeguards. Of particular concern was the fact that the nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa were not subject to Agency safeguards. He reiterated that under articles I and II, the transfer of any type of nuclear-weapon-related materials or services between a State party and a non-party, whether a nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon State, was precluded by the Treaty. Concerning article III, his Government urged States that had significant nuclear programmes to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. It also supported any initiative taken to subject civil nuclear facilities of nuclear-weapon States to IAEA safeguards, which would enable the cessation of fissionable material production to be verified.

59. As to article IV, the time had come to ensure more effective realization of its provisions. Since the world had moved into an era of co-operation rather than confrontation, a growing number of States parties needed increasing resources for civilian nuclear technology, in areas such as

medicine, agriculture, hydrology and food technology. His delegation was disappointed that IAEA and other multilateral agencies had not been given sufficient political and resource support for technical co-operation and assistance in those fields. It was also regrettable that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had been unable to reach agreement on important subjects of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and supply of nuclear material and services. His delegation hoped that the Conference would give strong support for the establishment of suitable funding mechanisms in those areas.

60. Regarding article VI, he noted with satisfaction the progress in bilateral negotiations since 1985. The two nuclear super-Powers had concluded the INF Treaty and committed themselves to concluding the START Agreement. However, his Government was disappointed that there had been no agreement on effective limitations, and it thus feared that the quest for a new generation of nuclear weapons would continue.

61. There had been reports of new nuclear-weapon systems, including submarine-based missiles and cruise missiles. Moreover, even if 3 to 4 per cent of the missiles were destroyed under the INF Treaty, their warheads would be retained. The START Agreement envisaged much less than a 50 per cent reduction, but even after a 50 per cent reduction of the two super-Powers' strategic arsenals, those two countries would have 20 per cent more nuclear warheads than they had had in the early 1970s. Current negotiations had not produced any progress concerning a possible agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space. Research and development were continuing in that field. Sri Lanka was thus seriously concerned at the possibility of an expensive and destabilizing arms race in outer space coupled with the development of new nuclear weapons.

62. There was an urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Such a ban was an integral part of the purposes set forth in the preamble and in the provisions of article VI. Moreover, it was seen by a majority of States parties as one of the most effective measures for supporting the NPT. His Government welcomed the step-by-step negotiations taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union for the purposes of limiting the explosive yield of test explosions, and it hoped that their constructive dialogue would enable the Conference to arrive at a parallel commitment to initiate urgent negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban.

63. It was regrettable that the legitimate demands of the non-nuclear countries for effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had remained unfulfilled for nearly a quarter of a century. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that subject had not made any progress in the past 10 years.

64. There had been intense discussions about non-proliferation in the future. All seemed to agree that greater efforts were called for in order to achieve the purposes of the Treaty. His delegation believed that the future

of the Treaty should be considered in a positive spirit so as to strengthen its authority. The Treaty could meet new dangers if the States parties showed the necessary political will to strengthen it. He expected the Treaty to move into the future and not into history.

65. Mr. SOMOGYI (Republic of Hungary) said that participation by the greatest number of States ever at the Fourth Review Conference showed the growing significance that the community of nations attached to the effective functioning of the non-proliferation régime. It constituted recognition of the paramount political importance of the NPT, which was a contributing factor in reducing the danger of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security. The NPT was an important stabilizing element in the current system of international relations, which was undergoing rapid but promising changes.

66. His Government fully subscribed to the political objectives set forth in the NPT and to the obligations aimed at their implementation. It therefore congratulated all the States that had acceded to the Treaty during the past five years and those that had expressed their intention to do so in the near future, and urged all other States to accede to the NPT.

67. His Government appreciated the fact that the basic provisions of the Treaty had been fulfilled. The nuclear-weapon States had not transferred nuclear weapons to other States, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had not acquired nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, concern had been expressed at the nuclear ambitions of certain so-called threshold States not parties to the Treaty. Thus it was crucial for the nuclear policies of States not parties to the NPT to be in harmony with the spirit of the Treaty, thus promoting international peace and security.

68. It was encouraging to note that significant steps had been taken towards halting the nuclear arms race and promoting disarmament. Since the NPT's entry into force, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles represented the first agreement eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons. That initial measure held out favourable prospects. If recent political change was accompanied by political intent, progress in nuclear disarmament would no longer be a mere pipe-dream. His Government earnestly hoped that the Soviet-United States agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons would soon be signed and followed by negotiations on further radical cuts in nuclear weapons.

69. His delegation deplored the fact that there had been no meaningful progress in the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. At the same time, it welcomed the steps taken to bring bilateral threshold agreements into force. Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty could not be delayed any longer. With a new security concept emerging, progress in nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test ban would be in full harmony with the spirit and letter of the NPT and might lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear deterrence.

70. Having signed the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States had accepted the obligation of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in the conviction that the nuclear-weapon States would provide guarantees not to threaten them. As a party to the NPT, Hungary required negative security guarantees.

71. IAEA's safeguards system played a key role in the operation of the non-proliferation régime based on the NPT. Additional countries had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, and all the nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily placed under IAEA control all or part of their civilian nuclear facilities. However, his delegation noted with regret that all States parties to the NPT had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the time-limit set in the Treaty. Compliance with obligations under international treaties was an indispensable condition for any country to be a reliable partner within the community of nations.

72. His Government sought to increase the efficiency of safeguards activities by improving the conditions for the Agency's control in Hungary. It supported all efforts to improve the financial, technical and organizational conditions of the safeguards system. It was firmly convinced that the commitments undertaken as part of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system had not in any way limited its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Its participation in international co-operation activities had enabled it to ensure the safety of its nuclear power plant, to devise modern systems of accounting and reporting nuclear materials, and to undertake research and development programmes. It would continue to participate, as both donor and beneficiary, in the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme.

73. The existing pattern of co-operation between suppliers was an important element in the reliable operation of the non-proliferation régime with regard to nuclear exports. Hungary had implemented the recommendations of the London Club and the Zangger Committee in that area. The changes that had recently taken place in the country's economic activity would not entail any relaxation of its commitments concerning nuclear exports.

74. His Government attached paramount importance to those aspects of the non-proliferation régime that had a direct impact on national security and international confidence. As a small country with a high population density, it was in favour of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and had, with Sweden and the Netherlands, sponsored a working paper on that issue. The tragic consequences of Chernobyl indicated that a nuclear catastrophe, regardless of cause, created transboundary perils. The formulation and conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities therefore demanded international co-operation.

75. The far-reaching changes taking place in the world, which were altering old enemy images, aroused hopes that that issue and the modalities for solving it would be addressed in a constructive manner in the concluding document of the Review Conference. Similarly, consideration should be given to the measures to be taken in cases where a State party, by declaring its intention to acquire nuclear-weapons capability, tended to undermine international confidence in the Treaty.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6

76. The implementation of the NPT over the past 20 years had not been without its problems, but they could not call the Treaty's authority into question. It was to be hoped that the States parties would be able to formulate, and to adopt by consensus, a substantive concluding document that would reflect their endeavours to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The outcome of the deliberations would undoubtedly have an effect on the future of the NPT, whose basic objective was to save future generations from the dangers posed by the existence and spread of nuclear weapons. His delegation stood ready to work in a constructive spirit for the success of the Conference.

77. Mr. KONGSIRI (Thailand) said that he wished to bring 14 points to the attention of the Review Conference. First, his Government reaffirmed its full support for, and commitment to, the NPT and called on all States that were not yet parties to accede to it.

78. The international community must continue to prevent States from obtaining nuclear explosives - by political, economic and security means. His Government urged nuclear supplier States to control exports and transfers of technology most carefully, especially "dual-use" exports. It hoped that more supplier States would join the nuclear suppliers' group with its stringent controls and that the Zangger Committee would be strengthened.

79. His Government was concerned at ballistic missile proliferation and the export of technology to build such missiles, and it urged more adherence to the missile technology control régime (MTCR).

80. It would like to see those States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities place all the relevant facilities under safeguards.

81. In extending co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States should ensure that the receiving State was a party to the NPT and applied full-scope IAEA safeguards based on the Treaty. Apparently, only seven countries had adopted such a policy. His Government urged other suppliers to take that most significant step.

82. In that context, his Government hoped that IAEA would be strengthened financially, and it urged those countries that had not yet paid their dues to fulfil their obligations punctually.

83. His Government also called on the developed countries to provide to the developing countries parties to the NPT adequate technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in order to promote their economic and social development. The implementation of article III (safeguards) and article IV (promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy) should be even-handed.

84. His Government welcomed proposals which would provide more security guarantees that nuclear States would not use nuclear weapons in a possible conflict with non-nuclear countries.

85. His delegation was pleased that the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be held in New York in early 1991, and hoped that progress would be made towards nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

86. It welcomed the new protocols that ensured effective verification of the threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and hoped that the two Treaties would soon be ratified.

87. His Government was pleased that significant progress had been made towards arms reduction agreements.

88. It was happy to note that the number of observers to the Conference had increased, and that China and France were participating for the first time.

89. His delegation endorsed the statement made on 22 August by the representative of Yugoslavia on behalf of the delegations of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not belonging to the East European or Western Groups. However, it noted that that consensus statement amalgamated a variety of views and interests.

90. Lastly, his delegation would make every effort to help the Conference produce a final document by consensus. Given the improved atmosphere between East and West and between the two super-Powers, it was optimistic about the outcome of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

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31 August 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7TH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 23 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia)

CONTENTS

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.7

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said that, in view of the remarkable improvement in East-West relations, his delegation placed high hopes in the Fourth Review Conference, whose outcome would have a significant impact on the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the next five years and on its status beyond 1995. The dispute over its discriminatory nature notwithstanding, the Treaty had proved to be an effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and had thus contributed actively to maintaining international peace and security. The Republic of Korea welcomed the observer delegations sent by France, the People's Republic of China and other States, because their presence would further enhance the importance of the Conference and serve as a first step towards their eventual accession to the NPT.

2. Since becoming a signatory to the Treaty in April 1975, the Republic of Korea had faithfully complied with its obligations and would continue to do so in the future. His delegation stressed the importance of the complementarity of the three objectives embodied in the NPT, namely non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those obligations must be met in an equitable and balanced manner. Regrettably, complaints persisted that the nuclear-weapon States and countries with advanced nuclear technology were still reluctant to transfer nuclear technology to States Parties that agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. With regard to the importation of nuclear materials and technology, States Parties often found themselves in a disadvantageous position as opposed to non-party States. Developing countries that fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, including the IAEA safeguards agreements, were entitled to the international co-operation needed to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Countries with advanced nuclear technology were called upon to provide those developing countries with every possible assistance and to relax restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technology and information and a stable long-term supply of nuclear fuels.

3. Co-operation among developing States Parties in peaceful nuclear development also deserved the support of countries with advanced nuclear technology, and the non-proliferation régime should not be enforced to the detriment of research and development in that area. His delegation stressed the important role of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, held in Geneva in March-April 1987, and hoped that the Conference would be revived.

4. The safeguard measures under article III were central to the effectiveness of the NPT régime. The Republic of Korea had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in October 1975 and had faithfully abided by it. It was regrettable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an NPT State Party with significant nuclear activities, had delayed committing itself to the safeguards agreement for almost five years, far beyond the legal deadline and in clear violation of its obligation under the Treaty. That posed a threat to the NPT régime. His delegation once again

called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA without further delay and to demonstrate its full compliance with the terms of the Treaty, thereby removing a stumbling-block to the reconciliation process on the Korean peninsula.

5. The safeguards agreements must not be used to promote a monopoly on nuclear materials and technology or to impose undue constraints on the transfer of nuclear materials and technology that might be detrimental to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by the developing countries themselves. In the interests of enhancing the universality of the safeguards agreements, steps should also be taken by the nuclear-weapon States to broaden the area of voluntary application of safeguard measures. In that context, his delegation welcomed the conclusion by the People's Republic of China of a voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in September 1988.

6. The protection of nuclear materials constituted another important dimension of the NPT, and adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material would help to strengthen the Treaty. The Republic of Korea had submitted its instrument of ratification of the Convention in April 1982.

7. Major progress had been made in reducing nuclear weapons arsenals in the past five years, thereby improving East-West relations. A comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons was essential in order to reverse vertical nuclear proliferation and would be an effective way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States. A ban on nuclear testing could be achieved through a step-by-step approach that relied on effective verification. In that context, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee by the Conference on Disarmament to examine issues relating to a comprehensive test ban was a positive development, as were the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

8. The implementation of nuclear disarmament under article VI would be better served if placed under the responsibility of the IAEA, inasmuch as the safeguards agreement laid down in article III was under IAEA supervision. Lastly, it was to be hoped that the Conference would make a further contribution to international peace and security by reasserting its firm commitment to the Treaty and strengthening the authority of the non-proliferation régime.

9. Mr. EVANS (Australia) said that the end of the cold war and the resulting understandings and agreements offered new hope of lifting the oppressive threat of global nuclear war. But there was no room for the complaisant assumption that a nuclear holocaust was no longer possible. The reduction in tension between the super-Powers had not led to a decline in regional confrontations. The indefensible aggression committed by Iraq against its fellow Arab and sovereign neighbour, Kuwait, which warranted the most forthright condemnation by the international community, was the first crucial test of crisis management in the post-cold-war era. Events in the Middle East provided a sharp reminder that deep enmities persisted in many parts of the

world and that naked aggression was still not a thing of the past. Furthermore, the capacity of various nations rapidly to develop nuclear weapons was all too apparent, not only in the Middle East, but in a number of other traditionally volatile regions of the world as well. Thus, the need for a joint effort at building confidence and underpinning security was in some ways more urgent than ever before. In an interdependent world, regional conflicts could not necessarily be isolated. Nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation must remain essential objectives for the international community.

10. Although a number of countries had still not joined the NPT, the Treaty had been a remarkable success. It had acquired a position of vital importance as the norm for responsible behaviour in the nuclear field and had become a pillar of the international and regional security framework. It was the foundation for most international trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without the assurances offered by the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, distrust of nuclear intentions would feed regional security problems, and international nuclear trade and co-operation would dwindle.

11. The continued success of the NPT must not be taken for granted. The Treaty would only continue to play an important role if it had the active support of the States Parties. That included making renewed efforts to achieve universal membership in the Treaty through dialogue with non-party States.

12. Since the previous Conference, Treaty membership had grown, and co-operation among NPT members had increased. The Conference on Disarmament had recently agreed on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee to discuss a nuclear test ban. The Treaty of Rarotonga had entered into force. Chernobyl had given renewed emphasis to the importance of international co-operation in nuclear safety. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency had entered into force; Australia had ratified both conventions, and it called for the widest possible adherence to them. Concerns about the quality of the environment and the serious effects that global warming would have on it had led to a reassessment of the place of nuclear power.

13. However, there had also been disturbing developments since the Third Review Conference in regard to nuclear supply and the lack of progress in concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA. His Government welcomed the decision by a number of major nuclear suppliers since 1985 to adopt the full-scope safeguards, in particular Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was, however, regrettable that over the past five years a small number of suppliers had entered into agreements to provide major nuclear items to non-party States without requiring full-scope safeguards. It was especially unfortunate that certain members of the Treaty were among the suppliers concerned. His delegation called upon the Conference to adopt a clear statement that future supply of nuclear items under new agreements should take place only on the basis of full-scope safeguards.

14. Another development of concern to Australia was that not all States Parties had exhibited by their actions and words the support for the objective of non-proliferation that Treaty membership required. Certain actions and statements of one or two States Parties had called into question their intention to abide by their obligations; that was unacceptable. Further, the progress in concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA had been disappointing. More than 50 such agreements remained outstanding. It was particularly disturbing when Treaty members operated nuclear facilities without safeguards and did not quickly comply with their obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement. Australia urged a renewed effort by States Parties to the Treaty and by the Director-General of the IAEA to encourage the conclusion of such agreements.

15. Australia was particularly concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having joined the Treaty almost five years previously, continued to operate an unsafeguarded nuclear facility. Such inappropriate behaviour was an added element of uncertainty in Asia and the Pacific and an obstacle to improved bilateral relations with other States. It was to be hoped that the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would report to its Government the depth of concern at the Conference about the continuation of that situation.

16. The existence of unsafeguarded facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States inevitably raised questions about their use and undermined regional and global security. Australia called upon all States outside the Treaty to adhere to it as soon as possible, to place all their nuclear activities under full-scope safeguards and to work together within the NPT for a more secure world. As to the future, there was reason to be optimistic. His Government looked forward to the day when South Africa and the whole of southern Africa would join the Treaty. His delegation welcomed the presence at the Conference of representatives of China and France and hoped that the re-examination of their attitude to the Treaty would result in early membership.

17. Further progress was also expected in reducing the nuclear weapons arsenals. Yet despite the disarmament steps already taken, there still existed some 50,000 warheads with a destructive capacity of nearly 16,000 megatons, equivalent to 3.3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. The commitment to work not only towards putting an end to the nuclear arms race but also genuine nuclear disarmament was a central obligation under the NPT. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention remained key priorities. Both agreements would play a major role in enhancing the disarmament process and preventing further proliferation. But in the pursuit of a chemical test ban, the NPT must not be placed in jeopardy.

18. A number of challenges remained: maintaining momentum in nuclear arms control; resolving regional disputes which could lead to further proliferation; encouraging all Parties to comply with the obligations of the Treaty; and finding the necessary resources for the IAEA to carry out its specific responsibilities at a time when there were significant new developments in the nuclear fuel cycle. The 1990s would see a steady increase

in the construction of power reactors and in commercial reprocessing, and even in at least one non-nuclear-weapon State. The rate of plutonium separation and the use of the separated material would be higher. The quantity of spent fuel stored would grow, with some stored away from reactors.

19. Those developments would place additional pressures on the IAEA. The safeguarding of fuel-cycle processing facilities was already absorbing a significant proportion of the Agency's safeguards resources. Safeguards arrangements, possibly more demanding of resources, would need to be developed for large-scale commercial reprocessing facilities and for the manufacture and use of mixed oxide fuels. It would also be necessary to decide whether and at what point safeguards on disposed wastes could be terminated. It was of central importance to the continued effectiveness of the NPT that the IAEA had the human and financial resources needed to carry out its safeguards programme. Maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards must be a clear objective of every member of the Treaty.

20. The momentous changes in the international order in the past two years had reduced the threat of nuclear proliferation, but the Treaty would not remain effective if the States Parties took it for granted. Australia would play its part in ensuring that the objectives of the Treaty were achieved. The NPT was a permament feature of the international security framework, and his Government was deeply committed to its continuation in force indefinitely after 1995.

21. Mr. OMAR (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) stressed the importance of the statement made at a previous meeting by the Yugoslav representative speaking on behalf of the neutral and non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT.

22. At a conference held in Paris in 1989, his country had appealed to all States to ban nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the framework of full respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. The decision taken to promote nuclear disarmament had also concerned other weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons.

23. His delegation strongly supported the NPT which had proved extremely useful for the maintenance of international peace and the avoidance of nuclear war that could destroy the whole planet. The Treaty had played an important role in preventing horizontal proliferation; it was essential that all its provisions should be faithfully observed and that all efforts should be taken to promote its objectives. In accordance with the eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs and article VI, cessation of the nuclear arms race and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control constituted the essential objective. In the Conference on Disarmament, his delegation had accordingly expressed its strong interest in nuclear weapons control and in the negotiations thereon. It therefore supported all bilateral and multilateral measures in that connection.

24. Part of the strategy of certain countries was based on the possession of nuclear weapons for use as a deterrent, something that required them to keep

stocks of nuclear weapons. As a result, they would still need to conduct underground tests. As his delegation saw it, such an approach involved a vicious circle detrimental to the goals of the NPT and to the aspirations of the peoples of the world, whose only desire was for peace and security. It was essential to resolve to put an end to that situation and to call for efforts in the right direction. His own country was totally opposed to the further development of nuclear weapons as well as to all nuclear testing.

25. There was also an urgent need for guarantees to be extended to the non-nuclear-weapon States to forestall the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against them. The present Conference could not be content with expressing regret at inaction in the matter, as had been done at the previous Review Conference.

26. Nuclear weapons were possessed at present by régimes that would not hesitate to use them. It should be remembered, moreover, that some of those powers were aggressive and were destabilizing their regions in Africa and the Middle East. He recalled in that regard that the Third Review Conference had "noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel". Israel was not, of course, a party to the NPT. The Third Review Conference had "further noted the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel". The present Review Conference should go beyond mere expressions of concern. It should take action in conformity with the principles stemming from article VII of the NPT. Other nuclear-weapon-free areas ought to be established and no effort should be spared to achieve the Treaty's purposes.

27. It was a matter for regret that little or nothing had been achieved in pursuance of the aims set forth in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and article IV. Article IV proclaimed the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "without discrimination". That provision was intended to apply to developed and developing countries alike. In actual fact, some countries were being denied the possibility of participation in scientific progress and research. The present conference should emphasize that the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should really be made available to the developing countries, thereby giving full meaning to article VI of the NPT. In that connection, the IAEA had a leading role to play. He wished at that point to recall the barbarous aggression in 1981 by Israel against the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. The aim of that act of aggression had been to cut off the Arab countries from participation in that form of scientific and technological progress. Such unjustifiable Israeli aggression had been widely condemned in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Chapter VII of the Charter on, action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, was relevant. The present Review Conference should take due note of that matter and of all its implications. Closer attention to the issue of the security of nuclear installations was plainly necessary.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.7

28. His delegation fully approved of the activities of the IAEA which made its expertise available in the service of verification and in providing safeguards. It had been gratifying to hear the statement by the Director-General of the IAEA and to learn particulars of the Agency's assistance programme for the next five years. Equally satisfying was the progress being made in the application of nuclear technology to agriculture and medicine.

29. An increase in the number of States Parties would further the cause of the non-proliferation régime. The NPT itself could be strengthened by the respect for its provisions, and more particularly observance of those provisions by the nuclear Powers. Lastly the Conference's final document should lay stress on non-discrimination in the application of article VI of the Treaty and should emphasize support of, and urge extension of the NPT.

Mr. Kosin (Yugoslavia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

30. Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) said that the Conference afforded a particularly favourable opportunity for promoting multilateral efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament. In the past five years, there had been some remarkable developments in world affairs. In their Declaration of November 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and that it should never occur. The 1989 Non-Aligned Summit had welcomed the signature for the first time in history of a treaty to eliminate some of the existing nuclear weapons, the INF Treaty, and had expressed the hope that it would lead the way to the adoption of concrete measures for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. By their Washington Declaration of June 1990, the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union had reaffirmed their determination to conclude by the end of the year the START treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

31. Similarly, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact had adopted on 7 July 1990 a declaration which stressed that present developments in Europe were creating the necessary conditions for discarding the model of security based on blocs, and that the elements of confrontation which had previously appeared in the documents of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance were no longer in step with the spirit of the times. For its part, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in its London declaration concerning a modified Alliance, had recognized that security and stability were not based exclusively on the military dimension and had invited the member States of the Warsaw Pact to conclude a joint non-aggression declaration. An invitation to visit NATO had likewise been extended to the President of the Soviet Union and the representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries.

32. Those welcome developments offered clear expectations not only to European and North American countries but also to non-aligned and neutral countries which did not possess nuclear weapons. A new concept of common security based on interdependence and co-operation was taking shape in the minds of the leaders of the great Powers. That new approach to security would be facilitated by the present situation of the two main Powers, which were

facing socio-economic and environmental difficulties, a growing external debt and increasing budgetary deficits: there was a triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security.

33. His delegation was attending the present Conference in the hope that the nuclear Powers would finally move towards the fulfilment, albeit partial fulfilment, of article VI of the Treaty. He wished to stress his use of the word "partial", because although the present situation with regard to disarmament was less unfavourable than when the three previous Review Conferences had been held, the expectations in the matter might well be disappointed. Article VI set forth the undertaking to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date - an undertaking which, read in conjunction with the tenth preambular paragraph of the NPT, had a close connection with the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, in itself an indispensable measure for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

34. In the absence of a total prohibition of nuclear tests, the nuclear arms race would continue indefinitely with new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Accordingly, his delegation could not accept the allegation that the main obligation of nuclear Powers under article VI was simply to work towards nuclear disarmament and that the duty in question was being fulfilled through the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the START negotiations. Only a treaty embodying a comprehensive nuclear test ban could be considered as a first indispensable instrument for bringing an end to the nuclear arms race.

35. Consequently, his delegation could not accept the "step-by-step" approach to solve the grave problem of the qualitative aspects of vertical proliferation. It considered that the bilateral treaties on underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would merely serve to justify the continuation of the nuclear weapons race; their entry into force constituted a step backwards since they purported to extend the limits of nuclear testing, whereas the demand of the majority of the countries of the international community, and particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, was the total and final cessation of nuclear tests.

36. A comprehensive test ban treaty constituted an immediate priority objective and the means of preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that Venezuela, together with five other countries, had requested the convening of an Amendment Conference for the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty with the aim of converting the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban convention. The Amendment Conference, which would be held in New York in January 1991, could supplement the work being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament.

37. It should be noted that the Conference on Disarmament had so far made no progress in the negotiations on such fundamental topics as a nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear weapons race and prevention of nuclear war; nor had it been able to work out effective international agreements that afforded non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use or the threat of use of

such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States had renounced the so-called "nuclear option" by acceding to the NPT; they were therefore entitled to demand firm and convincing legal guarantees that they would never be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons, or still less be the actual victims of the use of such weapons. The guarantee should be unconditional, just as their renunciation in 1967 of the possession of all types of nuclear weapons had been unconditional when they had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and later the NPT.

38. The commitment to non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes stemmed from the conviction that the possession of nuclear weapons would in no way enhance the security of Venezuela and would be detrimental to the security of neighbouring States. His country therefore actively supported the work of International Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to ensure that those countries of the region not yet having done so would accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To that end, it had in 1989 proposed an amendment to that Treaty to enable such States as Guyana and Belize to sign it. It would continue to participate actively to strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean and to ensure accession by all States in the region, including Cuba, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It also supported the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the NPT. The treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga were examples of the efforts which non-nuclear weapon States were prepared to make in order to ensure regional security and contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. As to the inalienable right of all States Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, he reiterated Venezuela's support for the IAEA safeguard system as a means of creating a climate of international confidence and of limiting horizontal proliferation. The system should therefore receive the moral and financial support of all IAEA member States. At the same time, however, the financial burden should be distributed in such a way that the greater part of the costs was borne by those countries with the most advanced nuclear technology. His country was pleased to note the establishment of an IAEA working group to look into that matter.

40. The transfer of nuclear technology, together with access to other technological know-how currently enjoyed by the industrialized countries could help to bridge the technological gap between the industrialized and the developing countries. His country therefore accorded priority to IAEA technical assistance and co-operation activities and was participating in its regional programme for Latin America. Increased financing was required for technical co-operation in order to ensure a better balance between promotion activities and regulatory and supervisory activities. In that context, it was also appropriate to emphasize that developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties should not be subject to any greater restriction on the transfer of nuclear technology than was established in the Treaty.

41. It was almost universally recognized that the Treaty was essential to maintain international peace and security and that it had contributed to

limiting horizontal proliferation. If it was to continue to be effective, its provisions must be maintained integrally and without discrimination. Reciprocity in respecting the provisions and the balance of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties was the best guarantee of the acceptability of the Treaty and the possibility of extending it beyond 1995.

42. Mr. AL-KOTAL (Iraq) said that his region was witnessing important events affecting the future of the peoples both in that region and throughout the world. While some of the events had been positive, others had had adverse effects and were threatening the States of the region in question and the national security and integrity of the Arab States as a whole.

43. The turning point in recent relations between Iraq and Iran represented an advance towards lasting peace between the two Muslim countries. A state of confrontation had been transformed into a state of peace and understanding which would strengthen the safety and security of the region. However, the illegal foreign intervention in the affairs of the region, the mobilization of naval fleets, armies and aircraft in the Gulf and in the territories of some Arab States were negative events. The fleets had been mobilized contrary to international law and were aimed at blockading and starving the people and children of Iraq. They included nuclear-operated ships and ships carrying nuclear weapons. It was reported that foreign land and air forces had spread nuclear weapons among States of the region which were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such military intervention, together with other recent actions, were a flagrant violation of the aims and objectives of the Treaty and constituted a serious threat to non-nuclear-weapon States in the region and to the safety of their peoples and national resources. Immediate withdrawal of those foreign forces was the sole guarantee to ensure a peaceful solution to the current problem - a peaceful solution which should be found by the Arabs themselves.

44. His delegation reaffirmed the principles and aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: prohibition and limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete nuclear disarmament to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear disaster, yet recognition of the principle that States should be allowed to exercise their inalienable right to use peaceful nuclear energy under effective international supervision.

45. Recent years had shown that: (1) in relation to the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to develop, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, the role of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system should be strengthened and all States should ensure its effective implementation; (2) not enough progress was being made towards nuclear disarmament or prohibiton of nuclear testing; (3) there had been an increase in individual actions to restrict the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, with some States Parties slandering others to justify the blockade imposed on such transfer, while at the same time giving Israel - a non-party State - justification for launching a military attack against a State Party, namely the destruction in 1981 of the Tammuz reactor in Iraq, which was under supervision of the IAEA; (4) no positive acts had been taken to guarantee the

safety of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threats of nuclear weapons; and (5) some States Parties to the Treaty had continued to provide assistance to racist entities enabling them to acquire nuclear-weapon capability; Israeli nuclear weapons had become a threat to the security of the States of the region and South Africa had become a source of danger for Africa.

46. He reemphasized the willingness of Iraq to create a zone in the Middle East which would be free of weapons of destruction - including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - under effective international supervision.

47. His delegation hoped that States Parties were aware of their responsibility for ensuring peace and security for all, on an equal footing, and ensuring implementation of the Treaty on the basis of: (1) a more balanced Treaty with fewer gaps and less discrimination; (2) emphasis on the universal nature of the Treaty and the need for all States, especially Israel and other countries in the region, to adhere to and respect article IX, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (3) détente in East-West relations as a source of encouragement to nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligation to do away with such weapons and impose a ban on their manufacture and testing; (4) until those aims were achieved, a positive guarantee to nuclear-weapon States that their safety and security would be guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any nuclear-weapon States, whether in an overt or covert manner; and (5) recognition of the right of all States to use peaceful technologies according to their needs, under effective international controls. It was his hope that States Parties would prepare for 1995 on such a basis, thereby ensuring the requisite practical objectives of the Treaty.

48. Lastly, he wished to ask whether the representative of Australia was aware that imposing a blocade against any State without being instructed to do so by the United Nations Security Council was considered an act of aggression which deserved the condemnation of the international community and that Australia, by participating in imposing such an illegal blockade against Iraq was carrying out such an act of aggression.

49. Mr. DUNA (Turkey) said that his Government considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be one of the most important multilateral arms control agreements concluded to date. By considerably reducing the risk of nuclear war, the Treaty had contributed to the process of international security and arms control. Turkey, being a party to the Treaty, held the view that strict adherence to its provisions by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Parties was of vital importance. The NPT had long proved its value in safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The preservation of the viability of the non-proliferation régime was a task of considerable importance, and it was therefore essential for the Conference to conclude its deliberations successfully.

50. Although the NPT had a larger membership than any other arms control treaty, two nuclear-weapon States as well as certain other important States that maintained unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were not parties to it. His delegation's pleasure in seeing France and China as observers at the

Conference would be further enhanced if their presence could be taken as an indication of willingness to become States Parties in the near future. At a time of profound and rapid political change in some parts of the world, it was particularly important that the Treaty should be maintained and strengthened. While welcoming the newcomers, his delegation urged all States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

51. The progress achieved in nuclear disarmament over the past five years represented a major step in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, he referred to the INF Agreement of 1988, the impending conclusion of a START agreement, to be followed by further talks on strategic balance issues, and the negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces expected to take place after the conclusion of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. His delegation also welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss at informal meetings the topics of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and hoped that the debate on those items would be continued at the 1991 sessions of the Conference.

52. Progress on negative security assurances, a subject which had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for many years, fell short of the desired level. Turkey shared the security concerns of non-nuclear States regarding the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. The absence of appropriate measures to safeguard the security of non-nuclear-weapon States could undermine the objectives and provisions of the Treaty.

53. In connection with the test ban issue, he noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had finally succeeded in agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee. It also wished to pay tribute to the Group of Scientific Experts, which had achieved considerable progress towards the establishment of a global network for the exchange of seismic data, an important element in the future verification system of the test ban treaty. As to the Amendment Conference to be held in 1991 for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the initiative of a group of countries which sought to convert that Treaty into a comprehensive one reflected the frustration of many States with the less than encouraging results of the depositaries' efforts to end test explosions. Unnecessary confrontation in that respect should, however, be avoided. The signing by the United States and the Soviet Union of the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty should be seen as a first step towards the banning of nuclear tests, and it was to be hoped that future negotiations would lead to further limitations upon the number and yield of nuclear test explosions and eventually to the end of all nuclear testing. A gradual, realistic and step-by-step approach towards that ultimate goal was called for. His delegation was of the opinion that further reductions of nuclear arsenals would also pave the way to a comprehensive test ban.

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eeded to co-operate with the
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field of nuclear energy production as well as in nuclear research and development. In that connection, it should be stressed that the requirements of peaceful nuclear installations operating under IAEA safeguards in line with the principles of the NPT must be met at all times; the suppliers should refrain from applying over-zealous restrictions going beyond the IAEA safeguards, something that would result in unwarranted limitation of technology transfer and co-operation among State Parties. Assistance to developing States Parties which had opted for nuclear energy was in the spirit of article IV of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and the industrialized non-nuclear-weapon States would find ways and means, both technological and financial, of making nuclear power an accessible option for developing countries. The spread of non-power applications of nuclear energy among developing countries was encouraging; in that connection, he wished to commend IAEA's performance in the technical co-operation and safeguards field, which had undoubtedly contributed to the recent accessions to the NPT. His Government hoped that the developed countries contributions would be commensurate with the growing requirements of the Agency's technical co-operation activities in the developing world.

55. Lastly, on the question of extension of the Treaty, to be considered at the 1995 Review Conference, his Government stood ready to support an extension for a second period of 25 years under the conditions stipulated in article III, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty with a view to the final elimination of all nuclear weapons and the ending of nuclear testing during that period. He invited other delegations to express their support for extension of the Treaty, so that the final declaration of the present Review Conference might contain suitable language to that effect.

56. Mr. CHANG ON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, in his statement earlier in the meeting, the representative of South Korea had failed to mention that his country served as a military base for a foreign country and as a storage facility for that country's nuclear weapons. Refusal to allow foreign nuclear weapons and troops to be stationed in the territory of any non-nuclear-weapon State was one of the most important preconditions for the prevention of nuclear conflict. In the interests of the safety of the Korean people, the whole region and the world at large, as well as of the success of the present Conference, he appealed to the delegation of South Korea to speak about removing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons from its territory.

57. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that fulfilment by States Parties of their safeguards obligations with the IAEA under article III of the Treaty was automatic and mandatory and was not accompanied by any additional conditions. The attempt by the representative of North Korea to introduce extraneous elements into the issue could not be justified and merely strengthened the suspicions and misgivings of other Parties which, for their part, were faithfully complying with their safeguards obligations.

58. Mr. CHANG ON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said he reserved the right to exercise his right of reply at a future date.

59. Mr. AL-SABAH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, as participants in the Conference were aware, on 2 August 1990 his small, peaceful country, a respected member of the international community, had been invaded by hundreds of tanks and tens of thousands of troops in a surprise attack by the Iraqi Government. The resulting disastrous situation was certainly not the responsibility of peace-loving Kuwait. Only a complete withdrawal by Iraq could bring that situation to an end. In deploring Iraq's insistence on flouting Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662 in violation of international law and practice, as well as its inhuman action of detaining large numbers of foreign nationals in Kuwait in violation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, he wished to express his country's appreciation to those States which had adopted a stance against the Iraqi actions.

60. Mr. AL-MATOOK (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation was opposed to the presence at the Conference of a delegation falsely claiming to represent Kuwait. That delegation had no legal status, and Iraq wished to affirm its reservations as to its presence. The many speakers who had alluded to the present situation in the Gulf area had failed to mention the presence in the Gulf of foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons, whose purpose was not to defend the people of Kuwait but to attack Iraq. Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq and the Iraqi forces had entered the territory at the request of the new Kuwaiti Government for the purpose of defending Kuwait's people and their revolution.

61. The PRESIDENT said that Kuwait was a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All participants in the Conference were Members of the United Nations and, as such, had to be guided by Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662. The presence of the delegation of Kuwait at the Conference was entirely in order.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

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11 December 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 24 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DITCHEV (Bulgaria)

CONTENTS

General debate (continued)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.8

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (*continued*)

1. Mrs. MASON (Canada) confirmed Canada's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the linchpin of the international system of nuclear non-proliferation. It was a tool for preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and building a framework for general as well as nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, it strengthened the role of the IAEA safeguards in respect of verification and helped preserve the peaceful nature of international nuclear co-operation and trade. Canada also attached considerable importance to the armament aspect of the NPT. The legal commitments set out in the first two articles made for improved regional and international security. The fact that over 140 States had opted for non-proliferation was extremely important for international security. Canada welcomed the accession of several other countries to NPT since the previous Review Conference, and was gratified to see that there were observers, including observers from two nuclear-weapon States, France and China. Universal accession to the Treaty was a major goal, and Canada would thus welcome accession by South Africa.

2. The political commitments relating to horizontal non-proliferation embodied in the NPT would be less convincing without the obligations contained in article III. Pursuant to that article, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertook to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that nuclear energy was not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that connection, Canada commended the new voluntary offer agreements announced by the Soviet Union. The Conference should consider extending safeguards to nuclear-weapon Powers.

3. The fact that IAEA had reported no diversion of nuclear material by NPT States Parties confirmed that the safeguards were operating effectively. Canada, which had submitted its exports to the Agency's full scope safeguards, unreservedly endorsed the Agency's safeguards system and hoped that it would be strengthened.

4. In addition to observance of articles I, II and III of the NPT, commitment to horizontal non-proliferation largely depended upon the good will of States Parties, and confidence-building measures were extremely important. The Agency should be requested to conduct specific inspections when uncertainties arose. The proposals made by the United Kingdom in relation to articles 73 and 77 of an NPT-type safeguards agreement afforded a good example. Greater transparency and openness by recipients of items that were not under safeguards but that might none the less be useful in military nuclear programmes should be encouraged, together with greater vigilance by suppliers. In that connection, Canada had a suggestion to make regarding tritium.

5. As to article III, Canada was particularly concerned that North Korea, which had considerable nuclear activity, had not yet concluded its

INFCIRC 153-type safeguards agreement within 18 months of its accession to the NPT, which was a perfect illustration of failure to observe the provisions of the Treaty.

6. Under article IV, the NPT aimed to facilitate international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties were first invited to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and information, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Canada, too, welcomed the Agency's activities in that sphere, as well as the extensive background paper on the varied peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their particular applicability in developing countries. Again, it was important to point out, in connection with the implementation of article IV, that the bulk of disbursements (about 80 per cent) and contributions (over 95 per cent) to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund came from States Parties to the NPT.

7. Many States Parties also participated in bilateral nuclear co-operation, and as a major exporter of nuclear items, Canada had played and would continue to play a significant role in international nuclear co-operation with a wide variety of countries, both developed and developing. It would be submitting to the Conference a paper on its bilateral activities, which included uranium exports, provision of power and research reactors, nuclear technology transfer and training activities. Canada had bilateral agreements with 28 countries which, with the exception of France, a nuclear-weapon State, were parties to the NPT. It believed that adherence to the NPT or to NPT-type safeguards was an essential condition of nuclear supply. Another important point was to clarify the list of nuclear materials and equipment. Some parties to the NPT objected to the additional non-proliferation assurances often required by suppliers. Such requirements were often a matter of national policy, responded to nuclear non-proliferation concerns and provided fallback safeguards in the event that IAEA was unable to apply safeguards. They made it possible to take particular precautions with high enrichment and reprocessing and to have some control over the retransfer of items to third parties. It was within that more comprehensive non-proliferation régime that assurances of nuclear supply could continue to contribute to world prosperity. That did not extend to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, as provided for in article V, for the benefits remained doubtful. As to the provisions of article VI, under which parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, all the efforts undertaken in that direction had provoked the build-up rather than the reduction of arms, in a climate of international tension. However, the international climate had changed considerably since the previous Review Conference, particularly in the East-West context, and States were demonstrating a revitalized commitment to resolve problems by peaceful means. Unprecedented progress had been made towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987, was a noteworthy achievement. The United States and the Soviet Union had reached agreement in principle on a START treaty, which should be signed before the end of the year. They had also committed themselves to negotiating a START II treaty and to pursuing a dialogue on

enhancing strategic stability after the implementation of START I. There were also other indications that the super-Powers had indeed embarked on the path of nuclear disarmament.

8. Notwithstanding a number of difficulties, there were grounds for optimism about efforts to move ahead towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Canada had actively participated in the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

9. Equally encouraging was the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties which could now be ratified. Canada also looked forward to the early resumption of bilateral super-Power negotiations on further restrictions on nuclear testing.

10. The bilateral nuclear negotiations should not overshadow efforts to reduce and control levels of conventional forces in Europe. Canada hoped that before the end of the year, an agreement would be reached at those negotiations which would reinforce the Stockholm document and the application of further confidence-and-security-building measures to be agreed on within the CSCE negotiations in Vienna.

11. The bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of chemical weapons, signed on 1 June 1990 was also an encouraging development.

12. The considerable progress made in the East-West context had contributed to a reduction of tension in several parts of the world. However, tensions continued to be high in regions in which States had yet to embark on the path towards the goals enshrined in article VI of the NPT.

13. In article VII, the Treaty stipulated that nothing in it affected the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Canada fully supported countries that sought to promote regional and international stability.

14. While the Review Conference was being prepared, numerous ideas had been proposed to strengthen various aspects of the NPT. The working paper submitted by Egypt and the proposal by Nigeria concerning negative security assurances were noteworthy and she commended the constructive ideas introduced into the work of the Conference.

15. Lastly, she hoped that the Conference would agree on a consensus final document that would acknowledge the important achievements of the NPT and identify areas in which it could be strengthened. A positive outcome to the Conference would make it possible to establish a basis for considering extension of the NPT beyond 1995. Canada supported an extension of such a vital treaty for an indefinite period. At a time of rapid change, it was

necessary to make a firm commitment to the goals enshrined in the Treaty, in order to build a world in which the power of the atom would be used solely to benefit humanity.

16. Mr. BARNETT (Jamaica) said that, with the end of the cold war, the international environment held real possibilities for the attainment of peace based not upon nuclear superiority or parity, but on mutual trust, respect and a willingness to pursue avenues which would lead to genuine peaceful coexistence among States.

17. The last half of the 1980s had heralded the new direction in international relations, marked by improved relations between the super-Powers and the signing of the INF Treaty. However, the elimination of an entire class of missiles still left the international community militarily only marginally better off, as there were still more than enough weapons to destroy the world several times over. The significance of the recent turn in international relations portended more than it actually meant. However, the prospects for an early signature of a strategic arms reduction treaty and of substantial progress in the Vienna negotiations were all the more encouraging.

18. As long as nuclear deterrence was the philosophy underpinning national security, at least for the major powers, and as long as military doctrines continued to be elaborated on that basis, the paradox implicit in nuclear weapons and security would remain. The decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was small comfort.

19. Although it had not been able to transcend those obstacles, the NPT had prevented an indiscriminate spread of nuclear-weapon States and had prepared the ground for better organized international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an area in which the IAEA had become indispensable.

20. Only a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would prevent the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons systems. Continued testing, at whatever level, implied acceptance of the idea that nuclear weapons were usable and would be used, thus indicating persistent adherence to a doctrine of certain mutual destruction. If no progress was made beyond that stage, then the NPT had not yet provided a suitable framework for the maintenance of international peace and security in a changing world.

21. In the absence of security assurances, there would always be uncertainty which would allow States to invoke more or less convincing justifications. Full participation in the NPT régime by the significant number of States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty should be one of the major goals of the participants in the Conference.

22. The principal concerns initially raised by the non-aligned countries were still unmet, more particularly a comprehensive test ban, a cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons, a freeze and reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, prohibition of the use of

nuclear weapons, and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty, which was essentially about States and not about weapons, had led to scant progress in those spheres.

23. The inalienable right of all the NPT parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was formally recognized in article IV, in which paragraph 2 stated the need for due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. There was no question that the utilization of nuclear energy had an important role to play in the pursuit of economic and social progress in all nations, and particularly in developing countries. In the coming years, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be increasingly crucial for development, and the relevant provisions of the NPT should provide a reliable framework from which all States should benefit. For its part, Jamaica encouraged the widest possible international co-operation with developing countries in order to ensure that maximum benefit accrued to States Parties. The transfer and exchange of scientific and technological information, material and equipment would further the development of nuclear energy for application in the areas of priority determined by each developing country, such as training, agriculture, medicine, health and power. His delegation wished to commend the IAEA for the extremely valuable role it played in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. Only accession by all States to the appropriate IAEA safeguards agreements would allow all to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for development purposes. Effective application of safeguards to all nuclear installations would provide assurance for all States that one of the fundamental undertakings of the NPT was not being compromised.

25. However, the disposal of nuclear waste and surpluses was an issue of the utmost importance and was indissociable from the search for long-term, cheap and clean power. The IAEA had a vital role to play in scrutinizing those questions, which also came under the heading of non-proliferation, and which should be addressed by an updating of the Treaty. It was essential to give the IAEA additional responsibilities and resources.

26. Regional nuclear non-proliferation made an invaluable contribution to the realization of global nuclear non-proliferation. Jamaica was a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibited the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the provisions of article VII of the NPT. Whatever the shortcomings of that Treaty, it encouraged the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other areas of the world and called upon all States to lend their support to such agreements. Jamaica also unreservedly supported the Treaty of Rarotonga.

27. Lastly, he reiterated Jamaica's commitment to the principles embodied in the NPT and its conviction that strict adherence to the Treaty was essential for international peace and security. He was confident that the trend towards the solution of conflicts through political means and international co-operation would gather momentum so that the world of 1995 would be prepared to embrace a much stronger and comprehensive NPT régime.

28. Mrs. BALJINNYAM (Mongolia) said that two outstanding features distinguished the Fourth Review Conference. First of all, the timely change in the international situation had created unforeseen conditions favourable for strengthening international peace and security through disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. It would thus be easier for nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT. Without wishing to underestimate the efforts made by the nuclear Powers, and in particular the USSR and the United States in the past five years, Mongolia considered that the progress made towards nuclear disarmament was still too modest and that much more concerted, collective efforts were needed to produce solid results.

29. Secondly, the present Review Conference was the last before 1995, when the parties to the Treaty would decide on extending it. Hence one of the main objectives of participants should be effectively to support global and regional efforts to implement fully the Treaty's objectives, as the Secretary-General had pointed out in his message to the Conference. It would also be an opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty and to renew their collective efforts to strengthen that important instrument still more.

30. The conviction that nuclear war would be a catastrophe for the survival of mankind had reinforced the determination of States to avoid such a conflict, while the improvement in East-West relations had diminished the threat of a nuclear confrontation and opened up new prospects for a real reduction in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 and its successful implementation heralded a new era in mankind's long quest for a world free of nuclear weapons.

31. The reassessment of the military doctrines of the two major alliances, in conjunction with the expected agreements on conventional military forces in Europe, should prepare the ground for further far-reaching disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures between States. The completion, by the end of 1990, of a START treaty between the USSR and the United States on the reduction of strategic arms should become a milestone in matters relating to nuclear disarmament. In that connection, her Government considered that no nuclear-weapon State should remain outside the process of nuclear disarmament.

32. In the hope that China and France, which were for the first time attending the Review Conference as observers, would decide to accede to the Treaty, her delegation welcomed the declarations made on a number of occasions by the representatives of those two nuclear-weapon States about their commitment to the purposes and objectives of the NPT. It also welcomed the conclusion by China of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

33. Unquestionably, the NPT, which had successfully withstood the test of time, was an essential part of the emerging system of international security. The unprecedented support it had received from the international community should act as a spur for extending it beyond 1995, since full attainment of

the goals set by the Treaty was a concern of all States, regardless of whether they possessed nuclear weapons. The Conference should issue a strong appeal to all non-party States to accede to the NPT by 1995.

34. The improvement in the international climate should make it possible to iron out the difficulties hitherto encountered in concluding an international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft agreement presented by Nigeria and the proposals made by other delegations, in particular Egypt, should serve as a basis for consideration of that issue by the Review Conference and also the Conference on Disarmament.

35. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Mongolia firmly believed that the most effective guarantee against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The most radical means to that end was a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and therefore Mongolia hoped that the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which had been re-established after a long break, would be able to deal constructively with that problem.

36. Mongolia had consistently supported the convening of a conference to amend the 1963 Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty. The decision to hold the Amendment Conference was a clear manifestation of the sense of urgency shared by the international community and of its resolve to put an early end to all nuclear weapon tests.

37. Her country had also supported the adoption of regional measures, such as the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which it considered to be a useful complement to the non-proliferation régime, and it hoped that its own territory would remain free of nuclear weapons.

38. The International Atomic Energy Agency had played a very special role within the framework of the NPT in the application of safeguards and the use of nuclear energy. The success achieved by that system, which was of crucial importance to the NPT's effectiveness, encouraged her delegation to support the idea of further strengthening the system in order to meet the special requirements that might arise in the disarmament context.

39. She unreservedly supported the declaration by the representative of the non-aligned and neutral States, which called upon States Parties which were in a position to do so to expand their assistance through the IAEA to developing countries and to promote favourable financing by international institutions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

40. In the weeks ahead, the participants in the Conference would not only have to reaffirm their commitments to the principles and purposes of the Treaty, but to pave the way for its smooth operation in the future. Their joint efforts towards that end should be reflected in a comprehensive, action-oriented final document which should aim at further strengthening the NPT and achieving universal accession to it.

41. Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria) pointed out that the Review Conference was taking place at a time when global political and security relations were at a crossroads, and at a time of dramatic changes in super-Power relations. Old structures were breaking down, opposing political and military alliances were giving way to new and co-operative arrangements, and world, regional and even bilateral crises were lending themselves to peaceful solutions. The transformations that had recently taken place in Eastern Europe and the climate of improved relations between the super-Powers had enhanced prospects for international peace and security. While that improvement in East-West relations had lent a new quality to political talks and dialogue on arms limitation, the international climate presented fresh opportunities for strengthening the norms and institutions of non-proliferation.

42. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had not only limited the spread of nuclear weapons, it also remained an extremely valuable disarmament instrument both for States Parties and for the entire international community, as it was the most widely accepted of such instruments and had a major role to play in the efforts of the international community to ensure the survival of mankind. It had been concluded in 1968 in order to halt the dangerous slide towards the qualitative improvement and quantitative stockpiling of nuclear weapons that threatened to engulf mankind. It had received broad support from newly-independent States, particularly in Africa, which sought an international environment conducive to peace and stability and devoid of military competition and a ruinous arms race.

43. Nigeria's commitment to the objectives of the Treaty had been both deep and firm. Apart from playing an effective role during the negotiation of the Treaty at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in the mid-1960s, Nigeria had been the second country to ratify the Treaty, after Ireland, and the first among the negotiators. It, had, moreover concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

44. His country was still deeply committed to the three inseparable objectives of the NPT: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and implementation of effective international safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. The NPT's provisions on the rights and obligations of States Parties attested to the special nature of nuclear energy and to the importance of openness in the conduct of nuclear energy programmes. Notwithstanding the asymmetry of the Treaty's rights and obligations, no non-nuclear-weapon State Party had so far exercised the option of withdrawal. On the contrary, the number of States Parties had continued to increase, and in that respect, Nigeria welcomed the nine new non-nuclear-weapon States that had acceded to the Treaty since the previous Conference. Such growing support for the Treaty should further strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

45. It was impossible, however, to gloss over those areas about which serious concerns had continued to be expressed. Questions had constantly been raised about the extent of the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to their obligation under the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any

non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. The current situation regarding the spread of nuclear weapons was disturbing and endangered the non-proliferation régime. It was obvious that, without the co-operation and assistance of some nuclear-weapon States, other States would not have been able to reach the nuclear-weapon threshold. In Africa, that development had resulted in South Africa's joining the nuclear-weapon States, which in turn had made it impossible to achieve total absence of nuclear weapons from the continent, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty. While recognizing some recent welcome developments in South Africa, the countries of Africa remained consistent in their demand that South Africa should take immediate steps to accede to the NPT and submit all its nuclear materials and facilities to IAEA safeguards.

46. Nigeria was aware of the benefits of the applications of nuclear energy in food and agriculture, in mining, water-resources development, medicine, industry, electrical power and research. It attached the utmost importance to international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and commended the IAEA for the crucial role it had played in promoting them. In spite of the growing demands on its services, the Agency was currently in its sixth year of zero real growth. The time was ripe for a substantial increase in the IAEA's regular budget in order to provide it with the funds necessary for safeguards and technical assistance services. Nigeria called for urgent measures to increase the IAEA's resources substantially, as a major factor in the non-proliferation régime. It also called for a judicious balance in resource allocation between IAEA's technical assistance programme and its safeguards, a call which in no way detracted from the importance of safeguards, particularly at a time when the spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities threatened some developing countries. Indeed, the safeguards system should be strengthened and the existing loopholes blocked.

47. It had to be remembered that, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty, all States Parties, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, had accepted a legally-binding commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, the adverse effect of the military posture and defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States Parties were likely to jeopardize attainment of the goals of the NPT. Accordingly, Nigeria urgently called on the super-Powers and other nuclear-weapon States, which were primarily responsible for the implementation of article VI, to take advantage of the considerably improved relations between them to redouble their efforts towards fulfilling the aims of that article. The statements they had already made during the Conference were encouraging and it was to be hoped that they would actively participate in the 1991 Amendment Conference aimed at converting the Partial Test Ban Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty to ensure its success.

48. The extension of NPT in 1995 hinged on the achievement of substantial progress in several spheres: the three Depositary Powers, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, should intensify efforts towards significant reduction in their nuclear

arsenals with a view to achieving global elimination of nuclear weapons at an early date; concerted efforts should be made to bring France and China, as well as the threshold States, into the mainstream of global non-proliferation; the prohibition of nuclear testing should become effective, verifiable and comprehensive; the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States in any region of the world should be discouraged, as it could trigger uncontrollable counter-proliferation and threaten the very fabric of the NPT; technical assistance to developing States Parties should be substantially increased so as to encourage non-party States to accede to the Treaty; safeguards arrangements entrusted to IAEA under the Treaty must be adequately financed to enable the Agency effectively to discharge its functions under the Treaty; non-nuclear-weapon States Parties should be afforded assurances by the Depositary Powers, in a legally-binding instrument, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and lastly, the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged.

49. As the Fourth Review Conference was the last before the 1995 Conference, it should focus its attention on the appropriate means of ensuring extension of the Treaty. In that connection, on 2 November 1989 the Government of Nigeria had formally submitted to the Depositary Governments a proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. Accordingly, it welcomed the consideration of the proposed agreement by Main Committee I of the Conference. It underscored that the proposed agreement, which was essentially complementary to the Treaty, was designed to allay the anxieties of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, most of which seemed to fear that, as a result of having forgone the nuclear option by acceding to the Treaty, they had been placed in a position of permanent military disadvantage in which they were vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. If the proposed agreement was adopted, the confidence of those States Parties in the effectiveness of the Treaty would be restored, as it would ensure them greater security in the nuclear sphere. Moreover, the proposed agreement was designed to encourage non-party States to consider acceding to the NPT. Consequently, it was to be hoped that States Parties would lend their full support to the proposed agreement.

50. In the view of his delegation, the ultimate solution to all problems of nuclear proliferation was to be found in a world in which the possession of nuclear weapons was perceived as both unnecessary and undesirable. Despite its shortcomings, the Treaty had been applied fairly satisfactorily over the past 20 years, and it was to be hoped that States Parties would continue to observe its provisions so that complete nuclear disarmament could become a reality.

51. Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia) said that the Fourth Review Conference was taking place at a time of widespread international détente and serious negotiations on general disarmament, when the relationship between East and West was now based on common interests. Nevertheless, the termination of military confrontation between the super-Powers had not put an end to tension in all regions of the world, as was illustrated by the recent deterioration of relations in the Middle East, which threatened international security.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.8

52. The Treaty was one of the most important international instruments in the sphere of disarmament, security and international co-operation, and the fact that the vast majority of States had acceded to it demonstrated the importance that the international community attached to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was gratifying to see the participation in the Conference, as observers, of an increased number of non-party States, particularly two nuclear-weapon States, China and France. It was none the less unfortunate that some States with considerable nuclear capability had still not acceded to the Treaty, or even to the non-proliferation régime. There was no doubt that the acquisition of nuclear equipment, and above all nuclear weapons, by those States, occasionally with tacit complicity from some States Parties, represented a threat to international security, and particularly the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

53. If the non-proliferation régime introduced under the Treaty was to become truly universal, all States Parties should strictly comply with their commitments. However, fundamental objectives such as cessation of the nuclear arms race and the promotion of co-operation among States Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, set out in articles VI and IV of the Treaty, were apparently far from having been achieved and much remained to be done in that regard. Accordingly, the process of nuclear disarmament already under way should become global, lasting and irreversible. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, an entire class of nuclear weapons had been eliminated. The conclusion of the START treaty, as well as negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons would represent further important steps towards nuclear disarmament, which had always been the goal advocated by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

54. The results of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been disappointing, and the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty continued to be a divisive issue between some nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, despite the fact that the conclusion of such a treaty would be the surest means of putting an end to the nuclear arms race. It was to be hoped that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban would make it possible to continue multilateral negotiations in that field. In addition, the recent signature of the verification protocols to the 1974 threshold test ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes should pave the way for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The initiative taken by Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia to convene a conference on that matter should also help to achieve that objective. The crucial issues included arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and in that respect, his Government considered that the only solution was to adopt a legally binding international instrument.

55. As far as international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was concerned, it was sufficient to mention the failure of the United Nations Conference on that topic in 1987. The Government of Yugoslavia could not agree to any restriction on the transfer of nuclear technologies, as each State had the inalienable right to develop its own programmes for the

peaceful uses of nuclear technologies for its economic and social development. Co-operation in that field should be extended to the environment, and the disposal of nuclear waste in developing countries must be prohibited. In that context, non-nuclear-weapon States should be given extensive financial support to encourage the use of nuclear technologies and energy for peaceful purposes, and IAEA safeguards should be more strictly applied.

56. As to the 1995 Conference, on the question of extending the Treaty, his Government considered that a preliminary exchange of views could already take place at the present Conference, in order rapidly to contribute to the restoration of a balance between the rights and obligations of States Parties and to eliminating discrimination, in the interest of the international community as a whole.

57. The best way to enhance the non-proliferation régime would be to continue along the path to general and complete disarmament in all areas, whether in nuclear, chemical, conventional or other weapons; urgently conclude a comprehensive and complete nuclear test ban; ensure unconditional observance of guarantees to the nuclear-weapon States and enhance international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation hoped that, thanks to the improvement in international relations, the credibility of the Treaty would be enhanced and international security thus better guaranteed.

58. Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria) said that, in spite of the doubts that had been voiced, the Treaty's objectives had been fulfilled to a large extent, although care should be taken not to overlook the fact that some States had still not acceded to it, and the risks of proliferation through the acquisition of nuclear weapons were still a matter of concern to the international community. Furthermore, even if the States Parties to the Treaty were divided into nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the fact that the non-proliferation régime created by the Treaty had helped to prevent new conflicts or the aggravation of existing ones was a source of satisfaction. His delegation was pleased to see that, since the Third Review Conference, 11 more States had acceded to the Treaty, and he expressed hope that all States that had not yet done so, would accede to it as soon as possible.

59. Further to the conclusion of the INF Treaty by the United States and the USSR, and to other recent developments in the field of disarmament, for the first time it seemed that the provisions of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were actually being applied. However, in view of the number of nuclear weapons to be destroyed, the INF Treaty could only be considered as a first step towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In the same context, it was to be hoped that the START I agreement on the reduction of the strategic arsensals of the two nuclear super-Powers would be concluded shortly and that a second agreement would also be reached later.

60. As to the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and confidence-building measures, an initial agreement would undoubtedly be reached in the autumn of 1990, and the relevant negotiations would be

continued in 1991. With regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests, the ratification by the United States and the USSR of the two verification protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was a step in the right direction. All those positive developments were, moreover, largely attributable to the recent improvement in East-West relations.

61. The international community had again and again stressed the need for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, although its appeals had been in vain, and efforts towards nuclear disarmament were hampered by continued testing and the consequent modernization of nuclear weapons. However, the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty were due to hold a new conference in January 1991 and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban had been re-established: measures that were encouraging, even if it was imperative for efforts to continue in that direction. In view of the differences of opinion on the question of assurances by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, it was essential for all participants in the Geneva negotiations to strive to find new common ground. In the area of multilateral disarmament, decisive progress had been made towards the preparation of a convention banning all chemical weapons. The agreement recently reached by the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy the bulk of their chemical weapon stockpiles before the year 2002 was particularly welcome. The bilateral commitment thus made should be a major incentive to bring the negotiations on a multilateral treaty to an early conclusion. It was appropriate to point out non-proliferation efforts should not be limited to nuclear weapons, but should cover all weapons of mass destruction and related technology.

62. With regard to regional aspects of the implementation of the Treaty, the recent satisfactory developments in Europe meant that co-operative security arrangements were replacing confrontational attitudes. Unfortunately, such was not the case throughout the world. Universal accession to the Treaty would make it possible to ease tension considerably, and it was to be hoped that States not parties to the Treaty would bear that in mind in considering whether to accede to it. Furthermore, if the Treaty was to be effectively implemented, all States Parties should fully comply with their commitments; unfortunately, that apparently was not always the case.

63. The policy of the Government of Austria regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was set out in a law forbidding nuclear fission for power production. However, as nuclear fission energy was widely used throughout the world, his Government was principally concerned with ensuring that nuclear materials were used only for peaceful purposes, and accordingly considered that exports of nuclear materials should only be authorized to States Parties to the Treaty which had also accepted the full scope IAEA safeguards. It also welcomed the application of the safeguards régime by nuclear-weapon States to some of their peaceful activities.

64. In 1995 the question of extending the Treaty would arise. The Government of Austria hoped that the positive experience of the past would by

then have been confirmed, proving that the Treaty was indeed an essential feature of the international community's policy in respect of world security.

65. Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation endorsed the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia on behalf of the non-aligned countries, and would point out that the Treaty had three main objectives: prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, peaceful applications of nuclear technology and complete nuclear disarmament.

66. An article-by-article review of the implementation of the Treaty revealed that article I had been observed by most States. Israel and South Africa, however, had developed nuclear-weapon capabilities, with the help of certain nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. Such violations could have serious consequences. In the case of Israel in particular, they had led to a significant imbalance in the security of States in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and thus triggered a horizontal and vertical arms build-up. His Government thus considered the implementation of article I to be a failure.

67. With regard to article II, non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty had complied with their obligations by not acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

68. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had accepted IAEA safeguards, thus complying with their obligations under article III. In contrast, the nuclear facilities of nuclear-weapon States remained, by and large, unsafeguarded. Hence there was no international control over the transfer of nuclear material from the nuclear-weapon States Parties to other States.

69. The provisions of article IV of the Treaty had not been observed. Not only had the developing countries not benefited from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, but they had faced growing and often insurmountable constraints, constraints imposed by the industrialized countries, and in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, which had entered into multilateral agreements. Some industrialized countries had also adopted retroactively applicable laws, such as the unilateral "non-proliferation" laws restricting the transfer of nuclear material and technologies for peaceful applications to the developing countries. Such measures, which were violations of article IV, had drastically curbed the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the developing States Parties to the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran had suffered particularly from those measures, which had prevented it from completing two nuclear power plants in which it had already invested more than four billion dollars. For want of the necessary material on account of export licence restrictions, it had also been unable properly to operate its nuclear research reactor. It had nevertheless been one of the first States to accede to the Treaty, and all its nuclear facilities came under IAEA safeguards.

70. The objective of article VI was undoubtedly the most important of the Treaty, although it had to a large extent long been ignored by the super-Powers. During the cold war, the arms race had reached its peak, but a number of positive developments had since taken place. However, the policy of

maintaining nuclear supremacy and refusing to disavow the nuclear option remained intact. Various States had adopted the doctrine of acquiring security through the achievement of nuclear superiority. Such trends had unfortunately paved the way for a qualitative and quantitative regional conventional arms race, thus boosting the transfer of arms to such regions. Recent developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf were the consequence of that dangerous process.

71. As a whole, the Treaty had apparently been satisfactorily implemented, although a deeper analysis showed serious drawbacks that could undermine its credibility. The rejection by the developing countries of a non-proliferation policy in the field of chemical weapons was an indication of their dissatisfaction. Under the NPT, they had given up the nuclear option in the hope that nuclear-weapon States would follow suit. They had complied with their obligations by not acquiring nuclear weapons and by placing their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. They had thus contributed to the preservation of the Treaty and to world security. In contrast, nuclear-weapon States, together with some other countries that were advanced in terms of nuclear energy, had done very little. Breaches of the Treaty had resulted in the development of new nuclear capabilities, in particular in one of the most sensitive regions of the world, the Middle East. Technical co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been minimal and, in many cases, discriminatory.

72. That trend must be reversed by taking a number of practical steps: commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty prior to 1995, which should eventually lead to a complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests; conclusion of a legally binding instrument to assure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States; the adoption of effective measures towards total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; establishment of an international and legally binding instrument on the basis of the principles of international co-operation for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and the adoption of measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology; and the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear facilities.

73. Lastly, he reiterated his country's commitment to the non-proliferation Treaty and expressed the hope that it would be extended. The Conference should concentrate on cases in which the provisions of the Treaty had not been implemented. The success of the Conference and of the Treaty depended heavily on the will of the nuclear-weapon States to rectify the shortcomings in the implementation of the Treaty.

74. Mr. AMOO-GOTTFRIED (Ghana) said that the fact that over 140 States had acceded to the Treaty made it a unique instrument in the history of international arms control. However, there were serious shortcomings to which the Conference should engage its attention.

75. The first question was the universality of the Treaty. It would be impossible for the NPT to achieve its goal until all States, and in particular those with significant nuclear programmes which had acquired nuclear weapon capability or were close to doing so, had acceded to it. Accordingly, his Government called on all those States to become parties to the Treaty as soon as possible.

76. Some States Parties continued to ignore their obligations under article III and had still not concluded safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Their attitude eroded the confidence of those States Parties that had complied with their obligations. The Government of Ghana implored those States which had not concluded safeguards agreements to take the necessary steps and invited suppliers and their clients to apply full scope Agency safeguards to all their transactions.

77. The Fourth Review Conference was crucial. It had to assess the achievements of the implementation of the Treaty and to adjust to the new political context in order to ensure the Treaty's viability.

78. The ultimate objective of the NPT was complete nuclear disarmament, which required an end to both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear-weapon States continued to improve the quality of such weapons could only encourage non-nuclear-weapon States with advanced nuclear technology to cross the nuclear threshold and develop nuclear weapons. The first step to halt that process was an end to nuclear testing through a comprehensive test ban treaty. The conclusion of such a treaty would be the most concrete proof of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to stop vertical proliferation and to work towards complete nuclear disarmament. The prospects of such a treaty were not as bleak as seemed at first sight. The signing of the INF Treaty, in 1987, had been followed by the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Again, the Ad Hoc Comittee on a Nuclear Test Ban had been re-established, a development which Ghana welcomed as a positive sign of the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament.

79. His Government considered the question of negative security assurances as being of the highest importance. An agreement must be reached on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, failing which certain non-nuclear-weapon States might consider that the possession of nuclear weapons was the only means of guaranteeing their security.

80. In its Safeguards Implementation Report for 1989, the IAEA indicated that in regard to the safeguards system, which was the linchpin of the whole non-proliferation régime, no diversion of safeguarded material to military use had been recorded. However, the IAEA was implementing the safeguards under a zero-growth budget. A dynamic and effective non-proliferation régime depended on an effective and comprehensive safeguards system. The Conference should thus consider the problem of how to increase the financial resources of the IAEA to enable it to maintain an effective and reliable safeguards system.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.8

The Government of Ghana considered that not only the nuclear facilities operated by non-nuclear-weapon States should be subject to IAEA safeguards, but also those of the nuclear Powers.

81. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a necessary step towards easing and eliminating tension, particularly in regions where one or more States possessed or were close to acquiring nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons in such regions was a source of instability and led to a dangerous regional arms race. He commended the efforts made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Pacific and called upon all States concerned to ratify and implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. Efforts should also be made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.

82. In the early 1960s, Ghana had pursued a vigorous campaign for nuclear disarmament. In the early stages of its independence, it had realized the need to mobilize opinion against the atomic bomb and its proliferation and on behalf of world peace. Disarmament and global peace had always been seen as prerequisites for Africa's development. The Government of Ghana associated itself with the statement by the non-aligned and neutral States Parties to the Treaty and would work towards the objectives underlined in the statement.

83. Ghana continued to pursue research in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In most developing countries, the applications of nuclear energy were essentially limited to medicine and agriculture. However, in view of the serious problem of environmental degradation, the developing countries would undoubtedly examine the possibility of replacing fossil fuels by nuclear energy. Yet the prohibitive cost of nuclear power facilities was a deterrent to the developing countries. The Government of Ghana called upon the States Parties which possessed the necessary technical know-how and financial resources to carry out their obligations under the Treaty by helping and encouraging developing States Parties to make use of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and industry, as well as in the sphere of economic and social development.

84. Disarmament should mean not only halting the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them, but also halting the production of biological and chemical weapons and destroying them. The Government of Ghana commended measures adopted by the two super-Powers to reduce their chemical weapon arsenals and called upon all other States Parties and non-parties to the Treaty which possessed chemical weapon stocks to desist from using or threatening to use them and to eliminate them along with all other weapons of mass destruction.

85. Lastly, he appealed to all parties involved in the Conference to approach with an open mind, objectivity and in a spirit of compromise those issues which had not yet been resolved. It was the duty of States Parties to plug the loopholes in the Treaty, to correct its shortcomings and to encourage all States to accede to it.

86. Mr. NAIMI ARFA (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, during the debates, reference had been made to the crisis affecting States in the Persian Gulf region. He requested delegations to use the expression "Persian Gulf" when they referred to the body of water separating the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Arabian Peninsula to avoid confusion with, for example, the Gulf of Mexico. He also requested the Secretariat to use the correct term in the summary records. He would point out that the term had been confirmed by two Secretariat notes dated 5 March 1971 and 10 January 1990.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.



PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.9
10 December 1990

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco)

CONTENTS

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.9

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6) (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that in compliance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference had already elected 21 of the statutory 26 Vice-Presidents. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, the Republic of Korea and Yemen had presented candidates for the five remaining posts. In the absence of objection, he would take it that the Conference endorsed those candidatures.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

2. Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) said that the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons assumed particular significance against the background of the rapid and very important changes that were taking place. Current events should provide the impetus necessary to ensure that the Treaty was both applied and observed. The NPT, whose provisions would, if they were genuinely respected, permit the international community to achieve total disarmament, constituted a most important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world; and that was why the Conference should carefully monitor its application, particularly in countries situated in regions where there was conflict. The Egyptian Government again appealed to South Africa and Israel to adhere to the Treaty as rapidly as possible. It welcomed the decision by China and France to attend the Conference as observers: that constituted a further step towards extension of the Treaty. Egypt unreservedly endorsed the objectives of the Treaty and hoped that the Conference would take place in an atmosphere of dialogue rather than confrontation.

3. East-West rapprochement gave cause for optimism concerning the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, events in the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrated that regional disarmament and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones were very important measures for the strengthening of peace and security. In the 1964 Cairo Declaration, the Egyptian Government had committed itself to the promotion of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa. Furthermore, Egypt had begun negotiations with Iran on the subject of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That initiative had been endorsed by the General Assembly at its session in 1974 and, every year since 1980, a consensus resolution had been adopted on the subject. In 1988 the Secretary-General of the United Nations had convened a group of experts to study the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Egypt looked forward to the group's findings. The Government hoped that non-nuclear-weapon States would abstain from helping others in the same situation to acquire such weapons and was most grateful to IAEA for its study on ways and means of implementing the provisions of the Treaty in the region. It would continue to assist the Director-General of the Agency in seeking to ensure that all the countries of the region placed their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. On 8 April 1990 President Mubarak had taken the initiative of calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a matter of the

greatest urgency, and seeking a total ban on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East and a commitment on the part of all the countries of the region to respect such a ban. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would complement the international efforts undertaken within the framework of the NPT and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to secure a treaty banning chemical weapons.

4. A new era had begun in 1945: the nuclear era, which had also ushered in an age of insecurity. States without nuclear weapons feared that States with such weapons might use them; that was why the Egyptian Government wished to see an article in the Treaty guaranteeing non-nuclear-weapon States protection from that threat. In that connection, Security Council resolution 255 of 1968 was unlikely to be effective. Moreover, although the five nuclear-weapon States had individually declared that they would not use them against States which did not possess such weapons, it was difficult to interpret those commitments, except that of China, as unconditional.

5. The Egyptian Government consequently hoped that the Security Council would adopt a new resolution to remedy those shortcomings.

6. The Egyptian Government invited all nuclear-weapon States to take advantage of prevailing circumstances to step up their negotiations with a view to total disarmament.

7. Recalling that article IV of the 1967 Treaty provided that States should undertake not to deploy nuclear weapons in outer space, the Egyptian Government called on the two super-Powers to intensify their negotiations in order to bring the arms race in that domain as rapidly as possible to an end.

8. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute an important milestone on the road towards both horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. The Egyptian Government therefore supported General Assembly resolution 44/106 on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It welcomed the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament and the creation of a Committee on the banning of nuclear tests and hoped that negotiations would lead to a comprehensive test ban.

9. Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would help to resolve economic crises by freeing resources for the compaign against drought, desertification and pollution. In that connection, the States Parties should have access to the information necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

10. Non-nuclear-weapon States had clearly committed themselves to respect the provisions of the Treaty. It was time for the nuclear-weapon States to do the same. They could make a start in that direction by reinforcing the security of States which had pledged themselves not to acquire such weapons.

11. Mr. ROZENTAL (Mexico) recalled that Mexico had been the first of the Latin American and Caribbean countries to ratify the 1963 Moscow Treaty, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was on

those three pillars, together with the Treaty of Rarotonga, that the present international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was built - a régime which was not yet universal, and which had not achieved its principal objective: a world completely free of nuclear weapons. Mexico's adherence to those multilateral agreements demonstrated a consistent policy based on the conviction that nuclear arms must be done away with. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the corner-stone of the régime of total absence of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Mexican Government once again urged France to ratify additional Protocol I of the Treaty; it also called on all those Latin American and Caribbean countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

12. Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT sought merely to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although for some the Treaty was a brake to *horizontal* non-proliferation, it should not be forgotten that article VI and the preambular paragraphs referred to nuclear disarmament and the banning of all nuclear weapon tests. For the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, however, the Treaty also constituted a brake to *vertical* proliferation. That position was reflected in resolution 2028 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1965 which, in turn, was based on the memorandum submitted by the delegations of the so-called Group of Eight of the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, according to which a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself but only a means to the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament, and that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

13. The NPT was also designed to promote international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that regard, the Mexican Government had continued to support the International Atomic Energy Agency.

14. Welcoming the fact that more than 140 States were currently Parties to the Treaty, Mexico regretted that not all States had acceded to it. The absence of certain States was particularly significant; and the time had come for an open and constructive dialogue with them in order to identify the controversial elements of the present non-proliferation régime and find solutions acceptable to all. The Mexican Government welcomed the presence as observers of many non-party States.

15. The Fourth Review Conference was more important than its predecessors, since it was the last one to be held before 1995, when the Parties would have to come to a decision with regard to the extension of the Treaty. Thus, the present Conference would have to examine those nuclear disarmament measures which must be adopted before 1995, so as to lay the groundwork for the longest possible extension of the Treaty. The three Depositary States, which possessed nuclear weapons, had not met their obligations under the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty, and that was why the Mexican delegation attached great importance to the draft resolution reproduced in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, in which the Group of Non-Aligned and

other States had set before the Conference a proposal designed to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and ensure its extension beyond 1995.

16. He subscribed fully to the statement by the representative of the Non-Aligned Group and expressed the hope that the Fourth Review Conference would make headway in the direction of a genuine régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Encouraging initiatives had taken place in the field of disarmament since 1985; various measures had been adopted since 1987 to prevent the risks of nuclear war and increase confidence, especially in Europe; important agreements had also been, or were in the process of being reached.

17. Nevertheless, the absence of political will to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty continued to be an obstacle to nuclear disarmament. The United States, the United Kingdom and their NATO allies insisted on the need to continue nuclear testing in order to maintain the credibility of their nuclear arsenals and justify their doctrine of deterrence. In the middle of 1990, it might well be asked who was to be deterred. Europe was in the throes of profound transformations. The matter was no longer one of adapting the military doctrines of the past to new realities, since those doctrines themselves had expired. The thinking of the Cold War years had to be unlearned, because nuclear weapons had lost their raison d'être.

18. He welcomed the reduction of 20 to 30 per cent in the strategic arsenals, but noted with anxiety that the weapons themselves were not disappearing, but were being redeployed outside Europe, to other regions. Thus, the nuclear threat had dwindled in Europe, but it had not disappeared. Nuclear disarmament would not be achieved as long as nuclear weapon testing and the production of fissionable material for military purposes continued. The necessary steps must therefore be taken to "suffocate" the nuclear arms race.

19. Mexico attached great importance to the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided for in article IV and in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the NPT, and emphasized the need to expand that co-operation and strengthen the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear energy was an essential component in the energy programmes of 27 countries in which a total of 434 nuclear power plants were located; and nuclear energy already account for 17 per cent of the world's electricity.

20. Several warnings, some of them tragic as in the case of Chernobyl, had highlighted the risks inherent in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Meetings had been devoted to the study of those risks. Interest in nuclear energy had declined in recent years, essentially for reasons of safety and of cost. That was a no doubt temporary state of affairs, and renewed efforts must be made to meet increased demands for nuclear know-how and equipment for peaceful purposes. The development of nuclear energy for civilian uses could give rise to suspicions regarding certain military intentions and article III of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system were thus very important in that context. He noted, nevertheless, that some countries continued to lay disproportionate emphasis on that aspect, to the detriment of the Agency's co-operation programme.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.9

21. Mexico remained ready to play an active role, but considered that the international community's tolerence was not inexhaustible and that it was impossible to continue to sustain a system in which certain countries enjoyed all the advantages and others had reached the limits of their patience. The situation was clear: the principles of the NPT must lead to a real and valid commitment. Otherwise, the future of humanity and of the Treaty itself were uncertain. Mexico urged all delegations to strive to achieve results in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the countries of the world. Any element of preconception which jeopardized dialogue and risked frustrating the legitimate hopes which nations had placed in the Conference must be firmly set aside.

Mr. Benhima (Morocco) took the Chair.

22. Mr. LUONG (Viet Nam) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the corner-stone of the non-proliferation régime, despite all the problems linked with its implementation. He was pleased to note that since the Third Review Conference there had been new accessions to the Treaty. The large number of participants in the Conference, and the participation of non-party States, especially of two nuclear-weapon States, encouraged hopes that the objective of universality of the Treaty would be attained.

23. Since the Third Review Conference, international relations had undergone profound modifications. The world had moved out of the cold war period into one of dialogue and co-operation. There were now real possibilities of preserving international peace and security and finding equitable solutions to regional conflicts. In that context, the process of both general and nuclear disarmament had made great progress. With the entry into force of the INF Agreement in 1988, genuine nuclear disarmament measures had been taken for the first time in history. Also to be welcomed was the signature of the verification protocols to the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976, as well as the progress being made towards conclusion of the START treaty, which provided for important reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. There was reason to be satisfied, but not excessively so, since even if the START treaty were well implemented, thousands of nuclear warheads would remain, enough to cause a nuclear holocaust whose consequences would bring about the total destruction of civilization.

24. The Vietnamese delegation hoped that the nuclear disarmament process would continue, and that non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the nuclear option would succeed in their demand that the nuclear-weapon States fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

25. He was convinced that the most decisive step to end the nuclear arms race was a total ban on nuclear weapon tests. He noted with satisfaction the recent revival, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban, and hoped that it would meet in the very near future. He found it unacceptable that some nuclear-weapon States relied on nuclear deterrence as their official security doctrine and persisted in believing that nuclear weapon testing was essential to ensure the safety

and reliability of their nuclear weapons. Equally unacceptable was the view held by certain States that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests could only be a long-term objective. That position was at variance with the basic principles of the NPT.

26. The Vietnamese delegation considered that the time was ripe for an immediate moratorium on all nuclear explosions, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In that connection, it endorsed the appeal by the group of non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT and also welcomed the readiness of the Soviet Union to adopt such a moratorium on the basis of reciprocity with the United States.

27. The non-nuclear-weapon States had the right to demand that all the nuclear-weapon States renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Unfortunately, there had been no progress in negotiations on that question. So far, only one nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty had guaranteed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he supported the initiative by Nigeria on the strengthening of negative security assurances, and hoped that the changes taking place in international relations and in the concepts of security would make it possible to solve that question in the near future.

28. Concerning the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the NPT, he welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1986, and expressed the hope that many South Pacific and other countries would ratify all the protocols to that Treaty.

29. Viet Nam had on more than one occasion supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South East Asia region, and it endorsed the ASEAN countries' initiative in that regard. His country also supported the efforts being made to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world.

30. Viet Nam fully supported the IAEA safeguards system which, in accordance with article III of the NPT, was designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; it had, moreover, signed a full-scope safeguards agreement for its own nuclear reactor.

31. Concerning article IV of the NPT, Viet Nam paid tribute to the efforts of IAEA to enable all States Parties, and particularly the developing countries, to have access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Like the non-aligned countries, Viet Nam considered that there should be a better balance between IAEA's expenditure on assistance and on its safeguard functions.

32. The future of the NPT would depend on events up to the extension conference in 1995. For the present it was important for the Fourth Review Conference to work out measures that would ensure the global application of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.10
5 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. F. PERPIÑA-ROBERT (Spain)

CONTENTS

General debate (continued)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.10

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) said that the remarkable improvement in the international climate and the enhanced role of the United Nations should make it possible to realize the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals, and promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with due account of the needs of the developing countries that were States Parties to the Treaty.

2. The NPT continued to serve as the corner-stone for the international non-proliferation régime, the Treaty having played a vital role over the past 20 years in reducing the risk of nuclear war, thereby making an invaluable contribution to international stability and world peace. The arms race, whether nuclear or conventional, was particularly destabilizing for developing countries, whose main concern was to improve the living conditions of their populations. To achieve that aim, peace must reign, and disputes must be settled by peaceful means. The arms race made such efforts more difficult, diverting for military uses valuable resources that could have been used for development.

3. Nuclear disarmament was an essential element in any serious steps to bring about national, regional or international security and development, for which reason, Cameroon had always been a staunch supporter of the Treaty, which, on the whole, had functioned well. The total number of States Parties had grown, and for the first time, two nuclear-weapon non-party States were attending the Conference as observers. It was to be hoped that the present Review Conference would take concrete measures to enhance the Treaty's work and that other States would accede to it in the future.

4. Despite the major progress made in reducing stategic nuclear arsenals, the Conference still had important work before it. It must take a stance on the discriminatory aspects and imbalances contained in the Treaty, particularly with regard to the commitments made by the depositaries on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. It must also increase its efforts to ensure that States Parties fully met their obligations under the Treaty. Again, concrete measures must be identified to help to achieve the goal of complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban, as well as to enhance international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. His delegation welcomed the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States Parties that they had scrupulously fulfilled their obligations under article I of the Treaty. No overt case of nuclear-weapon proliferation had been noted since the Third Conference. Yet the growth of the nuclear capability of a number of States that, for the most part, were not States Parties to the Treaty gave cause for concern, as did the alarming rate at which nuclear arsenals were being modernized. The Conference must give careful consideration to developments that might be inconsistent with the obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty.

6. The IAEA safeguards system provided for in article III had worked satisfactorily since the previous Review Conference. It should be noted that on 30 June 1990, safeguard agreements had been in force for 85 of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties (NPT/CONF.IV/12, para. 10) and that no diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material had been detected (NPT/CONF.IV/12, para. 6). His delegation hoped that the Conference would give due consideration to the problems encountered by the Agency in further increasing the efficiency of a system that had long proved its worth.

7. With regard to article IV, the energy requirements of developing countries had not diminished since the Third Review Conference. Non-nuclear-weapon States were therefore entitled to expect greater co-operation in the field of much-needed applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was to be hoped that the non-aligned countries' proposals in that regard would be favourably received, especially in view of the failure of the PUNE Conference of 1987 to achieve satisfactory results. Concern with non-proliferation should not serve as a pretext for preventing countries from acquiring or developing peaceful nuclear techniques or for imposing conditions incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of States. It was essential that the Treaty's three objectives of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially for the benefit of developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and general and complete disarmament should be pursued simultaneously and in good faith by all of the Parties. His delegation therefore hoped that the nuclear States Parties to the Treaty as well as other Parties capable of doing so would undertake to increase their technical and financial assistance, bilaterally or through the IAEA or other suitable international mechanisms, with a view to enabling developing States Parties to derive more of the benefits envisaged under article V. In view of the potential risk to human life and the environment, and bearing in mind the principle of non-use of force in international relations embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, it was also essential that peaceful nuclear installations should be given suitable protection.

8. It was a matter of concern that, despite some significant developments such as the signing of the INF Treaty, the joint declaration on non-proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union and the adoption of verification protocols at the recent Washington Summit, as well as significant progress achieved at the Vienna and Stockholm talks, the undertakings set out in article VI had not been fully discharged during the period under review. The problem of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, like that of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, remained unresolved. He continued to believe that the conclusion of an agreement on the complete halting of nuclear tests was an essential condition for compliance with article VI, and also supported the Nigerian proposal on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/17). It was also to be hoped that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-established by the Conference on Disarmament would accelerate its work with a view to arriving at an early agreement which, together with measures prohibiting the threat or use of

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties, would unquestionably contribute towards strengthening the NPT in particular and the non-proliferation régime in general, encouraging States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and restoring the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.

9. Lastly, stressing the major importance of the provisions of article VII, to many developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, he noted that in 1964, well before the NPT had been drafted, the African States had adopted a declaration on the denuclearization of their continent. Unfortunately, the entry into force of that declaration was still prevented by the attitude of South Africa, which had gradually acquired an alarming military nuclear capacity. His delegation welcomed the consensus reached on that issue within the Disarmament Commission, which would undoubtedly assist the General Assembly in adopting a set of measures guaranteeing respect for the Declaration.

10. Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia), emphasizing the importance her delegation attached to the Conference, welcomed all observer States, in particular France and the People's Republic of China, and expressed satisfaction at the numerous accessions to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference of 1985. In the 20 years since its coming into force, the NPT had not only attracted a larger number of accessions than any other arms control treaty but had also achieved considerable success in averting horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five States which had possessed such weapons at the time the Treaty was signed, in 1968. The present Review Conference was the last opportunity to assess the implementation of the Treaty before a decision on extending it was taken in 1995.

11. The Conference was taking place at a particularly significant point in history, when the ending of the cold war gave rise to hopes that international peace and security might be achieved through disarmament rather than through confrontation and a hazardous recourse to armaments and the arms race. The dramatic changes in the international political climate which had occurred since the Third Review Conference had eased international tensions and brought about important developments in disarmament and confidence-building. In particular, the signature and implementation by the United States and the USSR of the INF Treaty could be considered a watershed marking the beginning of a new trend in disarmament. The two super-Powers were also to be commended for the steps they were taking towards the eagerly awaited conclusion of a START agreement. However, the significance of those two agreements should not be over-emphasized, since they were intended to eliminate only a very small proportion of the total number of nuclear weapons possessed by the super-Powers. Like many other participants in the Conference, Ethiopia considered that the trends in the arms race had not yet been reversed and that the current favourable international atmosphere should serve as a spur to further significant progress in the fulfilment of commitments entered into under the terms of the Treaty.

12. When the NPT had been opened for signature more than 20 years previously, Ethiopia had been one of the first signatory States, not only because the Treaty imposed a legal barrier against the further spread of nuclear weapons but also because it was expected to promote progress in nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, the ultimate goal of achieving nuclear disarmament still seemed very remote today and the threat of nuclear catastrophe still loomed over the planet. Adherence to the Treaty was still far from universal; not all nuclear-weapon-States were Parties, and it was an open secret that a number of countries, having acquired the necessary materials and technological know-how, now had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear capability ambitions of certain States were a serious impediment to endeavours within the framework of the Treaty. If the present trend towards the non-application of safeguards in the transfer of materials which could be utilized for the production of nuclear weapons was allowed to continue, the NPT régime would be further weakened and eroded.

13. With the relaxation of international tensions and the ending of the cold war, the continuance of the arms race had become an anomaly. The nuclear-weapon States should grasp the opportunity offered them by the prevailing favourable political climate by discharging as fully as possible their obligations under the Treaty. A particularly timely and significant step would be the conclusion of an effective, verifiable and comprehensive test ban treaty, which would not only strengthen the NPT régime but would also provide some States with an incentive to accede to the Treaty. In that connection, it was gratifying to note that, after an interval of 7 years, the Conference on Disarmament had re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which had already made a good start on its work. Her delegation appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as possible.

14. Every effort should also be made to conclude an agreement of a legal and binding character on negative security assurances for States which had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons or the stationing of such weapons in their territory. Nigeria's proposal on that issue (NCB/CONF.IV/17) was timely and, in the present improved international atmosphere, deserved a positive response.

15. As to the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Ethiopia had always supported efforts aimed at establishing them; in 1964, it had been among the countries which had taken the initiative leading to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa by the Organization of African Unity, and had worked ever since towards the Declaration's implementation. It was indeed regrettable that continued calls by the General Assembly and other forums to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone remained unheeded. The wishes and decisions of non-nuclear-weapon States to keep their respective regions free from nuclear weapons should be encouraged, respected and reciprocated by positive action on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.10

16. Mr. RIVAS (Colombia) said that the Conference was meeting in particularly complex circumstances which had both a positive and a negative side to them as far as international peace and security were concerned. Ideological détente, rapprochement between the two super-Powers and the rapid changes in Eastern European were taking place at a time of recrudescence of regional tension, ethnic confrontation and a relative deterioration in the standard of living of more than three quarters of mankind. The background was one still dominated by an arms race that was unlimited as far as conventional weapons were concerned and, despite some successes in regard to nuclear weapons, an undeniable increase in the danger of horizontal proliferation, regardless of international commitments to the contrary. There was clear consensus on the virtues of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the positive results achieved in the 20 years it had been in force. The Treaty had sought to prevent unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons, pointing a finger at those who had fraudulently violated its provisions; it had succeeded in establishing what was, on the whole, a serious and useful system of verification.

17. None the less, while international opinion recognized the merits of the Treaty, it was also convinced that the NPT needed to be strengthened and complemented in some areas. Compliance was called for on the part of both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. Articles I and II should not be circumvented in any way and should cover not only nuclear weapons and explosives as such but also those elements inextricably linked with the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

18. The verification system established in article III of the Treaty should be made universal so that safeguards could be extended to all components essential for the use of nuclear energy, including those intended for peaceful uses, and should be extended to all States, which benefited from the transfer of technology or of nuclear materials. The limitations which hampered the work at the IAEA - lack of resources and lack of international commitment - must disappear to give rise to a less discriminatory system and provide greater security for the cause of peace and security.

19. The principle set out in article IV of the Treaty should be supplemented by a policy to make it possible in practice to achieve the objectives of developing research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Developing countries in particular faced great difficulty in enjoying the benefits of nuclear scientific and technological achievements. Such countries as had endorsed the Treaty and were fulfilling their obligations should not be prejudiced by the type of co-operation that some nuclear States provided to non-party States, in clear violation of their legal obligations. In that respect, his delegation endorsed the statement made to the Review Conference by the spokesmen for the Non-Aligned States and other States Parties not forming part of the Western and Eastern European groups.

20. The Conference afforded an exceptional opportunity for nuclear powers to strengthen their commitment under article VI. Important, albeit partial, steps had been taken on the road to nuclear disarmament, or rather to a lower

rate of nuclear armament. There was no doubt, however, that international opinion and the aspirations of all peoples continued to be in favour of bolder and more ambitious measures in that field. It was not enough for the two super-Powers to agree on certain limitations to their nuclear arsenals while leaving their destructive capacity intact, if nuclear-weapon States continued the race towards technical improvement of their weapons of mass destruction and a vertical proliferation which continued to threaten mankind, something that was against the very spirit of the Treaty.

21. Article VI fundamentally concerned the nuclear-weapon and potential nuclear-weapon States. It was difficult to imagine any serious attempt at nuclear disarmament that did not involve a ban on nuclear weapons testing. For that reason, there was increasing support for a total ban treaty to complement the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. His delegation, while not having called for the Amendment Conference for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, none the less recognized the importance of such a Conference.

22. One aspect of overwhelming importance was that of assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Throughout the period of negotiation of the Treaty, the concern of those States at being exposed to a situation in which nuclear-weapon States were not subject to any binding commitment not to use such weapons had been evident and had been reflected in the attitude of nuclear-weapon States parties, which had sponsored the agreement resulting in 1968 in the adoption of Security Council resolution 255. However, that "positive" assurance had never been considered sufficient by the non-nuclear-weapon States, even when strengthened by later declarations by States Parties and other States. The reasons for such dissatisfaction were clearly outlined in the document presented by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17). The Colombian delegation therefore considered that the time had come to embark on negotiations to provide sufficient guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. Such negative assurances deserved to be given careful consideration so that they might be refined and enriched by the international community for the purposes of complementing the non-proliferation system and making it truly universal.

23. To achieve universality and to secure the spirit in which the Treaty had been negotiated, efforts must be undertaken to ensure that nuclear-weapon States, and non-nuclear-weapon States that were not yet parties acceded to the Treaty as soon as possible. The difficulties encountered by many States in relation to the Treaty should be resolved in the interests of the cause of world peace. While it would be difficult under present circumstances to amend the text of the Treaty itself, it was possible and desirable to improve and complement its provisions by means of additional agreements, preferably on a multilateral basis, covering aspects essential to the non-proliferation system and nuclear disarmament.

24. Such interest in strengthening, making up the shortcomings and extending the scope of the Treaty did not, however, mean that it must be considered as the only possible system to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons and arrive

at nuclear disarmament. Regional instruments, the most significant being the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, provided a valuable means of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had preceded the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did not cover the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba not having acceded to it. It was unnecessarily weakened and the force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself was prejudiced as a result. His country was pleased to note the efforts being made by some countries in Latin America to amend provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that were preventing other countries from becoming parties to it. The Treaty also had the merit of compelling nuclear Powers to respect the denuclearization commitment of the States Parties and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States, thereby establishing the negative assurance that was lacking in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that respect, the efforts of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) to achieve the universality of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and monitor compliance with the relevant obligations were welcome; document NPT/CONF.IV/15 from that body was an important contribution to the present Review Conference.

25. In view of the obligation for States Parties to decide in 1995 whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a given period, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, it was necessary to define clearly the characteristics of the future Conference and the opportunities it offered. It was important to determine whether only the matter of extending the Treaty was to be discussed or whether the question of a review might also be included. In that respect, the work of the Preparatory Committee would be followed with interest. His delegation hoped that the wealth of material obtained from the four Review Conferences held so far would be duly utilized at the 1995 meeting.

26. Colombia, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, considered that the present Conference should, on the basis of the statements made by participating countries and particularly the statements made on behalf of nuclear-weapon States, reaffirm the validity and usefulness of the Treaty. At the same time, it was necessary to go further and ease the way for those States which had not completely fulfilled their obligations to do so in the future. It must not be forgotten that nuclear disarmament, as an essential complement to non-proliferation, was only one stage in mankind's long-term objective, which was general and complete disarmament. Such a goal was fundamental to the Treaty, and indeed was specified in article VI. His country continued to hope that the text of that article would not remain a dead letter but would become a reality and would guarantee mankind the future to which it was entitled.

27. Mr. RIVADENEIRA (Ecuador) said that the international community must undertake major efforts to banish the true causes of confrontations between nations by seeking equitable solutions to enormous past injustices and reducing the glaring disparities between rich and poor countries. Only then could the world live in peace and harmony. If backwardness, hunger and

disease and the crushing external debt of the developing countries were eliminated, the spectre of nuclear war would fade, particularly now, when the East-West struggle had considerably declined.

28. His delegation supported the point of view of the Non-Aligned Countries, particularly with regard to the halting of nuclear tests; Ecuador, with its coastline on the Pacific Ocean, was deeply concerned that testing continued despite repeated international protest. His Government also deemed it extremely important to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the developing countries.

29. His delegation underscored the importance of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Ecuador actively supported those two instruments and was prepared to work towards greater implementation and an extension of the TNP. It was to be hoped that the steps needed to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would be taken without delay and he fully endorsed the memorandum submitted by General Secretariat of OPANAL (NPT/CONF.IV/15).

30. Since the Third Review Conference, a new denuclearized zone had been created in 1986 under the Treaty of Rarotonga, a landmark on the road to the denuclearization of the planet. Hopefully, other nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, preferably in regions that had been focal points of international conflict and tension. It was also important for the various international forums on disarmament, for example the Conference on Disarmament, the Fourth Review Conference itself and those meetings that examined the problems of other types of weapons of mass destruction or the use of the marine environment and outer space, to co-ordinate their work and exchange information so as to arrive at allied general solutions. Equally crucial was the need to control the production and sale of conventional weapons, which, in the long run, could prove to be just as cruel and devastating. One major shortcoming of the NPT was its absence of universality, and the Conference should therefore reiterate its appeal to all nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States, especially threshold States, to accede to the Treaty. Without their participation, the NPT would never achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament.

31. Ecuador was deeply concerned that it was possible to avoid complying with the obligation under article I of the Treaty not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to non-party States, that had begun development of nuclear programmes without being subject to the Treaty's restrictions. It was incomprehensible that military assistance could be provided to countries known to be experimenting with vectors for nuclear warheads.

32. According to the data provided by the IAEA, few nuclear facilities in the States Parties to the Treaty were not subject to the safeguards régime. His Government wondered, however, how useful those safeguards could be if both nuclear-weapon States and threshold States refused to accept them. The Agency

should be commended for its efforts in implementing safeguards and working towards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but much remained to be done. The technical assistance resources offered by the IAEA to help developing countries acquire nuclear energy sources - in support of their economic and social development - continued to be scarce. Thus, there was an inexplicable imbalance in the importance that the Agency's main contributors attached to article III and to article IV of the Treaty. The granting of resources for IAEA's verification work should in no case be to the detriment of technical assistance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

33. While he welcomed the efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States to comply with article VI of the Treaty, it was important to make further progress in negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. The exceptionally favourable international situation must be used to convert the Partial Test Ban Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear testing, the long-term goal being complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.11
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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)
later: Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

CONTENTS

General debate (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.11

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. ANDERSSON (Sweden) said that the five years since the previous Review Conference had been exceptional and optimistic, particularly as a result of the radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and because the end of the cold war gave reason to hope for a significant improvement in international relations. However, recent developments in the Middle East were a cause of serious concern. It would be regrettable if the easing of the East-West tensions was followed by North-South confrontation at a time when world security could no longer be assured by deterrence. It was thus essential to formulate new principles for maintaining the security of all nations, and in that connection the recent enhancement of the role of the United Nations Security Council in matters vital to international security was to be welcomed.

2. Significant progress had been made in the field of nuclear disarmament. In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to begin negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Subsequent declarations by the two major nuclear Powers had demonstrated to the world community that policy makers were now asking fundamental questions about the future role of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. The first real step towards nuclear disarmament had been the conclusion in 1987 of the bilateral INF Treaty, which provided for the elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons. The comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, in which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States had participated, had also made a valuable contribution to the analysis of the matter. In the European context in particular, negotiations were under way on both disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures. The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) were expected to adopt regional measures in the near future; and although military negotiations had so far been concerned with conventional weapons, they were also expected to address the issue of nuclear weapons in the future.

3. The Fourth Review Conference could not but observe that, five years on, nuclear weapons posed the same grave threat, and that the capacity of the various arsenals was still considerable and likely to remain so indefinitely, even after the cuts envisaged in the START negotiations. Moreover, even if the arms race had slowed down in quantitative terms, refinements were constantly being introduced in the latest nuclear weapons; as long as such weapons existed, there would always be a danger that they would be used. Worse still, horizontal proliferation and the spread of missile technology added another frightening dimension to the problem. Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons could come about in various ways, for example, the installation, after radical political change, of a régime with access to such weapons. For its part, the Swedish Government had always maintained that the possession of nuclear weapons could never fully guarantee a country's security and, in fact, constituted a potentially dangerous threat to regional stability. The security of States could best be assured through the steadfast application of democratic principles, respect for human rights

and the economic well-being of their citizens. With those considerations in mind, the Swedish Government endorsed all the efforts made to create a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

4. The non-proliferation régime, of which the Treaty constituted the corner-stone, must be strengthened so that it could contribute in greater measure to ensuring the security of all States. It was encouraging to note that since the Treaty's entry into force, the number of officially declared nuclear-weapon States had not increased and that the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon countries had renounced that option by acceding to the Treaty. Furthermore, since the previous Review Conference, 10 States had ratified the Treaty and Albania had decided to accede to it; two nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty, France and China, were for the first time represented by observers at the present Conference. His Government also noted with satisfaction the joint declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to the effect that, once united, they would continue to observe the rights and obligations stemming from the Treaty. Those were all generally positive developments, and the Nordic countries had played their part in the process by a number of initiatives designed to persuade non-NPT States to accede to the Treaty.

5. The best way of achieving universality adherence lay in bringing about a situation in which all States Parties strictly observed the provisions of the Treaty, not only in peace-time but also in times of crisis or war. It was also highly desirable to pursue comprehensive negotiations on nuclear disarmament, including naval disarmament, with the objective of banning nuclear weapons from all ships and submarines other than those placed in classes specially designated by agreement. Such a prohibition should cover all sea-lauched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Moreover, in fulfilment of their obligations in that respect, States Parties should obviously conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty so as to halt the qualitative improvement and horizontal proliferation of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons. The Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union contained no binding provisions in that connection. The Swedish Government hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban would be reactivated at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament, since it had already been clearly demonstrated that the international community had at its disposal the scientific and technical means of verifying observance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and draft treaties on the subject were already on the table. In the meantime, the principal nuclear-weapon States should now declare a nuclear test moratorium. In that connection, Sweden shared Finland's serious concern about nuclear tests in the Arctic. It also considered that all production of new nuclear material which might be used to build weapons should be halted, and that any agreement reached in that connection should be verifiable, the prerequisite for any verification of that nature being separation, in nuclear-weapon States, of nuclear activities for peaceful and for military purposes. In addition, nuclear warheads should be dismantled and destroyed, all resultant transfers of fissionable material being monitored under IAEA safeguards.

6. States which had renounced nuclear weapons by acceding to a legally binding international instrument were fully entitled to negative security assurances and the guarantee that they would be safe from attack, or the threat of attack, by nuclear weapons, on the part of nuclear-weapon States. Such assurances must be straightforward and unequivocal, in contrast with those provided under the existing régime, which involved reservations that gave rise to ambiguities.

7. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was among the most important of non-proliferation measures.

8. The Chernobyl disaster stood out as one of the most tragic events of the five past years. It was regrettable that, despite the appeal made at the previous Review Conference for the speedy adoption of a treaty banning attacks on nuclear facilities, no progress in that area had been reported from the Conference on Disarmament. It was to be hoped that the Fourth Review Conference would address that issue again; with that in mind, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden had submitted working paper NPT/CONF.IV/22.

9. The importance of disarmament issues should not eclipse the provisions of the Treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, IAEA was playing a fundamental role in international co-operation, and was at the centre of exchanges and technical assistance, notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Swedish Government noted with satisfaction that, since the Third Review Conference, IAEA had not detected any diversion of significant amounts of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices. States Parties to the Treaty which had not yet done so must, as a matter of urgency, conclude safeguard agreements with IAEA, thereby fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. States which were not parties to the Treaty and had not yet submitted their nuclear programmes to IAEA full-scope safeguards should - as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had done - take that step. The application of full-scope safeguards should be a prerequisite for any transfer of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. All nuclear-weapon States should also place their peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards régime, in keeping with the principle of universal application. In that connection, his Government welcomed the offer by the Soviet Union to submit all its civil reactors to IAEA safeguards. Illicit activities in the nuclear field were the cause of grave concern and created serious risks of proliferation. For that reason, all participants in international nuclear trade should receive the assurance that nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes would not be diverted to military ends. Every effort should also be made to limit the production and circulation of nuclear materials that could serve for the construction of weapons. That was why the direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel was preferable to reprocessing, and all States should consider the establishment of an international plutonium storage régime. Again, with the increasing complexity of existing installations, verification schemes would themselves

have to become increasingly sophisticated and the States Parties to the Treaty should consequently commit themselves to providing IAEA with resources that would enable it to cope with an increasing work-load.

11. On matters of safety, international co-operation had increased since the accident at the Chernobyl reactor and it was to be hoped that IAEA would devote even greater efforts to the verification of the safety of reactors already in operation and of the oldest installations. The Swedish Government fully endorsed IAEA's work on nuclear safety regarding the entire nuclear fuel cycle and the elimination of all forms of nuclear waste, and would point out that, as more and more countries undertook nuclear research and launched nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes, the international community should increase its assistance in that domain.

12. The Conference would have a crucial bearing on the future of the Treaty, since it was the last before 1995, when the States Parties would have to come to a decision on the extension of the Treaty. It should be pointed out in that respect that the Treaty was one of the major instruments whose application would permit the attainment of the final goal, namely, the assurance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, which could only be in the interests of civilization and of the generations to come.

13. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh) said that the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the measures necessary to prevent nuclear catastrophes should be the prime objectives of the international community. He reaffirmed Bangladesh's total commitment to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty which, in spite of its limitations, was the only international instrument for promoting nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the ultimate objective was the establishment of a world order in which there would be no reason for the NPT and in which peace and security would be guaranteed and regional conflicts would be a thing of the past.

14. Any erosion of the norms of non-proliferation would also have consequences for the nuclear-weapon States. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States would no longer be unlawful; the result would be to a system of multiple deterrence.

15. The NPT was a complex instrument with inherent contradictions. There was no technical difference between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The problem posed by the control of atomic energy was that it could be both useful and destructive, and hence the difficulty of implementing articles I to IV of the Treaty. That duality had given rise to differing interpretations of the expression "non-proliferation". Two fundamental issues were posed: the supply of nuclear products and nuclear disarmament. As far as nuclear supplies were concerned, articles III and IV of the Treaty were incompatible. In article III, States undertook to accept the safeguards administered by the IAEA, whereas article IV affirmed the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, article III, paragraph 2, was discriminatory, as it did not exclude supplying material to non-party States and left open the question of whether all nuclear activities or only those directly related to

the use of nuclear energy should be subject to safeguards. The various interpretations of those two provisions had raised a number of controversies: some States had asserted that there was no incompatibility between articles III and IV and that the safeguards system made it possible to prevent proliferation while encouraging the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without fear of diversion of fissionable material to manufacture explosive devices, while others took the view that the safeguards system was inadequate and weak on account of budgetary constraints and the new demands placed upon it. The system had become lax: discrimination was practised and nuclear equipment and technology were transferred regardless of the safeguards.

16. The meaning of the word "proliferation" had changed. When the negotiations on the Treaty had begun in 1960, proliferation had meant the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives. By the mid-1970s, proliferation had been defined as the acquisition not only of nuclear weapons but also of their non-nuclear components. However, the safeguards system had remained restricted to fissionable material. No restriction was placed on the transfer and production of nuclear delivery systems. The only restrictions were those applied by the supplier States under domestic law. Unfortunately, that had failed to stop the transfer of critical technology and material and, although groups of suppliers had attempted to implement measures to supplement the system for monitoring exports of nuclear technology, they themselves had practised discrimination. The fact that some industrialized countries had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA had contributed to the latent proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the emergence of an intermediate position between having the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons and actually making them.

17. The consequences of those loopholes were varied. Some industrialized States had allegedly breached the provisions of article I by indirectly transferring nuclear technology and equipment to non-party States. Other States Parties took advantage of the loopholes to evade their obligation to accept IAEA safeguards. Trade by non-party States with advanced nuclear technology that sought export markets for their nuclear facilities and material was another problem.

18. Again, some neutral non-nuclear-weapon States Parties thought that the safeguards system was based on monitoring and did not encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Exports restrictions had denied them access to peaceful nuclear technologies, contrary to the provisions of article IV of the Treaty.

19. Over the past five years, demand in the nuclear energy sphere had declined. The drop in oil prices, nuclear accidents and the waste disposal problem had cast doubt on the feasibility of nuclear energy. A further factor had been the high cost of nuclear programmes and the lack of assistance for the developing countries.

20. Although major progress had been made in the implementation of article VI, the detractors of the NPT levelled a number of criticisms against it. According to them, the reduction in conventional and nuclear weapons had been offset by qualitative improvements. It had been underscored that arms

limitation negotiations had encouraged the qualitative development of weapons. The Treaty continued to be implemented partially rather than integrally. It focused excessively on the prevention of horizontal proliferation, while vertical proliferation had not been checked. Obstacles continued to hamper all activities in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

21. Despite some encouraging signs, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was unlikely to be concluded in the near future. The depositary Governments seemed unprepared to make the appropriate amendments to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty until verification methods had been improved and nuclear weapons considerably reduced. Those restrictions also lessened the likelihood of new collateral measures designed to promote general and complete disarmament. A commitment to provide both positive and negative security assurances in the form of a collective declaration would confirm the intentions of States. As far as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was concerned, the issue was a complex one that gave rise to reservations on the part of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. Highlighting the loopholes, contradictions and shortcomings of the Treaty was necessary to progress further. In addition, the progress made focused attention on those shortcomings. The current need was to identify how the credibility of the Treaty could be enhanced. It was not an ideal instrument and required improvement. Nevertheless, it would be no easy matter to amend the text or to add further protocols, in view of the difficulty of implementing the procedure provided for in article VIII. However, it was necessary to find means of more effectively applying the provisions and deciding in which fields efforts had to be intensified. His delegation endorsed the opinion expressed by Nigeria and Egypt. In order to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all States should still be encouraged to accede to it by convincing them that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was not inevitable. The IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened in order to satisfy the growing demand, and IAEA itself should be strengthened and its resources increased to allow it to monitor the implementation of safeguards and to encourage co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. States Parties should rationalize trade in nuclear products by standardizing and reinforcing export legislation so as to generate a uniform export code. The application of full-scope safeguards should be promoted and no supply agreements should be reached with States unless they placed all their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The safeguards system should be observed by all States Parties, and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty should comply with their obligation to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. Lastly, access to the peaceful use of atomic energy should be broadened and economic incentives should be provided to developing States Parties with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Bangladesh had submitted a working paper on the subject to Main Committee III.

23. As to nuclear disarmament, first of all stronger efforts should be made to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. While it welcomed the progress achieved in that direction, and in particular the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, his delegation considered that a partial test-ban treaty was not enough to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. The only intermediate stage would be a fixed-term moratorium on tests. It was also necessary to strengthen the security assurances provided to non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, pressure should be maintained so as to ensure that proposals for regional disarmament were implemented. Bangladesh shared the view that article V should no longer be applied, as it ran counter to a comprehensive test ban. Moreover, a follow-up mechanism should be established between review conferences. Consultations should be carried out to prepare for the 1995 Conference, at which States Parties would have to decide on extending the Treaty.

24. In conclusion, he wished to reaffirm that Bangladesh considered the Treaty as a valuable instrument to achieve progress in disarmament, peace and international security.

Mr. Kralik (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) took the Chair.

25. Mr. VILLARROEL (Philippines) said that the Fourth Review Conference should examine means of strengthening the provisions of the Treaty in order to attain its objectives. Since the non-proliferation Treaty had come into force, many events had occurred that could have a bearing on its viability. The vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had continued. Horizontal proliferation was a threat, as non-party States were on the point of acquiring nuclear capacity. The hope of halting the nuclear arms race and of achieving disarmament through the NPT was diminishing.

26. Article VI of the Treaty was the major sticking point. Notwithstanding the progress in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, an end to the nuclear arms race was still no closer than in 1968. Admittedly, an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban had been set up at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but it had received no mandate to negotiate or to elaborate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. It had, therefore, hardly been possible to make any signficant progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

27. However, it was no longer time to hesitate. The crisis confronting the Middle East demonstrated the extent to which weapons of mass destruction had made peace precarious. It was more urgent than ever to further the interests of non-proliferation and to bring the arms race to a halt. The technological means available for verification, the new spirit of openness and the acceptance of intrusive methods of inspection had made it possible for both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to adopt confidence-building measures. Yet virtually nothing had been done to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests. The Philippines, which was a party to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty favoured an amendment to the Treaty in order to bring about a comprehensive nuclear test ban. His Government would support any proposal for the immediate application of a nuclear test moratorium until the Fifth Review Conference of the Treaty. In that connection, his delegation unreservedly supported the draft resolution on disarmament and other security-related issues, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States.

28. As far as article IV was concerned, the accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, together with the problem of nuclear waste storage, had considerably altered the position of many States regarding the use of nuclear energy. In 1986, the new Philippine Government had made the decision not to bring into operation the country's first nuclear power plant, in Bataan province, on account of the inadequate safety measures and the vulnerability of the plant to an earthquake or volcanic eruption. Nevertheless, nuclear energy remained the most viable alternative to energy sources that contributed to environmental degradation through the build-up of carbon dioxide, methane and chlorofluocarbons. Meanwhile, thanks to the steps proposed to improve safety in nuclear power plants and nuclear-waste-disposal systems, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be continued.

29. There had been instances in which States had been discriminated against and had not enjoyed all the benefits contained in article IV on account of export restrictions affecting "sensitive" technology. Such discriminatory treatment should be avoided. The Philippines recognized the Treaty's vital role in international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and reaffirmed the inalienable right of any State Party to develop nuclear research and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty.

30. His delegation noted with satisfaction the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which sought to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology through its technical assistance and co-operation programme.

31. Special mention should be made of the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific, which had matured into an effective instrument for improving the level of self-sufficiency in the utilization of radiation in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry.

32. Other steps had been suggested to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As far as articles I and II were concerned, nuclear export legislation should be tightened and a universal nuclear export code developed. Non-nuclear-weapon States which refused to accept full-scope safeguards should be denied nuclear material and equipment.

33. With regard to article III, the Philippines advocated a strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow it effectively to monitor nuclear trade and any diversion of nuclear material and equipment for military purposes. In that connection, the Philippines called for continued efforts universally to apply IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities of all States.

34. His country noted with satisfaction that, as of 30 June 1990, 85 of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had concluded the safeguards agreements required under article III, and it urged those States Parties which had not yet done so to conclude such arrangements with IAEA as soon as possible. The Philippines also requested nuclear-weapon States to include in their safeguards agreements verification of all transfers of nuclear material and nuclear installations from military to peaceful uses. On

the question of increasing the resources allocated for safeguards, any increase in IAEA's regular budget should maintain the balance between expenditure on safeguards and promotional activities, and the degree of participation in financing should depend on the level of development of a country's nuclear power programme.

35. As to article IV, the Philippines regretted that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) had failed to achieve consensus on the principles for the supply of nuclear material, technology and data, and that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had not been more active in that field. His delegation expressed its full support for the draft resolution on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy submitted by the Non-Aligned Group in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2.

36. Article V should be reviewed in the light of environmental concerns and political realities. The "benefits" of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions still had to be demonstrated.

37. So far as article VI was concerned, a comprehensive test ban would be the most effective way to end the nuclear arms race. It would moreover be desirable for the Conference on Disarmament to receive the necessary support to achieve a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

38. In respect of article VII, many changes had occurred in the past two decades which had affirmed the right of States to conclude regional treaties to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories. The Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga were two examples that could be followed by other regions. Negotiations were currently under way among the member countries of ASEAN to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. Article VII should be expanded so as to encourage nuclear-weapon States to respect the provisions of agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Furthermore, security assurances should be provided by those States to non-nuclear-weapon States. Unilateral declarations of "non-first-use of nuclear weapons" were no longer sufficient.

39. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the only legally binding multilateral treaty on disarmament and the one with the largest number of accessions, should be strengthened and the principle of non-proliferation should be maintained for all types of weapon. All States Parties were bound by the Treaty, but it was incumbent on the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their obligations and display their commitment to non-proliferation by adopting measures designed to respect both spirit and the letter of article VI. The Conference was being held in what could be described as the post-cold-war era and the increasing interdependence among nations and the end of super-Power rivalry offered, for the first time since the Vienna Congress in 1815, the possibility of achieving a stable peace based on co-operation.

40. However, the period was not without danger, and the military capacity to destroy the world many times over still remained. The very existence of that capacity was destabilizing, as was currently demonstrated by the Gulf crisis.

The equilibrium of the world could be upset at any moment by economic problems, in particular the introduction of protectionist trade policies, the problem of the debt of the developing countries and balance-of-payments difficulties among the developed countries. Lastly, the increasing inequality and marginalization of the developing countries from the international economy was a major threat to world peace and stability. It was vital to advance along the path of disarmament and to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In addition, there was an urgent need to develop a security régime that took account of the political, economic and social issues.

41. Lastly, his delegation urged participants to take the path of reconciliation to ensure the future of peace.

42. Mgr. TAURAN (Holy See) said that the reason for the Holy See's participation in the Conference lay in its mission of peace. As part of that spiritual mission, the Holy See wished to make its contribution to all efforts on behalf of security, confidence and co-operation among peoples. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty sought to make a tangible and effective contribution to world peace.

43. It could be said that genuine progress had been made since the Third Review Conference. In 1987, the two super-Powers had signed the INF Agreement, which provided for the dismantling of all intermediate-range missiles and respective installations in the United States and the Soviet Union, and the START negotiations between the same two countries to achieve a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons raised the possibility of an even stricter limitation of nuclear weapons. Those factors, together with the current negotiations on conventional and chemical disarmament, represented a genuine peace dynamic. It was increasingly apparent that war was incapable of solving conflicts and that deterrence was merely an emergency solution. It was but one stage on the path towards disarmament, and other means of guaranteeing peace should be actively sought.

44. The dramatic developments in the region of the Persian Gulf were a reminder of the need not only to observe international commitments, but of the need to strengthen them. In that regard, he quoted the relevant preambular paragraph to the Treaty, in which States were requested to refrain from the threat or use of force and to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security.

45. The Conference should provide an opportunity for frank assessment of the current political and strategic situation and for improving it. It was desirable to achieve an increasingly stable balance in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to expand civilian applications of nuclear energy. It was also necessary to seek an equitable system for guaranteeing access by certain countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, lastly, an effective guarantee for the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had to be provided. In those matters, IAEA was called upon to play an increasingly important role and the time was

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.11

ripe for States to accept monitoring of their nuclear installations as well as export restrictions to eliminate the risks of nuclear-weapon proliferation and avert accidents that were always possible.

46. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute an additional assurance and a significant objective for nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, new prospects were offered that reconciled the right and capacity of States for self-defence with an end to the arms race. In the view of the Catholic Church, a defensive war could only be a last resort, once all efforts to settle differences peacefully had been exhausted.

47. The Fourth Review Conference was a challenge to the conscience of all those who had signed the Treaty.

48. He would point out in that context there were duties that could not be shirked: keeping one's word and keeping a watchful eye at all times, for there were risks that new States could acquire nuclear weapons and some countries might remain outside the non-proliferation régime. Again, there was the need for a linkage between disarmament and development.

49. In the view of the Holy See, war would always be a primitive means of settling conflicts and might was never right. Hence a new international moral system should be promoted and unceasing efforts made to foster a culture of peace; however, no peace plan would prove successful without respect for others, without a sense of solidarity and without observance of international law and machinery for dialogue.

50. As far as "education for peace" was concerned, there seemed to be an urgent need for mankind to put into practice spiritual values, which were a source of convictions that could inspire action. He repeated the message of Pope Jean-Paul II, who, on World Peace Day on 1 January 1984, had said that it was man who killed, and not the sword.

51. Lastly, his delegation urged mankind not to prepare for war, but to make peace. As long as men were pitted against each other, war would never be won, but if they joined together, peace could be achieved.

52. Mr. SENE (Senegal) said that the NPT was the most important multilateral legal instrument for the limitation of nuclear weapons that had been concluded since the advent of the atomic age. By controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty sought to eliminate the risk of nuclear conflict, which was a prerequisite for world peace and security. The Fourth Review Conference confirmed that the cold war had definitively become a thing of the past and that the balance of terror between the two formerly antagonistic blocs had come to an end. It was also the only occasion on which the non-nuclear-weapon States could remind the depositary Governments of their obligations under the provisions of the NPT.

53. Three major principles emerged from the preamble and the main articles of the Treaty: prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the right

to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for development, and the establishment of a framework for nuclear disarmament and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.

54. It should be remembered that under article I of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons and not in any way to assist any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture them. In exchange, non-nuclear-weapon States were required neither to acquire nor manufacture nuclear weapons. Those legal obligations constituted regional and international security assurances of non-proliferation that justified support for the NPT, in spite of its shortcomings. States Parties clearly had the legitimate intention of requiring genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament. Proliferation should thus be averted at all costs, as it would not only affect one country or region, but would be a source of concern for world security.

55. The progress made since the previous Conference should be resolutely pursued. With 142 States Parties, including 11 new accessions since the 1985 Conference, the NPT was the sole instrument that could boast of so many accessions. Furthermore, the presence of observers from two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, at the present Conference, held considerable promise for the future of the NPT. The Treaty should achieve the greatest possible degree of universality in order to strengthen its validity and credibility and to continue to contribute to world security and stability.

56. There were many lessons to be learned from an examination of the functioning of the NPT as far as article VII was concerned, in the light of the new international environment. The first meeting between President Gorbachev and President Reagan, at which they had agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, had marked the beginning of that process. The conclusion, in 1987, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which should be followed by new agreements and by consideration of a reduction in strategic weapons, had been the continuation of that meeting. In addition, there was the imminent ratification by the two super-Powers of the protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The International Paris Conference on chemical weapons had, moreover, given a powerful impetus to negotiations aimed at the complete and universal elimination of chemical weapons in conjuction with a verification system. Lastly, mention should be made of the Stockholm Document on security and co-operation in Europe and the forthcoming conclusion in Vienna of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe and North America together with an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures, concluded in the spirit of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki in 1975. The Final Act, one of the legal milestones of the present era, had organized East-West co-operation in spheres ranging from economics to disarmament, including science and technology, environmental protection and respect for human rights, in order to usher in an era of détente in Europe capable of diminishing the risk of

nuclear war. The reconciliation between the two military alliances of the East and the West and the reunification of Germany were bringing a new and peaceful order into being in Europe.

57. However, as the representative of Switzerland had observed, Europe was not the world, even if, as in the words of the poet from Martinique, Aimé Césaire, it was the progenitor of the intelligence, of the spirit and the repository of all philosophy. It was also necessary to take into account those countries that possessed large and modern armed forces that were not covered by any treaty, as had been noted in an article in the "Monde diplomatique" of August 1990. In the same connection, an authoritative voice on international policy in the East had stated on 6 March 1990 that there was potential to the south of Europe and in South-East Asia that could eventually become superior to Europe's own. Those pessimistic geopolitical considerations accurately reflected the current atmosphere of fear and mistrust. What was needed were peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, to lessen the risk of war and the use of blind force with all their unforeseeable consequences. Accordingly, it was necessary to intensify confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of North-South co-operation based on the principles of the Charter and the norms of international law, as a kind of North-South Helsinki Final Act capable of forestalling risk and strategic uncertainty, tension and crises likely to lead to regional or international instability.

58. The close of the twentieth century was full of menace, but it also bore promises and hopes of which the NPT was a tangible expression. Although the twentieth century had seen two world wars that had almost led mankind to ruin, it had also seen the struggle for the liberation of peoples and nations and the affirmation of respect for human rights. The leading actors on the international political scene were now on stage and had begun the dialogue about a future in which everything had yet to be invented. The new international order that was under construction called for consensus in remedying injustices and allowing the parties concerned to agree on the implementation of the rules of international law. The Treaty should take its place in that framework in the resolute search for universal peace and security and the survival of mankind through co-operation on behalf of development. Binding legal commitments should preserve the human values of brotherhood from the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

59. In that connection, the IAEA safeguards system had proved its worth for some 20 years and contributed, at the international level, to ensuring the peaceful nature of nuclear co-operation and trade. Article III of the NPT, which was the legal foundation of the non-proliferation régime, required States Parties to submit their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. Since the previous Conference, the Agency had, moreover, found no cases in which fissionable material had been diverted for the manufacture of explosive devices.

60. The proliferation of missiles nevertheless continued to reflect the propensity of some States to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In any event, it was desirable considerably to increase the human and material

resources of IAEA to enable it to improve still further the quality of its inspections and to develop its operational activities in technical co-operation.

61. The objective of the NPT was, in particular, to monitor observance of the commitment made by nuclear-weapon States Parties to reduce their weapons. Those States should demonstrate the political will to conclude, as early as possible, a comprehensive test-ban treaty so as to add weight to the NPT. Pending such a treaty, he commended the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc committee which should permit the initiation of negotiations for the preparation of such a treaty. Only a comprehensive test ban would make it possible to put an end to the arms race and to the qualitative improvement of weapons.

62. The negative security assurances demanded by non-nuclear-weapon States should be viewed in terms of the actual potential for strengthening the non-proliferation régime. Those States wanted a firm and binding commitment to provide them with a guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons. The relevant proposals by Nigeria and Egypt reflected, in particular, the desire to enhance the Treaty's validity.

63. It was worth noting that the three depositary Governments had on several occasions declared, in particular at the Washington Summit on 2 June 1990, that they had complied with their commitments under article I of the Treaty.

64. It should also be remembered, in respect of article VI, that the United Kingdom attached great importance to measures designed to control non-nuclear weapons with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (NPT/CONF.IV/21, para. 11).

65. As to article VII, as early as 1964 OAU had declared Africa a nuclear-free zone. In 1985 it had, at the initiative of the President of Senegal, adopted a resolution on a conference on disarmament, which should perhaps be updated to reassert the determination of Africa to do away with the nuclear threat. The current requirement was for a reassessment of the situation in the light of the changes that had taken place in southern Africa, in the hope that South Africa would shortly accede to the NPT and accept to submit its facilities to the IAEA safeguards system. Africa, which was experiencing economic crisis and instability, was threatened by marginalization and had every interest in examining, within the framework of a regional conference, the regional aspects of disarmament by setting them against the demands of peace, development and environmental protection.

66. The current troubled period should stir States Parties into focusing attention on the future of the NPT to provide proof of mutual trust, which was a prerequisite for collective security and strategic stability. Tangible and positive measures should be adopted by consensus to strengthen the universality and credibility of the NPT, so as to arrange properly for the 1995 Review Conference, a critical juncture at which a decision would be taken on the future of the Treaty. Senegal wished to reaffirm its commitment to

participating actively in the careful preparation of that crucial deadline and to leaving no stone unturned to ensure that the NPT was extended beyond 1995.

67. Mr. KATSIGAZI (Uganda) said that the Conference coincided with a warming of East-West relations, which was universally recognized as marking the end of the cold war. It was, however, necessary to guard against complacency and to take a hard look at the NPT, and after identifying its strong and weak points, to fashion a post-cold-war NPT and a non-proliferation régime based on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, truly to reflect the changing world and to continue into the twenty-first century.

68. In essence, the NPT was a contract concluded between the nuclear-weapon Powers, which undertook to put an end to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the non-nuclear-weapon States, which undertook not to encourage the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was no question that the latter, unlike the nuclear-weapon States, had complied with their commitment. There had indeed been collusion between the Western nuclear-weapon States, South Africa and Israel. For many years, South Africa's collaborators had been more strident than South Africa itself would have dreamed of being, in denying, both before the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly, that South Africa possessed nuclear capability. However, in August 1988, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs had publicly stated that his country was capable of producing nuclear weapons if it wished to do so, and the "Cape Times" of 25 April 1990 had reported that South Africa had developed a very advanced process for fabricating nuclear fuel elements and had thus become independent of overseas suppliers of fuel for its nuclear reactors. Although it was deeply concerned about South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons, his delegation nevertheless keenly observed the developments under way in South Africa, developments which should be assessed in the light of the declaration adopted by consensus at the sixteenth special session of the General Assembly, in December 1989. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States should continue to prevail on South Africa to accede to the NPT and to submit all its nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

69. Shady dealings such as those he had described tended to back up charges that the NPT was discriminatory. Contrary to the spirit of article IV of the Treaty, non-party States seemed to benefit more from the provisions of the Treaty than did States Parties themselves.

70. It was clear that the tragic accident at Chernobyl and the prohibitive cost of nuclear energy had a telling impact on the world's nuclear industry. However, the Director-General of IAEA had recently told the Conference that nuclear techniques were increasingly employed in agriculture, industry and medicine. In that connection, it was to be hoped that the sterile insect technique described by the Director-General and used to combat certain infestations of cattle by screwworm in North Africa could be applied to combat the tsetse fly in Uganda, where it had re-emerged after the two decades of trouble and chaos that had affected the country.

71. In March 1990 a regional seminar on the peaceful uses of nuclear science had been organized by OAU and IAEA in Kampala, and he wished to take the opportunity to thank the Agency for the role it had played in ensuring the success of the seminar. In the developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, such an effort at _rapprochement_ should allow the NPT and the non-proliferation régime to win over new members, although to do so, IAEA required a higher budget so as to be able effectively to discharge its mandate.

72. Uganda approved the proposal submitted by the Government of Nigeria to the depositary Governments of the NPT on 2 November 1989 concerning a proposed agreement on the prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties (NPT/CONF.IV/17). It was fair that there should be a balance between the commitments expected from those countries and the security assurances they should be given. Security assurances should also be the subject of a legally binding instrument beyond the realm of a veto and safely protected from different interpretation by different States.

73. In respect of article VII of the Treaty, his delegation supported the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the creation of new zones as instruments to enhance the non-proliferation régime. It was a matter of great regret that some Western States, through collaboration with South Africa in the matter of nuclear weapons, had frustrated efforts to turn Africa into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, made by the Heads of State of OAU, thus remained a dead letter.

74. Article VI of the Treaty, in which all parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and general and complete disarmament, had not been respected and the nuclear-weapon Powers had done nothing in the past 20 years to promote that objective. The quantitative reduction in nuclear arsenals was largely offset by the production of technologically advanced weapons that would allow each super-Power even if bilateral negotiations on arms reduction succeeded, to retain more than 9,000 nuclear weapons - three times more than they had had when the NPT had been signed in 1968.

75. The Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in September 1989, had declared that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was essential to preserve the non-proliferation régime embodied in the NPT. The treaty envisaged for 1995 should be based on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the conclusion of a treaty in that regard would considerably strengthen the NPT. It was to be hoped that the conference due to be held in January 1991 in New York to amend the Partial Test-Ban Treaty would adopt that view in order to allow serious negotiations to begin on a comprehensive test ban.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.12
5 September 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DE RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

General debate (*continued*)

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (*continued*)

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.12

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that, for future generations to live in peace, it was essential to ensure strict application of the NPT, a treaty that was of vital importance to the whole world, since it was aimed at directing into beneficial channels the extraordinary power of nuclear energy and at preserving international peace, security and stability. It divided States Parties into two categories: those which possessed nuclear weapons and those which did not, each category having its own important obligations to discharge.

2. Luxembourg was a small non-nuclear-weapon country but was very attached to the observance of its obligations regarding non-proliferation and it had adhered to the international control régimes on the export of nuclear materials; it applied the directives of the London Club and was a member of the Zangger Committee on the export of nuclear materials and equipment. It also abided by the international control régime on the export of missiles and had ratified the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. His country fully complied with the safeguards régime set up in implementation of article III of the NPT, in conformity with an agreement entered into in 1974. It had enacted domestic legislation enabling it to comply with its non-proliferation obligations relating to the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and the conditions for their physical protection.

3. It was disturbing that some States continued to remain outside the non-proliferation régime and that some States situated in sensitive regions might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. His delegation invited countries which were not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it and also called on all States Parties which had not yet concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA to do so.

4. Admittedly, progress had been achieved on disarmament in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but none had been made in multilateral disarmament negotiations. However, the existence of three nuclear-weapon-free zones, in Latin America, in the South Pacific and in Antarctica, was a matter for satisfaction.

5. Luxembourg was more and more persuaded that nuclear weapon tests did not enhance world security. In fact, those tests could lead to the development of new nuclear weapons and could favour both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A comprehensive test ban treaty, allied to an effective control régime, could make a significant contribution to the objectives of non-proliferation and act as an important step towards nuclear disarmament. His country hoped that multilateral negotiations in that direction would be initiated without delay. Lastly, he wished to stress that the main objective of the present Conference should be to demonstrate to the world the important role of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, fostering disarmament.

6. Mr. MARKIDES (Cyprus) expressed his delegation's wishes for the successful completion of the Conference for the benefit not only of the Contracting Parties to the NPT but of the world at large. The twenty-second anniversary of the opening of the NPT for signature and the fact that 45 years had elapsed since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a reminder for the whole world of the horror and destruction of nuclear war. At a time when the improvement in East-West relations created a climate that favoured confidence, co-operation and democracy, the present Conference should provide an opportunity for all States to review the operation of the NPT frankly and objectively and to try and identify its successes and weaknesses in order to achieve broader acceptance of it. Recent political developments underlined the importance of strict and faithful implementation of the NPT and strengthened the belief that international peace and security would be achieved basically by political means through international co-operation and peaceful negotiations based on the principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the observance of human rights.

7. As already pointed out during the debate, the NPT was important mainly as an arms control agreement. As such, it was indeed a historical achievement. From a realistic standpoint, however, the Treaty would be regarded as a contract or as a bargain between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The former had promised to end their vertical proliferation in exchange for a binding commitment by the latter States to end horizontal proliferation. Actually, the question whether the NPT had indeed effectively contributed to horizontal non-proliferation was a matter of appraisal, since there was no truly reliable denial of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, his delegation had the impression that matters would have been very different if it had not been for the NPT. By its very existence, the NPT appeared to have overcome the fulfilment of prophecies in the past to the effect that the number of nuclear-weapon States would have increased to 20 or 25 by now. On the other hand, with regard to vertical proliferation, the nuclear-weapon States had been constantly enriching their arsenals qualitatively and quantitatively. At the same time, more sophisticated and much more accurate systems of delivery heralded greater destructive capacity.

8. In addition to its non-proliferation provisions, the NPT embodied an obligation on the part of the States Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Full compliance with those provisions remained to be proved.

9. Despite the conclusion of a number of arms control treaties, including some important bilateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, there had, unfortunately, been no significant and substantial progress towards the aims set out in article VI of the NPT. In that connection, he joined with other speakers who had welcomed the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe - the INF Treaty. That agreement was a first small, but positive, step towards achieving some of the

objectives of the NPT. It was to be hoped that the recent favourable developments in international relations would make it possible for an agreement to be reached preventing an arms race in space and ending it on Earth. Such an agreement was essential not only as a necessary balancing element for the self-restraint shown by the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties under article II of the NPT but also as an encouragement to other States, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, to join the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty.

10. Promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, another important element of the NPT, would greatly contribute to the wellbeing of humanity. Important practical benefits from the use of nuclear energy had already been obtained in many fields, including power, medicine, industry and agriculture. Safeguards were, of course, necessary to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy into non-peaceful uses. It was also essential to bear in mind the devastating effects that accidents in nuclear installations could have on the environment for generations to come. The international system of safeguards was therefore of the utmost importance and was inseparably tied in with the NPT provisions on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connection, he wished to praise the work being done by the IAEA in administering the safeguards system in such a responsible and efficient manner. Any progress in improving the safeguards system would be a substantial contribution towards realization of the goals of the NPT.

11. As recognized in the preamble to the NPT, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty was essential in order to achieve nuclear disarmament. Negotiations in that direction should be resumed as soon as possible and such a treaty could perhaps be completed within a few years. The process could be hastened by a linkage between the comprehensive test ban and the NPT. The declaration adopted in September 1989 by the Non-Aligned Summit Conference stated, inter alia, that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was absolutely essential for the preservation of the non-proliferation régime embodied in the NPT. His delegation was in full agreement with the proposals put forward by other non-aligned countries with a view to preserving and strengthening the NPT. Those proposals included: (1) the declaration of a moratorium on all nuclear tests explosions till 1995; (2) a moratorium on the production of fissionable material; (3) the promotion of full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Ad hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament; (4) a readiness to accept multilaterally binding legal instruments to guarantee all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (5) support and recognition for existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and for those to be established in the future; (6) improved IAEA assistance to developing countries through financing institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

12. When the world's nuclear weapons arsenal was more than enough to destroy mankind, billions were being spent by the nuclear-weapon States on the development of destructive weapons. It was high time for those States to divert those huge sums to purposes beneficial to humanity, a great part of which was living under conditions of absolute deprivation.

13. Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal) extended a warm welcome to the observer delegations of France and China, which were participating in a Review Conference of the NPT for the first time.

14. The East-West process of détente and positive developments in some regional conflicts in the past few years had justified expectations that the present Conference would take place in a favourable international atmosphere. That atmosphere, however, had been radically altered by the crisis provoked in the Gulf by the annexation of Kuwait, which had been clearly condemned in all international forums.

15. In view of its aims, its membership, and the effects produced since it had entered into force, the NPT could be considered as a cornerstone of international security. Only two months previously, in Dublin, the leaders of the member countries of the European Community had expressed their concern about nuclear weapons proliferation and had solemnly urged those States which were not yet parties to accede to the NPT. His delegation wished now to echo that appeal. Accession by all countries, especially those with a known nuclear weapons capability, was essential to the credibility of the NPT. Equally indispensable for sound application and effectiveness of the NPT was strict compliance with its terms. It was regrettable that a number of States Parties continued to oppose proper implementation of the IAEA safeguard mechanisms, whose role was of paramount importance in the implementation of the Treaty.

16. Another major problem lay in the non-compliance with article I, which prohibited the transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear explosive devices and assistance and encouragement given in any way to such States in order to enable them to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. There had been examples of neglect which had ended in the clandestine transfer to such States of technology and/or fissile material falling under the provisions of article I of the NPT. His delegation did not, of course, deny the inalienable right of every country to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and it was well aware of the pressing needs of developing countries wishing to benefit from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, strict respect by the States Parties for the safeguards system was naturally interlinked with proper implementation of transfers of know-how and materials.

17. Since the Third Review Conference, there had been many welcome and sometimes unexpected political and military events of great significance for world security and peace. In that connection, great credit must go to the United States and the Soviet Union for their successful efforts in reducing the risks of nuclear confrontation - the INF Treaty and the verification protocols of the Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the promising prospect of the signing of a strategic arms reduction treaty. Those developments had paved the way for important multilateral and bilateral moves aimed at further reducing both conventional and nuclear arsenals not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. Moreover, the proposals made by the NATO countries for creating a joint NATO/Warsaw Pact

declaration open to all countries members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) had contributed to a more relaxed political atmosphere in Europe.

18. Under the terms of article X, the Conference had to decide in 1995 on the question of extending the NPT. Portugal was unequivocally in favour of extending it indefinitely beyond 1995. Lastly, it was his hope that the Conference would produce a final document reflecting in a realistic and balanced manner the dramatic progress made during the past few years, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. Such were the sincerest wishes of his country, which was proud of scrupulously complying with its obligations under the Treaty.

19. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the importance of the Review Conference lay in the variety of issues under consideration in assessing progress achieved in the field of non-proliferation and indeed in the fundamental goal of the Treaty - to remove the threat of nuclear warfare for the whole human race. Again, the Conference was all the more important in that it was taking place at a time of détente among the major nuclear Powers and the strengthening of international relations. Great changes had taken place in the international order, thereby vesting détente with strategic depth and furthering it without it being reported to the purely political and tactical contingencies.

20. Despite the fact that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not lived up to all aspirations, it had nevertheless succeeded in securing some progress. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were not moving towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons and all acted in full conformity with article II of the Treaty. However, the Treaty had weaknesses as well as strengths. It had not managed to broaden the scope of prohibition to prevent more States from having access to nuclear weapons, and it had not prevailed upon non-party States to accede to the Treaty. It was also regrettable that nuclear-weapon States Parties had not given preference in their co-operation activities to developing countries that were States Parties. The discriminatory structure of the Treaty remained, with some obligations being incumbent on certain States but not on others. At the same time, constraints imposed on the transfer of technology were a serious threat to the advancement of the developing countries. Furthermore, the safeguards system had not been entirely respected, for the IAEA had not been in a position to apply the system fully in all cases; to be meaningful any safeguards system must be total.

21. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be made less discriminatory and it should be aimed at ensuring accession by all States in order to achieve universality and to guarantee that there would be no recourse to nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State. In addition, it was to be hoped that the present situation of détente would lead towards an international commitment to put an end to the production of nuclear weapons and to destroy existing nuclear arsenals and indeed all weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological.

22. A special situation prevailed in the Middle East, which was currently undergoing a temporary crisis which his delegation hoped would be settled through Arab wisdom. For some decades, the region had experienced ongoing tension caused by the State of Israel in its desire for hegemony. Israel had acquired nuclear weapons thanks to the assistance of a few nuclear-weapon States, contrary to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that context, he appealed to the international community, the United Nations and the IAEA to work with the States of the Middle East to create a nuclear-free zone in the area. He urged the international organizations to apply the relevant resolutions in that respect and hoped that Israel would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and apply full-scope safeguards.

23. Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) referred to the remarks made by some representatives, including the delegation of the United Kingdom, a depositary State party, and the delegation of Australia in the course of general debate on the issue of the safeguards agreement currently under negotiation between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He also mentioned the statement made by the head of his delegation, in which he had pointed to the prevailing situation peculiar to the Korean peninsula, which directly affected his country's national security, and had made clear that his Government intended as a matter of principle to conclude a safeguards agreement. It was highly regrettable that some speakers had failed to note in their remarks the grave nuclear threat posed by a Depositary State Party to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a small non-nuclear-weapon State.

24. Obviously, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been elaborated as a result of the need to remove the nuclear threat and to achieve nuclear disarmament. Hence, the fundamental objectives of the Treaty had made the issue of security assurances one of the most important items on the agenda of the present Conference. Intentional failure in regard to one of those two aspects was, clearly, not a pragmatic approach and it would not help the strengthening and extension of the Treaty. He called upon States Parties to render valuable assistance in favour of the early conclusion of an agreement on security assurances between the nuclear threatener and the threatened, with a view to facilitating the conclusion of the safeguards agreement.

25. Lastly, he referred to the statement made in the general debate by the representative of Australia, in which the latter attempted to tell the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea what to do with its Government. He would remind the delegation of Australia that the Governments of States Parties were fully represented at the Conference. He wished to express his deep regret that such a flippant and imprudent statement against a sovereign State had been made by a foreign minister, a responsible statesman of a country, and drew attention to the possible consequences of such an act, which might affect the very authority of important conferences like the present Review Conference.

26. The CHAIRMAN, announcing the conclusion of the general debate, observed that 62 speakers had been heard in a positive atmosphere, free of recrimination or substantive departure from the main objectives of the Conference. Many delegations had referred to some significant progress in the

implementation of the Treaty, including disarmament and arms limitation measures, the continuation of negotiations on the reduction of strategic short-range nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons, and the fact that during the period under review the number of declared nuclear-weapon States had not increased. At the same time, it had been indicated that some matters, such as nuclear testing and negative security assurances required special attention.

27. Lastly, the general debate had been balanced and productive and the Conference could go on to the next stage of its work, during which the Committees must concentrate on specific review exercises. Generally speaking, it might be said that delegations to the Conference had shown a readiness to work towards a balanced and positive final document.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11) (*continued*)

28. *The CHAIRMAN*, referring to rule 12 of the rules of procedure, said he would take it that the Conference agreed to the schedule for participation in the costs of the Conference, which would be revised in the light of the real participation and of the costs incurred in the Conference and in the preparatory process.

It was so decided.

29. *The CHAIRMAN* said that, as a result of his appeal, the financial problem of the Conference was practically resolved, as a number of pledges had been announced and the Secretary-General of the United Nations was, on that basis, authorizing the continuation of basic services until the Conference completed its work, on 14 September 1990.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.13
17 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 September 1990, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. DE RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Reports of the Main Committees

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.13

The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.

REPORTS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES (agenda item 15)

Report of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/1)

1. Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria), Chairman of Main Committee I, introduced its report. Section I recorded the outcome of the review of articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3. A consensus had emerged on most of the text, but those parts on which agreement had not been reached had been placed in square brackets. Section II, regarding article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, showed that the Committee had been unable to agree on any text on that issue. As the report (page 10) made clear, the Chairman's paper was attached as an annex without prejudice to the position of any delegation.

2. As could be seen in Section III, containing the report of the work by the Sub-Committee on Security Assurances and subsequently by Working Group 2, agreement had been arrived at on all paragraphs but two. Paragraph 6 included a reference to unilateral declarations of all nuclear-weapon States "attached to this Final Declaration", which meant the final declaration of the Conference itself. He requested those States that had not already done so to forward those unilateral statements to the secretariat as soon as possible so that they could be attached to the Conference's final declaration.

3. Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation, welcoming a suggestion for a useful contribution to the work of the Conference, was pleased to submit its security assurance as an annex to the final document. The security assurance of the United States was long-standing and had been reaffirmed by three successive Administrations.

4. Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom) said that her delegation was pleased to see its unilateral security assurance attached to the final document. It had first been formulated in 1978 and since reiterated, and she read it out: "I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State". Needless to say, the non-nuclear-weapon States must also comply with their obligations under article II of the Treaty. The United Kingdom would continue to consult with the delegation of Nigeria and other delegations with a view to finding a mutually acceptable text for inclusion in the final document.

5. Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) announced that his Government's text on security assurances was also ready for inclusion in the final document.

6. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee I.

It was so decided.

Report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/1)

7. Mr. STRULAK (Poland), Chairman of Main Committee II, introduced its report. The Committee had made intensive efforts to arrive at a consensus and, despite reservations by a number of delegations, which had been duly reproduced in the report, agreement had been reached on a number of key elements of the Treaty.

8. In the review of article III, delegations had overwhelmingly reaffirmed the importance of a universal safeguards system as one of the pillars of an effective non-proliferation regime and had commended the IAEA in its role in that area. Significant progress had been made on special inspection missions by the IAEA, more transparency in IAEA safeguards information reports, and safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. There was recognition of the progress made by the Zangger Committee on controlling the export of sensitive items, and the continuation of NPT-inspired activities was encouraged. The Committee also stressed the importance of full-scope safeguards.

9. In the review of article VII, widespread support had been reaffirmed for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia, and the valuable role of existing zones in Latin America, the South Pacific and Antarctica had been underscored.

10. In its consideration of article X, which related, *inter alia*, to extending the Treaty beyond 1995, the Committee had been unable to reach a consensus on a text for inclusion in its report to the Conference, but he felt there was still room to build on the discussions and proposals on that subject. The Committee had decided not to recommend any additional formulations on articles I, II and IX after being informed of the language proposed for those articles by Main Committees I and III.

11. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee II.

It was so decided.

Report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/MC.III/2)

12. Mr. YAMADA (Japan), Chairman of Main Committee III, introduced its report. The Committee had considered the wording of 11 substantive items for the final declaration of the Conference and had agreed upon language for 10 items. Owing to disagreement on item IX, however, it had been unable to adopt the formulations as a whole. Intensive consultations had subsequently been undertaken on item IX, agreement had been reached, and the Drafting

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.13

Committee had adopted by consensus the whole of the substantive part of the report, with item IX amended. The package formulation was thus intended to form part of the final declaration.

13. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

It was so decided.

14. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) said that, while some progress had been made in elaborating the chapters of the final declaration corresponding to the topics assigned to Main Committees II and III, there continued to be difficulties with regard to the issues in Main Committee I, of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race, and security guarantees. His delegation shared the general desire to see the work of the Conference crowned by the adoption of a meaningful final declaration and not merely a document which tried to conceal certain basic facts regarding matters of fundamental interest to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. He therefore hoped that a final declaration would be adopted by consensus, but by a consensus that itself was meaningful.

15. The present Conference afforded a unique opportunity to begin in 1991 preparations for the extension conference in 1995 and to work constructively at the Amendment Conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in January 1991. The NPT should be extended well beyond 1995, and it was for that purpose that his delegation was co-sponsoring the draft resolutions contained in documents NPT/CONF.IV/L.3 and L.4.

16. He wished to reiterate that the success of the Conference depended on whether it would be possible to agree, first, on renewed efforts for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, second, on early steps for the preparation of the 1995 Conference, and third, on the establishment of a mechanism to work out an instrument on security guarantees. Again, the fate of the NPT depended on the way in which the three Depositaries fulfilled their obligations under article VI. There was a close link between the provisions of the NPT on nuclear disarmament and those on review conferences and the limited duration of the Treaty. That issue was brought out in the working paper circulated by his delegation under the symbol NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.3, also issued as NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.13. Mexico's position in that respect was held by a great many other States.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.14
27 November 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 14 September 1990, at 6.30 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Report of the Drafting Committee

Closure of the Conference

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NPT/CONF.IV/SR.14

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

(b) REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/CC.1 and Corr.1)

1. Mr. GROOP (Finland) introduced the report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.IV/CC.1 and Corr.1) on behalf of the members of the Committee. The Committee had held two meetings and, at its second meeting, had examined and accepted the credentials of the representatives of all participating States parties on the understanding that those States that had not yet submitted formal credentials should communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible. He was pleased to say that, since the publication of the report, credentials in due form had been received from Italy and the Philippines.

2. The PRESIDENT said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the report of the Credentials Committee.

It was so decided.

REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

3. The PRESIDENT said that the Chairman of the Drafting Committee had just informed him that intensive consultations were still in progress on certain aspects of the Conference's work. He therefore suggested that the meeting should be suspended until the work of the Drafting Committee had concluded.

The meeting was suspended at 6.35 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 a.m. on 15 September

4. Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden), introducing the report of the Drafting Committee (NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1), said that the Committee had considered at length the reports of the Main Committees and the proposals contained in documents NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/Adds.1, 2, 3(A) and Corr.1, 3(B), 3(C) and 3(D). Notwithstanding extensive consultations and considerable effort, the Committee had not been able to reach a consensus on a draft final declaration for consideration by the Conference.

5. The PRESIDENT said that he had been asked by various delegations to suspend the session for 10 minutes, before opening the floor for discussion, so that they might consult among themselves in the search for consensus.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 a.m. and resumed at 3.30 a.m.

6. The PRESIDENT, noting that a consensus had still not been reached, said that he wished to make a solemn and personal appeal to the Conference to attempt to reach a compromise.

7. The Conference was taking place in a new international socio-political context, in which a trend towards compromise and tolerance was prevailing. Recent years had seen a de-ideologization of international relations and the emergence of new perceptions. If those new perceptions were not made to

converge, all future bilateral and multilateral disarmament conferences would be invested with a feeling of bitterness that did not correspond to the international situation. All the work in the three Main Committees would be lost if one final effort were not made to resolve the disagreements over the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, article VI and article X.

8. He would therefore make one last effort by providing very brief texts of his own that attempted to indicate the extent of the differences of opinion. In such a way States parties would not be deprived, by political discord, of the practical value of a review that showed the Treaty to be healthy and functioning well in many respects.

The President's suggested texts were as follows:

"Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12

"The Conference deeply regrets that it was unable to arrive at an agreed text in its review of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12.

"Considerable efforts were made, in the course of intensive negotiations, to find agreed positions, assessments and recommendations. In the event, however, consensus was not possible other than to note the President's characterization of the differences, as described below in abbreviated form.

"A view held strongly by a number of States parties included the following elements: despite the obligations imposed in the Treaty, no agreements relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race had so far emerged; no progress had been made on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament; despite the ending of the cold war the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties were undergoing continuing development, including the development and deployment of new delivery systems; the number of strategic warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties have increased threefold since the entry into force of the Treaty; the aim of the START talks, if realized, would leave more strategic nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States than when the negotiations were made in 1982; the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States parties would put the future of the Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt. According to this view, the undertakings, objectives and aspirations of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty remained unfulfilled.

"A differing view held equally strongly by a number of other States parties included the following elements: there had been significant and positive developments in the international sphere since the 1985 Review Conference, particularly a substantial improvement in relations between the United States and the USSR and a greatly decreased level of tensions in Europe; the entry into force of the INF Treaty on 1 June 1988 had been a major advance in eliminating an entire class of nuclear arms and introducing verification provisions of innovative character and scope;

decisive progress in bilateral negotiations on the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which would be a major landmark in arms control; significant bilateral achievements in reducing chemical arms; the prospect for a far-reaching agreement on conventional forces reduction in Europe within a short time. According to this view, the period since 1985 had witnessed important progress towards achieving the undertakings, objectives and aspirations of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty.

"All States parties continued to express their strong support for the continued viability of the Treaty in the future.

"Article X

"The Conference regrets that it was unable to arrive at agreed language regarding the provisions of article X of the Treaty other than to note paragraph 2 of that article which states that:

> "'Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.'"

9. The PRESIDENT said that he intended to suspend the session for 30 minutes so that his proposals could be considered. On resumption, should his proposed texts not find acceptance, he would withdraw them and proceed to the closing of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 3.45 a.m. and resumed at 4.30 a.m.

10. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) said that his delegation found itself in an uncomfortable position as it would have preferred to be able to accept the proposed compromise. After intensive negotiations in the Non-Aligned Group, a consensus had been within reach, but had not been possible because of other delegations' positions. Now the President was asking the participants to accept a new text that was very different in both form and content from the one that they had been negotiating. While the President's efforts were appreciated, accepting the text would leave many questions unresolved, including the conclusions relating to article VI. His delegation had made major concessions during the negotiations, as reflected in the texts that had emerged from Main Committees II and III, and it had hoped that others would do so with regard to article VI. Since that had unfortunately not been the case, his delegation must oppose the compromise solution, and he was certain that other delegations shared that view.

11. The PRESIDENT, recognizing that his proposed texts had not found consensus acceptance, said that no final declaration would emerge from the Conference. He noted that the draft final declaration contained much of

benefit to many delegations. He hoped, although he doubted, that the lack of a final declaration would not adversely affect future negotiations on disarmament in the United Nations.

12. That having been said, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the report of the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.

13. Mr. REESE (Australia) said that, although all the purposes of the non-proliferation Treaty might not have been fulfilled, it was clear that the world would be a far more insecure place without it. Although much remained to be achieved with respect to nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test ban, those elements should be seen in the context of the full and thorough review of the Treaty that had taken place, in accordance with its terms. As the Australian Foreign Minister had emphasized in his plenary statement, the Treaty was a vital element of the international non-proliferation regime. The dedication of all delegations to the task of the Conference confirmed the instrument's vitality.

14. Discussion at the Conference had been creative and for the most part constructive in accordance with the new spirit prevailing in the international community. Among the more important achievements of the past four weeks had been: new agreed wording on negative security assurances and security guarantees; agreement on the need to bring about the discontinuance of nuclear explosions; agreement on an enhanced role for the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear testing; common understanding on future priorities for peaceful nuclear cooperation; concrete proposals for strengthening the barriers against the further spread of nuclear weapons; and perhaps most significantly, consensus on the need for nuclear suppliers to contribute to the goal of non-proliferation by requiring a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation and the application of full-scope safeguards. The overwhelming majority of suppliers had already taken unilateral action to that effect, and he hoped that those which had not done so would take early action in response to the views prevailing at the Conference.

15. The ideas, proposals and agreements in the reports of Main Committees II and III concerning enhanced security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be retained and utilized. It was vital that everyone should work together in IAEA and other relevant bodies to implement those proposals and thereby strengthen the central role of the Treaty in international security and nuclear trade and cooperation over the next five years.

16. Referring to the remarks made by the representative of Mexico, he said it was astonishing that negotiations on paragraphs 5 and 7 of the section on article VI had foundered essentially on a simple request to note the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on their bilateral negotiations on testing. His delegation deeply regretted the loss of consensus on a final declaration over that issue.

17. In conclusion, he said his delegation would make every effort to ensure that the many positive results of the Conference served as a guide in the period until the next milestone for the Treaty, the 1995 review and extension conference.

18. Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the Conference had been fruitful and had confirmed the commitment of the States parties to upholding the non-proliferation regime. In place of disappointment at the lack of a final declaration, the prospect of the 1995 Conference should stimulate continued efforts. Japan firmly believed in the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty as a system that made it possible to combine non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

19. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) expressed his delegation's appreciation for the constructive way in which the various committees of the Conference had worked. Mexico had attempted to contribute to the elaboration of a final declaration that would strengthen the Treaty and assure its extension past 1995, and sincerely regretted that it had not been possible to arrive at a text that aimed in that direction. Article VIII, paragraph 3 did not stipulate that every five-year exercise must adopt a final declaration. What was important was that the parties should have the opportunity to exchange views on the Treaty's functioning, and that had been accomplished. The Conference had identified areas of satisfaction and areas in which there was a growing lack of agreement, such as the comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and security guarantees for non-nuclear States parties. Another subject of particular importance had been the extension conference to take place in 1995.

20. As had been repeated throughout the Conference, there was a close link between the limited duration of the non-proliferation Treaty and the provisions of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty. That link remained, with or without a final declaration, and would be of decisive importance in 1995.

21. Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) endorsed the statements made by the representatives of Australia and Japan. The Conference had reconfirmed the commitment of the vast majority of States parties to the Treaty and revealed a broad consensus on how to implement and strengthen it. The few issues on which consensus had not been reached related to one part of article VI only, and did not jeopardize the large majority of topics on which agreement existed.

22. On the positive side of the balance were agreements on the application of full-scope safeguards, the innovative idea of special inspections and the notable agreement on how to approach the problem area of a tax on nuclear facilities. On the less positive side, for the first time the possibility had arisen of the undermining of the Treaty from within. Much attention had been paid to that problem in the review of both article II and the safeguards regime. He regretted that the Mexican delegation had not shown much interest in that threatening phenomenon, being absorbed as it had been by one issue.

23. Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria) expressed his delegation's deep regret at the lack of a final declaration. Consensus had appeared to be within reach during the exercise that had taken place in the Swedish mission, and in his view some differences could have been resolved if flexibility had been displayed. He hoped that setback would not undermine faith in the Treaty, which remained a corner-stone of international peace and security.

24. Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) speaking on behalf of the countries of the Eastern European Group, expressed sincere gratitude to the President and the Chairmen of the Main Committees. In the view of his delegation, an important and useful Conference had taken place in a new political context. It had confirmed the great vitality of the Treaty and the attachment of the States parties to it. The lack of a final declaration in no way undermined that conclusion. On a majority of issues wording had been prepared that went further than the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and that material would play a useful role in future efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Only one matter remained unresolved - that of the comprehensive test ban, on which his delegation's position was well known.

25. The results of the Conference would serve as a guide for strengthening the effectiveness of the Treaty, and it was everyone's duty to work towards its universality, in order to arrive at the next review conference with a shared view of the need for a long-term extension of the Treaty beyond 1995.

26. Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation believed the basic task of the Conference had been fully met. A comprehensive and thorough review had been conducted of all aspects of the Treaty, and the significance and interconnection of the aspects of non-proliferation, arms control and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been highlighted throughout the debates.

27. In contrast to past review conferences, the session had taken place at a time when enormous political, social and economic changes signalled the possibility of a world less burdened by confrontation, hostility and fear. However, the debates had also coincided with a situation in which unprecedented action by the United Nations Security Council had been necessary to address a major regional conflict threatening the interests of all nations. In that hopeful yet still dangerous atmosphere, virtually all participating Governments had pointed to the Treaty as a vital element in preserving global stability and peace.

28. Another and very important result of the Conference was the commitment by a clear majority of participating States to the importance of extending the life of the Treaty for a considerable period of time. Looking forward to 1995, the views expressed at the Conference provided a very strong basis for maintaining and enhancing the role of the Treaty in the future. It was regrettable that those and other important results had not been embodied in a consensus final declaration. His delegation had worked very hard to find consensus and common ground and, during the process of discussion and debate,

a wide measure of agreement had been achieved on many fundamental interests arising from the provisions of the Treaty. Much of the Conference could therefore be termed a success.

29. In conclusion, he stressed the continuing importance of the Treaty for world peace and security. All must strive to make it universal and defend it against critics, who might fail to appreciate its role in maintaining a world where the role of nuclear weapons was diminished rather than increased.

30. Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), speaking on behalf of the Western Group, associated herself with those who had expressed gratitude to the President for his efforts to save the final declaration, in which he had so nearly succeeded. It was a great pity that consensus had not been reached, especially - as the representative of Australia had said - in view of the rather surprising point on which discussion in the Drafting Committee had broken down. However, a great deal of common ground had been identified and common text agreed, and that included agreement on some article VI issues. On balance it must be said that the Conference had confirmed the deep commitment of all to the Treaty and strengthened its effectiveness.

31. Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that the lack of agreement on a certain part of the text of the draft final declaration, although regrettable, did not diminish the achievements of a very thorough review, reflecting the continuing vitality of the Treaty and the attachment of all the States parties to it. His delegation looked to the future with a feeling of confidence and renewed commitment to the Treaty.

32. Ms. MASON (Canada) expressed her delegation's deep disappointment at the inability to reach consensus on a final declaration. None the less, during the weeks of detailed review consensus had been reached on virtually all issues, which would no doubt strengthen the Treaty. Canada would spare no effort to ensure that that progress was built upon in the next five years leading to the crucial extension conference, for it firmly believed that the goal should and must be the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

33. Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia) regretted that despite very hard work it had been impossible to reach agreement on a final declaration, in particular concerning a comprehensive test ban. More important, it was regrettable that in a new era of disarmament the commitments under legally binding multilateral instruments entered into over 25 years before were still pending. However, as other delegations had pointed out, important work had been accomplished and commitments reconfirmed at the Conference, and it could therefore be considered a success.

34. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation deeply regretted that, despite constructive cooperation on the part of the non-aligned States parties to the Treaty, consensus had not been reached on a final declaration. His delegation had tried its best to narrow the gaps among the participants. Unfortunately, at the last minute a single nuclear-weapon State present had been unwilling to accept a proposal by the Chairman of the

Drafting Committee, although it had been accepted by the non-aligned countries and others participating in the consultations and consensus had been blocked.

35. While maintaining its commitment to the non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA full-scope safeguards, his country wished to record its dissatisfaction with the non-compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with the Treaty, in particular article VI. Meanwhile, the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular the developing and non-aligned countries, though fully committed to the Treaty, had not benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had not received preferential treatment with respect to non-parties. There was a need for serious consideration of those negative developments over the past two decades, in order that the extension of the Treaty should not be jeopardized.

36. Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) expressed regret that no final declaration had emerged from the Conference, despite the spirit of compromise that had prevailed in the discussions. It was in that spirit of compromise that his delegation had responded to the appeal by the Conference to supplier States to require the application of full-scope safeguards. In the absence of a final declaration, Belgian policy in future would depend on the attitude of the other supplier States.

37. It was sometimes forgotten that politics was the art of the possible, and that by focusing on a single aspect of the discussions, one delegation had assumed responsibility for what might be considered a failure. However, the work accomplished by the Conference showed that confidence in the Treaty and its effectiveness remained intact.

CLOSURE OF THE CONFERENCE

38. The PRESIDENT said that the lack of consensus on a final declaration should be seen as an incident rather than a disaster. After thanking all the delegations for their excellent work, he declared the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons closed.

The meeting rose at 5.30 a.m.

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.1-7

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 7th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Chairman: Mr. Adeyemi (Nigeria)

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.
GENERAL

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.1-7/
Corrigendum
31 January 1992

ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 7th MEETINGS

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Corrigendum

The present document contains the corrections received from delegations and from the Secretariat applying to the English text of the summary records of the meetings of Main Committee I of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.1-7).

With the issuance of this corrigendum, the summary records of the above-mentioned meetings are to be considered as final.

1st meeting

Paragraph 17

The name of the speaker should read Mr. HARUN-UR-RASHID

3rd meeting

Paragraph 27

The last sentence should read:

His delegation thought the delegation of Nigeria correctly stressed the special right of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to expect progress in that regard.

Paragraph 29

The last sentence should read:

His delegation was grateful to Egypt for elaborating ideas on further development of the system of security assurances.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.1
7 December 1990

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 24 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

(2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 3-12

(3) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues to be considered in the Committee

B. Security assurances:

(1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council

(2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(3) Consideration of proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (proposal by Nigeria)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.1

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3):

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(1) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3

(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12

(3) ARTICLE VII, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MAIN ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE COMMITTEE

SECURITY ASSURANCES:

(1) RESOLUTION 255 (1968) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

(2) EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(3) CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (proposal by Nigeria)

(agenda item 13) (NPT/CONF.IV/1 and 17)

1. The CHAIRMAN declared open the first meeting of Main Committee I.

2. Mr. BOOTHBY (Secretary of Main Committee I) announced that for financial reasons it might not be possible to provide summary records of the meetings of Main Committee I, but the Secretariat would in any case prepare a record of decisions taken.

3. The CHAIRMAN outlined his proposals for the organization of the Committee's work. The Committee would first hold a general exchange of views on the agenda items referred to it. Next, it would examine in depth the proposals or working papers submitted by delegations. In that connection he suggested that a special sub-committee should be established to examine, under the chairmanship of Mr. Deyanov, of Bulgaria, the proposal by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17). Thirdly, the Committee would consider the report which it would submit to the Drafting Committee. He asked members if they wished the initial exchange of views to be of a general nature or whether they preferred to deal with the agenda items one by one. His own preferance was for the former option.

4. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) also considered it preferable to start with a general discussion of the agenda items. He noted Mr. Boothby's announcement that, for financial reasons, the Committee might have to do without summary

records. If it agreed to that, the provisions of rule 42 of the rules of procedure of the Conference would not be observed. He considered that to be unacceptable.

5. The CHAIRMAN announced that steps had been taken to obtain the necessary funds to finance the Conference. If the financial situation improved it might be possible in the days ahead to return to a normal situation, and thus have summary records. He took the opportunity to remind delegations that the funding of the Conference was not the direct responsibility of the United Nations, which, with its well-known budgetary difficulties, was unable to place its services at the disposal of the Conference on the strength of vague promises of repayment. The Chairman asked the members of the Committee to accept that situation and he asked delegations to be brief, so that the general discussion would not continue beyond Monday, 27 August.

6. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said he appreciated that the Conference faced serious financial difficulties, but he thought the Committee could not possibly do without summary records. He therefore proposed that delegations should proceed on the basis that summary records would be produced, in the hope that the necessary funding would be released, which he was confident would happen. He agreed with the Chairman that the general discussion should not extend beyond Monday, 27 August.

7. The CHAIRMAN, agreeing with Mr. Taliani's proposal, invited delegations not to spend too much time on the question of summary records, otherwise the discussion would become uselessly bogged down.

8. Mr. GONZALO GUTIERREZ (Peru) also considered that the general discussion should cover all the items on the agenda and that all contributions should be brief and specific. It was his understanding that the President of the Conference intended to convene the Bureau in the near future to discuss the question of the financing of the Conference.

9. Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria) said that, as the experience of previous conferences showed, the work of Main Committee I had always been a difficult but instrumental part of the effort to review the implementation of the NPT and to draft a meaningful final document.

10. He hoped that the Committee would be determined from the outset not to waste valuable resources, but still allow itself enough time to carry out its task thoroughly. He therefore thought that after a brief general discussion on the implementation of articles I, II and VII and on the issue of security assurances, the Committee should break up into three or four subsidiary bodies which would draft the relevant parts of the Final Document.

11. In terms of organization, the review of issues relating to articles I, II and VI seemed relatively clear, but the review of article VII and the issue of security assurances might require particular care, given some previous arrangements agreed upon at the third session of the Preparatory Committee. The Chairman had just proposed that a sub-committee be set up to examine in detail the proposal by Nigeria concerning an agreement on negative security

assurances, which appeared as sub-item B (3) of agenda item 13. On the completion of its work, it might be appropriate, from the standpoint of economy of time and effort by delegations, to transform the sub-committee into a working group to deal with the other two sub-items (B (1) and (2)), namely resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group could also review article VII of the Treaty.

12. If delegations so wished, Main Committee I could, therefore, following the general discussion, separate into three working bodies: the first would review articles I and II, the second article VI and the third, formerly the sub-committee, would draft a text for the Final Document on the implementation of article VII and the whole issue of security assurances, making use of the sub-committee's conclusions concerning the proposal by Nigeria. The Bulgarian delegation considered that, while the scope of the consideration of security assurances could be limited to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, participation by all nuclear-weapon States, including the two observer States not parties to the Treaty, in the sub-committee's work would be desirable. His delegation was prepared to accept the arrangements suggested by the Chairman for the organization of the work of Main Committee I.

13. Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria) said his understanding had been that the sub-committee was to consider Nigeria's proposal in document NPT/CONF.IV/17, but Mr. Deyanov's remarks implied that it would also deal with other issues. Since time was extremely limited, he thought it would be better for the sub-committee not to dissipate its efforts and to focus on the proposal by Nigeria.

14. The CHAIRMAN said that he had understood the Bulgarian delegation to have suggested that the sub-committee should concentrate on the proposal by Nigeria and then turn into a working group which would deal with the other points mentioned. He believed drafting the Final Document would require many other, mostly informal, working groups to be set up.

15. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) thought it preferable that the sub-committee's terms of reference should be of a general nature, without specifying a particular document. The proposal by Nigeria was of course very important and should be given top priority, but he pointed out that Egypt too had submitted a working paper, of which a revised version (prepared in consultation with the Nigerian delegation) would shortly be circulated.

16. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) agreed with the representative of Egypt that the sub-committee's mandate should be to focus on the issue of security assurances, which would obviously involve its considering the highly important proposal by Nigeria.

17. Mr. HARUM-UR-RASHID (Bangladesh) associated himself with the remarks of the representatives of Egypt and Finland.

18. The CHAIRMAN, noting the proposals by Egypt, Finland and Bangladesh, said that, in the absence of objection, he would consider that delegations agreed to the proposed organization of the Committee's work.

It was so decided.

19. Mr. DEYANOV thanked delegations for having elected him to the post of Chairman of the sub-committee and assured the members of Main Committee I that he would do his utmost to deserve their trust, which was an honour for his delegation.

20. Mr. MACKAY (New Zealand) requested that, in the absence of summary records, the Secretariat should provide delegations with a document reflecting the decisions taken by Main Committee I.

21. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) asked what the situation really was with regard to summary records and whether delegations could share the optimism expressed by the representative of Italy on the matter.

22. Mr. BOOTHBY (Secretary of Main Committee I) said he agreed that the Secretariat had no authority to take action that was not in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Conference. However, it should be borne in mind that the Conference did not at present possess sufficient financial resources to provide summary records. The Secretariat had therefore requested that all Committee meetings be tape-recorded, which would mean that summary records could be produced once the necessary funds had been released. He assured all members of the Committee that the Secretariat would spare no effort to carry out its duties under the rules of procedure.

23. The CHAIRMAN, noting that no delegation wished to open the general discussion, proposed that the meeting should adjourn.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2
1 November 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Organization of work

General exchange of views on agenda items allocated to the Committee

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/Dec.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Committee for electing him and said that a record of the decisions on the programme of work had been prepared at the request of the delegation of New Zealand and circulated as document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/Dec.1. He intended to convene an informal meeting of friends of the Chairman, to begin as soon as the current meeting rose, in order to consider the programme, including the mandates of the sub-committee and of any working groups that might be required.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON AGENDA ITEMS ALLOCATED TO THE COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/17; NPT/CONF.IV/L.1; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1)

2. The CHAIRMAN invited members to engage in a general exchange of views on the review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in article VIII (3), pursuant to Conference agenda item 13 A and B. Only the present meeting was available for such an exchange and he urged speakers to be brief and to avoid repetition of statements made in plenary.

3. The Committee's work was vital and the task was to seek to strengthen the Treaty with a view to achieving broader adherence and improving the possibility of extending it indefinitely beyond 1995. In that regard, a unique opportunity was offered by the vastly improved international political climate and the upsurge in optimism and the will to co-operate. The Treaty was imperfect, of course, especially in its lack of credible guarantees and commitment to disarmament measures, not to mention the question of nuclear transfers. Again, the issues before the Committee were sensitive and complex. Members should show the utmost flexibility and a spirit of compromise. He hoped that specific proposals would be put forward in the form of draft texts so worded as to attract the widest possible support.

4. Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden) said that the United Nations Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, which she had chaired, had adopted its report by consensus. The Secretary-General was to transmit the study to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, and the text was available to the Conference as an informal paper. The adoption by consensus was in itself a significant achievement, in view of the scope and complexity of the subject; it had also been very timely, having taken place one month after an agreement, signed at the recent summit meeting in Washington, which provided for deep cuts in various categories in the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Soviet Union, continued negotiations on further cuts and effective limitations on qualitative improvements in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Coincidentally, on the day the report had been adopted the Heads of State and Government of the NATO countries had announced a major shift in military doctrine.

5. The study was the first United Nations study in the field of security to be completed in the new period of détente between East and West and the first in which nuclear-weapon States had taken part. It had responded to the need

to update and supplement, in the light of changes in the world political situation and developments in science and nuclear-weapon technology, the United Nations study submitted to the General Assembly in 1980. The report provided technical data and statistics on existing nuclear weapons, reviewed developments in nuclear-weapon systems, analysed doctrines and strategies, described weapons development, production and testing as well as the effects of nuclear warfare, commented on matters such as international security, arms limitation and disarmament, examined the legality of nuclear weapons and outlined a set of political conclusions. It had been able to show, thanks to the current climate of glasnost, data from the Soviet Union on matters such as birth defects and mortality rates from leukaemia in the Semipalatinsk region, where there was a Soviet nuclear test site. Nuclear weapons, even if not used, involved a high price for human beings and for the environment. For example, a $28.6 billion programme was proposed by the United States Department of Energy to rectify conditions at civil and military nuclear sites, clean up pollution and develop new methods for radioactive and chemical waste disposal.

6. The study's conclusions pointed to the entire world's conviction of the catastrophic consequences of a major nuclear war, referred to the nuclear-weapon Powers' determination, voiced during the past decade, to avoid any nuclear conflict, and stressed that not only those Powers, but other States also, should contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear war. The study noted the momentous world changes, including the progress in disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had reduced the threat of nuclear confrontation, and stressed the right and duty of States to help in disarmament efforts. Strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime remained fundamentally important, and global and regional efforts were needed to strengthen the régime further in all its aspects. The study ended on an optimistic note, postulating that reliance on military strength for national security would be increasingly supplemented by policies of confidence-building and co-operation - doubtless the trend over the long term.

7. It was her hope that the study would become a standard reference work, available to experts and laymen throughout the world, on the nuclear disarmament issues of the 1990s, and that it would prove useful to the Conference, which had the task, _inter alia_, of preparing for an extension of the NPT in 1995.

8. _Mr. GUTIERREZ_ (Peru) said there were a number of issues which should be reflected in the Final Document so as to mark some progress in relation to the one adopted in 1985, and one of them was vertical proliferation. Although the strategic arms limitation negotiations between the super-Powers, signified progress in quantitative terms, technological research was continuing. Hence, a clear statement by the nuclear-weapon States of their intention to comply with the obligation under article VI to end the arms race should be accompanied by an unequivocal statement of the intention to proceed to a corresponding qualitative limitation.

9. Horizontal proliferation, too, was a cause for concern. In the past five years, transfers to States not Parties to the NPT of material and technology for nuclear-weapon development, including the means to manufacture ballistic missiles and launch vehicles, had been on the increase. To put an end to that utterly objectionable practice, the Conference should, in line with the obligations set out in article I of the Treaty, arrive at an undertaking by all producer countries of relevant equipment or technology that they would demand, as a general rule, the "full-scope safeguards" from importers in all countries not Parties to the NPT. The safeguards should also be made applicable to all cases of supplies under existing contracts. It was to be hoped that an appropriate code of conduct, which some producer countries already intended to apply, could be adopted for acceptance by all NPT Parties and set forth in the Conference's Final Document. His delegation would revert to that matter during discussions on article III (2). The Final Document should also contain an urgent appeal for all non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the NPT to sign as speedily as possible the relevant IAEA safeguards agreement, pursuant to the provisions of article III (1).

10. Under article I, nuclear-weapon States Parties undertook not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or explosive devices or help any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire them. In order to strengthen that undertaking, a legally binding policy statement to that effect should be made by all nuclear-weapon States. Peru also endorsed the initiative aimed at requiring all non-nuclear-weapon States not (Parties) to the NPT to assume a legal undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices and to accept the IAEA safeguards for all their current and future nuclear activity.

11. As to the link between the NPT with cessation of nuclear testing and with a treaty on the total prohibition of such tests, it would be desirable to negotiate, among other options, a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, as a possible temporary measure, valid for 10 years perhaps during which period the nuclear-weapon testing States would undertake to adopt the necessary measures towards total cessation. The process could begin with the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, be extended to all States possessing nuclear weapons or devices and finally lead to a multilateral agreement.

12. Negative security assurances were an important complementary element, but had been widely and wrongly ignored. An agreement should be drawn up at once, legally requiring any nuclear-weapon State to avoid the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. His delegation supported most of the contents of document NPT/CONF.IV/17, containing the Nigerian proposal, but felt that a detailed analysis was warranted in order to align some of the matters with the requirements of the States Parties. It was ready to work to that end in the sub-committee to consider negative assurances. A further confidence-building measure would be a joint declaration, by all nuclear-weapon States, that none would be the first to use weapons of that type.

13. Despite a de facto moratorium on the production of fissionable material on account of the huge stockpiles in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States,

none of those States had voiced a decision to suspend production. Therefore, negotiations must be initiated on an agreement for international verificaion of a complete end to such production; such a measure would accord fully with bilateral understandings on the reduction of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons and therefore be consonant with article VI of the NPT.

14. In view of the welcome outcome of the recent talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on a substantial reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, it would be a valuable further step towards compliance with article VI if the super-Powers could formally announce, at the present Conference, an undertaking to draw up a strategic arms limitation agreement during 1990 and to begin START II negotiations as speedily as possible.

15. The views expressed during the current exchange could perhaps be issued as preliminary texts which, together with working papers submitted by delegations or groups, might serve as a basis for the Committee contribution to the Final Document. His delegation reiterated its readiness to co-operate fully to that end.

16. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) thanked the representative of Sweden for the information about the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons conducted by the United Nations Group of Experts. Since the previous Review Conference a number of significant developments had made the intervening period the most hopeful since the era of détente had begun. Yet there was no sign of the political will to arrive at an agreement on a total comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, the lack of which remained an obstacle to full compliance with the spirit and the letter of the NPT. The United States and the United Kingdom together with their NATO partners, insisted that continuance of nuclear testing was essential in order, as they put it, to maintain deterrent credibility. It was hard to see who needed to be deterred, now that the Cold War and confrontation had disappeared. Despite the negotiations for the cuts in strategic arsenals, the withdrawal of intermediate-range weapons from European territory and the possible reduction of short-range weapons there, it seemed that nuclear warheads were being repositioned in other regions or at sea. The nuclear threat, therefore, had not disappeared. Nuclear disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race would never be achieved while the testing and production of fissionable material for military purposes continued.

17. His delegation attached the greatest importance to article VI, which was based on the text of a Mexican initiative put forward in 1966, and fully supported the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, submitted by the Non-Aligned and Other States. The proposals it contained were aimed at strengthening the NPT and ensuring that it remained fully operative beyond 1995. In particular, he supported the call, set out in detail in operative paragraph 4, for action by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Committee's deliberations and drafting work must be systematic and orderly, so as to make a valid contribution to the Final Document of the Conference. Mexico's proposals to that end were contained in working paper NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1. The text was self-explanatory, and he would welcome any comments.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2

18. Mr. AALBU (Norway) said that the terms of articles I and II were central to the aim of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States had already acquired nuclear weapon capability or might be trying to do so was a particularly great danger in regions where tension and conflict posed a threat to international peace and security. The Nordic Governments had therefore suggested that all non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the Treaty should assume international, legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and no effort should be spared to secure universal adherence to the Treaty.

19. As to article VI, the Final Document should record that considerably more progress had taken place during the period under review than in any previous period and that prospects for further progress were good. Nevertheless, only limited progress had been made in regard to a total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions. A multilateral agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was vital in securing effective control over nuclear weapons development and proliferation. Therefore, the present Conference should strongly advocate that the recently re-established ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work when it resumed its deliberations in 1991. The Final Document should also reflect the environmental concerns voiced in regard to underground nuclear testing.

20. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important supplement to the NPT. The initiative must come from the States of the regions concerned and the zones established must not adversely affect existing security arrangements. All the major States of the region in question must be parties, and adequate verification arrangements must exist. Such zones had been established in Latin America and the South Pacific and had contributed to the global efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. However, it was important that all eligible States should become parties to such a treaty.

21. Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that all States Parties should abide by the provisions of articles I and II. Doubts of any kind - and some had been raised, unfortunately - about the implementation of those articles would damage the Treaty's credibility. It would be advisable, therefore, for States Parties, nuclear and non-nuclear, to reaffirm their strict observance of the provisions of those articles. Non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty should be encouraged to do so. Japan, which shared the concerns expressed about those States, had approached 13 of them shortly before the start of the Conference.

22. With regard to article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, it was fair to acknowledge the progress made during the past five years, far more than in the previous 15 years, in the nuclear-weapon States' nuclear disarmament efforts. Yet the Conference should also request further efforts in that direction. Nor should the obligation of non-nuclear States Parties to pursue general and complete disarmament be overlooked. Despite the encouraging CFE and CSCE negotiations and the progress in chemical weapon negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, more efforts were obviously required to dispel the danger of armed conflict in some regions, exemplified by the mounting crisis

of the past few weeks. Preambular paragraph 11 of the Treaty specifically referred to the States Parties' desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States. In some regions where disarmament efforts were not ripe for negotiation, political efforts might have to be given priority in order to ease tension and build confidence.

23. His delegation endorsed the welcome of the re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and hoped that it would be convened as early as possible at that Conference's 1991 session. A step-by-step approach was the shortest and most realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Japan intended to participate actively in the PTBT Amendment Conference to be convened in January 1991. It understood the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties' security concerns and agreed that a solution should be sought through in-depth dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States within the NPT régime. The Review Conference was one of the best forums for consideration of the problem, but in view of the complex practical aspects the dialogue might have to be pursued in the Conference on Disarmament or other appropriate United Nations forums.

24. Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said the President of his country, Mr. Vaclav Havel, had said recently, when addressing the Council of Europe, that the former totalitarian grip on Central and Eastern European nations had forced them to pay a high price for a security system based on fear of nuclear weapons. Those countries now realized that their common living space had thereby been deformed, and required a new system of security, an inseparable part of which must be the nuclear non-proliferation régime, at least until all nuclear weapons had been eliminated. Each signatory therefore had a grave responsibility not only to abide passively by the Treaty's separate provisions but actively to give effect to the non-proliferation régime and the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

25. However, the "nuclear market" was liable to make proliferation a major problem of the 1990s, involving not only nuclear arms but chemical weapons, missile equipment and nuclear technology. Hence, complementary, verifiable political and technical measures should be adopted at the national and the international level, to prevent the transfer of weapons and technology usable in the nuclear field. His delegation endorsed the conclusions of the Zangger Group in that regard. Accession to the Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States would, of course, considerably enhance the non-proliferation régime, by strengthening international legal obligations that no proclamations by non-Party nuclear-weapon States could replace.

26. The review of article VI focused particularly on nuclear-weapon States. Although implementation of its provisions was still not fully satisfactory, there had been more progress since the previous Review Conference than in all the preceding years; that dynamic atmosphere was propitious for the step-by-step solution exemplified by the signing of the INF Treaty in 1978, something which had shown that even highly complex problems could be solved given the political will, and by the fact that negotiations for START II had already led to the elaboration of 12 verification methods. Such sound progress augured well for further strengthening of the Treaty.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2

27. Negative security assurances were an important part of the arms reduction process, since further countries would accede to the Treaty only if they were convinced of its utility. The existing assurances were not unified, however, and some were inadequate for non-nuclear-weapon States.

28. Nuclear disarmament was inseparable from the disarmament process as a whole, and the comprehensive banning of nuclear-weapon tests was inseparable from the issue of non-proliferation. The committee for that purpose in the Conference on Disarmament had been re-established, and a Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be convened in January 1991. A complete global ban on nuclear tests was a key factor for strengthening the NPT and achieving nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

29. Responsibility for implementing the Treaty lay with nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties alike, bearing in mind the Treaty's importance for the future, for the Treaty should prevail over military ambition and force.

30. Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria), referring to the question of security assurances, said that what had, for two decades, been a legitimate concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had gradually become more associated with the nuclear-weapon States' security. It was curious, too, that the provision of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the NPT continued to be advocated by certain interest groups, at the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums, as a precondition for any progress on that issue. The subject had first been broached when non-aligned countries had specifically sought assurances that the renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and render them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. However, the potential disadvantage feared at the time had increased several-fold. Nigeria had observed all too often that unilateral declarations in that regard by various nuclear-weapon States helped only to the extent that they expressed those States' concerns. Although they might assist in negotiations, unilateral assurances alone could not constitute firm, credible and legally-binding agreements; they were un-negotiated, unverifiable, conflicting, contradictory and subject to divergent interpretations. Yet no real progress had been made in that regard since the Third Review Conference, for the nuclear-weapon States clung to their unilateral declarations, acting solely in their narrow security interests and disregarding the non-nuclear-weapon States' security concerns, thus producing a stalemate on that item at the Conference on Disarmament.

31. Insistence on unilateral negative security assurances introduced an unacceptable element, akin to blackmail, into multilateral disarmament negotiations. To suggest that States which had made a legally-binding commitment to relinquish the nuclear option should be content with such unilateral assurances was to undermine their sovereignty; to insist on unconditional assurances, thus placing parties and non-parties on the same footing, was unrealistic, unfruitful and disruptive. Negative security assurances must be effectively negotiated, in the light of current security realities. Until nuclear disarmament - the most effective assurance - was

achieved, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

32. Against that background, Nigeria had submitted a proposal, in 1987, in which non-nuclear-weapon States were classified according to their security situations, the purpose being to enhance negotiations. The nuclear-weapon States had preferred their unilateral declarations, and some non-nuclear-weapon States which had not renounced the nuclear option had remained unco-operative. Nor did a further proposal by Nigeria, in 1988, under which nuclear-weapon States would relinquish their unilateral declarations during the negotiating process, succeeded in breaking the stalemate.

33. To strengthen the NPT and allay the anxiety of some non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and provide further incentive to non-Party States to accede to the Treaty, Nigeria had submitted a draft agreement, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/17, on negative security assurances within the framework of the NPT. His delegation welcomed the support expressed by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and would speak again on the matter when it was taken up in the appropriate Sub-Committee, in the hope that the proposal could be adopted during the Review Conference. On that subject, his country believed that Security Council resolution 255 (1968), on Positive Security Assurances was inadequate and that unilateral declarations, having played no credible role in regard to negative assurances, should not be commended in the Final Document.

34. The current political developments in South Africa should not make for a false sense of security, since South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability was incompatible with peace and security for the world in general and the African States in particular. Since 1987 South Africa had been voicing its intention to accede to the NPT; it should take immediate action accordingly and submit all its nuclear activity to IAEA full scope safeguards.

35. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that one specific problem arising from the welcome progress being made in nuclear disarmament was the reconversion of weapons-grade fissionable material that became available following the decommissioning of nuclear weapons. Such material should be reassigned for peaceful purposes, particularly for the benefit of developing countries, under appropriate international supervision. Italy had drafted a text - unfortunately not yet available for circulation - on that issue. It wished to propose some wording for inclusion in the Final Document and would speak on the matter later.

36. Italy's position on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was well known. In view of the current progress towards nuclear disarmament, exemplified by the intention declared by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their IBMs by 50 per cent, the time was perhaps not ripe for a decision on the CTB issue, as could be seen from the outcome of the latest session of the Committee on Disarmament. It was possible that, in five years' time, the problem might have disappeared.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2

37. Mr. REESE (Australia) said that, although the previous Review Conference had deemed that articles I and II were fully implemented, since then the failure of States with significant nuclear capability to fulfil their obligations to complete their safeguards agreements, and clandestine attempts by some non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to procure certain questionable items, gave rise to doubts. His delegation hoped that the Final Document would mention that it was important for Parties to adhere, and be seen to adhere, to the Treaty obligations. Moreover, and in regard to preambular paragraphs 1 to 3, which were of central importance to the NPT, the wording should be stronger than it had been in the Final Document of the previous Review Conference.

38. Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 related essentially to the other half of the bargain struck in acceding to the NPT: the commitment to nuclear disarmament. In that context, Australia welcomed the improved political climate and the resultant enhanced prospects for nuclear and conventional disarmament. It supported the range of arms control negotiations, especially START, between the United States and the Soviet Union and looked forward to the conclusion of an agreement which would drastically reduce their arsenals. However, as the Australian Foreign Minister had pointed out during the general debate the number of nuclear weapons in the world would still be unacceptably high. His delegation therefore reiterated its conviction that nuclear disarmament must be pursued, actively and in good faith, pursuant to article VI, while recognizing that the process would be slow and complex and that, as noted at the previous Review Conference, stability was important.

39. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty remained an urgent priority, since the limits it would impose on proliferation, vertical and horizontal, made it an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process and thus of full implementation of the NPT. Although the agreements signed, since the previous Review Conference, by the United States and the Soviet Union on the Verification Protocol of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were welcome and should be acknowledged in the Final Document, a comprehensive test ban was some way off. It was gratifying to see the recent re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for it was time for the international community to begin work towards the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Although Australia had doubts about the Partial Test-Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, it would participate in it constructively. Whatever the Conference's findings with regard to testing, the NPT remained essential.

40. With regard to article VII, Australia's involvement in the negotiation and establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone reflected its view that, in appropriate circumstances, such a zone could make a major contribution to regional security and global disarmament efforts. China and the Soviet Union had since signed the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and the members of the South Pacific Forum continued to urge other

nuclear-weapon States to do so. The text of that Treaty would shortly be circulated and it was to be hoped that all delegations would support its inclusion in the Final Document.

41. Negative security assurances played a fundamental role in a treaty in which the vast majority of the States Parties had relinquished the option of nuclear weapons. His delegation looked forward to participating in the sub-committee to be established to consider proposals such as those submitted by Nigeria and Egypt relating to a legal system of such assurances. In that connection, under Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the signatories were legally bound to give negative security assurances.

42. Since the NPT still lacked universality, the Conference's Final Document should issue a strong appeal to all States not yet Parties to reconsider their position. Non-Party States did gain de facto security benefits from the Treaty while accepting none of its obligations, and hence means must be sought to show them sound reasons for joining. Increased membership, particularly by the so-called "threshold States", would help in the negotiations to extend the Treaty indefinitely beyond 1995.

43. Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that his delegation would work towards producing a consensus document, which could be achieved given goodwill and a spirit of co-operation. At the same time, efforts must be concentrated on establishing a sound basis for 1995, which meant that the NPT régime must be strengthened, not threatened or jeopardized in any way.

44. Satisfaction could be recorded with regard to article 1, but the implementation of article II needed to be strengthened, through scrupulous adherence by all Parties.

45. Article VI applied not just to nuclear-weapon States but to all countries, and involved non-nuclear as well as nuclear arms control negotiations. The United States had an impressive record of arms control negotiations and activities, nuclear and non-nuclear, which spoke for itself and testified to article VI's viability, yet it was time for the international community to demand that all Parties should make commensurate efforts to achieve arms control measures that could ease regional tensions and abate regional arms competition. The Conference should send a strong message to all States Parties accordingly. Fulfilment of article VI's objectives should not be judged solely in terms of the agreements concluded, for the article dealt with a process which was, in and of itself, of the utmost importance. It was also essential to recognize that changing political relationships affected arms control and disarmament measures and vice versa, and that particular arms control measures themselves, such as deep cuts in arsenals, required very careful attention in regard to the type and reliability of the weapons remaining. To avoid instability, reductions must be designed to maintain balanced defensive capability at every phase. Again, at every stage of reduction, the ability to test was essential. It must be recognized that nuclear arsenal reductions of the type sought in the START negotiations depended on awareness that the remaining weapons could be stored, deployed or transported safely and would perform as designed - which meant the ability to

test. The United States was committed to an eventual complete ban on testing, on a step-by-step basis. The conditions it imposed were based on the conviction that disregard for the relationship between the types of weapons remaining at any time, or their reliability, would be a seriously destabilizing factor.

46. In order to strengthen the Treaty, efforts must be made to attract States currently outside its régime. Nor must the Treaty be held hostage to the conclusion of any particular treaty, whether on banning, on reduction or on test limitations. Every arms control measure that contributed towards general and complete disarmament, the goal of article VI, must be considered and pursued on its own merits. The United States could not agree that a comprehensive test ban was a sine qua non for extending the NPT. As a matter of procedure, the United States rejected that form of hostage-holding just as it rejected any other form. As a matter of substance, it pledged itself, and called upon others, to keep the arms control process moving ahead on a smooth, steady course.

47. Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) said his delegation attached great importance to the re-establishment, at the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It had also welcomed the way in which informal meetings had been held at that Conference, such as those relating to items 2 and 3 of its agenda, at which the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States had reported on their bilateral negotiations on strategic and outer space weapons, and the discussions which had followed. That practice of interrelating current multilateral and bilateral efforts should be encouraged. As to security arrangements for non-nuclear-weapon States, the relevant committee had noted, in its report, the many recent political improvements whose effects should have a bearing on the search for possible solutions. The proposals and initiatives put forward at the Conference on Disarmament as well as those prepared by the Nigerian and other delegations in the preparations for the current Review Conference, should be viewed in the overall context of efforts to arrive at a common formula.

48. His delegation had listened with interest to the information provided by the representative of Sweden about the United Nations Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, and had noted not only the progress made, including the greater transparency which prevailed, but also the various concerns still being voiced, particularly in regard to the qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons.

49. Delegations should now make every effort to reach conclusions in a spirit of consensus; his own would heed the Chairman's remarks in that regard and co-operate to the utmost.

50. Mr. HARUN-UR-RASHID (Bangladesh) said that the NPT was widely viewed as one of the most important agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament, but it was intended only as a means to achieve the goals reflected in its provisions and in preambular paragraphs 8, 10 and 11. If the NPT régime was to be strengthened, five conditions were essential: scrupulous adherence by all States Parties to their treaty obligations, particularly the

provisions of articles I, II and III; disarmament obligation; security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; the peaceful application and transfer of nuclear technology, particularly to developing States Parties to the NPT; and full-scope safeguards for all nuclear activity.

51. The wording of article VI made its purpose very clear: cessation of the nuclear arms race, as well as nuclear and comprehensive disarmament. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the many recent positive steps such as the progress in the various arms control negotiations and measures undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. A comprehensive test ban was crucial to fulfilment of the Treaty obligations; it was not in itself a substantive disarmament measure but only a prelude. In that connection, all aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament pursuant to the terms of article VI, were contained in draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1.

52. Legally binding negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States were an imperative need but Security Council resolution 255 (1968) provided no commitment or obligation beyond those already contained in the Charter. On that point, his delegation would state its views during the deliberations on the proposals put forward by the delegations of Egypt and Nigeria.

53. Bangladesh supported the concept of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and recognized the regional treaties already concluded as positive developments. He was confident that the Committee would achieve success in its work.

54. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said it was clear that some articles of the NPT were being implemented and others were not. For example, article I had been observed as far as the letter, but not as far as the spirit was concerned. It was also generally recognized that the nuclear-weapon States Parties had been unable fully to implement the provisions of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, in sad contrast to the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had fully discharged their obligations under article II. Therefore, the factors which prevented States Parties from wholly implementing the provisions of the Treaty, and more especially of the articles in question, should be reviewed regularly if the Treaty's credibility was to be enhanced.

55. Article VI made it clear that all Parties must discharge their obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith. Hence, he could not share some delegations' interpretation that the NPT was but an instrument to encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons control. Indonesia also found it disquieting that the nuclear-weapon States' perceived strategic concepts meant that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons was accompanied by further developments in the quality and reliability of those that remained - in pursuit of policies which amounted to double standards and a threat to the Treaty.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.2

56. Regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at, promoted regional stability and security, thus contributing to the efforts to attain the NPT's goals. The ASEAN countries were intensifying their efforts to establish such a zone. It was hoped that all countries, especially nuclear-weapon States, with interests in such regions would accede to and respect the international instruments that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones and support the initiatives taken by States Parties in accordance with article VII of the Treaty, as called for in draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1.

57. The most effective safeguard against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It was to be hoped that, until that goal could be attained, all nuclear-weapon States would give an unconditional guarantee not to use, or threaten to use, such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, his delegation could support a proposal, on the lines put forward by the delegations of Egypt and Nigeria, to convene a conference on such assurances no later than 1991. Separate assurances by individual nuclear-weapon States were not enough at the present stage. In his opinion, the current world political climate was conducive to a start on negotiations towards an agreement on that issue.

58. Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka), referring to article VI, said that he welcomed the recent progress in bilateral negotiations, which contrasted with the overall lack of progress prior to the previous Review Conference. Nevertheless, it was disappointing that no effective limitations had been agreed upon in connection with the qualitative development of nuclear weapons systems, despite specific calls voiced at the previous Review. It was a matter for concern that, despite the deep cuts in strategic arsenals foreseen in the START negotiations, 20 per cent more nuclear weapons would be deployed than had been the case in 1970. As shown in the recent comprehensive study by the United Nations Group of Experts, continued modernization would lead to the deployment of new types of weapons systems, contrary to the purposes of article VII of the NPT.

59. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be a vital step towards non-proliferation, but no tangible move towards negotiating a treaty was being made. The argument that continued testing was necessary to ensure the safety of the remaining weapons was not backed by the published data, which indicated that the main considerations were further development, rather than safety. His delegation therefore deemed a comprehensive test-ban treaty an important concomitant to article VI and was disturbed at the lack of any clear commitment to resume even the non-negotiating work undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament in that regard. It also shared the concern voiced about the hazards, confirmed by new evidence, from underground nuclear testing. Testing of that kind, and the continued production of nuclear weapons material, would, if unchecked, result in the need for enormous expenditure on environmental safety.

60. Equally disquieting was the lack of progress towards meeting the non-nuclear-weapon States' legitimate demands for effective security assurances; the nuclear-weapon States should not continue to avoid addressing such genuine concerns. Perhaps they would be more amenable, at the present Conference, to seeking a workable solution. A number of constructive proposals had been made and should be considered constructively. In that connection, draft resolution NPT/CONF.IV/L.1 deserved the Committee's serious consideration.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.3
13 December 1990

ENGLISH
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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 29 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

later: Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (*continued*)

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3):

B. Security assurances:

(1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council

(2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(3) Consideration of proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (proposal by Nigeria)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.3

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, following the open-ended meeting he had held with friends of the Chairman, he proposed that the work of Main Committee I should be divided up among three working groups in accordance with the procedure adopted in 1985. Working Group 1, chaired by Mr. Vaerno (Norway), who was also Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I, would be responsible for reviewing articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Treaty.

2. Secondly, the Sub-Committee established at the first meeting of Main Committee I, pursuant to the decision taken at the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the Fourth Review Conference, had been entrusted with considering sub-item (3) of agenda item 13 B (security assurances), under the chairmanship of Mr. Deyanov (Bulgaria). The mandate of the Sub-Committee was: to consider in detail the substance of the proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (proposal by Nigeria, doc. NPT/CONF.IV/17); to establish the procedure for further action on the proposed agreement; and, lastly, to consider the proposal calling upon the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution on security assurances which would go beyond the provisions of its resolution 255 (1968) (proposal by Egypt, doc. NPT/CONF.IV/31).

3. The Sub-Committee would report to Main Committee I on its work, to which it could devote two official meetings and as many informal meetings as necessary. Upon completion of its work, the Sub-Committee would become Working Group 2, established by Main Committee I, and would be responsible for drafting the relevant parts of the report of Main Committee I to the Review Conference relating to agenda items 13 A (3) and 13 B (1), (2) and (3). Informal consultations on the drafting of the report were to be carried out simultaneously with the work of the Sub-Committee. Working Group 2 would report to Main Committee I.

4. Thirdly, Working Group 3, chaired by Mr. Adeyemi (Nigeria), would be responsible for dealing with article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty.

5. If he heard no objection, he would take it that those proposals were adopted.

It was so decided.

6. The CHAIRMAN read out the Committee's programme of work for the following days, which had been adopted without objection, and suggested that the consideration of questions allocated to the Sub-Committee on Security Assurances should continue.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3):

B. SECURITY ASSURANCES:

(1) RESOLUTION 255 (1968) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

(2) EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(3) CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (PROPOSAL BY NIGERIA) (NPT/CONF.IV/17) (agenda item 13 B)

7. Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria) recalled that the proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.IV/17) had been submitted on 2 November 1989 by the Government of Nigeria to the Depositary Governments of the NPT, which had, moreover, been requested to organize a conference, to consider that proposal, preferably during the NPT Review Conference.

8. Nigeria's proposal was complementary to the NPT in that it was designed to allay the anxieties of those non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT whose faith in the Treaty appeared to be eroding because they realized that, by foregoing the nuclear option through their accession to the NPT, they had placed themselves at a permanent military disadvantage and become vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. The adoption of the proposed agreement would restore their confidence in the Treaty by making it more relevant to their security concerns in the present nuclear era. It would also provide a further incentive for States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT.

9. The proposed agreement was restricted to States parties to the Treaty and was designed to recognize the sacrifice made by the non-nuclear-weapon States by ensuring that renunciation of the nuclear option was matched by legally binding negative security assurances. States wishing to benefit from such assurances from the Depositary Governments of the NPT should therefore first accede to the Treaty, thus strengthening not only it, but also, and more important, the non-proliferation régime.

10. Article I of the proposal provided for assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty which did not belong to a military alliance or have any other security arrangements providing for mutual defence with a nuclear-weapon State or, in other words, for the most vulnerable States without the umbrella protection of a nuclear-weapon State. If they were denied the nuclear option, it was only fair to provide them with assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

11. Under article II, non-nuclear-weapon States which belonged to a military alliance, or had other security arrangements providing for mutual defence, with a nuclear-weapon State would undertake not to partake in, or contribute

to, any military attack on a nuclear-weapon State party to the agreement or against its allies, parties to the Treaty, except in self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. All non-nuclear-weapon States referred to in that category already came under the nuclear umbrella of nuclear-weapon States.

12. Article III (3) of the proposed agreement, which suggested that the duration of the agreement should be the same as that of the Treaty, rightly established a direct link between the two instruments.

13. He recalled that the concept of security assurances had been born in the mid-1960s as a result of ever-growing concern among non-nuclear-weapon States about the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the acceleration of the nuclear arms race. It was, moreover, directly linked to the NPT, since it was during the NPT negotiations that a formal call had been made for credible and reliable assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

14. The security assurances embodied in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) were positive assurances which envisaged the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons before assistance would be provided. That resolution merely reaffirmed the existing Charter obligations to provide assistance or support to a country which had been attacked, irrespective of the type of weapons used. As a nuclear attack could come only from nuclear-weapon States, all of which were permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers, any decision concerning military or other action against a delinquent State would be impossible, since it was unlikely that an aggressor would consent to a collective action against itself.

15. Moreover, the negative security assurances provided unilaterally by nuclear-weapon States had not solved the problem, since, as Ambassador Alfaragi of Egypt had pointed out, unilateral declarations by their very nature implied that those who had pledged them could also repudiate them. Such assurances therefore had to be contained in a binding international legal instrument. Only on that basis would the Sub-Committee be able to make progress in its work.

16. The consideration of the question of negative security assurances in other international bodies and, in particular, the Conference on Disarmament had not been productive, as the nuclear-weapon States preferred not to go beyond their unilateral declarations, while some non-nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the NPT preferred to play the role of dog in the manger. It was against that background that his delegation had submitted the proposed agreement for effective consideration. It also suggested that the following proposal should be incorporated in the final document of the Review Conference: "Within the context of the proposal submitted in November 1989 on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, it was proposed to convene a conference, not later than 1991, in order to conclude an agreement aimed at assuring non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

17. Since the Committee did not have enough time to consider the Nigerian proposal in depth, more effective consideration within the framework of the NPT would be necessary at a later date.

18. Mr. ELARABY (Egypt), introducing document NPT/CONF.IV/31, said that it was a revised version of the working paper already submitted by Egypt at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, but it took account of the many views expressed by delegations at that session. Moreover, since Egypt fully supported the proposed agreement submitted by Nigeria on negative security assurances, it had carefully deleted from its working paper any reference that might wrongly be regarded as being in contradiction with the Nigerian proposal. That question was essential for all non-nuclear-weapon States and Egypt had preferred to avoid any reference to negative security assurances.

19. With regard to the question of the universality of the NPT, which was dealt with in one of the chapters of the Egyptian document, it must be borne in mind that, since 1974, Egypt had submitted each year to the General Assembly, initially in conjunction with Iran and then alone, a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The General Assembly had finally adopted a resolution on the topic in 1980. Quite recently, the President of Egypt had proposed an initiative which had taken account of the circumstances in the Middle East and had requested that the region should be recognized as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation hoped that the need to establish such zones would be mentioned in terms acceptable to all delegations in the final document of the Conference.

20. With regard to the universality of the non-proliferation régime, Egypt had proposed the initiation of an informal dialogue between the States parties to the NPT and States non-party to it and hoped that those consultations would give fresh impetus to the nuclear disarmament process. As far as international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was concerned, Egypt called on all States parties to the NPT fully to support the activities of IAEA, in particular by providing it with increased financial support.

21. As to negative security assurances, his delegation fully endorsed the proposal by Nigeria and considered that what was needed was an international instrument which was legally binding on the three nuclear-weapon Depositary States and which should be drawn up as quickly as possible. Furthermore, many non-nuclear-weapon States could still be threatened by States other than the three Depositary States or the five States which were officially nuclear-weapon States and which were, moreover, members of the Security Council. Twenty years after the entry into force of the NPT, a large number of nuclear threshold countries had still not become parties to the Treaty and had shown no intention of doing so. In the preamble to resolution 255 (1968), the Security Council had actually taken into consideration the concern of certain non-nuclear-weapon States that appropriate measures should be undertaken to safeguard their security, but it should be recalled that the resolution as a whole had been proposed only by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and not by the

five official nuclear-weapon States, and that it had been adopted with five abstentions. In addition, operative paragraph 1 did not take account at all of the extent and seriousness of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, whereas it would have been appropriate for the Security Council to commit itself to adopting appropriate and firm measures in the event of a threat to the peace, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter and, in particular, its Article 42. In paragraph 2 of resolution 255 (1968), the Security Council also did not commit itself to taking the necessary measures and merely welcomed "the intention expressed by certain States" to provide assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. Lastly, the reference in paragraph 3 of the resolution to Article 51 of the Charter was superfluous, as the principle enunciated had always been embodied in contemporary international law. His delegation therefore considered that the Security Council should be invited to adopt a new resolution containing credible assurances that went beyond the provisions of resolution 255 (1968) in order to take account of the peril emanating from the practice of certain nuclear threshold countries of an undeclared and ambiguous nuclear policy against their regional neighbours. The new resolution should also provide for assistance of all kinds, whether technical, political, humanitarian or economic, to victims.

22. Mr. SOP (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that, as long as the nuclear Powers were authorized to manufacture nuclear weapons and disarmament was not achieved, it was logical for the NPT to contain security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore regrettable that, in the 20 years since the Treaty had entered into force, the legitimate calls for security assurances had not been fully satisfied. At present, even if the doctrine of confrontation had been done away with, there was no proof that the nuclear Powers did not intend to continue to exercise political and military influence over certain non-nuclear-weapon States, thus helping to destabilize certain regions. For that reason, it was more important than ever to ensure the balanced implementation and extension of the Treaty and to provide universal and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

23. His delegation supported Nigeria's proposal and endorsed the working paper submitted by Egypt, as well as the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.1). It also proposed that consideration should be given to the possibility of convening, in 1991 at the latest, a conference on the preparation of an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

24. Mr. MacKAY (New Zealand) commended the delegation of Nigeria on the proposed agreement it had submitted to the Conference. New Zealand, which was a recipient of legally binding negative security assurances from two nuclear-weapon States, hoped that the improved relations between the nuclear Powers would make it possible to initiate a more constructive dialogue and to find common ground that would be more favourable for negotiations.

25. If the objective was to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence, reference should be made to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which derived from customary international law and constituted the very foundation of negative security assurances. The principle of the non-use of force as embodied in Article 2 of the Charter nevertheless had to be seen in the light of Article 51, which provided for the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurred against a Member of the United Nations. Consequently, any agreement on negative security assurances should be fully in keeping with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter in order to ensure that the parties to the Treaty did not derogate from principles that were already internationally established. It should also be stressed that in none of the unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States was the connection with the Charter clearly stated. Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter did not specifically deal with the special problems that nuclear weapons posed to world peace and security. However, all five nuclear-weapon States had acknowledged that the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence could be envisaged only in a far more restricted range of circumstances than the use of conventional ones. The common background of the unilateral declarations by those five States had undoubtedly led to Nigeria's proposal for the adoption of a legally binding international instrument.

26. In setting out the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was prohibited, it was important not to approve implicitly the use of such weapons in other circumstances. Negative security assurances should therefore be framed in an appropriately restrictive context. In that connection, the wording of the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty might be considered relevant in the context of the preamble to an agreement on negative security assurances.

Mr. Deyanov (Bulgaria) took the Chair.

27. Mr. GROOP (Finland) said that the assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be contained in a legally binding international agreement, whose provisions should be unconditionally and comprehensively respected, and that the States parties to the Treaty that had forgone the nuclear option were entitled to expect unequivocal security assurances. Universal accession to the Treaty would be the soundest form of guarantee. His delegation also fully endorsed the agreement proposed by Nigeria.

28. The Review Conference offered an opportunity for considerable progress towards nuclear security and it was essential for all States parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, to take part in the process and, in particular, in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

29. The unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States were not sufficient fully to meet the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States and, for that reason, it was to be hoped that, on account of the easing of tensions between the nuclear Powers and the military alliances, the States concerned would be

able to overcome their old concerns and provide all the expected security assurances. Moreover, non-nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to renounce the nuclear option so as to facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on security assurances. The United Nations was the proper framework for such an agreement and the Conference on Disarmament should make a new start in that direction. Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council could adopt a new resolution in which nuclear-weapon States would not only reaffirm the positive assurances contained in resolution 255 (1968), but would also stengthen their unilateral negative assurances of 1978 and 1982. The proposal made by Egypt in that regard should lead to a far-reaching debate that might strengthen the non-proliferation régime and would thus be a particularly significant step, since the issue of the extension of the Treaty would be dealt with at the next Review Conference in 1995.

30. Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) thanked the delegations of Nigeria and Egypt for the working papers they had submitted. Belgium had always been keenly interested in the issue of effective international arrangements to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It considered that the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States were legitimate and understood the disappointment and discouragement felt on account of the slender achievements of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament. However, even if the unilateral security assurances of the five nuclear Powers were not contained in a single declaration, they were not worthless. The problem was complex, particularly if it was borne in mind that certain States were on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons and assurances should be provided for States that refused to make their commitment to non-proliferation binding. Improvements had to be made, but the question was how. The solution should be sought within a body such as the Conference on Disarmament in which the five nuclear Powers were represented.

31. Belgium was unable to accept the provisions of article II of the agreement proposed by Nigeria, as they were contrary to the international obligations it had assumed as part of efforts to increase its security.

32. With regard to paragraph 4 (g) of document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1, his delegation was not sure that a conference designed to conclude an agreement based on Nigeria's and Egypt's proposals was likely to prove more successful than the Conference on Disarmament, which had been trying for 10 years to agree on a common formula. Belgium was, rather, in favour of the intensification of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (para. 6 (b) of doc. NPT/CONF.IV/L.1).

33. His delegation would refer in detail to the working paper submitted by Egypt when the French text had been made available. It noted, however, that, in part II of the document, Egypt proposed that the Security Council should be called upon to adopt a new resolution supplementing resolution 255 (1968) and providing for the payment of compensation and assistance to the victim State. His delegation wondered whether it would also be possible to include negative security assurances. Egypt's working paper also drew attention to the danger

that nuclear threshold States represented and provided for obligations to ensure the effectiveness of negative security assurances that also concerned nuclear threshold States. As that section supplemented Nigeria's proposal, the two documents should be considered at the same time.

34. Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that the debate on negative security assurances was not a recent one. The lack of credible and effective assurances for States parties could only undermine the non-proliferation Treaty. There was no satisfactory solution to the problem, as the effects of a nuclear war would ignore the boundaries on which such assurances were based. However, some form of negative security assurances was better than none at all.

35. His delegation looked forward to a constructive debate on that question in Main Committee I. The debate would reflect the differing perceptions of security interests, but it was to be hoped that the States parties to the Treaty would reach an agreement on a proposal designed to improve security assurances. As part of the process of strengthening the non-proliferation régime, new initiatives should be explored to reduce the need to acquire nuclear weapons and to build confidence between States parties.

36. The most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament. The statements made during the general debate had reflected the interest in that subject shown by the international community, which hoped that a legally binding international instrument would be drawn up. Those legitimate aspirations and the shared willingness to search for a common approach and to improve the situation were the starting-point for the deliberations in Main Committee I. His delegation would examine very carefully and in a positive spirit the proposals submitted to the Conference on that subject.

37. Mrs. SOLESBY (United Kingdom), thanking the delegations of Nigeria and Egypt for the proposals they had submitted, recalled that the main objective of the non-proliferation Treaty was security and that all States parties should benefit from the soundest security assurances.

38. In 1978, the United Kingdom had officially undertaken in Parliament and then at the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments, except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. The five nuclear-weapon States had officially given unilateral security assurances. The declarations by those States differed on account of their different national security perceptions and it had so far not been possible to find a single formula.

39. The United Kingdom considered that article I of the agreement proposed by Nigeria was more limited in scope than the existing British guarantees and did not contain the necessary exclusion clause. Article II excluded those allies

of the United Kingdom that allowed other allies to base nuclear weapons on their territories. The Government of the United Kingdom could not accept such discrimination.

40. However, it agreed with the objectives of Nigeria's proposal and was prepared to continue working on its wording.

41. She recalled that national assurances were based on national security perceptions and that, consequently, a convergence of wording required convergent perceptions.

42. The issue of positive security assurances referred to in Egypt's proposal was an important one and it warranted further consideration. In that connection, it should be recalled that Security Council resolution 255 dated from 1968 and it was fair to ask whether circumstances had changed sufficiently to make the adoption of a stronger resolution possible. It should also be stressed that any action by the Security Council in response to the use of nuclear weapons had to be decided in the light of the facts of the case and could not be defined in the abstract. Lastly, any provision on positive security assurances had to take account of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on the inherent right of self-defence.

43. Her delegation also feared that certain States with significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities might have acquired nuclear weapons. Only their accession to the Treaty and appropriate verification measures could dispel such fears. The Conference should make that point strongly in its final declaration.

44. Mr. WEMBOU (Cameroon) said that the proposal made by Nigeria on negative security assurances was interesting for three reasons. First of all, from the political point of view, it was designed to balance the obligations assumed by all parties under the NPT. Secondly, from the legal point of view, it was intended to make up for the lack of binding commitments by the Depositary States, which were nuclear-weapon States, vis-à-vis the other parties to the Treaty. It was also intended to supplement and expand on the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Lastly, from the practical point of view, it was designed to restore the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty by giving them the guarantees they were legitimately entitled to claim and it helped to enhance the Treaty's credibility.

45. The value of unilateral declarations was, of course, recognized. But the legal scope of unilateral declarations and of multilateral treaties was quite different. His delegation therefore supported the idea of convening a conference on the issue in 1991 at the latest.

46. The right of self-defence enunciated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations was recognized for all States and it was entirely legitimate for States and the nuclear-weapon Powers to refer to that Article. He

wondered, however, what that right meant for States which, in becoming parties to the NPT, had forgone the nuclear option, which would have been a means of ensuring their self-defence.

47. The Egyptian proposal on positive security assurances was important and his delegation would make detailed comments in the Working Group that was to consider the issue. For the time being, it merely noted that, if account had to be taken of a threat that emanated not only from the five nuclear Powers, but also from other States that had reached a certain threshold, that would indicate that there had been some vertical proliferation and that some States had thus strengthened their military capability. Working Group 1, which was responsible for reviewing articles I and II of the Treaty, as well as the third preambular paragraph, might be able to find a formula which would recognize the encouraging declarations of the Depositary States, but also make it possible to reflect the idea of, and concern about, vertical proliferation.

48. As to article VI, his delegation did not think that the problem was one of determining which group of States had or had not fulfilled its obligations under that article. It was well known that, despite the progress made in bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations, the States parties had not properly fulfilled their obligations. The problem was thus to decide which measure had to be recommended to ensure that article VI operated more satisfactorily in future.

49. In that context, the proposals put forward by the non-aligned countries relating to a nuclear-test-ban treaty and a provisional moratorium took on their full importance and significance. His delegation was of the opinion that Working Group 3 should look at those proposals carefully and consider them with an open mind and without pre-conditions on the part of any delegation, since the common objective was to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

50. Mr. BOZY (Hungary) said that, like most non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, his country had fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty because it believed that the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to threaten the non-nuclear-weapon States. He welcomed the fact that the nuclear-weapon States had mentioned negative security assurances during the general debate, but he regretted that the advantages offered by those unilateral declarations did not meet expectations. That was attributable to the differences in wording, and above all to the lack of a common approach to the basic issues relating to those negative assurances.

51. Hungary nevertheless shared the view expressed by Nigeria and Egypt in favour of a legally binding international commitment by nuclear-weapon States prohibiting the use of such weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty and whose territory was completely free of nuclear weapons.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.3

52. In view of the far-reaching changes taking place in international relations, account had to be taken of the legitimate needs of States that had forgone the nuclear option. Accordingly, his delegation was prepared to contribute to the success of the Committee's work.

53. Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that the question of assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT was of fundamental importance. In 1978, the United States Government had provided solemn assurances that had been confirmed by successive administrations and, more recently, within the framework of the Review Conference. His delegation had listened with interest to all the opinions expressed in the general debate on that issue, which had been on the agenda for many years. The problem was to find common wording for the assurances given by each of the five nuclear States, which were permanent members of the Security Council and the only States defined as nuclear-weapon States under the NPT. It had unfortunately not yet been possible to find a common formula acceptable to all the States concerned.

54. His country was still prepared to try to find a solution to that problem. It appreciated the efforts of Nigeria and Egypt to consider the issue in greater depth and would comment on Nigeria's proposal within the framework of the Sub-Committee on Security Assurances. It would also consider Egypt's proposal and endorsed the comments that Belgium and the United Kingdom had made on it.

55. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, he said that the obligations under the Treaty were solemn undertakings that could not and must not be subject to any concession on any point. His Government considered that any such concessions were an unacceptable affront to the Treaty.

56. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh) noted with satisfaction that the proposals by Nigeria and Egypt indicated a convergence of views. The overall objective was to find a legally binding commitment which would strengthen both positive and negative security assurances. Far from being incompatible, the two proposals were complementary. Egypt's proposal went beyond Nigeria's and attempted to extend assurances to include not only States parties to the NPT, but also other Powers and particularly the threshold States that constituted a direct threat.

57. The need for security assurances was the result of the fact that non-nuclear-weapon States that renounced nuclear weapons required assurances to protect their interests.

58. A framework of security assurances already existed. Articles 2, 4 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, together with Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the Rarotonga and Tlatelolco Treaties, set out specific commitments by the parties in respect of security assurances. With regard to positive security assurances, resolution 255 (1968) was not sufficient. Despite five abstentions, including that of France, a nuclear-weapon State, that resolution did not place enough emphasis on the extent of the nuclear threat and did not define the nature of defensive

measures. It also did not refer to the sanctions provided for in Article 42. It referred mainly to "intentions". The elements necessary to achieve a binding commitment were therefore lacking.

59. As far as negative security assurances were concerned, the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States revealed certain differences in the scope of the commitments and the legal reservations. The overall picture was one of insecurity and a lack of uniformity. It was thus necessary to find a single and far more categorical formula for assurances.

60. It was well known that, although the issue had always been on the agenda of many forums, no solution had been found. The reasons were that, despite many positive intentions, the current situation, with its changing security scenarios as a result of *rapprochement* between the super-Powers, East-West relations and greater security in Europe, also had a negative side. Multipolarity, the intensification of regional conflicts, ethnic and linguistic rivalries and other factors could bring about unexpected situations from the viewpoint, *inter alia*, of the use of nuclear weapons. Progress had to be made on that issue, which had been under consideration for more than two decades without much success.

61. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that his country was proposing that the Conference should invite the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution on security assurances. The proposed resolution should include credible assurances that went beyond the provisions of resolution 255 (1968).

62. Mr. HADDAH (Syrian Arab Republic) noted with satisfaction that all speakers, whether from nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, had without exception expressed their support for the objective set in the proposals by Nigeria and Egypt. Ways had to be found of achieving that basic objective, which was to provide the necessary assurances for the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. He considered that the assurances in Egypt's proposal were broader in scope than those proposed by Nigeria and he therefore hoped that all the elements in Egypt's proposal would receive the support and approval of the Review Conference.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.4
14 November 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.4

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(1) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the programme of work provided for three formal meetings at which members could make statements on the record concerning the topics to be dealt with in the working groups established by the Committee at its third meeting to facilitate the consideration of matters before it under agenda item 13. The current meeting would be given over to statements on articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 of the NPT. Those topics would be taken up by Working Group I immediately after the meeting had risen.

2. Ms. MASON (Canada) said that the basic non-proliferation goals of the NPT could not be satisfied unless there was absolute and complete compliance with articles I and II by all States Parties. Main Committee I should emphasize in its report that such compliance was essential to ensure international security and to promote wider disarmament. Clearly, the international disarmament agenda would be set back dramatically if more nuclear-weapon States, beyond the existing five, emerged. Regional tensions, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East, would be exacerbated if States in those areas openly developed nuclear weapons. Canada therefore called on all nuclear-capable States not parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty or at a minimum to accept its principles.

3. In the Canadian view, compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with article I had been satisfied. There was no evidence that those States had contributed to the development of nuclear weapons in other countries. It was gratifying that France and China, although not parties to the NPT, had maintained compliance with article I. The nuclear-weapon States should, however, take particular care that their military, scientific and civil nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States did not - even inadvertently - contribute to any nuclear weapons capacity.

4. Although there was no evidence that any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT had violated the article II obligation not to develop nuclear weapons or explosive devices, her delegation was less sanguine that compliance - at least in spirit - by all Parties with article II had been complete. Statements by any Party about the need to develop such weapons, clandestine procurement of nuclear-sensitive items or evidence of unsafeguarded nuclear activity could raise concerns in that regard. It was thus vital for all States Parties at the Review Conference to reaffirm the importance of full compliance with article II. It should be emphasized in the Final Document

that States Parties should refrain from any word or deed that could raise questions about compliance. In short, Parties should not only comply, but be seen to comply.

5. Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that the report of Main Committee I on articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 of the NPT was of pivotal importance to the work of the Conference. Ireland's view, as explained by its Foreign Minister in his statement in the general debate in plenary, was that the dangers of horizontal proliferation had not lessened since the last Review Conference; rather, they had increased, and were taking on new and more secretive forms. The primary task was therefore to send out a clear and unambiguous signal from the Conference that all the States Parties were earnest in their commitment to the basic objectives of the Treaty, as set out in articles I and II, and that they would comply fully with their provisions.

6. Accordingly, his delegation believed that the Committee's report should focus in particular on the following points. The Conference should call for complete and absolute compliance with articles I and II by all Parties to the Treaty. There should be a strong statement of the deep concerns expressed during the Conference about the risk of proliferation and the danger of nuclear war arising from any proliferation. A review of the implementation of the provisions of articles I and II since 1985 should be undertaken. Lastly, the report should reflect the concerns expressed about the proliferation dangers arising from the activities of States which were not parties to the Treaty.

7. Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) said that, in his delegation's view, very few basic changes would have to be made to the text of the Final Declaration adopted at the Third Review Conference in 1985. That comment held true especially for preambular paragraphs 1 to 3, which seemed to have been unanimously confirmed. However, their wording might be brought up to date by stating, for example, that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and by stressing the need to avoid any proliferation.

8. Concerning article I, there was no reason to doubt compliance by the nuclear-weapon States which recognized themselves as such. With regard to article II, his delegation believed that the Final Declaration should indicate that, notwithstanding the lack of clear evidence, there were serious concerns about the implementation of that article by some States Parties; hence the need in the Final Document to make a strong appeal to all Parties to comply strictly and scrupulously with their obligations and to avoid any actions which might cause or add to such concerns.

9. In his plenary statement, he had already expressed his delegation's concern about possible proliferation among States not parties to the Treaty which had nuclear programmes that might lead them - or perhaps had already led them - to acquire nuclear weapons capability. He therefore believed that the relevant paragraph of the 1985 Final Declaration should be strengthened to reflect the extent of that danger, above all if it was associated with ballistic missile capability for delivering powerful weapons of destruction,

especially nuclear weapons. The appeal made by several States, including Belgium, for the widest possible adherence to the Missile Technology Control Régime should appear in the Final Document.

10. Referring to the last paragraph of the part of the 1985 Final Declaration relating to articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3, he said that it was preferable, in view of developments in the international climate and the situation in certain regions, that there should be no mentioning of specific countries in the corresponding section of the report. If that approach was to be taken, his delegation would feel obliged to call for the naming of all countries that constituted a potential danger.

11. Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic) said that the general debate had revealed a consensus on two major points: first, that the NPT remained an important instrument for international peace and security; and, secondly, that further measures were required to strengthen the Treaty. In that connection, the need for universal adherence was particularly emphasized. Those basic ideas should be reflected in the Final Document, which should also restate that preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 remained valid and underline the fact that non-proliferation was an essential means of preventing nuclear war.

12. In addition, the Conference might welcome the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, it could express the hope that that tendency would be continued and become worldwide, thereby improving the conditions for the implementation of the NPT.

13. Concerning articles I and II, the Conference should reaffirm that the strict observance of the terms of those articles remained central to achieving the objectives of the Treaty. It could acknowledge the declarations by the States Parties with regard to the fulfilment of their obligations under articles I and II and take note of the concerns which had just been expressed by the delegations of Canada and Ireland.

14. Lastly, it might be worthwhile if the Final Document reflected the conviction that universal adherence to the NPT remained the best way to strengthen the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference should therefore urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 31 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3)

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

(2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.5

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12

(NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.2; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1; NPT/CONF.IV/L.1; NPT/CONF.IV/20, 21, 29)

1. Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that in view of the NPT's political importance the Conference should evaluate it as a whole, with a view to strengthening its implementation, rather than dissect it article by article and compare the results. Through such an approach a spirit of compromise could be maintained so that differing viewpoints could be accommodated.

2. Article VI and the tenth preambular paragraph were of vital importance. Main Committee I should consider what those provisions required of the Parties, to what extent they had been implemented and what should be aimed at in the period before the next review conference.

3. The Parties had undertaken to implement the provisions of Article VI because they recognized the devastating effects for humanity of a nuclear war. The purpose of the Treaty was the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

4. The appreciation of what constituted appropriate measures varied from one review conference to another. What was certain, however, was that the Treaty called for effective measures having as their goal the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In order to evaluate the developments of the past five years in the light of the Treaty, it was necessary first to examine the actions undertaken and the policies pursued by the nuclear-weapon States in order to end the arms race and make progress towards nuclear disarmament and, secondly, to evaluate the degree of progress made towards the general and complete disarmament to which all States were committed.

5. The past five years had witnessed some positive and encouraging developments: the improvement in East-West relations had provided a framework for significant progress in some areas of arms control; the INF Treaty had been signed and was being implemented; and a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) should soon be signed, an event that would strengthen the implementation of Article VI and result in reducing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

6. Progress had also been made in the area of conventional disarmament. That enhanced the prospect of an agreement that would considerably reduce the

existing level of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and thereby bring the world a step closer to the objective of general and complete disarmament.

7. The multilateral disarmament negotiations had also made progress towards the elaboration of a convention for a global ban on chemical weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged to intensify its efforts in that regard.

8. The progress made towards nuclear disarmament and arms control was the most significant development since the Third Review Conference. However, the prospects for complete nuclear disarmament in the immediate future were not bright. The lack of dynamism and progress in discussions on the items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament underlined the distance still to be travelled on the road to fulfilment of the objectives of preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 and Article VI of the Treaty.

9. The Irish delegation regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty had not yet been concluded. The connection between such a treaty and the NPT was underlined in the latter's tenth preambular paragraph. During the general debate, delegations had shown the importance they attached to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland had emphasized in his statement that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. The first step in moving to zero was to halt the development of nuclear weapons and therefore to end nuclear testing. His delegation saw no grounds for further delay in concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. He again called on the nuclear Powers to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests and also called again for the adoption of a moratorium on nuclear testing.

10. There had been progress in discussions in that area and the signing of the verification protocols to the United States-Soviet "threshold" treaties had been welcomed. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on Disarmament was a further encouraging sign. There should be a firm commitment to re-establish that Committee at the beginning of the next session of the Conference on Disarmament and to keep the subject on the agenda.

11. The Amendment Conference for the partial test-ban Treaty would provide an opportunity for nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to discuss a wide range of issues relating to the banning of nuclear tests and to narrow their differences. The Irish delegation was prepared, in a positive spirit, to contribute to a successful outcome to that Conference.

12. Mr. BOLIATKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Final Document of the Review Conference should give an objective view of the present situation. He proposed to comment on the events of the last five years in order to evaluate the implementation of preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 and Article VI of the Treaty.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.5

13. The international situation had undergone a fundamental change: there had been a reduction of military confrontation and a strengthening of confidence. The political and military situation in Europe had evolved.

14. The Soviet-United States treaty on the elimination of intermediate and short-range missiles had marked the beginning of nuclear disarmament in Europe and throughout the world.

15. The leaders of the Soviet Union and of the United States wished not only to bring about a successful conclusion to the negotiations and to sign a treaty providing for a radical reduction in the number of offensive strategic missiles by late 1990. They had also agreed to start further negotiations.

16. The improvement in relations between the Warsaw Treaty organization and NATO provided the first indication since the Second World War of the possibility of gradually dismantling the system of balanced forces in Europe, which was based on the military confrontation between the two alliances. It was planned to replace it by a new European security system which would be based, not on bloc structures, but on structures of another type. This new system would ensure stability in Europe.

17. The process of German reunification could and should encourage a reduction of the military confrontation in central Europe. The reduction of Germany's armed forces and its refusal to equip itself with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction strengthened the non-proliferation régime in the region, a development which was welcomed by the Soviet Union.

18. At the talks on conventional armed forces and the strengthening of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, an agreement was about to be concluded on limiting a whole range of weapons under strict and effective control. At their Washington summit meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded a very important agreement providing for an 80 per cent reduction of chemical weapons and they planned to continue their negotiations with a view to the total elimination of such weapons. That opened the way to the signing of a multilateral convention on chemical weapons.

19. The unilateral reduction of armed forces, defence budgets and military programmes by the Soviet Union and other countries and the reduction in the manufacture for nuclear armament purposes of certain products such as fissile materials was also contributing to the implementation of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and of Article VI of the NPT.

20. The banning of nuclear weapon tests was a complex issue and the subject of considerable controversy. He emphasized that the Soviet Union favoured a rapid and radical solution. The signing of the Protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties opened the way to further negotiations. The Soviet Union wished to see a strengthening of the parallelism between the two parties. It welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban and expressed its satisfaction with the work that Committee had done at the Conference on Disarmament. While that Committee's terms of reference did not provide for negotiation, it should be able to play its full role. The Soviet Union hoped

that the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament would be held in a climate of co-operation and would contribute to the development of the process which had been initiated.

21. The Review Conference should reflect the role of future negotiations, the increase in the number of participants in the negotiating process, the role of the Conference on Disarmament and of further talks on other aspects of disarmament such as tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, limitation of production of fissile materials and the disposal of recovered fissile materials. In that connection, the Soviet delegation drew the attention of the Conference to the joint document submitted by Italy and the Soviet Union (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.2). In conclusion, he said that, in spite of the difficulties and obstacles which had been encountered, the arms limitation process was evolving.

22. Mr. BOSCH (Mexico) said that his delegation shared the concern of the representative of Ireland with regard to the comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. It welcomed the position taken by the Soviet Union, which was seeking a radical solution to the problem of nuclear testing. He pointed out, however, that the preambular paragraphs and Article VI of the NPT unfortunately made no reference to chemical weapons nor to reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. The tenth preambular paragraph referred only to the continuation of negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests, while Article VI provided that the Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It did not provide for the implementation of partial collateral measures. The NPT had been in force for 20 years, yet there was still no nuclear test-ban treaty and no measures had yet been taken leading to genuine nuclear disarmament.

23. The Mexican delegation had submitted to the Committee a document (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1) containing a draft final declaration concerning the eighth to twelth preambular paragraphs and Article VI of the Treaty.

24. In the course of the general debate, more than 40 delegations had voiced their concern at the continuation of nuclear tests. The Mexican delegation considered that there was a very close and very clear link between Article VI, on the one hand, and Article VIII, paragraph 3, and Article X, paragraph 2, which related respectively to the review conferences and the duration of the treaty, on the other.

25. In a 1967 memorandum, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had stated that a treaty limited to the question of non-proliferation was not enough and that the nuclear Powers should put an end to the development of increasingly dangerous weapons, refrain from increasing the existing stocks of weapons and means of delivery, begin a reduction of armaments, halt the manufacture of fissile materials for military purposes and conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Some days later during the Conference of the 18-power Committee on Disarmament, which was taking place at Geneva, the representative of Canada had stated that, if no progress was made towards

disarmament, a non-proliferation agreement could last no more than a few years. In the same year, 1967, the representative of the United Kingdom had stated that the non-proliferation treaty should open the way to other nuclear disarmament measures, failing which it would not last. Shortly afterwards he had added that it was urgently necessary to put an end to nuclear tests and had expressed the hope that the improvement in the political climate that would result from the signing of the NPT would make possible the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In 1965, the President of the United States of America, Mr. Lyndon Johnson, had expressed his belief that extension of the partial test-ban Treaty to include underground tests would be a means of reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Following the signature of the NPT, in 1968, the United States representative had said in the First Committee of the General Assembly that Article VIII of the NPT strengthened Article VI, in calling for a periodic review of the Treaty every five years, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized. He had further stated that the United States believed that the continuing viability of the Treaty would depend largely on the outcome of the negotiations provided for in Article VI.

26. Twenty years after the entry into force of the NPT, there was still no sign of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament had re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on a nuclear test ban, but it had not given that Committee a mandate for negotiation. He was deeply concerned at the statements made by two of the three Depositary Governments. In document NPT/CONF.IV/21, the United Kingdom had stated that a comprehensive test ban remained its long-term goal and that progress towards that goal could best be made by means of a step-by-step approach. In document NPT/CONF.IV/20, the United States Government had expressed its belief that a comprehensive test ban should be viewed in the context of a time when the United States did not need to depend on nuclear deterrents to ensure international security and stability, and when the United States had achieved broad, deep and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and a greater balance in conventional forces. Twenty years after the entry into force of the NPT and having regard to its tenth preambular paragraph, its Article VI and all that had happened, or not happened, at the Conference on Disarmament, those two statements were cause for considerable concern.

27. Mr. GORDON (United States of America) said that he wished to stress two primary points.

28. In the first place, he hoped that the Committee would not engage in academic or legalistic debates about what measures should be considered in reviewing Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the NPT. If the conclusion of a single treaty providing for general and complete disarmament was regarded as the literal objective test, it was clear that that objective had not been accomplished. However, that would not amount to a fair assessment of the progress made in the last five years. Article VI should rather be considered in terms of all the accomplishments which had contributed to achievement of the long-term objective - INF, strategic arms reductions and other disarmament measures in both nuclear and non-nuclear areas.

29. It was therefore necessary to be pragmatic and realistic and to recognize the fundamental changes that had occurred in the world and in East-West relations since 1985, as well as the broad range of arms control negotiations taking place, both in the nuclear and conventional fields. Those negotiations were relevant to the objectives of the NPT and aimed at ensuring international security. Some examples were the Stockholm CDE Agreement, the United States-USSR agreement on destruction of chemical weapons, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a multilateral chemical weapons convention and the CFE negotiations. The United States delegation insisted that the Final Document should note all the relevant arms control negotiations and the accomplishments that had occurred, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The NPT should be replaced in the current international security environment so that the Review Conference might produce a credible Final Document. Referring to document NPT/CONF.IV/20, part C, Arms Control and Disarmament, he pointed out that his country had faithfully fulfilled its obligations during the past five years. He believed that the arms control process would continue as successfully in the next five years.

30. The United States considered that all States Parties, and not only the nuclear-weapon States, must play an active role if further progress was to be assured. It regretted that, in spite of the East-West rapprochement, regional confrontations and armed conflicts were continuing in many regions of the world.

31. Mrs. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that the world had seen important changes resulting in solidarity and co-operation among nations, and particularly the nuclear Powers, which should do much to further the adoption of practical disarmament measures.

32. Notwithstanding the measures taken to limit nuclear armaments, she noted that since the signing of the NPT the three nuclear-weapon States had increased their capability. Scientific and technological advances had contributed to a qualitative proliferation and to the development of new nuclear weapons and the controls which had been introduced or were about to be agreed upon were designed to eliminate weapons which the nuclear Powers regarded as obsolete and not essential to deterrence.

33. That had been confirmed by the declaration of 1 June 1990 concerning future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons to secure further reductions designed to stabilize the nuclear arsenals. Nuclear testing would therefore continue, new, improved launching systems would be developed and a new environment, outer space, would play an increasingly important role in the arms race.

34. During the current Treaty review period it had not been possible to reaffirm at the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament the contents of the Final Document of the first special session, which set forth the priorities in the area of disarmament on which the international community had reached a consensus.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.5

35. The nuclear Powers had so far failed fully to observe the provisions of Article VI of the NPT, which were closely linked with the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty. Her delegation therefore considered that the holding of an Amendment Conference to transform the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would be an important measure to ensure more complete fulfilment of obligations under the NPT.

36. She urged the adoption by the Depositary States and the States Parties of the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States and other States (document NPT/CONF.IV/L.1) to ensure that Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty were observed. The Conference on Disarmament should also be requested to ensure that practical measures were taken in the area of general and nuclear disarmament. Venezuela also supported the document submitted by Mexico on the same subject (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1).

37. Her delegation considered that the non-proliferation régime should be strengthened and that the NPT should be extended beyond the year 1995 by a set of five measures: agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, support for the holding of a conference to amend the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to transform it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty, an immediate freeze on testing, manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons and of all their means of delivery, cessation of production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and intensification of negotiations on the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

38. The Venezuelan delegation hoped that the work of the Conference would lead to the adoption of a declaration reaffirming the fundamental purposes and principles of the NPT, so as to ensure that it continued to be implemented beyond 1995, that Treaty being vital for the maintenance of international peace and security.

39. Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) said that he would confine his comments to the manner in which the Committee should conduct its review of Article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. In his view, the part of the Final Document dealing with Article VI should briefly and clearly reflect, in balanced fashion, the present situation with regard to the implementation of that article, pointing out that it concerned all of the States Parties, even if a special responsibility devolved upon the nuclear States. He also felt that the review should be confined to the period since the Third Review Conference and that the conclusions should be based on a comparison between the situation that had existed in 1985 and the accomplishments and prospects noted in 1990. There was no question of contrasting the present inventory and that of the year of signature of the Treaty.

40. He noted that certain documents and statements constituted excellent historical studies of the NPT, but were much too detailed and defeatist to serve usefully as a realistic framework for the Final Document. In drawing up a balance sheet it was necessary to take account, not only of practical measures already decided upon and/or implemented for ending the nuclear arms race or ensuring disarmament, but also of all the current or planned

negotiations for the purpose of reaching on early agreement and of political decisions likely to affect the importance of nuclear weapons in current strategies.

41. Many positive developments had occurred since 1985 and they spoke for themselves. At none of the previous Conferences had it been possible to announce comparable achievements and his delegation was therefore somewhat surprised that certain statements and documents seemed to have implied that obligations under Article VI had not been fulfilled and that the measures agreed upon had been inadequate. He wondered whether the extraordinary events and developments that had taken place throughout the world in the past year could actually have passed unnoticed or not have been fully appreciated.

42. He pointed out that the Review Conference was not the First Committee of the General Assembly, where a flood of resolutions, motions and decisions were put to the vote. It was a forum for objective consideration of the implementation and observance of the Treaty, the purpose being to draw conclusions for the future. The Review Conference was not competent to decide whether the Treaty should be extended. Article X (2) was clear on that point. That decision would be taken in 1995, following a further review of the situation. The Belgian delegation believed that many developments would have taken place by that time which would justify only the continuation of the Treaty in force indefinitely.

43. The Belgian delegation could support the proposed organization of the consideration of Article VI which would include so-called collateral measures, the whole constituting general and complete disarmament.

44. Mr. WEMBOU (Cameroon) said that his delegation had already made some comments of a general nature during the general debate and he would therefore confine himself to indicating in more detail his delegation's approach to assessment of the operation of Article VI and the points it would like to see included in the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference.

45. In his delegation's view, the Conference's task was to see what measures should be taken to ensure that the Treaty operated more effectively in the years to come. Those measures must be both balanced and audacious. The Conference should not engage in drawing up a balance sheet which only highlighted negative features or justified national positions.

46. The debate on the NPT should be in the appropriate context of Article VI, which was clear. The many positive developments which had occurred since the Third Review Conference and their importance from both the nuclear standpoint and the standpoint of conventional weapons should be recognized. The progress which had been made should be considered, not solely from the standpoint of maintenance of international peace and security, but also in the light of the specific objectives of the Treaty. Those were two quite different aspects. Furthermore, the progress that had been made should be seen in the light of the specific objectives of Article VI.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.5

47. He noted that in the period since the year 1985 vertical proliferation had continued, nuclear weapons had continued to be improved in qualitative terms and progress in the bilateral field had not always been accompanied by similar progress in multilateral negotiations. Despite the considerable progress made, much still remained to be done, therefore, before general disarmament could be achieved. In other words, strict and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of Article VI have not yet been accomplished.

48. To achieve the objectives set forth in that article, it was desirable to reach agreement on a set of measures which could be set out in the Final Document. In his delegation's view, that document should first take note of the progress that had been made, viewing it in relation to the objective of international peace and security, but evaluating it also in relation to the objectives set forth in Article VI.

49. The document should then include a provision concerning the resumption of negotiations with a view to the preparation of a convention on chemical weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should also be asked to start negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. That was the only concrete and practical measure that could really lead to an ending of the nuclear arms race and setting 1991 as the date should not cause any delegation to hesitate. The Depositary Governments should be requested to announce, on a provisional basis, an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The delegation of Cameroon viewed the forthcoming conference to amend the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty as a unique opportunity for States to commit themselves to pursuing in good faith negotiations aimed at securing a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty before 1995.

50. Mr. MACKAY (New Zealand) said that, in referring to the question of implementation of Article VI of the NPT, the Final Document should combine encouragement with warnings. While the international community had every reason to be pleased with the progress made in the last five years with the conclusion of the INF Treaty, as well as in the area of limitation of strategic weapons and conventional forces in Europe, those positive results were not sufficient to swing the balance in their favour.

51. The best indication of a State's intention to observe Article VI was its attitude to the question of nuclear tests. The States members of the Conference on Disarmament had decided to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with that question, but it was disappointing to note that that Committee had not been given a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The nuclear-weapon States should therefore be urged to resume in 1991 negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. In that connection, New Zealand attached great importance to the forthcoming Amendment Conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty. New Zealand and its regional neighbours had repeatedly drawn attention to the environmental and health hazards which nuclear testing presented and his delegation would like to see their concern on the matter reflected in the Final Document.

52. Mrs. MASON (Canada) said that the Final Document should refer to the unprecedented progress made since 1985, particularly during the past 18 months, involving developments all of which were consistent with the aims of Article VI of the NPT. Developments of particular importance were the INF Treaty and the progress which had been made in negotiating a START treaty. The negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were more difficult, but progress had nevertheless been made with the re-establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on nuclear testing in the Conference on Disarmament and the conclusion, in June 1990, of the Protocols on verification of the 1974 and 1976 bilateral Treaties.

53. Article VI called not only for negotiations on measures relating to cessation of the arms race and to nuclear disarmament, but also for negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. As had been pointed out by a number of delegations, considerable progress had been made in the past five years (a) in the field of conventional disarmament, where an agreement on conventional forces in Europe seemed in sight, (b) in the drafting of a convention on chemical weapons, and (c) in strengthening confidence and security measures in the framework of the Vienna negotiations. On 1 June 1990 the United States and the USSR had signed a bilateral agreement relating to destruction of their stocks of chemicals weapons, thus making a major contribution to the collective efforts to ban such weapons.

54. Much still remained to be done, however, both in the East-West European context and in other regions and particularly the regions of conflict. Concern in that regard should also be reflected in the Final Document. For the section of the Final Document relating to the implementation of Article IV and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the NPT, she proposed the following outline plan: (1) strategic nuclear weapons, (2) substrategic nuclear weapons, (3) reduction of nuclear risks, (4) nuclear tests, and (5) outer space.

55. Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka) said that his delegation did not take such a pessimistic view as some others of the progress that had been made towards achievement of the objectives of the NPT. He agreed with the representative of Ireland that the Conference should evaluate the impact of the measures taken and should also measure what still remained to be done.

56. While the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the progress being made in the negotiation of a START treaty were cause for satisfaction, he pointed out that nothing had been done to limit the modernization of nuclear armaments. It was necessary also to bear in mind that, even if the nuclear arsenals were halved, they would still exceed by 20 per cent their level at the start of the 1970s. He also drew attention to the fact that space weapon programmes had not been abandoned and he joined the representative of New Zealand in stressing the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The cessation of tests was an essential measure to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that connection, he regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to give a negotiating mandate to the *ad hoc* group on nuclear tests. The Conference should strongly encourage continuation of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban process, particularly in view of the forthcoming conference to amend the Partial Test-Ban Treaty.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.5

57. Mrs. SOLESBY (United Kingdom) said that she wished to supplement the information in document NPT/CONF.IV/21, which dealt with the question of the United Kingdom's implementation of Article VI of the NPT, by explaining certain points.

58. Since the 1985 Review Conference substantial unexpected results had been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament. Examples were the bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and the USSR, the progress made towards conclusion of a START treaty and the signing of the INF Treaty. Even before the latter treaty had been concluded, NATO had unilaterally decided to destroy 2,400 of its nuclear warheads deployed in Europe, so that, currently, NATO had fewer nuclear warheads in Europe than at the time of the conclusion of the NPT. Furthermore, NATO had proposed the initiation of negotiations on elimination of short-range nuclear forces and of nuclear shells, once the treaty on conventional forces in Europe had been concluded.

59. The United Kingdom also welcomed the United States-USSR agreement on the Protocols to the bilateral Treaties of 1974 and 1976. It saw a comprehensive nuclear test ban as a long-term objective that could be reached only by stages and considered that priority should be given to substantial and verifiable reductions in the present nuclear arsenals. In her delegation's view it was undesirable, at the present stage, to amend the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty by including underground tests in it. Nevertheless, both the Amendment Conference of the Parties to that Treaty and the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament could do useful work with a view to a future complete banning of nuclear tests.

60. The United Kingdom also attached great importance to the measures to control non-nuclear armaments that were being taken under Article IV of the NPT. Those measures were vital stages in the achievement of the objectiveof general and complete disarmament. In that connection, she emphasized that Article IV and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs concerned all the States Parties, without exception, and related to all aspects of disarmament. The United Kingdom hoped that a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe could be signed in 1990. It would then like to see negotiations aimed at controlling conventional weapons and welcomed the talks on confidence-building and security measures. It therefore endorsed the "open skies" concept which it saw as an additional confidence-building measure. She pointed out that control of conventional weapons was a matter, not only for Europe, but for all regions. With regard to the question of chemical weapons, she welcomed the progress made at the Conference on Disarmament and hoped that there would be a further intensification of the negotiations at its next session. Her delegation considered that, while the Final Document should refer to the results achieved since 1985, it should also mention all that remained to be done.

61. Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the cessation of nuclear tests was the most important aspect of implementation of Article VI and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the NPT. Japan had made considerable efforts towards the achievement of that end. Nevertheless control of conventional armaments was also highly important and he welcomed the results achieved in

that area, particularly in Europe, but he stressed the need to pursue those efforts in other regions, where the situation was in some cases alarming. He would like to see those points included in the Final Document.

62. Mr. CALDERON (Peru) said that the Final Document of the Conference should make special reference to the progress made in implementing the agreements already concluded in the area of nuclear disarmament, as well as to the negotiations which would lead to the conclusion of further agreements. It should be clearly stated, in that context, that the United States and the Soviet Union had undertaken to conclude a START-I agreement in 1991 and to begin as soon as possible negotiations with a view to a START-II agreement. It was also necessary to emphasize the need for substantial progress in the implementation of measures to put an end to the nuclear arms race, from the qualitative standpoint in particular. The Fourth Review Conference should also urge that real progress be made in the Conference on Disarmament in preventing a nuclear arms race in outer space. The greatest importance should also be attached to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and all the States Parties to the NPT should be urged to participate actively in the Amendment Conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, so that the objective of a ban on underground explosions also might rapidly be achieved. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States should immediately take all necessary measures in order progressively to reduce the number and power of their nuclear tests and, if possible, impose on themselves a moratorium in that area.

63. The Peruvian delegation appreciated the interest of certain delegations in the negotiations at the regional level on chemical weapons and reduction of conventional armaments. Nevertheless, it felt that the Conference should focus in its deliberations on the obligations arising from Article VI and the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty which related exclusively to the question of nuclear disarmament.

64. Mr. REYES (Philippines) agreed that the Conference should confine itself strictly to the consideration of nuclear issues. Although, in the context of general and complete disarmament, the question of proliferation of chemical weapons, conventional weapons and ballistic missiles occupied an important place, the essential issues referred to in the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and in Article VI of the Treaty should not be ignored. His delegation fully supported the proposal to hold, in January 1991, an Amendment Conference of Parties to the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, with the aim of securing a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and it hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament would continue its work in that area.

65. Mr. HILALE (Morocco) said that when the NPT had been signed in 1968, the primary objective had been that the nuclear Powers should undertake to negotiate with a view to securing general disarmament under international control. That had been a counterpart, as it were, for the non-nuclear-weapon States, which had sovereignly renounced the nuclear option by acceding to the Treaty. Unlike the 1985 Review Conference, the Fourth Conference was taking place in a most favourable climate, as substantial disarmament agreements had been concluded and other agreements were being negotiated. An INF Treaty had

been concluded, negotiations were in progress with the aim of reducing strategic armaments by 30 to 50 per cent, and other negotiations had been initated between the two alliances on the question of reduction of conventional weapons. Those new developments were certainly encouraging and should permit fulfilment of the desire of the international community for general and complete disarmament. The Conference, in its Final Document, should devote considerable attention to the progress made towards disarmament. It was necessary to be realistic, however, without being negative, and to point out that the results achieved did not fully meet the hopes aroused by the undertaking given in 1968 by the three nuclear-weapon Powers which were the Depositaries of the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon Powers should therefore further be urged to redouble their efforts in the interest of the entire world community.

66. Since the question of regional disarmament in general and negotiations on chemical weapons in particular had been raised in the Committee, the Moroccan delegation proposed that all delegations should consider that thorny question. It asked all participating delegations to consider the reasons which were leading countries to engage, in so far as their resources permitted, in a sort of regional arms race. The problems which were causing this arms race were clearly political in nature and the only way of ending the race was through a settlement of the political conflicts. In that connection, his delegation earnestly hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would intensify its work on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and, in particular, the banning of nuclear tests. It hoped that the international community would give the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate mandate that would enable it to contribute to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its first special session on disarmament.

67. The Moroccan delegation also hoped that, before the next review conference, the objectives pursued would have been achieved, since that was a prerequisite for the extension of the treaty. It also considered that any references to disarmament questions should be confined to the positive new developments since 1985. It was unnecessary to revert to negative factors which were now things of the past.

68. Mr. KAREM (Egypt), referring to the undertakings by the States Parties under the eighth preambular paragraph and Article VI of the Treaty, said that the Fourth Review Conference should mention in its Final Document the particularly positive new developments that had occurred since 1985 and note with satisfaction that world security was now no longer based on the balance of forces, but rather on co-operation among all States. It should be made clear, however, that, despite the recent agreements, insufficient progress had been made, particularly in implementing the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty, and that the world community must commit itself to continuing, more energetically than ever, negotiations with a view to general and complete disarmament. It was time to give very high priority to the aim of concluding a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and his delegation therefore fully

supported the convening in 1991 of an Amendment Conference of the Parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. Such a Conference would serve to strengthen appreciably the non-proliferation régime.

69. Mr. JELEN (Hungary) stressed the importance of the measures to be taken in the event of a State Party to the Treaty openly or implicitly showing its intention to acquire a nuclear capacity, even though that question had no direct connection with the specific mandate of the Review Conference. In such an event, the principles enunciated in the eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty would be of the greatest importance, as those principles related to the strengthening of trust between States and the level of that trust had to be constantly and systematically re-evaluated if the Treaty was to retain its raison d'être. Several delegations had voiced their concern at intentions announced by certain States, or even measures they had taken, which conflicted with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty. It was therefore desirable that the Conference should emphasize, in its Final Document, the need for measures to strengthen confidence and security under the Treaty.

70. Mr. WORBS (Italy) drew the Committee's attention to document NPT/CONF.IV/29 on peaceful utilization of military nuclear materials for the production of electric power, the purpose of which was to indicate the benefits that could flow from the achievements in disarmament of the last five years. The Soviet Union and Italy had proposed a wording for the part of the Final Document dealing with Article VI of the Treaty. His delegation hoped that the secretariat would take account of that wording in preparing the draft Final Document.

71. Mr. BOSCH (Mexico) expressed his Government's concern at the difficulties to which the question of negotiations on a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons had given rise in 1990. In that connection, he drew attention to the fact that the 1975 and 1985 Review Conferences had made no reference in their Final Documents to matters relating to non-nuclear weapons, whether bacteriological, biological or chemical. The Fourth Review Conference should therefore avoid complicating things by referring to those questions in its Final Document.

72. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) also expressed the view that, in considering the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and the related preambular paragraphs, the Conference should confine itself solely to issues related to the ending of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in general. In the past five years there had been both positive and negative developments in areas other than the nuclear field, but the Conference would be departing from its mandate if it did not confine itself strictly to consideration of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, whose main purpose was to promote international peace and security. In that connection, he pointed out that the Third Review Conference had not dealt with any questions other than those in the nuclear field. His delegation considered that the Fourth Conference should follow that example.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.6
11 December 1990

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 5 September 1990, at 4.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Consideration of the report of the Committee

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.6

The meeting was called to order at 5.10 p.m.

CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/L.1; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WG.1/CRP.1/Rev.4; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WG.2/CRP.2/Rev.3; NPT/CONF.IV/31; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.3)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider first of all the substantive part of its report, issued in draft form in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/L.1. He drew attention to the fact that documents NPT/CONF.IV/L.1 and NPT/CONF.IV/L.4 should also be listed under the heading "Documents containing elements relevant to a Final Declaration" in paragraph 4 of the draft report. The Secretariat would complete the information for inclusion in paragraph 5 ("Work of the Committee") and, in preparing the final version of the report, it would take account of any drafting changes agreed upon. In the absence of objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted all that part of its draft report which appeared in NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/L.1.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. AALBU (Norway), introducing the draft report of Working Group 1 (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WG.1/CRP.1/Rev.4), said that some delegations had expressed reservations concerning the final wording of some parts of the draft report. That was why paragraphs 8 and 9 had been enclosed in square brackets. Footnotes 1 and 2 provided the necessary explanation on those matters. Annexes I and II to the report contained two proposed texts, one from the United Kingdom and the other from Nigeria.

3. Mr. OWOSENI (Nigeria) noted that the text in paragraph 8 of the draft report, which was in square brackets, was identical to that in the Final Document of the 1985 Conference, except that there was naturally no mention of Namibia, which had since become independent. The Nigerian delegation would like to see the same wording retained, while taking due account of political developments in southern Africa.

4. Mr. KATSIGAZI (Uganda) agreed with the Nigerian delegation. He urged that the Final Document should contain a reference to the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel and mention the role which could be played by an independent Namibia on the international scene.

5. Mr.JACOBY (Canada) said he had no objection to the deletion of the words in square brackets in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft report, but thought it preferable to retain the passages that were in square brackets in paragraphs 5 and 7, in view of the concern caused by the development of nuclear programmes in some States non-parties to the Treaty. The important issue, still unresolved, was the matter of paragraphs 8 and 9. His delegation favoured either mentioning no specific country by name or naming all the countries that were in a position to acquire a nuclear capability, whose activities in that regard had not escaped the attention of the international community.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that he had spoken with Mr. Aalbu about the matter and thought that more time was needed to iron out differences of opinion. The

Committee had not completed yet its work and negotiations were continuing. In the interest of making progress he proposed that the report of Working Group 1, as submitted by Mr. Aalbu, should be approved, but that the passages mentioned should be left in square brackets while negotiations continued.

7. Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) said that her delegation had no objection to make regarding the contents of document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/L.1 and saw no reason why the Committee should not move on to consider the reports of Working Groups 1 and 2. She felt, however, that it was not appropriate to approve individual paragraphs of the report. Either they should approve the report as a whole or they should wait until all the relevant points had been settled.

8. The CHAIRMAN said he had proposed that the report should be adopted in its present form, including the square brackets, so that the Committee could move on and be in a position to submit a comprehensive document, already translated, to the Conference. The report, as a whole, should be adopted, not individual paragraphs.

9. Mr. CALDERON (Peru) said that the Committee was not at present adopting, but was simply taking note of the two reports submitted, while bearing in mind that consensus, had not yet been reached on certain paragraphs.

10. The CHAIRMAN thanked the representative of Peru for that clarification and confirmed that the Committee's task was to take note of what had been done.

11. Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) said that her delegation took note of the three drafts which had been submitted, namely the substantive part of the Committee's report and the reports of Working Groups 1 and 2, on the understanding that that did not mean its acceptance or approval of individual paragraphs.

12. The CHAIRMAN suggested that Main Committee I should take note of the reports and that the Secretariat should proceed with the translation of the documents. In the absence of objection, he would take it that the Committee approved his suggested course of action.

It was so decided.

13. Mr. MORADI (Iran) agreed with the Chairman that Main Committee I should continue with its work.

14. The Iranian delegation noted that there was no reference to the fact that paragraph 9 of the report and the footnotes had been submitted by the Chairman. It pointed out that paragraphs 1 to 8 had been prepared by Working Group 1, but that no decision had been taken with regard to the inclusion in the report of paragraph 9, the footnotes and the annexes. If the latter had been proposed by the Chairman, they should be presented separately, under an appropriate heading. His delegation reserved the right to comment later on the question of inclusion of that passage in the report.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.6

15. The Iranian delegation regretted that Working Group 1 had not been able to reach agreement on paragraph 8 of the draft report. It reiterated that there was no definition of a "threshold" country and that it could not accept any wording which differed from that in paragraph 8. South Africa and Israel had refused to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and the threat which those two countries represented were well known in their respective regions. The Iranian delegation hoped that Main Committee I and the Conference would succeed in producing a Final Document which would be adopted unanimously and would reflect in appropriate fashion the concern that had been expressed regarding the threat which the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel constituted.

16. The CHAIRMAN said he did not think such an exchange of views would help to advance the Committee's work. The Committee's task, for the time being, was to take note of the reports, without amending their contents.

17. Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria), speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Security Assurances and of Working Group 2, recalled that the Sub-Committee had been established at the first meeting of Main Committee I to deal with agenda item 13 B (3) of the Conference and that Working Group 2 had been set up at the third meeting of the Committee.

18. The Sub-Committee on Security Assurances had held two regular and three informal meetings. Working Group 2 had held five meetings to draft the part of the report of Main Committee I relating to agenda items 13 A (3) and to items 13 B (1), (2) and (3). Its duties with respect to drafting a report on the review of item 13 A (3), relating to Article VII of the Treaty, had been taken over by a working group established by Main Committee II.

19. The Sub-Committee on Security Assurances had considered in detail the proposed agreement on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17), and the procedure for further action on that agreement. It had also considered the proposal by Egypt calling on the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution on security assurances which would strengthen the provisions of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) (NPT/CONF.IV/31 and NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.3).

20. The discussions in the Sub-Committee had revealed the high level of interest of States in enhancing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. However, the exchange of views on various aspects of the proposals had shown the complex nature of the issues involved.

21. The Sub-Committee had supported the objective of the proposal by Nigeria, but there had been insufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion on the procedure for further action on the proposed agreement. The discussions had revealed some differences between delegations on the question. The proposal by Nigeria was currently the subject of intensive consultations, as was the proposal by Egypt.

22. Working Group 2 had completed the work of drafting the part of the Final Document relating to the review of the operation of the Treaty and recommendations with respect to security of non-nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WG.2/CRP.2/Rev.3). The square brackets indicated those passages on which there was as yet no consensus. Shortage of time had prevented the Working Group from resolving the few remaining differences. He hoped that the intensive informal consultations which were taking place between delegations on the substance of the paragraphs in question would enable a consensus to be reached, either in Main Committee I or in the Drafting Committee.

23. Mr. ELM (Sweden), referring to paragraph 4 of the draft report submitted by Working Group 2 (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WG.2/CRP.2/Rev.3), requested that the summary record should reflect his view that when assistance to a country was envisaged under the provision referred to, that country should have the right to decide whether and how such assistance should be provided.

24. Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria) proposed that, in the interest of clarity, the words "of the Final Declaration" should be added in paragraph 4, after the reference to Annex II, and also after the references in paragraphs 6 and 12 of the draft report.

25. Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria) said that those purely technical errors would be corrected in the final wording of the report.

26. Mr. WEMBOU (Cameroon) said that his country supported the adoption of the document in its present form, even with the deletion of the square brackets in paragraph 13.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to adopt the text, retaining the square brackets.

28. Mrs. GONZALES Y REYNERO (Mexico) said that in her delegation's view the Committee should only take note of the draft report, and not adopt it.

29. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that adopting the report of Working Group 2 was not the same as adopting the report of Working Group 1. However, he was prepared to comply with the Mexican delegation's wishes if that delegation was not in a position to adopt the draft report.

30. Mrs. GONZALES Y REYNERO (Mexico) confirmed that at that juncture her delegation preferred to take note of the draft report of Working Group 2.

31. The CHAIRMAN, speaking as Chairman of Working Group 3, which had the task of reviewing Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12 of the Treaty, said that because of the flood of proposals on that subject the second draft report was not yet available.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.7
17 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE I

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 10 September 1990, at 3.45 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Draft report of the Committee (*continued*)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/SR.7

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/L.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN suggested a new paragraph 5 which described the papers submitted to the Committee and read:

"The following documents were submitted to the Committee on the items allocated to it:

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.1	Suggested elements to be included in the Final Declaration, submitted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.2	Final document language relating to the use of fissile material for peaceful purposes, submitted by Italy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.3 and Rev.1	Proposed language in the Final Document on Security Assurances, submitted by Egypt
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.4	Suggested paragraphs for inclusion in the Final Declaration on Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, submitted by Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Philippines, Venezuela and later by Indonesia
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.1	Working Paper containing a draft outline of the review of the NPT's operation: Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, submitted by Mexico
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.2	Draft language for inclusion in the Final Document on intentions and confidence- and security-building measures in the context of the Treaty, submitted by Hungary
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.3 (also issued as NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.13)	Working Paper on the link between the provisions of the NPT regarding nuclear disarmament measures and those regarding the review conferences and the limited duration of the Treaty, submitted by Mexico."

2. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt the new paragraph 5.

It was so decided.

Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12 of the Treaty

3. The CHAIRMAN said that, following consideration in Working Group 3 of the revised version of the Chairman's paper on article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 (MC.I/WG3/CRP.1/Rev.1), it had become clear that consensus on the text had still not been found. It was therefore proposed that the paper should form an annex to the report of Main Committee I and a paragraph should be inserted in the report reading:

> "Despite intensive efforts, the Committee was unable to reach agreement on a text regarding the review of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12. The Committee took note of the Chairman's paper of 6 September 1990 (MC.I/WG3/CRP.1/Rev.1). The paper was not discussed, although it was generally regarded as being a useful basis for further consideration, and the Committee decided that the paper should be annexed to its report, without prejudice to the position of any delegation."

4. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico), referring to the Chairman's paper to be annexed to the report, said several delegations had stated in Working Group 3 that they had proposals for amendments, but there had not been time to go through the paper paragraph by paragraph. He therefore wished to know what procedure was to be adopted in that respect.

5. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said his delegation had substantive amendments to propose to the paper and hoped that there would be an opportunity to submit them.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that it was for the Drafting Committee to decide on how to proceed, but delegations would no doubt be free to submit amendments. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to insert the new paragraph and also the paper in the form of an annex.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.1-8

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 8th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Chairman: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.
GENERAL

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.1-8/
Corrigendum

31 January 1992

ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 8TH MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Corrigendum

The present document contains the corrections received from delegations and from the secretariat applying to the English text of the summary records of the meetings of Main Committee II of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.1-8).

With the issuance of this corrigendum the summary records of the above-mentioned meetings are to be considered as final.

8th meeting

Paragraphs 14 and 16

The name of the speaker should read: Mr. POLHO

Page 341

Delete the words "said that the paragraph currently proposed was:" above paragraph 25.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.1
30 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 24 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Organization of work

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.1

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, following the practice of previous Review Conferences, the Committee had been assigned the task of considering agenda items 13.C (1-3) and 13.E and 14.A and 14.B (NPT/CONF.IV/1, pp.10-13). The target date for completion of the Committee's work was Wednesday, 5 September 1990, the Drafting Committee being scheduled to begin its work no later than Monday, 10 September 1990. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Palais des Nations would be closed officially on 6 and 7 September, which were public holidays in Geneva. In view of the limited conference facilities available, no more than two meetings of the Conference could be held simultaneously. The best possible use, therefore, had to be made of the limited time available to the Committee. He would prefer issues to be taken up one by one, in the order in which they appeared on the agenda. There was obviously no need for a general debate, and the Committee's task would be greatly facilitated if statements were succinct and addressed one specific issue at a time.

2. Given the shortage of time, it was also important that the discussions should result at the earliest possible stage in specific conclusions or recommendations to be elaborated by the Committee. Concrete suggestions in writing would be welcome, as would informal consultations aimed at producing an agreed text. The Chair and the Bureau of the Committee would be ready to participate actively in a search for consensus formulations.

The meeting rose at 3.25 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.2
23 January 1991

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3), as follows:

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (*continued*)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.2

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3), AS FOLLOWS:

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 and 7 (continued) (NPT/CONF.IV/12, 32/Rev.1; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.1, 2, 6 and Add.1, 8)

1. The PRESIDENT invited delegations to begin discussion of the item in accordance with the programme of work adopted at the previous meeting.

2. Mr. WAGNER (Czechoslovakia) said that his country had acceded to the NPT in 1968 and had signed an agreement with IAEA in 1972. Already in the 1970s, Czechoslovakia had begun a programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and at present it had eight light-water reactor units with a capacity of 440 MW in operation, with six under construction (four 440-MW units and two 1,000-MW). All Czechoslovakia's nuclear power plants were built according to USSR designs. The nuclear fuel elements were also supplied by the USSR, and the spent fuel, after five years' cooling, was re-exported to that country. Recent political and economic changes in Czechoslovakia had also brought about a diversification in that area, and contacts had been made with other partners all over the world with a view to achieving greater safety at nuclear power plants. Those changes had also brought about a change in the leaders' attitude towards the problems of the nuclear fuel cycle, and his country was considering long-term storage of spent fuel on its own territory together with the possibility of having it reprocessed by a partner.

3. In Czechoslovakia, the system of accountancy and control of nuclear materials was the responsibility of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission. In 1989, for example, the Commission had conducted verifications in 265 organizations divided into 13 material balance areas. It had checked 747 significant quantities of nuclear materials, which represented a growth of 192 significant quantities in one year. In compliance with the IAEA plans, inventories had been taken in all 13 material balance areas; their results had been verified by IAEA inspectors, who had arrived at positive conclusions. In general, cooperation with IAEA had been successful, and members of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission had taken an active part in the work of various IAEA advisory bodies such as the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. At the same time, it had been made possible for IAEA to test various kinds of safeguard equipment at Czechoslovak nuclear facilities, where a number of IAEA inspectors had also been trained.

4. Czechoslovakia believed that the NPT had proved its effectiveness and that it would continue to play an important role after 1995. Many of the recommendations and conclusions of the Third Review Conference in respect of

the implementation of article III were still valid and formed a sound basis for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, although accession to the Treaty remained the best way of attaining that goal. He appreciated the fact that nuclear-weapon States were only delivering nuclear facilities, materials and technologies to other States on condition that those States undertook to use them solely for peaceful purposes and to place them under IAEA safeguards. However, the risk of proliferation persisted in the case of nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States to which IAEA safeguards were not applied. The only way to resolve that problem was to apply IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States throughout the world. That was one of the reasons why Czechoslovakia had co-sponsored an appeal by 11 States to nuclear-weapon States to make all their peaceful activities subject to IAEA safeguards, which would strengthen the safeguards system and create a precedent for other States. The sponsors of the appeal also wished to see IAEA speed up the development of new approaches to international safeguards based on advanced technologies. Czechoslovakia welcomed the fact that IAEA had not detected any diversion of safeguarded materials to the production of nuclear weapons or to purposes unknown over the past five years.

5. The IAEA safeguards system was effective and economical, and the Agency was now able to perform inspections at nuclear facilities of all types. The standard of inspections should now be improved, by developing more modern methods and making better use of IAEA funds and staff.

6. In 20 years, the full-scope safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153) had not lost in significance. Only the approach to their implementation should be partly changed. At the beginning, for lack of experience, the material balance had been considered the surest proof of compliance with article III. It had subsequently turned out that rigid application of that method did not always produce the best results. To continue along those lines would create certain practical problems and eventually might raise doubts about the reliability of the safeguards system. There were chronic deficiencies in the annual safeguards implementation reports, and strict application of the material balance concept was a burden to nuclear facility operators and obliged IAEA to handle a high volume of information. Thus changes should be made in that area, in view of the rapid development of nuclear technologies.

7. Czechoslovakia had therefore proposed that the material balance should be supplemented by other factors identified in INFCIRC/153 that had not yet been sufficiently taken into consideration, such as the factors mentioned in paragraph 81 (effectiveness of State accountancy and control systems, characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle, international interdependence of the cycle and technical developments in the field of safeguards), together with the principles set forth in paragraph 6 (statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material, concentration of verification on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle that included the production, processing, use and storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made). It would also be appropriate to make greater use of paragraph 84, which provided for unannounced inspections. Thus those factors and criteria should be combined in a reasonable way with the material balance concept. Once that scheme had

gradually been established, it would be possible to introduce "selective safeguards", which could be implemented at two levels. The assessment and final designing of such a system would probably be among SAGSI's main tasks in the near future. Closer cooperation with State systems of accounting and control would further increase the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system, in particular in the field of inspector training and safeguards systems testing. To facilitate the implementation of the safeguards system, Czechoslovakia had also decided to simplify the procedure for designating IAEA inspectors and to cancel the visa requirement for IAEA staff travelling to Czechoslovakia.

8. IAEA's work in the field of physical protection was highly appreciated. The existence of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was valuable in that connection, even if problems remained to be solved in implementing it. For the purposes of its activities in connection with the implementation of article III of the NPT, IAEA would have to have an adequate budget; there again a satisfactory formula would have to be found, and the co-ordination of national support programmes would have to be improved. In conclusion, he said that the NPT was currently playing an irreplaceable role, which would become fully effective when all States with any nuclear activity acceded to the Treaty and when the safeguards principle was fully applied all over the world.

9. Mr. COUSINS (Australia) noted first of all that the final document of the Third Review Conference urged all States, in the framework of their international nuclear cooperation and their nuclear export policies, to take effective measures towards a commitment to non-proliferation and to agree to full-scope safeguards. During the general debate at the Fourth Review Conference, some delegations had expressed regret that a small number of States continued to deliver nuclear material and equipment without requiring full-scope safeguards, despite the appeal made at the previous Review Conference. Australia believed that the Conference should take a clear stand on that question. Some delegations were preparing a proposal on the subject, and he hoped it would enjoy the support of a large number of States. The final declaration should also call on all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to make the legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to agree to submit all their peaceful nuclear activities to the IAEA safeguards system. States that supplied nuclear material and equipment should also be called on to require non-nuclear-weapon States to make that commitment before delivering any supplies to them. It was reassuring to note that, since the last Review Conference, eight States had concluded the safeguards agreements provided for in article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, but it must be noted that 51 States had not yet done so. They should therefore be asked to fulfil that obligation as soon as possible.

10. The recommendations of Main Committee II on the safeguards question in 1985 had been very useful, and the current Conference should make equally constructive recommendations, both to IAEA and member States. The Committee should take note of the fact that IAEA had not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material and that the safeguards had not

hampered the peaceful nuclear development of the States parties. The Committee should also welcome the significant efforts made by IAEA to improve the effectiveness of its safeguards activities. The Director-General of IAEA had taken an interesting initiative in connection with the designation of inspectors, and the Committee should call on all States to respond positively to that proposal.

11. During the general debate, some speakers had referred to the need to monitor international trade in certain substances, including tritium. He hoped that co-ordinated measures would be taken leading to agreements on the non-proliferation of those substances. The Committee and Conference should also recognize the importance of State systems of accounting and control for implementing the IAEA safeguards system. So far only 28 States had signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the Conference should call on all States to ratify it as soon as possible. The Conference should also tackle the question of the future of the non-proliferation regime, especially in view of the developments in the fuel cycle, and should express its satisfaction at the considerable amount of work already done by IAEA in that area. Article XII.A.5 of the IAEA Statute stated that any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what was needed for the uses indicated was required to be deposited with the Agency in order to prevent the stockpiling of those materials. The implementation of that provision should be studied further in the light of progress expected in the 1990s in the area of the fuel cycle.

12. Those were the points that his delegation would like to see included in the final declaration.

13. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) said that the distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States was of crucial importance, if only because the full-scope safeguards applied solely to the latter. Many of the non-nuclear-weapon States had attempted to reduce the degree of discrimination as much as possible by demanding that the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States should also be subject to a safeguards system. The nuclear-weapon States had in fact signed voluntary-offer safeguards agreements with IAEA, which varied in scope. The final declaration should record that fact, while appealing to the nuclear-weapon States to place more of their civilian facilities under safeguards.

14. Since supervising the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States increased IAEA's financial burden, practical and economical means must be found to enable the Agency to fulfil its functions. For example, the nuclear-weapon States might be asked to provide full reports on their peaceful nuclear activities, in combination, where appropriate, with random verification. Those measures would also make it possible to reduce discrimination between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The distinction between civilian and military nuclear activities was also crucial. For example, when a non-nuclear-weapon State traded with a nuclear-weapon State, it would like to be sure that the supplies it was selling would not be used for military nuclear purposes. Thus there must be a

complete separation between the civilian and military sectors in nuclear-weapon States, some of which had already taken steps to that end. Such a separation was all the more important in view of the new arms control measures, providing, for example, for a decrease in the production of fissionable material for military purposes. In conclusion, the final declaration should stress the obligation for any nuclear materials or nuclear installations transferred from the military to the civilian sector to be subject to safeguards.

16. Mr. ALER (Sweden) said that his country had always seen full-scope safeguards as a necessary but not sufficient requirement for nuclear exports. He hoped it would be possible to reach an agreement on the draft final declaration language that his country had submitted together with a number of other States parties. In Sweden's experience, a full-scope safeguards regime did not in any way hamper a nuclear power programme, and Swedish industry saw export controls as a necessary or even desirable element of international trade in the nuclear area. Any attempts to achieve a commercial advantage through weaker safeguards would be difficult to accept, and the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT should mark the definitive change to a new safeguards regime for international nuclear cooperation.

17. The financing of the safeguards regime remained a problem for IAEA. It was for the States parties to solve that problem, and he was confident that they would fulfil their responsibilities when IAEA had to make a decision on the new arrangement proposed by the special working group set up for that purpose.

18. Sweden welcomed the offer by the USSR to make most of its civil nuclear reactors eligible for IAEA safeguards. The separation of military and civilian nuclear activities announced by the United Kingdom and the full reporting of its nuclear materials flow to IAEA were also a move in the direction recommended by the Third Review Conference. Sweden urged the other nuclear-weapon States to follow those examples.

19. It was sometimes claimed that safeguards in nuclear-weapon States meant a waste of IAEA resources. There were, of course, strong reasons for equality under international law between the nuclear industries in nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, a cut-off of production of nuclear-weapon materials and transfer of nuclear material from weapons to peaceful uses must be verified if they were to be credible. That implied the verification of a complete separation of the civilian and military sectors of the nuclear-weapon States. On the cost of implementing safeguards relating to the civilian nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States, there were many misunderstandings. According to IAEA, they would require an increase of 100 to 200 per cent in the safeguards budget. According to Sweden's calculations, which were based, it was true, on reasonable assumptions about economies of scale in the supporting activities of IAEA, a global system would require a doubling of the IAEA safeguards budget. It was also necessary to estimate possible cost reductions through the introduction of new safeguards methods. The Swedish study also showed that if all installations in non-nuclear-weapon States not yet covered by full-scope safeguards were to be

included, the present IAEA safeguards budget would have to be increased by some 3 per cent. However, whatever the cost of a global safeguards system, it would be modest in a disarmament context. In a world trying to eliminate nuclear weapons, a universal safeguards system was a necessity.

20. Mr. MAKIPENTTI (Finland), introducing document NPT/CONF.IV/32/Rev.1, which his country had sponsored together with 22 other countries, noted that a number of States parties which were suppliers of nuclear material and equipment had been holding series of meetings in what had become known as the Zangger Committee to co-ordinate the implementation of article III.2. Already before the first Review Conference, they had written to the Director-General of IAEA to propose certain rules, in particular a "trigger list" of items for the implementation of IAEA safeguards, subsequently published under the symbols INFCIRC/209 and 254. Successive developments in technology had led the group to expand the list considerably and to make revisions to documents INFCIRC/209 and 254. Although those documents had no status in international law, they made an important contribution to the non-proliferation regime; they had become part of national legislation in many of the member countries of the Zangger Committee and were reflected in a large number of bilateral agreements entered into by States parties to the Treaty. The sponsors of draft text NPT/CONF.IV/32/Rev.1 were convinced that it was extremely important for more States parties to the Treaty to adopt those rules and therefore recommended the adoption of the text for inclusion in the final declaration.

21. Mr. KENIEWSKI (Poland) said that his country had always believed that international cooperation in the nuclear energy field should be closely linked to the international safeguards system. After 20 years of laborious efforts to set up an effective non-proliferation regime, the States parties to the NPT were being offered a unique and historic opportunity to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. To provide a convincing guarantee that nuclear materials would not be diverted for non-peaceful purposes, the safeguards must be effective and reliable. Their effectiveness must also be perceptible to non-professionals, in particular those who in one way or another influenced the decisions taken in national and international bodies. He therefore welcomed the fact that the IAEA had in September 1988 organized a conference for journalists and hoped that there would be more such initiatives in the future. There was a consensus that the IAEA was properly fulfilling its functions of monitoring source and special fissionable material. Thanks to the support of generous States parties, new control methods and techniques had been developed, and the use of human resources had been improved (in particular through simplification of the procedures for designating inspectors).

23. However, in other fields, there was a need to take measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system, in particular to resolve the still outstanding question of model provisions or facilities, improve the training of inspectors - who should be given responsibilities commensurate with their professional skills - and relate the objectives of the inspections to their costs in order to bring out the safeguards' cost-effectiveness.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.2

24. Although it was not easy to finance international activities, economies might also prove costly in the long term. For example, it was not certain that the reductions made in some training programmes in the 1991 budget would provide any real savings. In addition, if the present loopholes in the non-proliferation regime remained, it would be difficult to make effective improvements in the safeguards system, in view of technological developments and the increase in the quantities of nuclear material to be controlled.

25. Concerning the question of full-scope safeguards, he noted that not all the supplier States had fully respected articles III.1 and III.2 of the Treaty and said he was convinced that full-scope safeguards should be extended to all international trade in nuclear items. Poland was one of the sponsors of the text just introduced by Finland. Although the implementation of IAEA rules would in no way hamper the development of the civilian nuclear industry, certain facilities should be given to the developing countries that imported nuclear products. To that end, better use might be made of the existing technical assistance mechanisms.

26. The weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime could not be eliminated without eliminating other controversial elements at the same time, in particular the dual purpose fuel cycles of certain nuclear-weapon States, which diminished the value of the voluntary-offer safeguards agreements concluded by them with IAEA. It was highly desirable for a clear distinction to be made between the military and civilian fuel cycles in all nuclear-weapon States, if possible before the next Review Conference.

27. Mr. ADEKENYE (Nigeria) noted that the IAEA safeguards system was a solid pillar of the non-proliferation regime and welcomed the fact that in its report (NPT/CONF.IV/12) the Agency said it had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material. He also noted with satisfaction that on 30 June 1990 safeguards agreements were in force for 85 of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Nigeria therefore called on the 51 non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.

28. At a time when technological progress was rapid and when the increase in nuclear capacities was becoming a matter of concern, especially in certain regions, it was obvious that the role of the IAEA safeguards should be strengthened "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under [the] Treaty", which would only be possible if, after six years of zero growth, the IAEA budget was substantially increased. The Agency must also be given sufficient resources to implement its programme of technical assistance to developing countries, of which Nigeria was one.

29. He believed that confidence in the NPT must be further strengthened, and to that end, he urged States that supplied nuclear material and equipment to require States that were not parties to the Treaty to undertake to place their facilities under full-scope safeguards. That would eliminate one loophole which the threshold States could take advantage of to conduct nuclear weapons programmes.

30. Nigeria was concerned by South Africa's becoming a nuclear-weapon State and the obstacle that represented for the denuclearization of the African continent. The States that supplied nuclear equipment and material should cease all cooperation with South Africa until it acceded to the NPT and placed all its installations under IAEA safeguards. Finally, he hoped that all the States that had not yet done so would take the necessary steps to accede to the NPT with a view to strengthening peace and stability in the region.

31. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) noted that IAEA safeguards played a significant role, in particular by reassuring all the States that the Treaty was being observed. The nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States that had not concluded safeguards agreements represented a serious potential risk of proliferation and were a source of tension. He therefore urged all such States to conclude an agreement with IAEA and thus fulfil their obligations under article III. That applied particularly to States which, like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conducted significant nuclear activities, and he wished to stress the unqualified nature of that obligation. IAEA, for its part, should spare no effort to facilitate the conclusion of the safeguards agreements still outstanding and keep member States fully informed of its initiatives and of reactions to them.

32. The United States fully supported the safeguards system, technically, politically and financially, and was grateful to the Agency for the measures it had taken to make the system more effective. It particularly welcomed the fact that new technologies had been incorporated into the system. Nevertheless, it was necessary to ensure that trust in the system was not weakened by extraneous political considerations; all parties to the Treaty should continue to support the system politically, technically and financially. IAEA must be given enough resources to enable it to fulfil its mission.

33. The United States welcomed the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan had the previous year decided to require all countries to which they supplied nuclear material and equipment to have signed full-scope safeguards agreements. Non-nuclear-weapon States that insisted on conducting unsafeguarded nuclear activities should not receive any more supplies. The United States fully supported the text submitted by Finland on behalf of the Zangger Committee (NPT/CONF.IV/32/Rev.1) and urged all States parties to comply with the procedures set forth in document INFCIRC/209. It also asked States that made international transfers to provide IAEA with precise information as promptly as possible in order to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the States that were not subject to a full-scope safeguards regime.

34. Concerning safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States, the agreement concluded by the United States with the IAEA gave the Agency the right to require full reporting on safeguarded installations. The United States favoured the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States as far as available resources permitted. It should be noted that the safeguards that IAEA applied to the United States had the same scope as those in force in

the non-nuclear-weapon States. It was important for safeguards to be applied in the same way everywhere and for there not to be any "second class" safeguards, which would necessarily be discriminatory.

35. Several speakers had implied that a new safeguards system based on random verification might be implemented in the nuclear-weapon States without entailing extra expenditure. If IAEA was actually in a position to develop such a system, the United States would be in favour of introducing it - on condition that it apply to all States, and not just the ones that had nuclear weapons. However, it did not appear to be established that a random verification system would be able to provide satisfactory guarantees.

36. Concerning substances not identified in article III, such as tritium, the United States agreed that States should make sure that the necessary steps were taken to avoid the proliferation of such elements. For its part, it already exercised strict control over all exports of tritium and other elements not identified in article III, basing itself on the principle that not to do so would be to contribute to proliferation. He urged the Committee to study the question of strict control not only over tritium exports, but also over trade in other similar items.

37. Mr. ENDO (Japan) noted that IAEA played an essential role in the implementation of the provisions of the NPT and expressed appreciation for the sound functioning of the Agency's safeguards system. There was, however, still room for improvement. The need to make the full-scope safeguards system as technologically and institutionally efficient as possible could not be overstressed, in particular in view of the increase, in both number and size, of nuclear facilities throughout the world, the development of automation and advanced technologies and the financial difficulties of IAEA. Japan, for its part would continue to support efforts in that direction, in particular through its voluntary contributions to the LASCAR forum (Large-Scale Reprocessing Plant safeguards) and through the Agency's safeguards programme. The Agency's financial difficulties should lead member States to consider simplifying the process of inspection, in particular by making use of advanced technologies that could reduce the cost of implementing the safeguards without diminishing their effectiveness.

38. Concerning the implementation of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, Japan was of the view that those States should be placed on an equal footing with non-nuclear-weapon States. For that reason it welcomed the fact that the previous year China had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, following the example of other nuclear-weapon States, which had pledged themselves to report on the material and equipment used in their civilian installations. Within the limits of available resources, random verifications and other specific safeguards methods should be envisaged for those States.

39. As it had already stressed in the plenary, Japan was concerned at the fact that certain States parties had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, despite the provisions of article III. Japan could urge them to fulfil their obligations in that respect promptly. Concerning exports of nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States, Japan had taken

strict measures, authorizing such exports only towards countries that had acceded to the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards. Japan hoped that other exporting countries would adopt equally strict measures, and it welcomed the Federal Republic of Germany's recent decision to that effect. Finally, he hoped that the text submitted by the representative of Finland would be included in the final declaration.

40. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he would not make a general statement on article III of the Treaty but would simply stress a few points that his delegation felt to be extremely important.

41. Austria hoped in particular that the Conference would make it clear that acceptance of full-scope safeguards was a prerequisite for any delivery of nuclear items. At previous review conferences, Austria had stressed the fact that article III.2 should be understood as meaning that any exports of the substances covered in that paragraph must be subject to the safeguards required by that article, i.e. the safeguards stipulated in document INFCIRC/153. It was only for political reasons that the minimal solution of facility-related safeguards had been chosen (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2). It was high time to return to the letter of article III and make the acceptance of full-scope safeguards the prerequisite for all nuclear material deliveries, whether or not the recipient countries were parties to the NPT. Austria was sure that IAEA would not fail to make a model agreement on full-scope safeguards available to non-party States for that purpose. That did not mean that the States parties should be diverted from one of their essential objectives, which was the accession of all States to the Treaty.

42. Austria was pleased to note that the nuclear-weapon States were prepared to make certain of their peaceful nuclear activities subject to a safeguards regime. It hoped that the voluntary-offer agreements would extend to all peaceful activities, then to all those States' nuclear material. Despite the difficulties that might arise, in particular financial ones, Austria believed that such an extension of the safeguards regime to the nuclear-weapon States should not raise insoluble problems. Finally, he noted that his country had sponsored a number of the documents before the Committee, together with Australia, Finland, the Netherlands and other countries.

43. Mr. IONESCU (Romania) said that the implementation of safeguards in his country had so far not prevented nuclear facilities from functioning normally or the country's nuclear activities from proceeding smoothly. Romania had in fact recently joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and had so informed the Director-General of IAEA. Its acceptance of IAEA safeguards and the Group's guidelines had made it easier for it to gain access to nuclear technologies and enabled it to obtain nuclear equipment and material.

44. To lighten the Agency's task, and in view of its financial difficulties, Romania had recently decided to accept the simplified procedures for designating inspectors. It considered the Agency to have duly fulfilled its mission with regard to safeguards implementation and intended to co-operate more closely with it in that area. Romania agreed that the fissionable material that became available as a result of disarmament measures should be

used as nuclear fuel and made subject to Agency safeguards. It also believed that it was absolutely essential for all States parties to the NPT to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. Finally, he informed the Committee that his country had become a sponsor of the draft resolution on full-scope safeguards (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.6).

45. Mr. PARNOHADININGRAT (Indonesia) noted with satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards system fulfilled its purpose in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indonesia was prepared to support the Agency in its performance of the functions assigned to it under article III, in particular by participating in the safeguards support programme. It had also accepted the simplification of the procedures for designating inspectors and had helped the Agency to make the public more aware of its safeguards activities.

46. Because of the extension of the safeguards system, it was essential to ensure that it remained effective, in particular through better scheduling of inspections and improved training of inspectors, mainly those from developing countries. It was unfortunate, however, that IAEA had been operating for several years with a zero-growth budget, a policy imposed by certain States which he believed might jeopardize the system's effectiveness. It was absolutely necessary for the system to be given sufficient resources, and it was only right that the contribution of the member States which had the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons and the most advanced States should continue to increase. Although IAEA was to be congratulated for having increased the safeguards budget by using extrabudgetary resources, it must not have to invoke budgetary restrictions as a reason for diminishing the scope of the safeguards system.

47. The industrial countries were increasingly asking for a reduction of the safeguards on their nuclear facilities. However, any relaxation of the existing rules in that area would have serious implications for the effectiveness of the system and would jeopardize the implementation of article III. He would also like to point out that the bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements dealt only with delivery vehicles and did not concern IAEA. However, once the nuclear material was removed from the warheads, it might be stockpiled with IAEA, which would assure the parties that it was not being used for military purposes. It might then be recycled for civilian purposes.

48. Mrs. GONZALEZ (Mexico) said that she shared the view of the Director-General of IAEA that the safeguards system had gained strength with the passage of time and that all States parties agreed that it was impartial. However, it still needed to be made universal, even if all the nuclear-weapon States were now subject to the regime since China had concluded a voluntary-offer agreement with IAEA. In particular, all States parties must conclude the safeguards agreements required by the Treaty. She also hoped that the nuclear-weapon States' proposals would be less limited in scope, so that the Agency would be better able to control their nuclear activities.

49. Document NPT/CONF.IV/12 indicated that the IAEA secretariat had taken measures to improve the methods for implementing the safeguards system but

that the budgetary restrictions had begun to affect those measures. Although the Mexican Government believed it was very important to ensure that the safeguards system was cost-effective, it also believed that the resources assigned to it must be sufficient to allow it to function properly. The States with the greatest nuclear capacities should therefore increase their contribution to the Agency, to enable it to fulfil its functions satisfactorily. Similarly, the States that exported nuclear material and equipment should support the Agency in its efforts to implement the safeguards system by monitoring their exports.

50. In his opening statement, the Director-General had expressed the hope that the fissionable material recovered through nuclear disarmament measures would as far as possible be used as fuel for producing electricity. That idea had been put forward in connection with the establishment of an international plutonium stockpiling system, in conformity with article XII, paragraph A.5, of the IAEA Statute. The Third Review Conference had also taken a decision to that effect, and her delegation believed that the time had come to set up such a stockpiling system.

51. Mrs. JACKSON (New Zealand) said that her delegation had become a sponsor of the proposals before the Committee regarding article III of the Treaty. As a founding member of IAEA, New Zealand strongly supported the Agency's efforts to maintain a high level of effectiveness in implementing the safeguards. The results achieved were praiseworthy, since the Agency had not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material or equipment. It was therefore providing States, whether or not they were parties to the NPT, with a not insignificant guarantee of non-proliferation, and it was no doubt for that reason that the NPT was the disarmament agreement to which the greatest number of States had acceded.

52. New Zealand associated itself with the delegations that had requested the States supplying nuclear items to require importing States to have accepted full-scope safeguards and to have pledged themselves not to acquire nuclear explosive devices. It welcomed the steps taken by the Federal Republic of Germany to that effect and associated itself with the delegations that had criticized the fact that many States members had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA. It therefore called on those States, especially the ones that conducted significant nuclear activities, to fulfil their obligations under the NPT.

53. The voluntary-offer agreements concluded with the Agency by the nuclear-weapon States were very welcome, but they should be asked to extend them to other civilian facilities. Such a decision would represent an important confidence-building measure, and she hoped the Conference would support her delegation on that point. To perform an ever broader and more complex task, IAEA must be able to draw upon the most advanced technologies and methods, and to that end all the parties must make sure that it received the resources it needed. Financing through the ordinary budget remained important for the smooth functioning of the safeguards regime. Careful planning and efficient management should enable the parties and the Agency to make the best possible use of the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.2

54. Mrs. TALLAWY (Egypt) referred to the importance of the safeguards system for the non-proliferation regime and invited all States parties that had not yet done so to fulfil a basic obligation by signing safeguards agreements with the Agency. She was pleased to note that some countries that were not parties to the Treaty had agreed to conclude safeguards agreements.

55. If the safeguards system was not to be overtaken by technological developments, IAEA must have the necessary material and know-how for effective verification. In addition, while it was reassuring that no diversion of safeguarded material had been detected, the fact should be more widely publicized through broad dissemination of the IAEA report. Egypt also believed it was very important for the final declaration to stress the responsibility of the States that exported nuclear material and equipment, which ought to require importing States to accept full-scope safeguards.

56. She was pleased to note that the five nuclear-weapon States had concluded voluntary-offer agreements; however, that did not exempt them from meeting their basic responsibility, which was to work towards the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. She also welcomed the fact that the Director-General of IAEA had indicated his intention of travelling to the Middle East in the near future to see how far it would be possible to place all the nuclear facilities in the region under the safeguards regime. The regime should also apply to Israel and South Africa, thus helping to build confidence in both regions. Finally, she pointed out that when the situation in the Middle East was so explosive, the international community had a duty to bring pressure to bear so as to ensure that peace and security would prevail.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.3
25 January 1991

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 29 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

   (1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

   (3) Article VII

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.3

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 (continued)

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had been extremely surprised by the remarks made by the representative of the United States at the previous meeting. His delegation had on many occasions set out its position regarding safeguards agreements with IAEA. The United States, while urging his country to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency as soon as possible, brandished the nuclear threat against it. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was prepared to conclude such an agreement forthwith if the United States ceased its pressure and provided it with security assurances. The question could be settled not by threats, but by negotiation.

2. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United States did not constitute a threat for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. States Parties had a binding commitment to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA and to implement them, and they could not invoke factors external to the Treaty. Lastly, he would point out that safeguards agreements between NPT parties and IAEA were reached after negotiations.

3. Mr. RYANG LEE (Republic of Korea) recalled that the Final Document of the Third Review Conference underscored the fundamental role played by IAEA safeguards in promoting regional and international peace and security and in enhancing trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States Parties to the Treaty were under the obligation to accept Agency safeguards, which contributed to the maintenance and consolidation of the non-proliferation régime. The conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA had strengthened confidence among States Parties and encouraged other States to accede to the Treaty, which had thus become more effective and universal. The Republic of Korea had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in April 1975, since which time it had always complied with its obligations under article III of the NPT. With regard to the report by the Director General of IAEA, it was gratifying to see that the Agency had detected no diversion of significant amounts of safeguarded nuclear material.

4. The voluntary offer agreements concluded by nuclear-weapon States were just as important as the obligation on the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties

to implement safeguards, in so far as they consolidated the non-proliferation régime, strengthened the authority of the Agency and increased the effectiveness of the safeguards system. His delegation commended China's conclusion of a safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1988 and sincerely hoped that nuclear-weapon States would continue to extend the areas to which safeguards applied. Moreover, strict control over exports of nuclear material and equipment by the nuclear advanced countries would enhance the safeguardssystem. The relevant measures adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan were steps in the right direction.

5. His delegation was deeply concerned to note that, of the 135 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, 51 had still not concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Such was the case, in particular, with North Korea, which possessed important nuclear facilities. The fact that that country had, for five years, delayed concluding an agreement was a threat to peace and security in North-East Asia and undermined the credibility and strength of the non-proliferation régime. The attitude of North Korea was, moreover, a breach of article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty. That situation was a matter of concern for the entire international community, which could be reassured only by the prompt conclusion of a safeguards agreement with IAEA. It was the duty of all parties concerned to intensify their efforts to persuade North Korea to submit its facilities to IAEA safeguards as early as possible. That would help not only to strengthen the universal application of the safeguards, but also to remove a stumbling block in the inter-Korean reconciliation and confidence-building process.

6. His delegation hoped that his observations would be duly taken into account in the final document of the Conference. Lastly, he wished to thank IAEA for the competence and dedication with which it performed its task and assured it of his country's support and co-operation.

7. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that it was shameful to hear such remarks from the people of South Korea, who had allowed a large amount of nuclear weapons, which threatened the country, to be deployed on its territory. His delegation reserved the right to revert to that issue.

8. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that IAEA had been made responsible for verification of commitments assumed by States pursuant to the Treaty in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices. Under its Statute, the Agency was also required to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. While it approved the principle of IAEA safeguards, his delegation was concerned about the discriminatory treatment that affected non-nuclear-weapon States. Inspection of a number of specific civilian facilities in nuclear-weapon States had entailed an increase in expenditure linked to the implementation of safeguards and distracted attention from the potential threat from unsafeguarded nuclear military facilities. The safeguards system should be applied in the same way in

nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon ones. He considered, moreover, that the refusal by South Africa and Israel to submit their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards jeopardized the Agency's credibility.

9. The developing countries had been extremely disappointed that the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had not fulfilled their expectations with regard to the implementation of article II of the Agency's Statute.

10. While it approved of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in principle, his delegation denounced its discriminatory nature. The Convention excluded nuclear material in the possession of nuclear-weapon States. However, the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear uranium was far greater in those countries than that of ordinary uranium in the non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. His country was totally committed to the NPT and to the full-scope safeguards, and it had joined in the new inspection system set up by IAEA. His delegation invited States Parties to adopt measures to convince the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle their military nuclear facilities and to transfer the nuclear material to civilian facilities, under Agency safeguards. In his opinion, any restriction on the transfer of nuclear material and technology outside the framework of the Treaty and the Statute of IAEA would constitute a violation of the sovereign rights of States.

12. His delegation's observations should be duly taken into account in the Committee's final report.

13. Mr. DESPRES (Canada) said it was perfectly normal for countries that had signed an arms control agreement to have means of demonstrating that they respected their commitments and of ascertaining that other countries did so. As far as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concerned, IAEA provided, through its safeguards system, assurances that nuclear material was indeed used for peaceful, not military, purposes. IAEA's efforts in that field were an outstanding example of multilateral co-operation, and the safeguards system was frequently cited as an instance of an operational verification system capable of being applied in other areas of arms limitation and disarmament. Accordingly, his delegation again invited States Parties that had not yet done so to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement without delay.

14. It was gratifying that a larger number of States Parties made supply of nuclear material subject to the implementation of Agency safeguards. His delegation had taken part in drafting a document on the subject, for inclusion in the Final Document, and hoped that the largest possible number of delegations present would co-sponsor it. It had, moreover, associated itself with three other draft documents submitted by Finland, the Netherlands and Australia and it endorsed the views expressed by the representatives of those three countries.

15. With regard to the document submitted by the Netherlands, his delegation considered that the implementation of IAEA safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, as well as complete separation of civilian and military nuclear cycles, strengthened the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon supplier States that their nuclear exports would not be used for military purposes.

16. The document submitted by Australia indicated that there was other material, in particular tritium, that came within the scope of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and contained a proposal for the adoption of measures to ensure that such material was not diverted for a use prohibited by the NPT. Tritium, which could be used for peaceful purposes, was also used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. According to a number of rumours, countries had allegedly secretly acquired tritium for explosive purposes together with equipment used to extract it. As a major world supplier of tritium, in 1986 Canada had set up its own export monitoring system. His delegation considered that States Parties to the NPT should ensure that there was no likelihood of tritium exports being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes: accordingly, it hoped that the text it had proposed together with other delegations would be included in the Final Document.

17. Canada wished to make available to delegations a brochure recently published for the Canadian population and entitled "Canada and international safeguards". The brochure, whose subtitle was "Verification of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", dealt, inter alia, with the Canadian programme of support for safeguards and could be of some use to the non-specialist.

18. Mrs. BYRNE (Ireland) wished to draw attention to the essential points that should appear in the Committee's final report. All States Parties, whether nuclear-weapon States or not, had every interest in implementing IAEA safeguards, as they made it possible to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty were complied with. The Treaty's credibility largely hinged on the efficacy of IAEA safeguards, which was why the Conference should, first and foremost, strengthen the safeguards system as one of the primary barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

19. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States posed a serious threat of proliferation. Accordingly, it was to be hoped that the Conference would call for the continued pursuit of the principle of the universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

20. Full-scope safeguards should be required for the supply of nuclear material. Her delegation welcomed the announcements by a number of Governments of their intention to move towards such a policy, and it called for a firm decision by those that were now hesitant. The text her delegation had co-sponsored on that issue accommodated a number of concerns and took into account the practical difficulties of making new supply arrangements. The Conference should indicate in its Final Document that a growing number of States approved the full-scope safeguards system.

21. The Committee's final report should also tackle the issue of the implementation of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. Admittedly, the voluntary offer agreements concluded by the five nuclear-weapon States helped to attain the objectives of the NPT, but those States should extend the agreements to all their civil nuclear facilities. Such a step would demonstrate that all States, whether parties to the Treaty or not, whether nuclear-weapon States or not, accepted safeguards, and it would build confidence, thereby facilitating verification operations. Her delegation hoped that nuclear-weapon States would work constructively towards the adoption of an appropriate recommendation that took into account both the financial implications and the practical options available for applying such safeguards, including full reporting and random inspection. In that regard, Sweden had supplied helpful information on the real financial implications of the global safeguards system, a cost that was modest when set against thetremendous cost of disarmament measures in general. It went without saying that the adoption of such a recommendation presupposed a clearer separation between civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States.

22. The Conference should spur the efforts being made to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Committee itself could address the issue of the transfer of nuclear materials and facilities to peaceful uses and call on nuclear-weapon States to offer all such transfers for verification. Her delegation was prepared to help in preparing a draft text on the matter, which was central to the objectives of the NPT.

23. The Committee should also take up the question of plutonium storage, which had not been dealt with satisfactorily in 1985. IAEA should be requested to study the need for the deposit of any excess of any special fissionable materials, as provided for in article XII A.5 of its Statute, in order to avoid any risk of proliferation.

24. Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet Union participated with other nuclear supplier countries in updating the list of fissionable material and nuclear equipment for which exports were subject to the application of IAEA safeguards; in addition it strictly complied with the list. He commended the proposal to call on the main supplier States to insist that non-nuclear-weapon importer States not parties to the Treaty should commit themselves to applying IAEA safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities, a policy his Government encouraged all exporters to follow. Such a positive trend should be supported, and it was in that spirit that his delegation looked on the texts submitted for inclusion in the final document, including the text of the Zangger Committee.

25. The effectiveness of IAEA checks was also gratifying. However, the Agency should make better use of its experience in that field in respect of full-scope safeguards: in particular it could simplify its inspection activities and confine its efforts to those phases of the fuel cycle that did not concern products directly used to manufacture nuclear weapons. Moreover, such a move would be fully in keeping with the provisions of document INFCIRC/153.

26. As far as the issue of safeguards funding was concerned, the Conference should make a recommendation in the Final Document, calling on IAEA's secretariat to consider fresh cost-cutting formulas in the implementation of safeguards, in particular through random inspections and by establishing a link between verification methods and the types of facilities and fuel cycles in the countries to which the full-scope safeguards applied.

27. The Conference should adopt significant measures, including IAEA surveillance of the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, the Soviet Union was prepared to increase the number of its nuclear facilities subject to Agency supervision. Inspections by IAEA in the Soviet Union were carried out in accordance with a voluntary offer agreement dating from 1985 which covered the VVER-1000 nuclear reactor at the Novovoronezh power station and the Moscow experimental reactor. In July 1990, IAEA had, for the first time, inspected the BN-600 reactor at the Beloyrsk nuclear power station and an effective verification procedure had been developed. Regular inspections of the BN-600 were planned for 1992. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would strive to promote as extensive monitoring as possible of peaceful nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States. Naturally, it was also necessary to take into account the practicability of such measures and the resources IAEA was able to devote to them.

28. Lastly, his delegation again underscored the capital importance of strict compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by all States Parties, without exception.

29. Mr. BEETS (Belgium) said that his delegation had taken part in the drafting of the document submitted by the Zangger Committee. The co-ordination provided by the Committee allowed proper implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Belgium considered that application of full-scope safeguards to the overall peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not parties to the Treaty, was the ultimate objective. However, it would be more willing to subject exports of nuclear material and equipment to full-scope safeguards if all exporter States decided to adopt the same policy.

30. His delegation had taken note with interest of the elements proposed in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.1. As to item 10 of the document, Belgium attached great importance to co-operation between IAEA and EURATOM. Such co-operation considerably reduced costs, particularly with regard to what were considered sensitive facilities. Belgium had spared no effort to assist the Agency in implementing safeguards, and six years earlier it had set up, in conjunction with EURATOM, a support programme to optimize the implementation of safeguards. Item 15 of the document dealt, inter alia, with separated plutonium intended for peaceful purposes, and Belgium appreciated the efforts made by the Agency in implementing safeguards, in particular in a number of large-scale manufacturing plants. In June 1990, the Government had urged the IAEA Board of Governors to submit all such plants to safeguards. Nevertheless, the physical protection of nuclear material should be covered by a separate paragraph.

31. With regard to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, it might well be possible to facilitate the disarmament process by placing the nuclear-weapon States' enrichment and reprocessing plants - which covered two indispensable stages in the manufacture of nuclear bombs - under international control. It would thus be possible to know what amounts of fissionable material were intended for military purposes. He went on to cite article 84 of the EURATOM Treaty and specified that monitoring would cease as soon as the material in question entered nuclear weapon plants.

32. Mr. LENDVAI (Hungary) said that, as a member of the Zangger Committee, Hungary had taken part in drafting the text proposed for inclusion in the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference, and it approved the text without reservation.

33. The five years ahead would be decisive not only for the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but also for the future of nuclear energy. The public was concerned about the environmental consequences of the use of nuclear energy and worried that it might be used for militarypurposes. For that reason the debates at the Conference should be credible. Naturally, it was for the media to decide what should be published or broadcast, but his delegation was convinced that the more detailed and precise the information, the lesser the likelihood of its being misinterpreted. In that connection, it would be desirable for the annual report on the implementation of IAEA safeguards to be widely distributed. While he recognized that it was for the General Conference of IAEA to discuss that issue, he considered that it should be mentioned in the Final Document and proposed a wording which he read out.

34. Mr. HARUN-UR-RASHID (Bangladesh) said that article III of the Treaty still posed a number of problems of interpretation, for it was still not clear whether it concerned the implementation of safeguards within or outside the framework of the NPT. The safeguards system was essentially designed for rapid detection of the diversion of significant amounts of nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Again, it was disturbing to see the nuclear-weapon States conduct nuclear activities without implementing the safeguards, yet encouraging to observe that some of them subjected some of their facilities to IAEA inspections.

35. In his opinion, the Committee should examine the loopholes in the safeguards system and make recommendations to plug them. One of the loopholes in the NPT was the failure to compel supplier States to require the implementation of safeguards as a prerequisite for the export of nuclear products: nuclear exports should be made subject to the implementation of full-scope safeguards. Furthermore, while non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were required to submit all their nuclear activities to safeguards, non-party States did not have to meet that requirement and were consequently able to import nuclear material without concern for safeguards. Such a policy was discriminatory and should be changed. In addition, IAEA should constantly ensure that the safeguards were adapted to developments in nuclear technology. The nuclear fuel cycle could pose a number of problems for the implementation of the non-proliferation régime. It was harder, or even

impossible, to carry out verification operations in larger and more complex installations. Accordingly, the fundamental principles of safeguards should be examined and better means worked out to ensure implementation.

36. Lastly, his delegation wished to reaffirm that the results of the Agency's safeguards activities lacked transparency, and it requested the Agency to remedy the situation.

37. Mr. BERG (Norway) said that the Committee should mention a number of points in its report: all States Parties to the Treaty should conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA; all supplier States should require the implementation of full-scope safeguards by non-nuclear-weapon States as a requisite for their exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology; the principle of universal implementation of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities should be maintained; the IAEA safeguards system should be developed in the light of progress in nuclear technology and the considerable growth of nuclear material requiring safeguards; it was necessary to agree on a system to ensure adequate funding for IAEA safeguards; all States should assure IAEA of their full co-operation in the implementation of safeguards, pursuant to bilateral and multilateral agreements; international co-operation and monitoring measures at the national level should be strengthened so as to make sure that equipment and products intended for the processing or manufacture of nuclear material were used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

38. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) said it would be useful for the Agency to assess the experience it had acquired in 20 years of implementing the safeguards agreements. He would like to know whether, in the Agency's view, a new interpretation, in the light of technical developments, might be capable of making some improvements in the safeguards agreements. The safeguards system, which was designed rapidly to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, was based on declarations made by States which were subsequently checked by IAEA inspectors. The system had hitherto operated satisfactorily, although it was possible to query its current suitability. When it had been drawn up, 20 years previously, the safeguards system had been considered a major step forward in verifying the limitation of weapons and of disarmament. Since then, far more intrusive approaches had been adopted. Nevertheless, the safeguards system, as described in document INFCIRC/153, provided for inspections, in particular special inspections (paras. 73 and 77), which could prove extremely valuable in detecting breaches of the Treaty and in allowing States Parties to reply to unfounded accusations. However, as no such inspections had yet been carried out, it was not known how they could be implemented. It would be advisable to request the Agency to consider the question and to report on its conclusions so that the States Parties would be in a better position to appreciate that type of inspection. His delegation would like to discuss with other delegations a draft text on the matter, for inclusion in the Final Document.

39. Since the previous Review Conference, the Netherlands had exported no nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States whose nuclear

activities were not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. His Government had officialized that practice: henceforth it would refuse to allow nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States which did not implement IAEA safeguards.

40. He hoped that the participants in the Conference would agree to demand the application of full-scope safeguards as a condition for the supply of nuclear material. With that in mind, his delegation was in a position to approve the text suggested for the Final Document by Australia and other States.

41. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the Committee's work, said that the Hungarian delegation had proposed a wording for the presentation of the results of IAEA's safeguards activities. However, the Italian delegation had distributed a similar document. Perhaps the two delegations should draw up a joint text.

42. Mr. GHISI (Italy) said that his delegation had already contacted the Hungarian delegation in that regard.

43. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the texts submitted for inclusion in the Final Document should be examined and, for the purpose of studying the proposals or observations delegations wished to make, informal working groups should be set up. Two groups could be established, one chaired by Mr. Meerburg, to examine the text submitted on the application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, the other group, chaired by Mr. Villarroel, to examine the proposed text on article VII of the Treaty.

44. Mrs. TALLAWY (Egypt) said that the time was not ripe for setting up informal working groups to consider each of the texts submitted, as the delegations did not have enough members to attend all the working meetings. Moreover, the activities of the working groups might overlap.

45. The CHAIRMAN pointed out he had thought of two informal working groups, which would not meet simultaneously, in order to lighten the work of the Committee. In any event, it was possible to wait and see how work progressed before taking a decision on the subject.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.4
28 January 1991

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV

(3) Article VII

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.4

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (*continued*)

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(2) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3 IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES III AND IV

(3) ARTICLE VII

(NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.1, WP.2; NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.2-CRP.4)

1. Mr. RASHID (Bangladesh) said that, during the general debate, his country had clearly pointed out some contradictions that were inherent in the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For example, his country saw no technical difference between the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The specific duality of atomic energy explained the different interpretations of non-proliferation (its deterrent nature, on the one hand, and its promotional nature on the other), which had given rise to a series of controversies concerning the equity of the commercial aspect, the terms of procurement and the assistance rendered by nuclear-weapon States to other States wishing to undertake nuclear programmes. Efforts should therefore be made to fill the gaps in articles I and II of the Treaty.

2. With regard to article VII, Bangladesh believed that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted a very important step towards the strengthening of peace and security. The proposal made by Poland 33 years earlier (the Rapacki plan) had been followed by various other proposals, which had led to several very important treaties prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in specific geographical zones (Treaty on the Antarctic, Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty of Rarotonga).

3. The *rapprochement* between the two super-Powers had made it possible to establish a climate of understanding and had facilitated a common approach towards genuine disarmament through the reduction of nuclear arsenals and conventional forces and the establishment of a more stable and durable order in Europe. It was to be hoped, therefore, that those promises would exert a favourable political influence on other regions of the world. However, there was a danger in so far as the easing of tension between the super-Powers, being focused primarily on peace and security in Europe, might entail a certain degree of indifference towards other regions of the world, which would have to take the measures needed to ensure their own security. Consequently, it was imperative that that easing of tension should not be interpreted as encouraging regional or national hegemony.

4. In view of all those factors, which weighed heavily on the world community, he advocated the promotion of regional disarmament through measures

such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. To that end, account should be taken of the existence of regional differences and the fact that some detractors felt that those zones should be created within the wider framework of general and complete disarmament.

5. The major Powers would do well to support those regional measures, which were essential to promote greater confidence, stability and security throughout the world. In particular, such zones would help to invalidate the concept of nuclear deterrence and would curb the attempts of non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire atomic weapons of their own. Moreover, measures to consolidate the non-proliferation system would strengthen the security, freedom and sovereignty of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which would then become less dependent on decisions taken by the nuclear Powers. Such measures would inevitably help to facilitate efforts to achieve conventional disarmament and would also help to create conditions more conducive to greater confidence and better protection of the environment. Finally, measures to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones would also promote openness about nuclear potential.

6. Bangladesh therefore firmly supported the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean and other regions of the world. It was in favour of re-establishing an ad hoc committee, and convening an international conference to study the creation of such a zone in the Indian Ocean.

7. In conclusion, he said that arms control, disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction represented the only way of ensuring the prosperity and material, social and spiritual progress of all peoples in the world. It should never be forgotten that the last preambular paragraph of the Treaty recalled that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security were to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

8. Mr. GOMAA (Egypt) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an essential disarmament measure, particularly in areas of conflict. The Third Review Conference had recognized that the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States was absolutely necessary for the effective establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those States should therefore support regional efforts to that end. Every year since 1974, Egypt had submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and since 1980 that proposal had been adopted by consensus. Egypt had also recently proposed the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East with a view to the consolidation of peace and security not only in that region but throughout the world. In pursuit of that initiative, Egypt had requested the distribution of a draft text on regional nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.4), with a view to its possible insertion in the final document.

9. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, with regard to articles I and II of the Treaty, his country's legislation sought to ensure that no one in the United States of America could help a non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire a nuclear explosive device. His Government had also taken new measures to tighten export controls, and he urged all supplier States to follow its example. He hoped that the Committee's report would state that articles I and II of the Treaty had been respected and call upon all parties to fulfil their obligations under the NPT by ensuring that their exports did not help countries to carry out nuclear-weapon programmes or other nuclear activities that were not subject to a system of safeguards.

10. Concerning article VII, the United States of America was in favour of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, provided that the requisite conditions were met, and fully supported the Treaty of Tlatelolco. His country also supported the proposals that had been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia, on condition that the establishment of such zones did not prejudice the security agreements currently in force.

11. Mrs. JACKSON (New Zealand) said that, with regard to the implementation of article VII of the NPT, her country intended to propose the inclusion in the final document of a draft text concerning the Treaty of Rarotonga, to which New Zealand and 10 other countries members of the South Pacific Forum were parties. It would be recalled that the Treaty of Rarotonga made provision for a verification and control mechanism to facilitate the application of the IAEA safeguards. She hoped that, once they had studied the text, delegations would be able to approve the wording proposed by New Zealand.

12. Mr. DESPRES (Canada) said that the commitments undertaken by States pursuant to article II of the Treaty were primarily an expression of their political will, since the extent to which those commitments were respected could be verified only partially through the IAEA safeguards system. Consequently, the effectiveness of efforts to prevent horizontal proliferation depended largely on the good intentions of the parties. However, confidence-building measures could be intensified and, to that end, the States parties should be willing to provide fuller explanations when questions were raised concerning their compliance with the NPT.

13. Canada had duly taken note of the United Kingdom's proposals concerning articles 73 and 77 of the model safeguards agreement, as well as those of the Netherlands concerning the means of verification which were available to IAEA but which it did not use in practice. According to the Netherlands, those provisions would enable the Agency to carry out specific inspections in particular circumstances. Canada therefore joined the Netherlands in proposing that IAEA should be recommended to study that question.

14. Mr. ADEKANYE (Nigeria) emphasized the importance of the application of article VII of the NPT and pointed out that, since the entry into force of the Treaty, only one nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established and the efforts of the African countries to establish such a zone in their region had been thwarted by South Africa's nuclear programme. It was therefore imperative

that Pretoria should take all the necessary measures to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards system. Nigeria had submitted a draft text to that end and hoped that the Conference would agree to include it in the final document.

15. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), wishing to clarify his Government's position on the question of safeguards, said that there were three main elements in the NPT, namely, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that precedence could not be given to any of those objectives without rendering the Treaty pointless.

16. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had always been in favour of the IAEA safeguards system, although, in its opinion, that system could not be imposed on the States parties, in view of the threat which a nuclear-weapon State party could pose to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. In other words, his country remained concerned at the increasing nuclear capability of the United States of America. Once that country removed its nuclear threat and undertook not to use nuclear weapons against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, his country would be willing to sign and apply the safeguards agreement. International law recognized the fact that accession to a multilateral treaty should not prejudice the interests, particularly the security interests, of a State party. He requested that his Government's point of view be reflected in the final document.

17. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) pointed out, firstly, that his country had been the first to propose, in 1974, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and that it was only at a later date that Egypt had made a similar proposal.

18. Secondly, the IAEA safeguards applied only to the civil nuclear installations of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, in accordance with safeguard agreements of the type INFCIRC 153, and to the civil nuclear installations of the other States in respect of which voluntary offers of the type INFCIRC 66/Rev.2 had been made. Consequently, the IAEA safeguards did not apply to installations that posed a potential threat to international peace and security. That should be clearly stated in the final document of the Conference.

19. Mr. PARNOHADININGRAT (Indonesia) said that his country intended to submit a draft proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, in accordance with article VII of the NPT. It would be recalled that, in 1971, the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had decided to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and that the establishment of a denuclearized zone formed an essential part of that plan. Indonesia believed that regional arrangements were essential to enable smaller countries to counter the effects of rivalry among the major Powers, defuse regional tensions and foster conditions conducive to their economic and social development.

20. In a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the non-nuclear-weapon States would be able to play a bigger role than the nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate in practice their commitment to the cessation of the arms race and to nuclear disarmament. The political circumstances that had hitherto prevailed in the region, which had been characterized by rivalry among the major Powers, had not been conducive to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the summit meeting at Manila in 1987, the ASEAN countries had decided to intensify their efforts to establish such a zone and had formed a working group to further those efforts. That objective was consistent with article VII of the NPT, under which States had the right to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. However, the member countries of ASEAN in no way intended to reduce their co-operation with countries outside the region, and in view of the improvement in the general political situation, Indonesia thought that the time had come to call upon all the States parties to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. Finally, he said that, if it was to be a success, the Conference should clearly specify the measures to be taken by the parties that had not properly fulfilled their obligations under the terms of the Treaty and he emphasized that those measures should be set out in the final document.

21. Mr. HADAD (Syrian Arab Republic) welcomed the positive results of the application of articles I and II of the Treaty, but nevertheless stressed that the implementation of those articles was raising various problems, which in some cases had been created deliberately. In fact, on the pretext of the need to ensure strict respect for the principle of non-proliferation, some developing countries had been the subject of largely unjustified suspicions concerning their alleged acquisition of nuclear products and equipment and the establishment of nuclear installations in their territory. Although such concern might indeed be justified in the case of countries that were not parties to the Treaty, it should be noted that the States that were parties to the Treaty were subjecting themselves to strict inspection and control procedures, which should promote a certain degree of confidence in their policy, particularly since IAEA's experts and technical assistance units were fully familiar with the various nuclear activities that were being undertaken by those countries, essentially for peaceful purposes.

22. With regard to the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the international community could either work towards general nuclear disarmament, which might be very time-consuming, or endeavour to alleviate tensions and reduce dangers in specific cases by establishing such zones in particular regions in which political confrontations were giving rise to the greatest concern. The Middle East, which had been in constant turmoil since the beginning of the century and had experienced several wars, would be one of the regions in which the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would be most desirable, since it had been proved that tension in any region of the world inevitably threatened international peace and security and that fact had been reconfirmed by the present crisis. For its part, the Syrian Arab Republic had been one of the first countries to approve the initiatives taken by the United Nations and IAEA with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone

in the Middle East. His country also hoped that the idea of nuclear disarmament would be extended to all forms of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons.

23. Mrs. GONZALEZ (Mexico) said that her country had been one of the first in Latin America and the Caribbean to deposit its instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Moscow of 1963, the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, on which the entire international system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was based. However, that system had not been universally respected and the main aim of general and complete disarmament had not yet been achieved.

24. She urged all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean which had not yet done so to accede rapidly to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which constituted the corner-stone of the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. She also called upon the French Government to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Treaty.

25. She reaffirmed the Mexican Government's support for all proposals aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world and expressed the hope that the initiatives taken to that end would be successful, thereby proving that the establishment of such zones contributed effectively to disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security, as the General Assembly of the United Nations had affirmed at its first special session on disarmament.

26. Mr. GHISI (Italy) said that his delegation wished to withdraw its proposal concerning article III of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.2) and co-sponsor the proposal on the same subject that had been put forward by Hungary in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.3.

27. Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka) said that he was convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would make a significant contribution to the process of disarmament, and first and foremost, to regional and international stability and security. The Sri Lankan Government fully supported the establishment of such a zone in South-East Asia and hoped that the adoption of measures to that end would be confirmed in the final document of the Fourth Review Conference.

28. Mr. COUSINS (Australia) said that his country's delegation would be submitting to the secretariat a proposal that had already won the broad support of a large number of delegations from all regions of the world. Under that proposal, all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not already done so would be invited to undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept the IAEA safeguards concerning all their nuclear activities for peaceful purposes; the States that supplied nuclear equipment would be under an obligation not to trade with States unless they had given that undertaking and all States parties to the Treaty that had not already done so would be called upon to conclude safeguard agreements with IAEA as soon as possible.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.4

29. His delegation hoped that that proposal would be approved unanimously so that its provisions could be included in the final document of the Fourth Review Conference.

30. Mr. SHINYO (Japan) said that his Government was deeply concerned that some States parties had not yet fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty and had not yet concluded a safeguard agreement with IAEA, since their failure to do so might reduce mutual confidence among States parties and weaken the non-proliferation system. In that regard, his Government would urge the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its obligations under article III of the Treaty as soon as possible.

31. With regard to negative guarantees of security, his Government understood the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties and sincerely hoped that the Fourth Review Conference would provide an opportunity to begin a dialogue on that subject among all the States concerned. However, he emphasized that that question, like the question of the obligations arising from the Treaty, should be examined separately and that, at all events, priority should be given to verification of full respect for the provisions of the Treaty.

32. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) hoped that all States parties would, like his country, accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards, although he though it essential to take due account of all the problems that arose in that connection, particularly for non-nuclear-weapon States, which could legitimately express some reservations. The problems that were being encountered in that regard should be examined with all the requisite impartiality.

33. With regard to the wording that had been adopted in some documents of the Fourth Review Conference, he warned against the use of expressions such as "regional conflict" or "region of conflict", since they might be prejudicial to some countries which, although pursuing entirely peaceful policies, were situated in zones of conflict. Finally, with regard to the imposition of further restrictions within the framework of IAEA's monitoring activities, itwas important to ensure that they did not affect either the sovereign rights of States or the credibility of IAEA.

34. Mr. ADYERI (Uganda) said that his country, like others in the third world, was complying fully with the non-proliferation system that had been introduced by the Treaty and regretted that not all States parties were strictly respecting their obligations under the Treaty, whether they possessed nuclear weapons or not. In fact, some nuclear-weapon States were violating the IAEA safeguard agreements with impunity and giving direct assistance to States that were endeavouring to acquire a nuclear capability. His Government hoped that the system of negative security guarantees would be fully applied so that all States parties to the NPT would be treated on an equal footing.

The meeting rose at noon

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.5
28 January 1991

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 31 August 1990, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (*continued*):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones;

   (1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

   (2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV

   (3) Article VII

E. Other provisions of the Treaty

Role of the Treaty in the Promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.5

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

E. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (agenda item 14):

A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY BY STATES

B. MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING A WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

1. Mr. SHINYO (Japan) said he was firmly convinced that universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty constituted a determining factor in the effectiveness of the régime established under the Treaty, which was of vital importance to the maintenance of peace and stability in an ever-changing world. In that spirit, he noted with satisfaction that France and China were participating for the first time as observers in the work of a conference to review the Treaty. He hoped that those two countries would accede to the Treaty by 1995 and urged them to continue in the interim to abide by the essence of its provisions. The fact that the five nuclear Powers were attending the Conference offered prospects which should not be disregarded.

2. He urged the non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so to immediately take the requisite steps to accede to the Treaty and called upon those States which were operating or building major nuclear facilities to submit them to full-scope safeguards so as to disepl any suspicions the international community might have about the real reasons for their reluctance regarding the Treaty. Japan, for its part, even before the Fourth Review Conference, had broached the question of accession to the Treaty with 18 States members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the hope of winning them over to the cause of non-proliferation. Some of them appeared to be quite well disposed to the Treaty, but the majority remained hostile, believing it to be discriminatory. In order to promote wider acceptance of the Treaty, it was important for each of the States Parties not only to observe its provisions more strictly, but also to initiate a dialogue with non-party States to pinpoint and, if possible, to overcome the strategic, geopolitical and socio-economic obstacles that prevented a country from acceding to it.

3. With regard to the question of extension the Treaty should remain in force for as long as possible after 1995. The idea of States Parties having an informal exchange of views on the matter before 1995 was worthy of consideration. Such an exchange could take place within meetings of bodies such as the First Committee of the General Assembly, thus making it easier to organize and to avoid any unnecessary expenditure. The conference to be

convened in 1995 should also afford an opportunity for a review of the operation of the Treaty which would be a good starting-point for a discussion on the extending of the instrument.

4. Mrs. GARCIA GUERRA (Mexico) said it was important to implement each of the provisions of the Treaty and pointed out that, at the 1995 conference, the Parties would be called upon to state their views, not only on the operation but also on extension of the NPT, in the light of the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken under the various articles. Her delegation would promptly submit to the Committee a working paper on that very important question.

5. Mr. CLARK (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the three depositary States, said that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proposed for inclusion in the Final Document a text on artice X and on convening a single conference for review and extension of the Treaty in 1995. The text read:

> Article X
>
> "The Conference recalls that this article requires that 'twenty-five years after entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'. The Conference further recalls that the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. The Conference therefore recommends that an Extension Conference should be held during 1995 to make a choice from among these alternatives.
>
> "The Conference further notes that 1995 falls at a five-year interval from the Court Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, and that there should be an opportunity at that time for a full review of the Treaty's operation since the Fourth Review Conference, consistent with the terms of article VIII (3) of the Treaty.
>
> "Therefore, the Conference invites States party to the Treaty which are members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly:
>
> "'Implementation of the conclusions of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for a single conference on Review and Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'."

6. He requested that the text, which was self-explanatory, should be circulated as a working paper of the Conference.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.5

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES;

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7

(2) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3 IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES III AND IV

(3) ARTICLE VII

(NPT/CONF.IV/32/Rev.1; informal conference room paper on special inspections and the information policy of IAEA)

7. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that his Government, by its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the proposals it had submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council, one of which had been designed to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula (A/S-15/19) and the other to substantially reduce the level of armed forces in the area (S/19017), had intended to promote nuclear disarmament throughout the world and on the Korean peninsula. However, those initiatives had not produced any results: the grave threat which nuclear weapons posed to his country had not been removed, and there were no indications of an improvement in the situation in the short term.

8. Since 1985, South Korea had maintained all of the combat-ready tactical nuclear weapons which had been unilaterally deployed in its territory, and which had a total yield, according to the Brookings Institute, some 1,700 times higher than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Those weapons posed a real threat, especially since the owner State's defence reports categorized the Korean peninsula as a first-class theatre for the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, by their scope and nature, the "Team Spirit" military exercises, which were carried out jointly by the State which owned the weapons and by South Korea, had become a real rehearsal for nuclear war: the operations, which went on for 90 days, had for several years mobilized, for example, 200,000 troops, a major task force of the Seventh Fleet armed with 1,500 nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, B-52 strategic bombers from Guam and F-111 strategic nuclear attackers.

9. Nevertheless, his Government, for its part, had followed the spirit of the provisions of article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since all of the country's nuclear facilities and activities had been submitted to the IAEA safeguards system under an agreement of the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 type, and the Government was continuing to negotiate a standard full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. However, the situation was such that it had become imperative for his country to seek security assurances through legally binding measures to promote general nuclear disarmament or, at least, to resolve the

situation on the Korean peninsula. As it was hardly to be expected that the provisions of article VI of the Treaty would be implemented in the short term, his Government proposed that the States Parties concerned should simultaneously conclude, at the earliest possible date, a nuclear safeguards agreement and an agreement to assure his country against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That proposal was within the framework of the issues currently under consideration by the Review Conference, and he requested that it should be duly reflected in the Final Declaration of the Conference.

10. The CHAIRMAN said that part of the proposal made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea came under agenda item 13 B, which was being considered by Main Committee I.

11. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands), commenting on the substance of the proposal, said that the situation on the Korean peninsula was hardly satisfactory; it would perhaps be helpful if the two Koreas could endeavour, following the example of the European countries, to achieve a better balance of conventional forces, as that would necessarily lead to a reduction in, and even in the long term to complete elimination of, the number of nuclear weapons based on the peninsula. Nevertheless, the situation on the Korean peninsula did not seem to have changed radically since 1985 - indeed it appeared to be entirely stable. Therefore, he did not understand why the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should wish at that point to link the question of obtaining legally binding security assurances from the United States to the conclusion of a nuclear safeguards agreement. After all, the United States had explicitly undertaken an absolute commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State except in the case of an attack on the United States by a country which had joined with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out the attack. Accordingly, the United States did not pose any threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Moreover, since all the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had already been submitted to IAEA safeguards, he wondered why the Government of that country had so many difficulties in concluding the full-scope safeguards agreement referred to in article III of the Treaty. While the scope of the safeguards would be the same, the country would dispel any remaining uncertainty as to its fulfilment of the obligations it had incurred under the Treaty.

12. The CHAIRMAN said he wondered whether the previous speaker's remarks were not somewhat irrelevant. Noting that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wished to exercise his right of reply, he would point out that, in accordance with rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, such statements should be as brief as possible.

13. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reminded the representative of the Netherlands that the United States and South Korea had rejected several proposals made by his country to reduce the level of armed forces currently deployed throughout the Korean peninsula. The threat which the United States posed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was very real: the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises were among the largest of their type carried out anywhere in the

world and undoubtedly constituted a preparation for nuclear war. For instance, on 24 August 1990, the United States Air Force Command in the Pacific region had sent F-15 and A-6 airplanes from Japan to South Korea to take part with 20 United States F-16 nuclear bombers in a three-day training exercise, from 24 to 27 August 1990, in preparation for a nuclear attack on strategic targets in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He was prepared to provide fuller information to any delegation wishing to have accurate reports on the situation.

14. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the obligations incurred under the Treaty constituted solemn undertakings, the fulfilment of which could not be negotiated in order to obtain concessions on another issue, however important. Any efforts in that direction were intolerable and should be rejected by all the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, his country categorically rejected any allegation or insinuation that it was preparing for a nuclear attack on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the cover of the military exercises conducted by its armed forces.

15. Mr. YUH (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, asked why, if that was the case, the United States refused to put an end to its military exercises on the peninsula and what other meaning it would give to the operations conducted in the region in August 1990.

16. Mr. LENDVAI (Hungary), speaking under agenda item 13 C (1), outlined his views regarding the measures which could be taken in a hypothetical case in which the implicit or explicit ambition of a State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was to acquire nuclear-weapons capability. Under such circumstances, courses of action were open under the IAEA safeguards system, such as the special inspections referred to in paragraphs 73 and 77 of the INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) model agreement. Those possibilities were probably unrecognized and therefore not used properly.

17. It should not be forgotten that the foundation of the safeguards system was information, primarily the very full information each State Party was required to provide to the Agency about its nuclear facilities and materials for the purpose of a safeguards agreement. IAEA carefully examined and verified that information before devising inspection, accounting and reporting procedures for each facility, procedures which were then applied within the framework of subsidiary arrangements. Thus, to the extent that it was possible to believe in the objectivity and exhaustiveness of the results achieved by the initial and subsequent verification operations, it was also possible to believe in the effectiveness of the safeguards system. If such confidence was undermined by the declared or undeclared nuclear ambitions of a State Party, information was still the means by which efforts should be made to restore it. In such a case, any State possessing data which could inform IAEA about the realization of the main objectives of the safeguards system could and should officially transmit those data to the Agency so that it could undertake a special action in addition to regular and ad hoc inspections, as authorized by the safeguards agreement concluded with the State concerned. Furthermore, any INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement required the signatory

State to transmit to the Agency all information concerning modifications of its nuclear programme which had an impact on the safeguards and to provide the Agency with the means of verifying the accuracy of such information.

18. Of course, the extent to which such an approach could really restore confidence still had to be determined. Nevertheless, courses of action were open under the safeguards system that had so far received little attention and were not used sufficiently. Moreover, it was important to fill all the gaps in the concrete implementation of the provisions of the NPT by 1995, when States Parties would decide on extension of the Treaty. It was in that spirit that his delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, had submitted to the Committee an informal text on special inspections and the information policy of IAEA, which they proposed should be included in the Final Document of the Conference.

19. Mrs. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ (Venezuela), drawing attention to articles I, II and VII of the Treaty, recalled that the General Assembly, by its resolution 2028 (XX), of 1965, entrusting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the task of negotiating a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, had requested that body to ensure that the treaty was free of loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form (para. 2 (a)), and that nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories (para. 2 (e)).

20. However, articles I and II of the Treaty, read in conjunction with each other, did not explicitly prohibit a nuclear-weapon State from establishing in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State nuclear weapons which remained under its jurisdiction and control, or from introducing nuclear weapons into regions in which a group of non-nuclear-weapon States was obviously determined not to take part in the nuclear arms race. It was plainly a gap which had facilitated the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and jeopardized effective implementation of article VII. For example, the fact that a group of nuclear-weapon States, including two that were depositaries of the Treaty, had the habit of not indicating whether their vessels were or were not equipped with nuclear weapons, appeared to be inconsistent with article VII.

21. Under those circumstances, the Conference should emphasize in its Final Document that it would be impossible to consolidate the Treaty of Rarotonga and to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones without the support of the nuclear-weapon States. Similarly, it was desirable for the Conference to firmly support the efforts undertaken by States in various regions, such as Latin America, to establish or consolidate such zones, as regional solutions evidently constituted an effective means of combating the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, she deemed the text on regional nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.7), which Egypt had proposed for inclusion in the Final Declaration, to be highly relevant, and the texts on the implementation of article VII which had been submitted by other countries were of interest.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.5

22. Mr. MAKIPENTTI (Finland) said that the 23 States which were authors of document NPT/CONF.IV/32 had decided to make a number of changes in the text, which they proposed for inclusion in the Final Declaration of the Conference. The changes consisted mainly of mentioning IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as revised, in order to avoid any confusion with what had conventionally been called the London guidelines. The IAEA document contained a short list of items for the implementation of Agency safeguards regarding exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty. In the new version of the text (NPT/CONF.IV/32/Rev.1), it was recommended that the list should be reviewed periodically in order to take into account advances in technology and changes in procurement practices.

23. The authors had submitted to the Committee the amended text of their proposal, for consideration, and the list, for information, in the hope that it would thus be possible to reach consensus among the regional groups and that the Conference could urge all States to adopt the standards laid down in document INFCIRC/209, as revised.

24. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had concluded the item-by-item consideration of the questions allocated to it, and that it remained for the Committee to draw up and adopt its report to the plenary Conference. As agreed, the Committee would meet informally for that purpose immediately after the meeting.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.6
5 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 3 September 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (*continued*)

Draft report of the Committee

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.6

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that a number of documents to be considered by the Committee were in preparation and would be available shortly. The deadline for the completion of the Committee's work was 5 September. He hoped therefore that the informal consultation groups headed by the two Vice-Chairmen could agree on consensus texts by the end of the day.

The meeting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.15 a.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

2. The CHAIRMAN invited members of the Committee to examine the draft report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/CRP.8) paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1

3. Mr. CLARK (United Kingdom) pointed out that consideration of article VII of the NPT had been assigned to both Main Committee I and Main Committee II. He also wished to know whether article X of the NPT would be dealt with under agenda item 13.C.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that it was probably regrettable that article VII of the NPT had been assigned to two Main Committees, and he would seek to clarify that situation. Agenda item 14 had also been assigned concurrently to Main Committee I and Main Committee II, but that arrangement was apparently causing no difficulty. In any event, the Drafting Committee would review the work of the three Committees, and any problems could be cleared up at that time.

Article X of the NPT would be considered under agenda item 13.E.

Paragraph 1 was adopted.

Paragraph 2

Paragraph 2 was adopted.

Paragraph 3

5. Mr. PARNOHADININGRAT (Indonesia) said that Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam would be joining Indonesia and the Philippines as sponsors of the conference room paper concerning article VII of the NPT.

Paragraph 3 was adopted.

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 4 was adopted.

Paragraph 5

Paragraph 5 was adopted.

6. The CHAIRMAN remarked that the adoption by the Committee of the draft report was ad referendum, since it would be considered as a whole once the substantive parts had been finalized.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.7
10 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 September 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (continued)

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.7

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the formal meeting would be followed by an informal session to conclude consideration of working paper No. 1 and other related proposals. He was of the opinion that, once agreement had been reached on the language for the Committee's report on its review of article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, the Committee should consider the language for articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3. If time permitted, the Committee could also look at proposals on item 13.E, "Other provisions of the Treaty", particularly proposals contained in working papers 9 and 10 relating to article X.

2. The Working Parties chaired by Mr. Villarroel and Mr. Meerburg had concluded their work and texts were being prepared for circulation. The Committee was also in contact with the Chairman of Main Committee III, which was also preparing a paragraph on item 14.

3. He said that it was possible that the last formal meeting of the Committee would be rescheduled to take place the following afternoon, instead of in the morning, in order to allow sufficient time for the finalization of the text of the substantive part of the Committee's report for its consideration and adoption.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.8
17 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8TH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 5 September 1990, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. STRULAK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Draft report of the Committee

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.8

The meeting was called to order at 4.50 p.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider, paragraph by paragraph, the substantive part of its draft report, contained in an informal document which, for the time being, was available only in English.

A. Review of article III

Paragraphs 1-3

Paragraphs 1-3 were adopted.

Paragraph 4

2. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran), referring to the footnote to paragraph 4, requested that the name of his delegation should be added to that of the delegation of Mexico as having expressed a reservation on the inclusion of the phrase "in non-nuclear-weapon States" in the second sentence of the paragraph.

3. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), Mr. ADYERI (Uganda), Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka), Mr. GOMAA (Egypt), Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria), Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. BIN ALI (Malaysia), Mr. HILALE (Morocco), Mr. SAHBOUN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Ms. HERNANDEZ (Venezuela) and Mr. CULAFIC (Yugoslavia) also requested that the names of their delegations should be included in the footnote.

It was so agreed.

Paragraph 4 and the footnote thereto, as amended, were adopted.

Paragraphs 5-13

Paragraphs 5-13 were adopted with minor drafting changes.

Paragraph 14

4. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran), referring to the third sentence of paragraph 14, said that, as explained in an earlier statement, his Government considered the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to be discriminatory and therefore could not associate itself with an appeal to all States that had not done so to adhere to the Convention at the earliest possible date. He proposed the deletion of the sentence in question.

5. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the paragraph as a whole had been provisionally adopted by the Committee. He suggested that a footnote should be added indicating that the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran had requested the deletion of the third sentence.

6. After a brief discussion in which the CHAIRMAN and Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) took part, Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, while remaining unsatisfied, he would not block the consensus by insisting on his proposal.

7. The CHAIRMAN expressed his appreciation of the co-operative attitude adopted by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Paragraph 14 was adopted.

Paragraphs 15-17

Paragraphs 15-17 were adopted.

Paragraph 18

8. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) proposed that in the second sentence, reading "Without prejudice to the existing principles guiding international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference in this regard calls for early consultations among States to ensure that their supply and export controls are appropriately co-ordinated.", the words "especially article IV of the NPT," should be inserted after the word "energy".

It was so agreed.

Paragraph 18, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 19

9. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) suggested that a sentence reading "In this context, regional fuel cycle centres should also be considered further." should be added at the end of paragraph 19.

It was so agreed.

Paragraph 19, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 20

10. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran), referring to paragraph 20, which read:

> "The Conference urges all non-nuclear-weapon States which have not already done so to make an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges nuclear supplier States to require henceforth as a necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States under new supply arrangements, such a commitment and acceptance of such safeguards.* The Conference expresses

> its view that accession to the Treaty is the best way to achieve these objectives. The Conference stresses that the application of such safeguards in additional States should not diminish resources for the IAEA's promotional programmes in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.",

said that his delegation had two points of concern arising from the text but that in a spirit of compromise would be willing to accept the wording as it stood on the understanding that his delegation interpreted, firstly, "all their peaceful nuclear activities" to mean safeguardable peaceful nuclear activities and facilities in the framework of the categorization of safeguards and, secondly, "relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States under new supply arrangements" to mean not that any other arrangement or additional restriction was to be imposed on the developing countries, but that the text referred to new contracts in the future.

11. Mr. GHISI (Italy), referring to the footnote to paragraph 20, which read:

> "The delegations of Belgium, the Soviet Union, Switzerland and the United Kingdom expressed a reservation on the inclusion of the word 'require' and proposed as an alternative formulation the following: 'join together in requiring'. The delegation of Italy expressed the same reservation and proposed as alternatives to 'require' the expressions 'consider' or 'consider requesting'.",

said that Italy could be included among the names of countries at the beginning of the footnote and that the final sentence should consequently be deleted.

It was so agreed.

Paragraph 20 was adopted with the footnote as amended.

Paragraph 21

Paragraph 21 was adopted.

Paragraph 22

12. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the first sentence of paragraph 22, which read:

> "The Conference also recommends that the Director General of IAEA as a matter of priority further pursue the conclusion of such agreements and encourage their timely entry into force, and that parties to the Treaty, in particular the depositary parties, should actively support this activity, and that the Director General should keep member States of IAEA informed of his efforts and the responses thereto.",

should be amended, in accordance with the discussion in informal meetings, to read:

> "The Conference also recommends that the Director General of IAEA as a matter of priority further facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such agreements, and that parties to the Treaty, in particular the depositary parties, should actively support this activity."

Paragraph 22, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraphs 23-26

Paragraphs 23-26 were adopted.

Paragraph 27

13. *Ms. HERNANDEZ* (Venezuela), referring to the last sentence of paragraph 27, which read:

> "In this regard, the Conference recommends that the Zangger Committee should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export requirements laid down by it do not hamper the acquisition of such items by States parties for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.",

suggested that the word "recommends" should be replaced by "requests" and that the words "should continue to" should be deleted.

14. *Mr. MAKIPENTTI* (Finland) observed that the formulation as it stood was the result of a compromise and therefore urged that it should remain.

15. *Ms. HERNANDEZ* (Venezuela) said that in the interest of consensus she would not press the amendment, but would wish to have her delegation's preference stated in a footnote.

16. *Mr. MAKIPENTTI* (Finland) said that, in the interests of minimizing the number of reservations, his delegation would be prepared to accept the Venezuelan proposal to substitute "requests" for "recommends". The other sponsors accepted that amendment.

17. *Ms. HERNANDEZ* (Venezuela) thanked the representative of Finland and withdrew her delegation's reservation.

Paragraph 27 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 28 and 29

Paragraphs 28 and 29 were adopted.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.8

B. Review of article VII

Paragraphs 1-5

Paragraphs 1-5 were adopted.

Paragraph 6

18. Mr. YOUN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that he had made a proposal relating to a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula, which read as follows:

> "The Conference notes the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. The Conference also notes that the Republic of Korea and other States oppose the proposal in view of the general criteria for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones mentioned above."

The words "mentioned above" were intended as a reference to paragraphs 2 and 4. He wished to know whether his proposal was to be incorporated into paragraph 6, reading: "The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the world.", to which his delegation had originally expressed a reservation, as indicated in a footnote to the paragraph.

19. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) said that the understanding which had been reached was that the single sentence in paragraph 6 would remain as it stood, while the proposal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could take the form of a separate paragraph to be numbered 19.

20. Mr. VILLARROEL (Philippines), Vice-Chairman, said that the logical place for the proposal seemed to be paragraph 6, following the existing single sentence.

21. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) said that it had originally been planned to add those two sentences to paragraph 6 but, on reflection, it had been decided to turn them into a separate paragraph. The single sentence which at present formed paragraph 6 embodied what was clearly a general principle. It did not seem appropriate to insert at that point a reference to a particular country or region. It should not be forgotten that there were proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world, to which no reference was going to be made in the report.

22. Mr. ADYERI (Uganda) agreed: paragraphs 1 to 6 contained general statements in which no particular countries were mentioned. It would be out of place to insert in paragraph 6 a reference to the Korean peninsula, only to continue thereafter with generalities. The logical place for the proposal was after paragraph 18.

23. Mr. CLARK (United Kingdom) agreed with the previous speaker.

24. *The CHAIRMAN* suggested that the Committee should adopt paragraph 6 as it stood, in its original single-sentence form, and without the footnote relating to the reservation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It was so decided.

said that the paragraph currently proposed was:

25. *The CHAIRMAN* invited the Committee to adopt the text of the proposal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as paragraph 19.

It was so decided.

Paragraph 7

26. *Mr. LENDVAI* (Hungary), referring to the second sentence of paragraph 7, which read:

> "In this connection, and taking into account the latest international political developments, which are more conducive than in the past to the establishment of zones in certain regions of the world, nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.",

said that the words "nuclear-weapon-free" should be inserted between "establishment of" and "zones".

It was so agreed.

Paragraph 7, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 8

Paragraph 8 was adopted.

Paragraph 9

27. *Mr. BUJ* (Mexico), referring to the penultimate sentence of the paragraph, which read:

> "It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I, to ratify it, and reiterates its call upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty to do so at an early date to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty in the region.",

proposed that the order of words be changed so that it read:

> "It reiterates its call upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty to do so at an early date to ensure the

full implementation of the Treaty in the region, and it reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol 1, to ratify that Protocol."

28. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) endorsed the proposal made by the representative of Mexico. He none the less considered that an imbalance remained in the text in that one country was mentioned by name whereas the relevant Latin American countries were not; he therefore expressed a reservation on that point.

Paragraph 9, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraphs 10 and 11

Paragraphs 10 and 11 were adopted.

Paragraph 12

29. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America), referring to the footnote to paragraph 12, which read: "The delegation of the United States expressed a reservation to the text in the first sentence of paragraph 12.", said that the latter part should be amended to read: "... the first two sentences of paragraph 12.".

30. Mr. CLARK (United Kingdom) pointed out that, owing to a printing error, a passage was obviously missing from the text of the concluding sentence of paragraph 12, which read:

> "All States parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone."

31. The CHAIRMAN invited the Vice-Chairman to clarify the matter.

32. Mr. VILLARROEL (Philippines), Vice-Chairman, said that the intention was to quote the last two sentences of paragraph 14 of that part of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference which dealt with article VII. The correct text should therefore be:

> "All States parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone."

33. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no further comments, he would take it that the Committee agreed to adopt paragraph 12 as amended.

It was so decided.

Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15

Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 were adopted.

Paragraph 16

34. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the word "sentences" in the footnote to paragraph 16 should be corrected to read "sentence".

Paragraph 16 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 17

35. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) proposed that, in the first sentence, the reference to the ASEAN States' "summit meeting in December 1987" should be changed to "their summit meeting in December 1987 in Manila".

Paragraph 17 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 18

36. Mr. VILLARROEL (Philippines), Vice-Chairman, said that paragraph 18, which now read "The Conference takes note of the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia had been endorsed by other South-East Asian countries", should be changed to read: "The Conference takes note that the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia has been endorsed by other South-East Asian countries."

Paragraph 18 was adopted as amended.

37. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that it had adopted an additional paragraph, to be numbered 19, as a result of the discussion on paragraph 6.

38. The Committee had now completed its consideration of sections A and B of the report, relating to the review of articles III and VII. He invited the Committee to adopt sections A and B, as a whole, as amended.

It was so decided.

C. Review of article X

39. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now engage in informal consultations to examine the various proposals relating to the review of article X.

The meeting was suspended at 6.30 p.m. for informal consultations and resumed at 6.45 p.m.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/SR.8

40. The CHAIRMAN said that despite serious efforts, it had not been possible to agree on a compromise text on the review of article X with regard to the convening of an extension conference in 1995 together with the Fifth Review Conference. Consequently, it had been decided to refer the working papers which had been submitted (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.9, WP.10 and WP.10/Rev.1) to the Drafting Committee and to annex them to Main Committee II's report.

41. Mr. BUJ (Mexico) said that document NPT/CONF.IV/L.3 should also be included in the above-mentioned list of documents, having been the basis for NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.10/Add.1.

42. The CHAIRMAN said that comment could be reflected in the record. Having considered the language decided upon by Main Committee I for the review of articles I and II, and the wording produced by Main Committee III for the review of article IX, it had been decided to state in the report that Main Committee II would not propose additional formulations for those articles.

43. After reading out a number of technical changes in the descriptive part of the report, he said that if he saw no objections, he would take it that Main Committee II wished to adopt the report as amended.

It was so decided.

44. Mr. BUJ (Mexico) said that his delegation approved the wording of the report, but reserved the right to make its position known in the light of the final document.

45. The CHAIRMAN, noting that Main Committee II had completed its work, thanked the members of the Committee and the secretariat staff for their co-operation.

The meeting rose at 7.10 p.m.

Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/45/III
NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.1-5

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st TO 5th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 20 August to 14 September 1990

Chairman: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.1
10 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Articles IV and III (3), preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II

(2) Article V

Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.1

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

(1) ARTICLES IV AND III (3), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II

(2) ARTICLE V

ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (agenda item 14):

A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY BY STATES

B. MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING A WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed members and said that the Committee's terms of reference had been worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference. The primary task was to review the implementation of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of use of nuclear energy and included article IV and article III (3) and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, as well as to articles I, II and V. The Committee shared with Main Committee II the review of agenda item 14 and there might be some overlap because of the links between international co-operation and the non-proliferation assurances through safeguards. Close contact would be maintained with Main Committee II in order to avoid any duplication of work.

2. The documents before the Committee included one on basic facts within the framework of United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.IV/4), the statement by the Non-Aligned and Other States (NPT/CONF.IV/30), and two background papers by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14). Parts of the papers provided by the depositaries were also relevant (NPT/CONF.IV/19, 20 and 21), as well as parts of the memorandum from the five Nordic countries (NPT/CONF.IV/18).

3. He suggested that the Committee should limit the debate to two meetings and devote the remainder of the available time to the drafting exercise, while allowing delegations to make statements at a later stage.

4. Mr. WAGNER (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said that his country had acceded to the NPT from the very beginning and had a long tradition in the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a non-nuclear-weapon Party. The practical results of the implementation of the NPT had proved its validity and justified extending it beyond the year 1995.

5. At present, his country operated eight 440 MW light water reactor units supplying about 28 per cent of total electricity production. Four additional 440 MW and two 1,000 MW units were under construction. All the reactors were of USSR design. Recent political and economic developments had resulted in a change from a unilateral USSR orientation to broader co-operation with advanced partners all over the world and, in that new orientation, strong emphasis was being laid on increasing operational safety. His delegation welcomed the fact that the NPT did not impose limitations on efforts to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy in international co-operation.

6. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's activities in relation to article IV was concerned more particularly with developing and increasing the level of nuclear safety and radiological protection. Hence it wholeheartedly supported the efforts of the IAEA and recommended greater activity and universal adherence to improved and internationally recognized standards for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including all aspects of management and disposal of radioactive wastes. Examples of active co-operation in that field included the invitation to the IAEA's OSART mission to the Dukovany nuclear power plant (NPP) in 1989, the invitation to the IAEA's ASSET mission to the Jaskovské Bohunice V-1 NPP and the invitation to the IAEA's pre-OSART missions to the [illegible] NPP site in 1990.

7. His country's accession in 1987 to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident had also helped to strengthen nuclear safety and radiological protection. It had concluded bilateral agreements in the matter with Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary, and had been a member of the IAEA's IRS system since 1985. It had also played an active role in the Council of Regulatory Bodies established among WWER-type reactor-operating countries.

8. His delegation supported the efforts of IAEA to ensure long-term forecasts of nuclear material and equipment supplies with effective assurances of non-proliferation. The area was one in which a successful solution had yet to be arrived at. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had prepared a number of basic documents presenting some recommendations. The main task of the CAS, namely the formulation of principles for the assurance of supplies, had not yet been completely fulfilled. He therefore recommended that CAS should resume its activity and seek for new solutions.

9. The technical assistance and co-operation programmes organized within the framework of the IAEA and referred to in article IV were important. By the agreement on technical assistance concluded with the IAEA, his Government had undertaken to utilize the accepted assistance exclusively for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Actually, his country not only accepted but also offered technical assistance and Czechoslovak experts were sent to developing countries to organize education and training; specialized IAEA education and

training courses were also held in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic itself. His country's total contribution since the Third Review Conference to the IAEA technical assistance budget amounted approximately to 17 million crowns.

10. Other examples of active international co-operation could be cited, such as the Arrangement between the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission (CSAEC) and the United States for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in nuclear safety matters, concluded in 1989. A similar agreement had been reached that same year with France on the exchange of technical information related to nuclear safety inspection activities and co-operation in the elaboration of a set of principles on nuclear safety. Co-operation with Japan in the same field went back to 1986.

11. Two other agreements were in preparation, one with the Government of the United States and another with the Government of Canada on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Co-operation in the same field with the USSR and the CMEA member countries was still good.

12. All those examples showed that the NPT provided a firm world-wide basis for useful co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination or limitation on development in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that it afforded assurances of compliance with the non-proliferation undertakings referred to in articles I and II. For that reason, his delegation supported all efforts to keep the Treaty in force without any revision and to achieve universal accession to it.

13. Mr. ANGUIANO (Mexico) said that the Committee was called upon to evaluate the events which have occurred since the Third Review Conference with respect to articles IV and V and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the NPT, and to put forward fair, objective and realistic conclusions and recommendations. The Committee should not confine its work to bringing up to date the wording of the 26 paragraphs on international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which had been included in the 1985 Final Declaration. In its discussion on the extent of progress or regression with respect to such co-operation, the Committee could rely on the experience of the parties to the NPT. It would also find useful guidance in such documents as the valuable IAEA papers (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14) and the most recent papers of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

14. There was an obvious concern on the part of a considerable number of States Parties about the genuine application and fulfilment of the provisions of the NPT on nuclear co-operation for peaceful purposes. There was dissatisfaction at the restrictions that still existed with regard to the exchange of equipment, materials and knowledge of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes among the Parties. There was also dissatisfaction at the limited access of developing countries to that area.

15. At the same time, some of the limitations and restrictions observed in 1985 had decreased in recent years as a result of a number of factors which

had altered the pattern of the world market for nuclear resources for peaceful purposes. The concern with the security and the reliability of nuclear reactors had greatly increased following the Chernobyl accident and in some developed countries there was a slow down - or even scrapping - of some programmes for the production of electricity with nuclear energy. The high cost of projects of that kind and the absence of international financing had deterred many developing countries from expanding their nuclear energy programmes.

16. It followed that there was now an excess supply of nuclear-source electric energy in the international market. World demand for new reactors was practically at a standstill and only 96 units had been under construction at the end of 1989. Between 1985 and 1989 the design capacity of nuclear power stations had grown only by 20 per cent and, at the outset of the present decade, nuclear energy accounted for less than 17 per cent of world electricity production when some 10 years before it had been forecast that at least one-fifth of total electricity would be of nuclear origin. Accordingly, the countries that were the traditional suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and the new suppliers which had emerged, had a large part of their production and export capacity lying idle. Most of them were competing for maintenance contracts and the sale of spare parts for stations already in operation. As a result, transfers of nuclear technology and materials for the few remaining users in the market had become more flexible. That development did not reflect any real change of attitude and was simply due to the market situation.

17. To state the position more precisely, the analyses made by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13, annexes II.A and II.B) showed that the international market was clearly a "buyer's market" with ample possibilities for diversification in supplies. Although no major changes had been recorded in the export policies of the suppliers, including restrictions on the export of "sensitive technologies" and constraints with discriminatory elements, a distinct flexibility was apparent in the application of constraints, especially with regard to the so-called "prior consent rights".

18. He had in mind the supply of nuclear plants and equipment, uranium, initial and back-end fuel cycle services, complete fuel supply and technological and operational support. In all those spheres of the peaceful nuclear industry, there had been fewer cases of restriction and since 1980 there had been no cases of interruption of supplies to buyer countries bound by safeguard agreements. Those developments had been the result of adverse economic conditions in many countries which had been obliged to reduce their productive capacity in the past decade. Suppliers had thus been able to leave part of their productive capacity idle. Another factor was the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear plants, equipment and materials.

19. It was in that area that the contradictions between non-proliferation and nuclear development for peaceful purposes became evident. In view of the dynamics of nuclear research and nuclear industries in threshold countries which were not States Parties to the Treaty but had mostly established safeguards agreements with the IAEA, there were countries which felt

restricted and discriminated against in regard to access to equipment, materials and technology which might obviously serve a dual purpose - for peaceful or warlike purposes. Consequently, in discussions in such forums as the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, three threshold developing countries had assumed a leadership role in discussing with the industrialized countries their over-emphasis on a close tie between non-proliferation commitments and the right to unrestricted access to technologies. Mexico, as a State Party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was on a number of occasions the object of discrimination because it was subjected to restrictions on access to advanced nuclear technology, yet observed that, as a result of economic interests, private enterprises of developed countries whose Governments had declared that they were against the proliferation of sensitive technology none the less enabled strategic supplies to reach countries which were not subject to international safeguards of any type. Such contradictions and inequitable treatment would come to an end only when the NPT moved towards a total ban on nuclear-weapon testing and towards general disarmament.

20. Various developments indicated that there had been significant changes in the world energy market. Among them was the need of several developing countries to step up their electrification programmes based on fossil fuels, which would certainly affect the world environment through the increase in carbon dioxide and other similar gases and would have repercussions on the public concept of the risks and advantages of using nuclear energy to obtain electricity. The emergence of new technologies to reduce the costs of nuclear energy would also bring about changes in energy policies. Again, progress in the application of nuclear resources for purposes other than electricity and in international co-operation on nuclear security and radiological protection was helping to renew world interest and demand for nuclear technology and equipment for multiple peaceful uses.

21. In short, the Committee must bear in mind that, in the light of current circumstances, restrictive and discriminatory policies on the part of suppliers would tend to be revived in regard to the provision of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For that reason, efforts such as those undertaken by the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which had assumed less importance as a result of the availability of uranium and other material, should be resumed.

22. After having surmounted many problems, Mexico was, with the commencement of commercial operations at its nuclear power station at Laguna Verde, becoming a member of the group of States which were producing energy from nuclear sources. As a country committed to non-proliferation and in particular to the NPT, it had confirmed its decision to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards.

23. For developing countries such as Mexico, there was an urgent need for the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology without discrimination to be intensified in order to support national economic and social development efforts. The NPT, which offered an ideal framework in which to achieve that

objective, had not been entirely able to fulfil its mission as a result of the lack of political will on the part of some suppliers to commit themselves to broad international co-operation programmes. Lack of external financing severely restricted the opportunities for many developing countries to continue with their nuclear energy projects.

24. The present Conference was the immediate predecessor of the 1995 Conference, at which a decision would have to be taken on the future of the Treaty. It was therefore all the more urgent for States Parties to fulfil their obligations. Total nuclear disarmament was the best means of ensuring non-proliferation and of guaranteeing that nuclear energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes. Fulfilment of the commitments emerging from the present Conference would provide a basis for strengthening the Treaty and effectively extending it into the coming century.

25. Mrs. EL TALLAWI (Egypt) said that her country attached considerable importance to the objective and purpose of article IV of the NPT; the peaceful use of nuclear technology was one of the main pillars of the Treaty and she therefore hoped that the final document would include practical and comprehensive recommendations on that aspect.

26. Referring to several matters already raised by her delegation at the previous Review Conference, she drew attention to the desirability of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of according preferential treatment to States Parties in facilitating the exchange of information, the technical capacity and the financial ability to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. Another aspect to be borne in mind was that the financial resources currently available to the IAEA in general and to its promotion and technical co-operation activities in particular were not commensurate with its obligations arising out of the terms of the NPT. Such resources should therefore be significantly increased and, in that respect, her delegation's proposal in 1985 to set up a fund for that purpose should be reconsidered in the light of the current situation, in which nuclear technology had become essential in order to resolve many developmental problems and had proved its usefulness in agriculture, medicine, water desalination and measures to combat desertification. Indeed, the state of development of the developing countries meant that such advanced technology was essential in overcoming the crucial developmental problems that could not be solved by traditional means.

27. Another aspect raised in 1985 had been that of financing the nuclear power programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. The matter should be pursued further and the Conference should find ways and means to overcome financing difficulties. At the same time, transparency with regard to the use of the results of scientific meetings of the IAEA should be promoted in order to make it possible for all concerned to use the latest developments in the field of nuclear technology, to collect information and set it out in a clear fashion so that decision-makers would become increasingly aware of the latest advances.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.1

28. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty having embarked upon peaceful nuclear programmes should have assurances that their programmes would not be endangered. Assurances should cover the danger of attack or threat of attack on safeguarded nuclear facilities; States Parties should, on request, provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties subjected to such an attack and States Parties should refrain from providing any sort of nuclear co-operation or assistance to any State which made an attack of that kind.

29. The IAEA had been successful in tackling the issue of the dumping of nuclear waste by means of guidelines which had been agreed by consensus and it was to be hoped that further progress would be made in that area. As to the CAS, her country had strongly supported its work and believed that it should not be terminated, even if there had been a change in the market, as it was still important to monitor the situation. She joined the representative of Mexico and other speakers who had spoken in favour of reactivating the work of that Committee. Lastly, on full-scope safeguards her delegation fully supported the proposal submitted by Australia.

30. Mr. WISBER LOEIS (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States, introduced the draft resolution, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in relation with the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The draft resolution contained elements which reflected the position of the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests in international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In presenting the draft resolution the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties were sincerely committed to pursuing the objectives of the Treaty as stipulated in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. Recognition of all elements contained in the draft resolution would provide a strong impetus for effective implementation of the Treaty by, inter alia: eliminating the discriminatory practices exerted by some States Parties in providing assistance in the nuclear field to developing countries which were States Parties; terminating the supply of sensitive nuclear technology in contradiction with the spirit of article IV in relation to article I of the Treaty; further striving for the establishment of principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and reaffirming the role and activities of the IAEA in its promotional as well as regulatory endeavours.

31. In that respect, he drew attention to the terms of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The draft resolution brought into sharp focus matters for consideration during the present Conference. Adopting it would reaffirm the validity of article IV and thus strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the most widely acceptable non-proliferation régime.

32. Mr. ENDO (Japan) said that, in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and maintain and enhance its universality, it was essential to make adherence to it even more attractive by adopting specific measures. Two important areas should be considered in that respect: further promotion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses, and reinforcement of export controls for nuclear-related materials.

33. In regard to the first area, the fact that there were over 140 States Parties to the Treaty indicated that it was one of the most widely accepted agreements. States had adhered to the Treaty in such large numbers not only because they were convinced that the NPT régime was indispensable in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also because the régime was functioning well as a basic framework for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan was keenly conscious of that fact and, as one of the most advanced countries in that area, was determined to continue to extend co-operation within that framework, as it had done over the previous five years.

34. International co-operation with the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy took a variety of forms. Japan, for its part, placed emphasis on multilateral Government-to-Government co-operation through the IAEA as well as on bilateral co-operation, and had greatly increased its financial contributions. Japan's contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in the fiscal year 1990 amounted to over $5 million, or a little over 11 per cent of the Fund as a whole. That figure represented an increase by almost 200 per cent over the 1985 contribution. Resources allocated for technical assistance by the IAEA were, of course, modest, but compared with the IAEA budget's zero growth in other areas the increase was a substantial one.

35. Utilizing its advance nuclear technology, Japan had played a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of co-operation programmes of the Regional Co-operative Agreement, a form of co-operation which it greatly appreciated. Japan welcomed the recent establishment of a similar agreement for Africa and would demonstrate its great interest in the new scheme by attending the inaugural meeting to take place in Cairo on 4 September 1990. Japan would continue to contribute as much as possible towards the expansion and strengthening of multilateral co-operation through the IAEA.

36. As to the issue of preferential treatment raised by some participants in the Conference, his country shared, in principle, the view that some preferential treatment to States Parties would help to strengthen the NPT régime. On the other hand, he doubted whether preferential treatment would be compatible with the principle of equality among member States of international organizations, such as the IAEA. In his view, a policy of preferential treatment would hardly be applicable in the case of the IAEA, either from the legal or from the practical point of view. The Agency's Statute required that all member States, including those not parties to the NPT, should be treated on an equal footing; even if that stipulation did not exist, to expect States members of the IAEA that were not parties to the NPT to participate in a consensus decision to adopt a policy which would operate to their detriment would be far from realistic. Speaking as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA, he did not think that the suggestion was practicable.

37. With regard to Japan's policy on exports of nuclear-related materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States, it took strict measures to ensure that its co-operation in matters involving non-proliferation considerations was

limited exclusively to those countries which had acceded to the NPT and had accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. It wished that other exporting countries would take similarly strict measures. Furthermore, it saw a need for supplementary regulations to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and further strengthen the existing NPT regime. Such measures should not be intended to hamper exchanges in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; rather, they should facilitate international co-operation by further increasing mutual confidence among partners and motivate non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Lastly, with reference to the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), the IAEA Board of Governors had just received that Committee's report, which would be forwarded to the Agency's General Conference to be held in September 1990.

38. Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) drew attention to the working paper his delegation, together with others, had submitted on article III (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1). He also welcomed the paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1), which contained many useful ideas and would doubtless stimulate substantive discussion in the Committee. In preparing for the present Conference, his delegation had taken as its starting point the final document of the previous Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I), which had contained a significant and balanced review of technical co-operation developments in the five-year period preceding 1985, along with recommendations for the future. Those recommendations had, by and large, been heeded. Levels of multilateral nuclear co-operation had generally risen, in some areas quite significantly. IAEA's funding mechanisms were clearly working to the advantage of developing countries. Bilateral and regional nuclear co-operation among States Parties had continued to expand, with few indications of any new or significant problems. The link between supply and non-proliferation conditions continued to be examined within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). Although no concrete results had been achieved on principles, a new spirit of common endeavour appeared to be emerging. Recent discussions within CAS showed that the supply/demand situation had in some respects improved, and that supply problems between Parties had generally been resolved rapidly and satisfactorily. While it was not convinced of the need for a resumption of formal CAS meetings, his delegation none the less agreed that the important changes taking place in the policies of both older and new suppliers might make a renewal of discussions on principles desirable.

39. As to some of the detailed proposals of the Third Review Conference relating to the Agency's technical assistance activities, indicative planning figures had been set to ensure continued adequate funding for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. New regional co-operation agreements had been established for Latin America and Africa, and the regional agreement for Asia and the Pacific had continued to expand its range of activities and to provide a valuable service to Parties in that region. A paper on activities under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific would be submitted to the present Conference. Another recommendation of the Third Review Conference had been given effect in that multi-year, multi-donor projects were now a reality.

40. The Agency's evaluation capacity had developed, although more resources were needed to ensure that technical assistance funds were used as effectively as possible. The IAEA had examined the scope for facilitating funding of nuclear power projects, and was taking account of the study's findings in developing its own programmes. Regional seminars were being conducted with a view to developing understanding of the needs both of national energy authorities and of financial institutions. Lastly, greater attention had been given to addressing the needs of the least developed countries, and his delegation would continue to work towards further enhancing that effort.

41. The Agency's background paper on article IV (NPT/CONF.IV/13) gave a balanced and helpful account of IAEA's technical assistance activities since the Third Review Conference. The improved flow of funds and the continuing strength of the commitment of NPT Parties to giving preferential treatment to other States Parties were best demonstrated in the record of footnote a/ projects. The IAEA continued to be the most important multilateral institution within the scope of article IV of the Treaty. Its activities in that field had shown that it was sensitive to the interests of all the member States, the overwhelming majority of which were Parties to the NPT. That point should be clearly reflected in the final document.

42. There were, of course, other avenues of technical co-operation, both multilateral and bilateral. In the multilateral field, an important role was being played by such United Nations bodies as UNDP, FAO and WHO, as well as by non-governmental bodies, institutes and industry groups which helped to create a stable environment for nuclear co-operation. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) was an important recent example. However, bilateral nuclear co-operation probably remained the single most important ingredient in world-wide nuclear co-operation activities. There had been a slump in demand for nuclear reactors, but the volume of co-operation worldwide and the range of power and non-power applications continued to expand. Australia had continued to play a full part in nuclear co-operation. It had maintained its contributions to TACF and was a major contributor to the Asia-Pacific RCA. It had bilateral nuclear co-operation programmes with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It continued to be a major supplier of uranium for nuclear power generation, having exported 20,000 tons since the previous Review Conference under bilateral safeguards arrangements covering 20 States Parties to the Treaty. The agreements in question, which complemented IAEA safeguards and NPT objectives, had operated smoothly to the full satisfaction of all concerned. Australia also had bilateral arrangements covering other forms of nuclear technology, including the technology of disposal of high-level fuel-cycle waste products.

43. In its bilateral co-operation, his country adhered to a policy of strict preference for NPT Parties and also took carefully into account its obligations under articles II and III of the Treaty. Like those of other States Parties, Australia's activities were conditioned first and foremost by the existence of adequate safeguards against the diversion of transferred items for use in nuclear weapons or explosives. That issue would be examined fully in Main Committee II. Australia's international nuclear dealings also relied heavily on multilateral efforts to respond to the interrelated concerns

of safety and environment. He welcomed the substantial international effort to alleviate the effects of the Chernobyl accident and eliminate the possibility of any recurrence, and also the IAEA's response to the Brundtland report. Similarly, he supported the continued focus of IAEA programmes directly aimed at ensuring that the nuclear power industry should remain as environmentally sound as possible and at developing nuclear techniques for use in addressing environmental problems. Equally gratifying was the Agency's consideration of a code of practice for the transboundary movement of nuclear materials and waste and its contribution to the development of safety and other guidelines and to the consideration of nuclear liability issues, matters which were central to the nuclear industry and to the exchange of technology.

44. Mr. RASHID (Bangladesh) said that many of the elements crucial to the implementation of article IV had already been mentioned by the representative of Egypt, as well as by the representative of Indonesia in presenting the draft resolution of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1). His delegation fully supported the draft resolution and hoped that it would be favourably received by the Committee.

45. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference had stressed the need for technology transfer and promotional co-operation between States Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Transfer of technology in that field could contribute to the elimination of existing technical and economic gaps between developed and developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear applications were not reaching the developing countries among the Parties to the NPT. There was a growing feeling that some incentives should be accorded to the NPT developing countries so as to make the Treaty more attractive to other developing countries that were not parties to it. The non-proliferation régime could be strengthened only through universalization of the Treaty, and it was therefore essential to secure more accessions by granting preferential treatment to developing States Parties. The development aspect of the Treaty should be realized to the fullest extent and expenditures on technical co-operation should be comparable to the level of expenditures on safeguards activities. Clearly, the developed countries must do their utmost to enable the NPT developing countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

46. In the view of his delegation, article IV should encompass co-operation in all energy areas, and not just in the field of nuclear energy. In order to run a nuclear power facility, a country needed a sizeable electrical grid, experience in handling complex energy systems and back-up electricity sources in the event of unforeseen circumstances forcing a shut-down. Many developing countries, in particular the least developed, were unable to meet their electricity needs, and it was therefore essential to give broad assistance to the NPT developing countries in improving their energy systems so that they could reap the full benefits of nuclear energy. In that context, his delegation intended to submit a proposal for incorporation in the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1.

47. Mr. IONESCU (Romania) said that his country had adopted a programme to promote the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity and for

non-energy purposes. It had concluded bilateral agreements on the transfer of equipment, materials and technology, was implementing safeguards and had taken measures to prevent proliferation.

48. Romania received technical assistance from the IAEA, which was to be congratulated on its efforts during the period under review, and had benefited from international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, within the framework of the NPT. An Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) had been sent to evaluate a nuclear plant under construction; a Waste Management Advisory Programme (WAMAP) mission had examined radioactive waste disposal; and a Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) had looked into questions relating to radiation protection. In June 1990, agreements had been reached with the Agency on the transfer of low-enriched fuels for a safeguarded research reactor in Romania.

49. In view of the positive developments in international relations, actual prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the major objective supported by most States, should be achieved by means of co-operation between partners engaged in a joint endeavour. It was necessary to work towards enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, expanding international co-operation in that area and improving the safety of nuclear power plants in operation or under construction. All States Parties to the Treaty must have better access to safeguarded nuclear energy and technology transfer. Greater support must be given to the Agency's technical assistance missions, and the use of nuclear techniques must be stepped up in industry, agriculture, medicine and other sectors. The nuclear materials recovered in the disarmament process must be recycled for peaceful uses in non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the Conference must consider ways of protecting nuclear facilities from attack and ensure that its conclusions on that question were reflected in the final document.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.2
18 September 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (continued):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Articles IV and III (3), preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II

(2) Article V

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NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.2

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (*continued*)

1. Mr. ALER (Sweden) observed that his delegation, with others, had submitted proposals for the form of language on articles IV and V to be used in the final document. It had also studied with interest the proposals contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, prepared by the Group of Non-Aligned States.

2. Following the tragedy of Chernobyl, there had been a great effort to intensify international co-operation on nuclear safety and radiological protection, primarily under the auspices of the IAEA. The IAEA General Conference would shortly be discussing a very comprehensive report by the Board of Governors and the Director General, outlining a programme of action for the 1990s on the whole subject of the safety of nuclear installations, radiological protection and waste management. A special high-level conference would be held in 1991 to cover the entire field of safety, on which occasion his delegation hoped that it would be possible to reach agreement on a set of fundamental safety principles, possibly of a mandatory nature, for the guidance of national authorities. Sweden did not believe that the IAEA should assume the role of an international safety inspector, as had been suggested in the general debate, for the ultimate responsibility must lie with national safety authorities and with Governments. The IAEA could, however, increase its assistance through the mechanism to send international expert missions to countries that so required, and technically developed countries should be urged to make experts available for such tasks. Nuclear safety remained an international concern and, in that context, he hoped that the proposals to be made by Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden, on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations, for the draft final document, would meet with general approval.

3. In the period under review, the IAEA had strengthened its role as the main instrument for international co-operation in peaceful nuclear applications. While the IAEA report (NPT/CONF.IV/13) gave a detailed account of activities and resources during the period, it did not give the whole picture and followed the practice of earlier Review Conferences of listing, *inter alia*, contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and extra-budgetary contributions for technical assistance. However, considerable extra-budgetary resources were also given in support of co-operative research programmes and other activities. In addition to the amounts listed in the Agency report, Sweden, for example, had contributed some $3 million over the previous five years, primarily for agriculture and environmental protection. He therefore proposed that the Agency be asked to review its practice when reporting to the next Review Conference, so as to provide a more comprehensive picture.

4. Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, although Canada was a medium-sized industrial power, it had developed an important nuclear industry based on a unique reactor type known as CANDU and on extensive expertise related to

peaceful nuclear disciplines. With 19 reactors in operation, nuclear power accounted for some 18 per cent of Canada's electricity production. In March 1990, the Government had announced a number of measures to strengthen the nuclear industry because it believed that it was important for economic, environmental and energy-related reasons. At the same time, Canada remained the world's largest exporter of uranium, exporting nearly 10,000 tons a year since 1985 to a wide variety of countries. As an important nuclear supplier for peaceful purposes, Canada believed that the NPT was an absolutely essential framework to ensure that international nuclear commerce would not contribute to proliferation. Without the NPT-based system, there would be much less peaceful nuclear exchange than was the case at present.

5. Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty created special responsibilities for countries such as Canada to facilitate exchanges of nuclear technology within an appropriate non-proliferation framework. There had been a number of developments in peaceful nuclear energy since the previous Review Conference and his delegation wished to consider them in connection with the implementation of article IV. Document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1 covered a number of successes and further challenges pertaining to the implementation of article IV and, taken in connection with document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, should provide an excellent basis for the Committee to formulate language for the final document. A balanced assessment of article IV must consider the responsibility of States parties to the NPT to facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation, together with factors - political, economic and technical - which might constrain such co-operation and, above all, the overriding need to ensure a secure non-proliferation framework.

6. The NPT framework facilitated the development of bilateral nuclear co-operation between States Parties in mutually agreeable circumstances, but it did not obligate every NPT supplier State to enter into bilateral nuclear co-operation with every other NPT State Party. Bilateral nuclear co-operation remained a sovereign decision and might not reasonably be possible in certain situations. Second, the bilateral co-operation agreements required by Canada and other supplier States and the adherence by supplier States to arrangements such as the London Supplier Guidelines responded to legitimate non-proliferation concerns. While they were based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such bilateral and multilateral arrangements could legitimately contain additional requirements covering, for example, a situation where the IAEA could not apply safeguards. Export controls, bilateral requirements and multilateral arrangements by nuclear supplier States responded to the demands of their public to ensure that their nuclear items were not diverted for explosive devices. They represented a complement to the NPT and made nuclear co-operation easier. Third, as recent studies by the CAS had demonstrated, the international nuclear power market since 1985 had generally been characterized by an absence of demand rather than problems relating to security of supply. The safety, technical and financial demands of nuclear power accounted largely for such a situation, particularly in developing countries. Because of that, as well as the emergence of new suppliers, his delegation did not attach particularly high priority to a rapid conclusion to CAS work on principles of security of supply unless equal commitments to

non-proliferation could be assured within that context. Similarly, it believed that commercial nuclear contracts could be and had been generally respected.

7. Fourth, notwithstanding the current depressed demand situation for nuclear power in most parts of the world, his delegation believed that the advantages of nuclear power as a cost-effective and environmentally advantageous source of electricity would ultimately result in an increase in demand in both developed and developing countries, particularly if nuclear safety and waste management concerns could be resolved. Canada believed that the IAEA had fully considered the potential contribution of nuclear power to sustainable development and that the Review Conference should recognize those recent developments in the role of nuclear power. Fifth, the importance of nuclear safety should be recognized, particularly since the tragic Chernobyl accident, as should increased international co-operation in the areas related to nuclear safety. In that respect, the IAEA had done exemplary work in developing conventions on early warnings and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident with transboundary consequences, in establishing guidelines for the siting, design and construction of nuclear facilities, and in international transactions in nuclear waste, radiological protection and waste management programmes and assessment of nuclear plants. Canadian resources and officials had participated extensively in such IAEA programmes, thus representing fulfilment of the article IV ideal. Moreover, the IAEA's technical co-operation programme was the pre-eminent multilateral framework for the realization of article IV. The fact that the vast majority of its funds came from and were allocated to NPT States Parties represented a major contribution to the observance of article IV. Besides its IAEA budget contribution, Canada contributed about $US 1 million a year to the rapidly growing voluntary fund, which was supplemented by multi-donor projects and successful regional arrangements in Latin America and Africa.

8. While the Conference should strongly support such progress in making nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear application available to developing countries through the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, it should be cautious in calling for massive increases in the Fund, much less creating new funds at a time of financial restraint in international organizations. As a supplier State, Canada was aware of the technical and financial constraints facing developing countries in trying to develop nuclear power programmes. There was no easy way to overcome such difficulties, but the IAEA had made good progress in studying the problem and making recommendations. None the less, more remained to be done by international financial organizations and the nuclear industry itself. Canada stood ready to participate in discussions on how to overcome the financial constraints in promoting nuclear power in developing countries.

9. The 1985 Review Conference had also requested that States Parties should recount in written form their experiences in bilateral co-operation measures to further the implementation of article IV. Canada had prepared a paper pointing out that, because it made NPT adherence and NPT-type safeguards a prerequisite for full nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States, it clearly gave preference to NPT parties. It had full nuclear co-operation

with 28 States, many of which were developing countries, and CANDU reactors were in operation in the Republic of Korea, under construction in Romania and under consideration in a variety of NPT countries, including Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and Hungary. Canada was prepared to provide limited assistance for the safe and efficient operation of Canadian-supplied CANDU reactors in Argentina, India and Pakistan but, true to its commitment to the NPT, would not consider the resumption of full nuclear co-operation with those countries until they accepted the NPT and full-scope safeguards. Canadian uranium exports to the United States of America, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Europe required the same non-proliferation framework as did exports of reactors and other trigger-list items: NPT adherence and a full bilateral nuclear co-operation relationship. Full Canadian nuclear co-operation was characterized by extensive technology transfer, a particularly good example being Canada's relationship with the Republic of Korea. The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board also offered advice and training to nuclear regulatory bodies, and Canadian universities and research institutes had received foreign nuclear experts studying nuclear technology. His country was also a major supplier of nuclear equipment and material for health, cancer therapy, agriculture, food irradiation and industry. It supplied about 65 per cent of all bulk isotopes made available in the world and lent some financial assistance for nuclear exports, particularly to developing countries.

10. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America), commenting on his delegation's overall assessment of the role of the NPT in facilitating peaceful nuclear co-operation, said that, in his message to the Conference, President Bush had noted that the Treaty's "contributions to the development of nuclear power have helped to improve the quality of life around the globe" and that the Treaty "remains a hallmark in our long quest for peace and for peaceful nuclear co-operation among nations". In that connection he also referred to the statement of the head of his delegation in the general debate.

11. He believed that the report of Committee III should begin with a strong endorsement of the Treaty as the best foundation for continued nuclear co-operation among nations and a positive assessment of the record under the NPT over the past five years. The issue was not one of whether co-operative nuclear activities had reached the levels desired by all; in a world of competing demands for resources and at a time when all nations were experiencing economic difficulties, that was not a reasonable standard for judgement. Rather, it should be asked what the picture of nuclear co-operation would look like without the framework provided by the Treaty. In his opinion, it would be far different and less positive; without the clear and binding assurances against misuse contained in the Treaty, there would be a great reluctance to transfer materials, equipment and technology which could help a country move in the direction of nuclear weapons.

12. As to activities by the United States, he drew attention to document NPT/CONF.IV/20 and to the section entitled "Fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". For those nations which might hear arguments that the flow of nuclear co-operation had somehow diminished over the past five years, he would refer them to pages 8 to 16 of that document.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.2

13. One matter sometimes neglected in discussion of international nuclear co-operation under article IV was the important role played by private industry in the transfer of technology in such an important area, a point mentioned in paragraph 6 of document NPT/CONF.IV/4. While it was at times easy to forget that article IV spoke not of "assistance" but of the commitment of parties to "exchange" and to "co-operate", his Government believed that the report of the Conference should find a place where the important role of private industry could be recognized. In that respect, he commended the statement on the Treaty circulated by the Uranium Institute as a valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

14. The work of the Conference should also include a balanced and objective look at the most important events having affected international nuclear co-operation under the Treaty, the most significant of which had been the tragic reactor accident at Chernobyl, an incident fundamentally affecting both government and public attitudes towards nuclear energy. Its lessons should be reflected in the Conference's final document. Prior to April 1986, the nuclear power debate had been diffuse, focusing sometimes on waste management issues, sometimes on proliferation risks and sometimes on costs. Since then, it had become focused on and dominated by the consideration of nuclear safety. None the less, terrible as the consequences had been in human terms and much as they had had an adverse effect on the plans of many nations for exploiting nuclear energy for development, the event had had some positive consequences in nuclear co-operation, including the negotiation in a remarkably short time of two important multilateral conventions - on assistance in nuclear or radiological emergencies and an early notification of nuclear accidents. Also, at the Special Session of the IAEA General Conference in September 1986, important consensus conclusions had been reached concerning the uses of nuclear energy. The final document of that Special Session addressed such fundamental issues as the role of nuclear energy, the responsibility of States in using it, international co-operation and, the role of the IAEA. The report of the Review Conference should take positive note of the response to Chernobyl, including the assessment of the causes of the accident conducted under the auspices of the IAEA and the continuing co-operative efforts, both inside and outside the IAEA, to address the fundamental problem of nuclear safety. Some mention should also be made of the efforts under way to develop smaller and more passively safe reactors which would help meet the needs of developing nations without problems caused by earlier generations of technology.

15. Another event which should find a place in the Committee's report was the 1987 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE). The Conference had been over 10 years in the making and had been held only one year after the Chernobyl accident; there could be no doubt that it represented an important bench-mark in multilateral nuclear co-operation outside the usual framework of the IAEA. However, care should be taken to provide an accurate and balanced assessment of UNCPICPUNE, rather than focus on only one of its dimensions. It had been a remarkably successful example of the kind of nuclear technology exchange envisaged by article IV of the NPT. In its Committee II, over 103 technical papers had been presented, under seven

categories, on the broadest range of nuclear subjects. An accurate assessment of that Conference was reflected in paragraph 29 of document NPT/CONF.IV/4. In line with that assessment, his delegation would hope to see those practical and positive results recorded in any statement the Committee would wish to make on UNCPICPUNE.

16. Another aspect of the UNCPICPUNE had been the effort in Committee I to reach agreement on a number of universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on ways and means for promoting such co-operation in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations regarding non-proliferation. That subject was also related to the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). His Government had actively participated for many years in the effort to define a range of universal principles and, while it was disappointed that the effort had not met with success, its assessment of the reasons and the relevant conclusions with regard to future efforts differed from the perspectives of some other delegations.

17. First, he strongly believed that the NPT and the work of past Review Conferences represented a rather coherent and satisfactory set of principles of nuclear co-operation which could be universally approved as a basis for exchanges between nations in that field. Second, the primary reason for the frustrated efforts in other forums to define universally acceptable principles rested primarily on the fact that a small number of Governments did not agree that the NPT and its central concept of full-scope safeguards represented an acceptable condition for the conduct of international nuclear co-operation. His Government did not therefore see an overwhelming need to look beyond the framework established by the NPT and its related instruments and practices to try and establish a new set of so-called "universal principles". The United States Government had repeatedly affirmed its support for the CAS process and considered that recent CAS efforts had made a positive contribution to an understanding of nuclear supply issues during the present period. However, it had doubts about the wisdom of resuming consideration of universal principles within the context of CAS until two clear factors were present: firstly, a genuine need for such principles to provide for meaningful international co-operation and, secondly, some reasonable prospect that there could be consensus agreement on such principles to be presented to the IAEA Board of Governers. His Government would be particularly reluctant to embark on a divisive and controversial debate which would polarize the nuclear community at a time when a unified and positive approach was badly needed for the nuclear option to continue. Consequently, on the issue of principles of supply, his delegation would wish to see a final document that recorded past efforts to achieve agreement and did not attempt to cast blame for the results of the process to date. It would further wish to leave the question of pursuing universal principles in CAS to the chairman of that Committee in consultation with its members.

18. The Review Conference should be placed on record as favouring the adoption of full-scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supply by all parties to the Treaty, as well as other suppliers. His delegation saw the relation between articles III and IV in that context as very important in

providing a sound basis for international nuclear commerce. Those who had drafted the Treaty had wisely understood that a nation's acceptance of safeguards covering its entire nuclear programme established a clear presumption that it was devoted only to acceptable, peaceful purposes. Those nations which had accepted such safeguards should be reinforced in that commitment by the knowledge that such a step conferred concrete and specific benefits in "the terms of nuclear trade". As a matter of both law and policy, the United States had long implemented the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear commerce and took very positive note of the recent decisions by Japan and Germany to pursue a similar policy. It therefore strongly supported the inclusion of such a recommendation in the report of the Committee and in the final document of the Conference.

19. As to the effort to promote nuclear development, with emphasis on the financing of nuclear power or research reactor projects, he believed that it would be appropriate for the Conference to commend the valuable contribution made by the IAEA expert Working Group, comprising representatives of nuclear energy agencies in a number of developing countries, of export credit agencies in several developed nations and of the World Bank, UNIDO and the IAEA, and which had published in 1987 a document on the promotion and financing of nuclear power programmes in developing countries. The report was balanced and its recommendations deserved to be given the closest attention by individual nations, international lending agencies, commercial credit institutions and the IAEA. Its balance stemmed from the fact that it recognized the multifaceted nature of the task of promoting nuclear reactor development and did not place undue emphasis on any of the many problems in the field or hold out false hopes that a single solution could unlock the door to major resources for nuclear development. It identified such key elements as public acceptance, project preparation, adequate planning, industrial and technical infrastructure and a regulatory framework in addition to financing, as being important. Future efforts, particularly those in the IAEA, should continue to emphasize all elements in the task of mounting a successful nuclear programme.

20. The financing of nuclear power projects involving foreign-supplied technology was normally provided through export credit agencies supported by Governments of supplier States. In the United States, it was provided by the Export-Import Bank. While the size of export credit agency loans, their terms and conditions varied considerably with the nature of the equipment and services being provided, such an export credit approach was not totally unregulated. Since August 1984, the credit agencies of most nuclear suppliers had based their lending decisions on the so-called OECD consensus or Sector Understanding on Nuclear Power Plants. His country believed that that consensus introduced desirable consistency into an extremely complex credit process. At the same time, his Government would not favour proposals to extend significant subsidies to nuclear projects through concessional credits. Such a course would distort economic decision-making on electric power generating projects and conceivably increase already high debt burdens for nations experiencing economic difficulties. Multilateral credit institutions, including the World Bank, should evaluate nuclear power as one option when assessing a borrowing country's electric power programme. He

supported the present approach of multilateral banks of selecting the type of power plant for a loan on the basis of least cost, with appropriate consideration of environmental and other factors, and believed that adequate financing could be made available for nuclear power projects through existing institutions and lending arrangements in those cases where the elements identified in the 1987 IAEA expert study had been clearly established.

21. As far as the structure and content of the Committee's report were concerned, the rather brief period of time available for review meant that it was difficult to produce an extensive final document touching on all the issues many delegations might have wished to cover. Other multilateral nuclear meetings had wisely decided that the primary institution for international nuclear co-operation - the IAEA - was the right place to keep the central focus of efforts in that area. He therefore envisaged a rather short report, similar to the 1985 report in length, touching on the most important issues arising from article IV. The 1985 Final Document also provided a useful model with regard to structure, although if a more logical ordering of topical sections could be worked out, he would have no difficulty in supporting a different arrangement. Lastly, his delegation would be submitting texts of several short paragraphs on issues raised in his statement, as a contribution to drafting the Committee's report.

22. Mr. NEFEDOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the current abundance of materials, equipment and services was conducive to enhancing widespread use of nuclear energy. International co-operation was progressing and in recent years, the Agency's technical assistance budget had grown. In the view of his delegation, it was essential for States Parties that could make materials, equipment and services available to increase their voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and to technical assistance projects in the developing States Parties.

23. The Soviet Union remained faithful to the principles of providing international co-operation on an equal footing and of granting assistance to developing countries and regions in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Since the Third Review Conference, the USSR had greatly increased such co-operation, focusing primarily on questions related to the safe development, increased efficiency and reliability of nuclear energy, as well as environmental protection and a reduction in the use of fossil fuels. It was providing assistance to a number of Eastern European countries to allow them to manufacture equipment for a variety of reactor types and, more recently, to build their own nuclear reactors. Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic were also co-operating in the Soviet Union on the construction of the Khmelnitskiy nuclear power facility, which would then deliver electricity to those countries over the next 20 years in proportion to their contribution to the construction project.

24. Following the Chernobyl accident, increasing emphasis had been placed in the USSR and throughout the world on improving reactor safety. That was the goal of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), of which the Soviet Union was one of the founders, the constituent conference having been

held in May 1989 in Moscow. WANO was currently examining questions relating to the modernization of the first generation of reactors in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

25. The Soviet Union had proposed that a scientific research project be undertaken on alleviating the biological impact of the radiological emergency brought about by the Chernobyl accident. Some 26 States had expressed their interest, and his Government was completing the preparations in association with the IAEA.

26. His delegation stressed the importance of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. The Soviet Union had regularly increased its voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, usually exceeding the recommended amounts, 3.5 million roubles having been allocated in 1989, compared with 2.6 million roubles in 1985. It also made funds available to the Agency for technical assistance in developing States Parties to the Treaty. For the period 1991-1994, 2 million roubles would be earmarked for that purpose. His country was currently implementing 19 major contracts with the IAEA to supply equipment and materials valued at more than 6 million roubles. Preparations were under way to sign another 20 major contracts with the Agency for a total of 10 million roubles. Bangladesh, Mexico, Egypt, Portugal, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland and other countries had received or were receiving supplies. The Soviet Union was also conducting various study courses and on-site training programmes through the IAEA.

27. His Government continued to favour granting non-weapon-States Parties preferential treatment for the supply of equipment, materials and information in the nuclear field and in accordance with its obligations under the Treaty, the Soviet Union provided supplies to such non-nuclear-weapon States on the condition that they agreed to apply Agency safeguards. The USSR had never refused to grant technical or commercial assistance or to supply nuclear materials or equipment to States Parties for political reasons. Obviously, it would continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world and to meet its contractual and legal obligations in that regard. Lastly, his delegation hoped that some of its proposals would be reflected in the Committee's final document.

28. Mr. VERBEEK (Netherlands), commenting on the draft resolution submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1) said that the information made available on bilateral nuclear co-operation by a number of participants in the Review Conference showed how unjustified it was to express, in the second preambular paragraph of that doucment, "dissatisfaction" with the implementation of article IV and related provisions of the Treaty. There was ample proof that, over the past five years, international co-operation had continued to increase, particularly in the areas of non-energy-related nuclear applications and of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The record had also revealed an increase in international co-operation in nuclear power production. The reason for the small number of new nuclear power projects in developing countries lay in the reassessment of national nuclear policies after the Chernobyl accident, the

availability and economic attractiveness of other energy sources and the scarcity of resources in many developing countries for financing nuclear power projects, rather than any unwillingness on the part of supplier States.

29. The analysis of the relationship between supplier and recipient States, as contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, struck his delegation as somewhat outdated, in particular the motives ascribed to supplier States, such as the reference in operative paragraph 7 to non-proliferation "as a pretext" and in the sixth preambular paragraph to "discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States party to the Treaty", as well as the claim in the ninth preambular paragraph that certain measures were "in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty". Those and similar obsolete phrases had been coined some 20 years previously, and it was surprising to see them re-emerge.

30. Supplier-recipient relations had been discussed at great length in the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and during the UNCPICPUNE and its preparatory process. Although no final agreement had been reached on a list of peaceful nuclear co-operation principles, it should be acknowledged that the CAS had come very close to agreeing on one. The time might, indeed, have come, as suggested in operative paragraph 13, to resume formal discussions in the CAS. The setting up of a consultative mechanism among States Parties to examine supply problems, as suggested in operative paragraph 6, would then be superfluous.

31. His delegation questioned the reasoning in operative paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c). For example, subparagraph (a) appeared to reject all preconditions for access to nuclear material and equipment, yet subparagraph (b) deemed it useful for the IAEA Board of Governors to reach agreement on conditions for non-proliferation requirements. Again, subparagraph (c) made the sympathetic suggestion that preferential treatment should be given to the developing countries. The notion of a free transfer of nuclear technology was somewhat theoretical. In reality, nuclear co-operation could take place only on the basis of an agreement between recipient and supplier on non-proliferation objectives and a clear understanding and full implementation of the measures arrived at. Over the past decade, a wide range of such agreements had been developed in the CAS among suppliers and recipients, in particular among States Parties to the NPT. Those measures went beyond the application of IAEA safeguards; they also pertained to physical protection measures, specific measures concerning retransfers and the management of nuclear materials after use or in cases of further fuel-cycle steps. In practice, suppliers and recipients usually had little difficulty reaching agreement on such measures. When they could not, it might be that one of the parties involved had not committed itself unequivocally to non-proliferation, for example by becoming a Party to the Treaty, or that the bilateral relationship between the parties involved did not favour bilateral co-operation in general, let alone in nuclear matters. How could States that had serious bilateral difficulties be forced to co-operate on nuclear energy as though they maintained friendly relations.

32. In the view of his Government, the implementation of article IV had been successful on the whole. Co-operation within the IAEA had been quite satisfactory and advantageous for the parties concerned, and it was to be hoped that that trend could be continued in the coming five years, especially if, in the light of recent political developments and environmental considerations, Governments decided to reduce the use of fossil fuels.

33. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said that his country had made every effort to develop nuclear energy while faithfully adhering to the letter and the spirit of the NPT régime.

34. More than half of the Republic of Korea's total electricity, one of the highest proportions in the world, was provided by nuclear power from 9 units with an installed capacity of 7,000 MW. By the turn of the century, 14 nuclear power plants would become operational.

35. The Republic of Korea intended to step up co-operation with supplier countries to enhance domestic capability and enhance nuclear safety. His Government was grateful for the assistance provided by supplier States and the IAEA in launching nuclear development projects. The time had come for the Republic of Korea to share its experiences and know-how with other developing countries through international arrangements, namely the IAEA framework, and in keeping with its technological and financial capability. To that end, it had organized and financed regional training courses on nuclear power project planning and implementation under the auspices of the IAEA since 1988. The third training course, with participants from a dozen developing countries, was scheduled for October 1990.

36. Strengthening the NPT régime was an essential pre-condition for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the régime should not jeopardize the inalienable right of any State Party to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. The fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technological information must be made available to the Parties concerned, provided that transactions were made with full-scope safeguards. Preferential treatment should, of course, be given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. It was to be hoped that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy would be resumed, and more effective nuclear technology transfer mechanisms among developing countries must be explored within the NPT régime, by developed and developing countries alike.

37. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) stressed the great importance that Italy attached to full implementation of article IV of the NPT, the best proof being his Government's considerable efforts to further a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in developing countries through bilateral agreements as well as through the IAEA, in particular by financing the International Centre for Theoretical Physics.

38. Further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy could only be visualized if very strict safety criteria were implemented. At present,

the safety régime basically relied on national regulations which were already supplemented by many actions at the international level. A strengthening of the international safety régime would further increase the degree of safety reached in the various States and would also make for more public confidence in the nuclear sector.

39. The implementation of Nuclear Safety Standards essentially involved the authorities at national level. Since the volume of activities was substantial, it would be impossible to transfer them completely to an international organization. Application procedures must therefore continue mainly at the national level. It was none the less possible to envisage procedures for permanent verification at an international level, aimed at assessing the adequacy of the activities carried out in the individual countries. An international control unit could assess the quality of the safety régimes implemented in the individual countries.

40. For that purpose, it would be necessary in the first place to review the control procedures existing in the various countries, a review that had already been started by the IAEA. Any possible gaps would then be bridged and existing procedures would be harmonized and rationalized. Mechanisms would be operated for continuous verification of the quality of the national safety régimes, relying on the implementation of adequate Quality Guarantees programmes possibly tailored to each individual country or group of countries. Lastly, verification and controls would be carried out by the IAEA, in accordance with the criteria of such missions as OSART, ASSET and RAPAT. The missions, however, should be made not only on request by the countries concerned, as was the case now, but also on a systematic basis by a decision of the IAEA. Integrated safety missions should also be envisaged to cover all safety aspects of nuclear installations.

41. Such a system of tests and verification should be the subject of an international agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the IAEA, along with regional agreements. In the case of the European Economic Community, that task could be entrusted to Euratom, which would act upon delegation by the IAEA in the framework of a specific agreement similar to the verification agreement negotiated on NPT safeguards.

42. His delegation was submitting a working paper (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.2) on the subject, suggesting specific language for inclusion in the final document. The paper submitted by Australia and nine other countries (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1) contained much valuable material, but it did not go far enough on the issue of nuclear safety and he therefore urged the sponsors to strengthen their paper on that point.

43. Not all of IAEA's technical assistance was given through the Technical Assistance Department and reflected in the technical assistance report. In IAEA's Board of Governors, he, as a Governor, had repeatedly urged the secretariat to include in the annual report a compendium encompassing all types of technical assistance given by and through the IAEA, including assistance by other departments, such as the Centre for Theoretical Physics.

Some $1 million a year of technical assistance was provided through the IAEA regular budget and $500,000 annually by UNESCO. His country also made a voluntary contribution.

44. Mr. FLYNN (Ireland) said that he would confine his remarks to signalling the issues which his country hoped to see reflected in the Committee's report.

45. Ireland had associated itself with a text (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1), circulated by a group of like-minded countries, that reflected their view on the issues raised by a review of article IV. His delegation strongly commended the text as a basis for the Main Committee's final report to the Drafting Committee. His country gave strong and unqualified support to the NPT, which it regarded first and foremost as a treaty aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was in that framework that his delegation viewed international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The discussions on the implementation of article IV of the NPT had to take the binding commitment to non-proliferation into account.

46. The Government of Ireland recognized the need to establish an equitable and stable framework for nuclear trade and co-operation. He believed that article IV had never been intended to prescribe a code of conduct for nuclear co-operation. The article provided the basis, but not the elements, for formulating a framework which would allow international trade to flourish, while avoiding the risks of nuclear proliferation. The authors of the NPT had intended that that framework should rise above the risk of discrimination between trading partners and avoid frustration of its objectives by commercial rivalry between exporting countries. However, because of the inextricable linkage between nuclear non-proliferation and co-operation, NPT Parties deserved special attention in the regulation of nuclear exchanges for peaceful uses.

47. The final report should reaffirm the undertakings of the Parties to the NPT in accordance with article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. That reaffirmation should strengthen the contribution to progress in general and to the elimination of technological gaps between developed and developing countries. It believed that the problems of least developed countries merited special care. The Conference should, in addition, express support for the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). The measures recommended by the CAS would deal with the need for predictable long-term supply and also with the important aspect of non-proliferation.

48. In the general debate in plenary, his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed Ireland's view that nuclear power programmes should be generated in accordance with the highest possible safety standards and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. The present Conference should express concern about the risks posed by nuclear energy and encourage efforts to deal with them in the IAEA and elsewhere.

49. His Government was pursuing elsewhere the idea of an international nuclear inspection force to verify safety standards for the benefit of nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon States alike. The establishment of such an

inspection force would greatly help to restore credibility to the nuclear industry, where the idea of inspection was not a new one. Safeguards inspectors already fulfilled an inspection function of a kind. Yet it was not enough to call for closures of badly designed installations and for new safety standards: a new worldwide openness was necessary in dealing with safety issues. The Conference could not ignore the extraordinary tragedy of Chernobyl. To fulfil the spirit and the letter of article IV of the NPT, it must rise to the challenge posed by the need for safety and radiological protection. His delegation stood ready to co-operate with others in formulating appropriate language to reflect that concern and it welcomed the ideas put forward by the Italian delegation in that regard. His delegation welcomed the Conference on Nuclear Safety, to be held in 1991 by the IAEA. That Conference, which had been proposed by Ireland on behalf of the European Community, would greatly help to strengthen international co-operation in relation to nuclear safety. Concerns about safety called for a culture that was capable of attaching priority to safety rather than to production and profit.

50. It was gratifying to note the continued growth of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme, the importance of which ought to be mentioned in the final document. The fact that the IAEA's assistance had been chiefly required in the non-power uses of nuclear energy was especially welcome.

51. The question of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations had received serious attention at the Third Review Conference. It was still relevant and should be discussed in the final report, which should speak of the need for concrete steps to provide assurances against such attacks. His delegation welcomed the useful working paper and informal text circulated on the subject by a number of delegations.

52. Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) said that the Committee's report should reaffirm the continuing validity of the central principles contained in the NPT, review the application of those principles over the past five years and also look at how they should be applied in the years to come. The principles themselves were unchanged but history had not stood still and care should therefore be taken to stick to issues which were relevant to the present time.

53. His delegation had circulated a paper containing language which could be incorporated into the report. It contained a short passage on article V identical with that in the 1985 report. As to article IV, the text set forth the main areas which his delegation believed should be covered. The first was the importance of stressing that the NPT provided a framework of confidence for world-wide development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without it, nuclear co-operation between States would be much more difficult.

54. The second point was the importance of recalling and restating the basic principles contained in article IV and of emphasizing that the rights of all parties set out in the article must be exercised in conformity with earlier

articles. The need should be recognized for predictable long-term supply assurances to be matched by effective assurances on non-proliferation.

55. The third point was the importance of nuclear co-operation in extending the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. Support for continuing programmes of technical assistance should be emphasized and the value of IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme stressed, as well as the mechanism which allowed extra-budgetary funds to be channelled to projects in developing States parties to the NPT. The appreciable level of bilateral co-operation should also be noted.

56. The fourth point concerned nuclear safety, which clearly called for greater emphasis than it had in 1985. The Conference should place on record its sympathy for all those affected by the Chernobyl disaster and stress all that had been done in the framework of the IAEA to strengthen co-operation in the field of nuclear safety - in particular the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, to which all States should be urged to adhere.

57. Lastly, on the question of discrimination by nuclear suppliers, the rights and obligations set out in article IV could not be considered in complete isolation. They depended on faithful observance, by all Parties, of the preceding articles. A non-nuclear-weapon State which wished to enjoy the benefits of co-operation under article IV had first to accede to the NPT; it had then to conclude a safeguards agreement in accordance with article III (4), and thereafter, it had to continue to comply with its obligations and avoid any actions which might give rise to suspicion that it was not doing so.

58. The supplier States, for their part, were actually called upon by the Treaty to discriminate. The definition of the precise meaning of the obligation under article III (2) was a question to which the supplier States had rightly devoted much attention, some of them insisting on full-scope safeguards, which meant in practice that they discriminated against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to an extent greater than the Treaty prescribed. Many States Parties wished to see all supplier States adopt full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and the United Kingdom was prepared to join a consensus of major suppliers to that effect.

59. The loudest accusations of discrimination came, of course, from States not parties to the Treaty. It was indeed true that the supplier States discriminated against those States and would continue to do so. On the other hand, it was quite incorrect to suggest that efforts made by the suppliers to fulfil their Treaty obligations constituted discriminatory policy against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The United Kingdom fully recognized its obligations under article IV, but also felt bound to have regard at all times to its obligations under articles I and III.

60. Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria), stressing the importance his country attached to the implementation of article IV, expressed appreciation for the IAEA's

crucial role in facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific information in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency's programme had expanded considerably since 1985, continuous improvements being achieved in both the quality and the effectiveness of its technical co-operation projects. His delegation would wish to see the Conference acknowledge the importance of the work of the IAEA as a principal agent for technology transfer under article IV (2) and commended for the effectiveness of its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme. It joined other delegations in calling for a substantial increase in the Agency's financial and human resources, as well as in the extrabudgetary resources for footnote a/ projects, from which Nigeria, for one, had greatly benefited.

61. As to the statement made by an earlier speaker to the effect that, while preferential treatment in terms of technical assistance was acceptable in the context of the NPT, its application within the IAEA would be difficult from the legal and practical points of view, he would point out that some kind of reward had to be offered to countries which had given up their nuclear weapon option in the interests of global stability and security. He saw no conflict in the application of preferential treatment to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty within the IAEA, particularly in respect of projects funded through extrabudgetary resources. It was his hope that the Conference would reaffirm the decision of the Third Review Conference urging that preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such a reaffirmation would also serve as a political message emphasizing the rights and obligations of States Parties.

62. The issue of the IAEA's assistance in securing finance from outside sources for nuclear power projects in the developing countries remained unresolved and would have to be addressed before those countries could enjoy the benefits of nuclear power generation. Special attention should also be given to the needs of those developing countries which wished to acquire a research reactor as a first step towards a nuclear power programme. His delegation urged the IAEA to continue its search for ways of financing nuclear power programmes for developing countries and welcomed its efforts in the development of small- and medium-power reactors, as well as its intention to offer developing countries integrated assistance in developing their infrastructures for execution of nuclear power programmes, including the training of personnel.

63. Priority attention should be given to the development of high levels of nuclear safety. The Conference should acknowledge the importance of safety and radiation protection and the increased efforts of the IAEA to strengthen international co-operation in that field.

64. On the subject of Regional Co-operative Agreements, he noted the successes achieved in agriculture under the RCA for Asia and the Pacific and in the training of scientists in Latin America under ARCAL. Expressing the hope that the African Regional Co-operative Agreement, which was expected to

become operational in 1991, would receive the necessary support from outside Africa, he noted with satisfaction the statement made by the representative of Japan announcing the attendance of two senior Japanese officials at the inaugural meeting of AFRA. The contribution of all non-African countries intending to attend the meeting would be highly appreciated.

65. Notwithstanding the Agency's conclusion that "in the view of most suppliers, the present situation was not one of supply assurance but rather of demand assurance" (NPT/CONF.IV/13, annex II (a)), his delegation took the view that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply should continue to monitor the supply situation on a long-term basis.

66. Nigeria, which had consistently supported the strict application of full-scope safeguards, viewed with concern the relatively easier access which some non-parties seemed to have enjoyed and which had enabled some of them to acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities. It would be ironic if the non-proliferation régime were applied to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in such a way as to constitute an obstacle to their development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation would wish to see the Conference reaffirm that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any State Party to the Treaty to engage in peaceful nuclear activities.

67. Lastly, he fully supported the draft resolution of the Group of Non-Aligned States contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1.

68. Mr. SAVERYS (Belgium) said that the draft resolution submitted by a Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2) presented a rather pessimistic analysis of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The reality, as eloquently demonstrated by some earlier speakers, as well as in document NPT/CONF.IV/NC.III/WP.1, submitted by Australia and others, was more positive, and his delegation would wish to see that reality reflected in the final document. Accordingly, he suggested that language in the final document on peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be based on five elements.

69. First, the importance of article IV, which was and remained one of the cornerstone articles of the Treaty, should be stressed. Second, a few paragraphs should be devoted to international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, which had considerably increased since 1985. The work done within the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency should be mentioned prominently in that connection. Third, the record of the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation activities over the past five years was a good one and should be stressed. Fourth, mention should be made of bilateral co-operation among States Parties in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an aspect which unfortunately was often neglected. His country, for its part, had, over the years, accepted many trainees from all parts of the world under IAEA fellowships and still continued to do so; regrettably, not all the opportunities offered by Belgium were taken up. Belgium's nuclear industry had a fine record of excellence and continued to be active internationally, especially in the field of safety of nuclear

installations. Fifth, some reference should be made to prospects for the future. In his delegation's view, the trend towards increased bilateral and multilateral co-operation should continue under effective safeguards and with due regard for the demands of nuclear safety and radiological protection.

70. Ms. FATIMAH (Malaysia), having stressed the important role played by the NPT in focusing international efforts on the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, said that the observance by States Parties of article IV could not be regarded as satisfactory. Without serious and concerted efforts to correct that situation, universal adherence to the Treaty could not be expected in the near future. Her delegation fully supported the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1) expressing the concern of States Parties with regard to the implementation of article IV and suggesting specific steps to be taken in that connection.

71. The nuclear power option, attractive as it was to developing countries striving for industrialization while at the same time seeking to reduce adverse environmental impact from burning fossil fuels, remained unattainable for many of those countries, owing, *inter alia*, to the prohibitive cost associated with a nuclear power programme. The Senior Experts Group established by the IAEA in 1986 to study arrangements for the financing of such programmes in developing countries had not yet produced results. In the meantime, a number of obstacles still remained to the developing countries' quest for an environmentally cleaner and more reliable source of energy. More particularly, export credit conditions were still unattractive as far as nuclear power was concerned. Her delegation hoped that the final document of the Conference would accurately reflect that situation. The suspension in 1987 of formal discussions within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply and the failure of the UNCPICPUNE Conference to reach consensus represented further setbacks to the developing countries wishing to develop a nuclear programme. Her delegation was nevertheless hopeful that, with the help of the IAEA, those obstacles would eventually be overcome. Hence it called upon States Parties to show greater sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their obligations under article IV.

72. The expansion of applications of nuclear techniques in the field of medicine, agriculture and industry during the period under review was encouraging. However, the zero real growth of the IAEA's regular budget imposed constraints on promoting nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Her delegation wished to see not only a greater expansion of the IAEA's promotional activities but also wider participation by scientists from developing countries in co-ordinated research programmes and in the IAEA's technical and expert meetings. The zero real growth policy had surely outlived its purpose, and it was time to allow some meaningful growth in the Agency's regular budget.

73. While the commendable results achieved by the IAEA in the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries could be attributed to the dedication of the IAEA secretariat, to the commitment of recipient States and to the generosity of donor States, an assured financial resource was essential

to ensure a successful and sustainable technical co-operation programme. Although it might on the surface be true that, as other representatives had alleged, there had been some growth in technical co-operation funds, actual payments to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, which constituted the main source of technical co-operation funding, had in reality continued to decline. Her delegation was concerned that, unless appropriate steps were taken, the much-needed programmes in developing countries would be seriously hampered.

74. Technical co-operation through regional mechanisms had proved highly effective. In the Asia and Pacific region, the Regional Co-operative Agreement had been of enormous help to Member States in achieving self-reliance in the applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia attached great importance to such regional arrangements and, in that regard, wished to congratulate the African States on the recently concluded African Regional Co-operative Agreement.

75. In conclusion, she wished to stress that the objectives of the NPT could be achieved only through effective and equitable implementation of all its provisions, including article IV. As a multilateral institution with a central role in the implementation of article IV, the IAEA should continue to receive the full support of all States Parties. Her delegation hoped to see a meaningful growth in the Agency's programmes in the near future.

76. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that the IAEA's two main interrelated objectives were, first, to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and, second, to ensure that assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. In his delegation's view, both those objectives should be considered on an equal footing; in other words, the full commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and their acceptance of IAEA safeguards should be based on the assumption that they would fully benefit, on a non-discriminatory basis, from technical assistance and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, the Agency's technical co-operation programme was funded by the unassured and unpredictable mechanism of voluntary contributions, whereas the safeguards system was financed out of the regular budget. Reiterated appeals over the past two decades by almost all developing States members of the IAEA, most of which were Parties to the NPT, calling for the correction of that anomaly had thus far been ignored by the major donors, which were also mostly Parties to the Treaty.

77. With reference to the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), he noted that, in view of the absence of co-operation by some industrialized countries, and in particular by the nuclear-weapon States Parties, CAS had so far been unable to complete its task. In the meantime, new restrictions relating to nuclear technology transfer had been and would continue to be imposed on the developing countries. A similar negative attitude had been observed at the UNCPICPUNE Conference.

78. His delegation fully endorsed the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1). While commending the contribution made by the IAEA within the limits of the unassured financial resources available in the area of technical co-operation, it expected States Parties to conduct a fair and unbiased critical review of the implementation of the Treaty and of the Agency's statutory obligations. In conclusion, he requested that the points he had made should be duly reflected in the final document of Main Committee III.

79. Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) introduced the working paper submitted by his delegation and 10 others, containing proposed language for the final document in connection with article V (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.4).

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.3
4 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 29 August 1990, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (*continued*)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.3

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, in informal consultations with delegations, general agreement had emerged on following the same format as the final document produced by Main Committee III at the Third Review Conference. Working papers were ready on seven of the eight categories of issues identified as relating to article IV, and the paper on the eighth category was expected shortly. The Bureau had also prepared an informal paper, which it hoped was as neutral as possible, concerning article V. The working paper submitted by Australia on behalf of 10 States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1; the working paper prepared by Italy appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.2; two working papers prepared by Bangladesh appeared in NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.3 and Add.1; a second working paper submitted by Australia on behalf of 11 States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.4; the working paper prepared by the United States would appear shortly in document NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.5; the working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1; and the working paper presented by Egypt appeared in document NPT/CONF.IV/31.

2. Every effort must be made to adopt the Committee's report by consensus, in accordance with rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. In view of time constraints, he suggested that the drafting exercise should be conducted by the Drafting Group at an informal meeting; the results would then have to be endorsed by the Committee at a formal meeting.

3. If he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt his suggestion.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.4
5 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 31 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Organization of work (_continued_)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent _within one week of the date of this document_ to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.4

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK (*continued*)

The CHAIRMAN said that the Drafting Group had made good progress in preparing the final report and it was hoped that it would be possible to conclude the first reading at the Group's next meeting. He suggested that another two meetings of the Drafting Group should be held to conclude the second reading, and copies of the report would be made available so that the Committee could adopt it at meetings on 3 and 4 September.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 3.30 p.m. to enable the Drafting Group to meet.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.5
17 October 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 5 September 1990, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

CONTENTS

Draft report of the Committee

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.5

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/L.1 and Add.1 and 2)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the draft report, which was the outcome of discussions held in the open-ended drafting group, where good progress had been made and agreement reached on many important matters. The President of the Conference had expressed satisfaction at the progress made by Main Committee III and the hope that the latter would be able to approve its draft report at the current meeting.

2. After drawing attention to a number of editorial additions and amendments; and in the absence of any observations on the part of members of the Committee, he said he would take it that the Committee accepted the technical part of the draft report, as contained in paragraphs 1-6. He then invited the Committee to consider the section of the draft report relating to formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference.

3. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation's approval of the draft report must remain tentative until the Committee members' views had been made clear on all substantive items.

4. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation appreciated the Chairman's efforts towards achieving consensus adoption of the Committee's draft report. The developing countries party to the NPT had worked in a spirit of unstinting co-operation and consensus on all subjects, including the question of South Africa and Israel. But a lack of co-operation on the part of a few delegations, including those of certain nuclear Powers, had made it impossible to settle all outstanding questions. His delegation appealed for one more informal effort, with a view to the adoption in plenary meeting of the Final Declaration in its entirety.

5. The CHAIRMAN said he felt sure that all members of the Committee had striven to reach a consensus. He invited the Committee to consider the draft formulations item by item. In that connection, a text had just been circulated to the members of the Committee in respect of item IX; that item, therefore, would be considered last of all.

I. Inalienable rights and fullest possible exchange

II. Supply assurances/non-proliferation assurances

6. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee had no comments relating to the texts of items I and II.

III. Promotion and financing of nuclear power

7. Ms. MAEGAARD-NIELSEN (Denmark), referring to paragraph 2, said that, since many environmental problems associated with the use of nuclear power remained unsolved, her delegation was in no position to accept wording which implied the use of nuclear power. It would prefer the words "the area of

promotion and financing of nuclear power" to be replaced by "the field of nuclear energy"; it also felt that, in the second and sixth lines in the English text of paragraph 3, the word "power" should be replaced by "energy".

8. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) strongly urged that the text of paragraph 2 should be left as it stood; he saw no difficulty with the wording, since the call for full co-operation was addressed to all States parties "in a position to do so". The text of paragraph 3 was a statement of fact; it was incontrovertible that IAEA did provide assistance in the development of nuclear power.

9. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation, though it too saw some difficulty with the text of paragraph 2, could accept it, especially if the Committee could agree to add the words "if requested". The text of paragraph 3 seemed more satisfactory, since the words "upon request" were contained in the second sentence; it might be an improvement to add, in the first sentence, the word "interested" before "developing States".

10. The CHAIRMAN said he felt that the United States representative's observations fully reflected the drafting group's approach, and that adoption of the Danish delegation's proposal might alter the text's main thrust. He suggested, therefore, that the text could be left as it stood, the relevant observations being noted in the summary record of the meeting.

11. Mr. ALER (Sweden) said he appreciated the point made by the delegation of Denmark; his own delegation, too, found some difficulty with that and other parts of the text. However, mindful of the intense efforts which had gone into the drafting, he was prepared to follow the Chairman's suggestion.

12. Ms. MAEGAARD-NIELSEN (Denmark) said that it was not her delegation's intention to block the consensus on the Committee's report.

13. The CHAIRMAN said that, on that understanding, he took it that the Committee had no objection to the text as it stood.

IV. Nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management

V. Technical assistance

VI. United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

VII. Sustainable development and environmental perspective

VIII. Attacks on nuclear facilities

14. The CHAIRMAN said he noted that the Committee had no comments in relation to items IV-VIII.

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.5

X. Review of article V

15. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said that the Final Declaration should be comprehensive in scope and apply to all possible cases. Therefore, his delegation proposed the addition of a third paragraph to item X, reading:

> "The Conference also notes the potential nuclear-weapon capability of a State party to the Treaty, where the nuclear facility is not safeguarded".

16. Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) said that his delegation, and doubtless some others, shared the concern which underlay the previous speaker's proposal. On the other hand, he doubted whether the text of the item in question was the best place in which to express it. In any case, it seemed that the matter was being considered in one of the other Main Committees. Again, the text as it stood was the outcome of thorough consideration aimed at achieving a careful balance, which any further amendment might upset. He hoped that the delegation of the Republic of Korea would not insist on amending the text and that the point raised could be duly reflected in the summary record.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that in view of the fact that item X dealt with a review of article V of the Treaty, the point raised by the Republic of Korea was not relevant to that item.

18. Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that he agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom. While the point made by the Republic of Korea was valid, it did not belong under item X. Perhaps the proposal could be taken up when the Committee considered item IX, where it might be more relevant. In any event, the issue was not the potential nuclear-weapon capability of a State party to the Treaty, but rather whether that State party represented a threat to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

19. Mrs. BATACLAN (Philippines) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the statement by the representative of Canada.

20. The CHAIRMAN said if he heard no further comments, he would take it that the Committee had no objections to item X as it stood.

XI. Review of article IX

21. Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, with respect to paragraph 3 of item XI, informal dialogue between the States party to the Treaty and States not party to the Treaty had been going on for many years and would surely continue in the future. Consequently, he wondered whether the word "initiation" in the first line was appropriate.

22. Mr. SAHBOUN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that while the efforts of the Chairman and other delegations to reach consensus were greatly appreciated, some points of disagreement remained. Therefore, the acceptance by his delegation of the sections under consideration was only provisional, pending approval of the entire text.

23. The CHAIRMAN said that in the absence of further comments, he would take it that the Committee had no objection to item XI.

Item IX

24. At the invitation of the CHAIRMAN, Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) read out the following proposed text for item IX:

> "The Conference notes that the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the NPT, in particular South Africa and Israel, represent a threat to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article IV. The Conference affirms its desire to see such nuclear programmes directed to peaceful purposes in conformity with article IV by the adherence of these States to the NPT and their acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Conference notes the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel."

He pointed out that, within the working group which had elaborated the text, the following questions had been considered: whether Main Committee III was the appropriate forum in which to consider that particular issue, and whether specific countries should be mentioned in the text. There had been general agreement that attention should be focused on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would avoid an overlap with the work of the other Main Committees in the same area. The working group believed that the text had given due consideration to all the views expressed, and recommended it for acceptance by the Committee.

25. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) said that, having participated in the informal consultations on the text, his delegation appreciated the spirit of co-operation that had been demonstrated. However, while it represented substantial progress towards language which would be acceptable to all, the text as it stood did not meet all the concerns of his delegation. The question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy certainly belonged in the final report of the Committee. However, the paragraph under consideration singled out only two of the threshold States which gave cause for concern. His delegation was equally concerned about the activities of States which had not been mentioned. Perhaps the text should be forwarded for review to the Drafting Committee, which could then ensure that the language was consistent with the corresponding texts submitted by the other Committees.

26. Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) endorsed the statement by the representative of the United States of America. His delegation was also concerned about the lack of balance in the text. It would not be opposed to fowarding the text, as it stood, to the Drafting Committee.

27. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that unless agreement could be reached on every section, the report should not go to the Drafting Committee as representing the Committee's final report.

28. It was quite logical to single out South Africa and Israel, since only those two States had ignored the many international resolutions and declarations calling for co-operation with IAEA *vis-à-vis* nuclear safeguards. The fact that South Africa and Israel were mentioned specifically would put pressure on them to comply with those safeguards. If there were other States not party to the Treaty which had demonstrated a similar lack of commitment to those regulations, his delegation would be glad to name them specifically. Finally, he urged all delegations not to block consensus on the text under consideration.

29. *Mrs. EL TALLAWI* (Egypt) pointed out that Israel and South Africa had already been singled out on many occasions, in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the IAEA General Conference. Like many others, her delegation was concerned about the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the NPT. For that reason, it had agreed, in a spirit of compromise, to the wording "in particular South Africa and Israel", implying that there were in fact other States involved. Her delegation could not accept a less strong wording. If other States were singled out elsewhere, her delegation would be willing to mention them. She hoped that the delegations who were opposed to the text under consideration would join the consensus.

30. *Mr. HADDAD* (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the text which had been considered by the Committee on the previous day was the same as that adopted by consensus at the Third Review Conference in 1985. It was regrettable that the United States, which had joined the consensus on that decision, now wished to change the text. His delegation was satisfied with the text as adopted in 1985. Neither Israel nor South Africa had ever taken any effective steps towards accepting the NPT or complying with agreements on global safeguards and guarantees. Had they done so, his delegation would not insist on maintaining the 1985 version of the text. Moreover, after 1985, new factors had come to light which made that version even more compelling. A reputable British newspaper had published a statement by an Israeli nuclear technician to the effect that Israel had a nuclear arsenal of more than 100 bombs. The accuracy of that statement had been confirmed by a celebrated British nuclear scientist. Israel's nuclear capability was well known. In addition, it had an arsenal of intercontinental missiles. Consequently, it represented a threat to all the Arab countries and possibly even to many Asian and European countries.

31. In singling out Israel and South Africa, the text was consistent with many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and IAEA. The reasons were known to all: those two countries were racist and expansionist and had no trust in the United Nations, and posed a threat to world peace and security. In contrast, there were no resolutions which referred to the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of India or Pakistan. If the United States was concerned about such a danger, it should submit a draft resolution to that effect to the General Assembly, the Security Council or the IAEA General Conference.

32. His country, which had hoped to adopt a text similar to that adopted in 1985, was willing to accept the text under consideration. If the United States insisted on blocking the consensus, his delegation would interpret that action as a deliberate attempt to deadlock the Committee, undermining the spirit of compromise which had prevailed up to that point.

33. Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) said that the Committee's draft report represented a substantial achievement and reflected favourably on the serious commitment of the Committee members. With respect to the text currently under consideration, he pointed out that the situation had changed considerably since 1985 and, consequently, a new text was in order. Not only had the threat of nuclear proliferation changed in character, but the attitudes of States party to the Treaty had changed with respect to various questions concerning the supply of nuclear technology and equipment. Singling out two States was discriminatory since the problem of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities existed in a number of threshold States. As a possible solution, he suggested that the words "in particular" in the first sentence should be replaced by the word "including". His delegation agreed that the text as it stood might be forwarded to the Drafting Committee with the remainder of the report.

34. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) urged delegations to bear in mind that the issue under consideration was a highly sensitive one for the majority of the parties to the Treaty, and would have an impact on the future work of the Fourth Review Conference and that of other forums as well. He pointed out that the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel had been mentioned specifically several times in the Final Declaration of 1985. Indeed, all the previous Final Declarations had singled out those two countries, as had several General Assembly resolutions. Those actions had been taken in response to concern expressed by the countries in regions bordering South Africa and Israel.

35. His delegation hoped that a consensus text could be arrived at, failing which it would associate itself with the view of the non-aligned parties to the Treaty.

36. Mr. VERBEEK (Netherlands) said that he was in favour of sending the text being discussed to the Drafting Committee for consideration in the light of the problems found by the other Main Committees. His delegation was not entirely satisfied, however, with the wording of the text, which was insufficiently balanced. While it was true that Israel and South Africa had been singled out in United Nations resolutions and those of other organizations, some of those resolutions had also been insufficiently balanced. To improve the text, his delegation proposed that the word "weapons" should be inserted in the last sentence so that it would read "... any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear weapons programme of South Africa and Israel".

37. Mr. HILALE (Morocco) said that he was surprised that a consensus had not so far been reached with regard to the nuclear programmes of States which were not parties. While specific mention had been made of South Africa and Israel in United Nations resolutions and those of other major international

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/SR.5

organizations, there had been no such mention of other non-parties, although individual countries might well have produced reports or resolutions of their own reflecting their concerns regarding other non-parties for quite legitimate reasons. He said that no one denied the threat that the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel posed to their neighbours. For 20 years, all African countries, with the exception of South Africa, had been calling for their continent to be denuclearized. The Middle East continued to be a highly volatile area because of Israel's refusal to adhere to repeated calls by the United Nations for the area to be denuclearized. It was clear therefore that the item under consideration merely reiterated concerns which had been expressed in the reports of the previous three Review Conferences and which were now even greater owing to the increased evidence regarding the nuclear programmes of those two States.

38. In the current international climate, attempts were being made to raise the credibility of the United Nations and to ensure the universal implementation of the Organization's resolutions. His delegation hoped that IAEA could contribute to that objective by referring to United Nations resolutions and, in particular, those which stated that the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel posed a threat not only to their respective regions, but also to the non-proliferation regime itself.

39. Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) thanked the delegations of Australia and the Netherlands for their constructive proposals. The fact that something had been said in the 1985 report was, he agreed, insufficient grounds for repeating it in the 1990 report. It was for that reason that the original text had been significantly modified. His delegation, like others, believed that since the United Nations and IAEA had specifically referred only to South Africa and Israel in the past, there were grounds for mentioning only those two States. He urged those delegations which opposed the naming of the two States to take into account the fact that the text under consideration was not as strongly worded as that of the 1985 report.

40. Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said he had hoped for a consensus on the issue, but realized that a sensitive area was involved. Considerable progress had however been made in the morning's informal discussions on the text, which situated the problem in the context of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article IV and urged non-parties to rectify the situation. While his delegation would have preferred not to name countries specifically - since South Africa and Israel were not alone in that category of States - it was prepared to accept that they should be named in the interests of compromise, bearing in mind that the original text had been toned down and that a similar text had been approved in the 1985 report. He added that his delegation could support the Australian proposal that "in particular" should be replaced by "including", if that produced a broader consensus.

41. Mr. ANGUIANO (Mexico) thanked delegations for their efforts to reach consensus on an important and complex issue. Since all delegations would have another opportunity to discuss the Committee's report after it had been

integrated in the Final Declaration by the Drafting Committee, he proposed that the report should be sent to the Drafting Committee with an indication as to which parts of the report had been agreed on in principle.

42. Mr. NEFEDOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thanked delegates for their efforts to reach a compromise solution. He said that the text under consideration reflected the viewpoints of all the countries involved in the informal discussions. While many of the members of the Committee agreed that the wording was not perfect, it was nevertheless a more or less balanced text, and his delegation was therefore in favour of accepting it and submitting it with the remainder of the report to the Drafting Committee, with a minor grammatical change to the last line to read "the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Israel".

43. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation could not accept the proposed replacement of "in particular" with "including", nor the Netherlands proposal that the text should refer to "nuclear weapons programmes". The former was unacceptable as it would put countries involved in only minor nuclear activities on an equal footing with those conducting large-scale nuclear activities. The latter was unacceptable as previous IAEA resolutions had not referred to nuclear weapons programmes; moreover, it was well known to be very difficult to separate general nuclear programmes from nuclear weapons programmes.

44. The CHAIRMAN observed that, while much progress had been made on the issue during informal contacts, agreement had not yet been reached on the final language to be used. He pointed out to the members of the Committee that they would have another chance to discuss all the problems when the full report was considered by the Conference plenary. It was his hope that, as in the case of the 1985 Review Conference, a consensus could be reached on the issue in the Final Declaration. He urged members of the Committee to continue their efforts to reach a consensus, but proposed that the practice used in 1985 could be followed by placing before the disputed paragraph the words: "The Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the following paragraph:". That would be followed by the original text proposed by Nigeria, since the text was still the subject of negotiations.

45. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that since the delegations blocking the consensus against the will of the majority had done so on the grounds that the situation had changed since 1985, the Chairman's suggestion of using the same procedure as in 1985 was not necessarily advisable. His delegation could not accept the submission of the report to the Drafting Committee if the problems surrounding item IX were ignored. As a compromise solution, he suggested that the Committee should adjourn for informal consultations and resume that afternoon. His delegation, like others, would not be satisfied if only part of the Committee's mandate was reflected in the report. The alternative was that a compilation of the standpoints of all delegations regarding the report in its entirety should be submitted to the Drafting Committee.

46. Mr. MGOKWERE (Nigeria) supported the proposal that the meeting should be adjourned for informal consultations.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that that would unfortunately be impossible since conference facilities would not be available. He believed, like most delegations, that talks could continue informally on the issue, but they could take place after the Committee had concluded its final meeting, since there would be enough time before the Conference reviewed the final document. He suggested that paragraph 7 of the introductory part of the report should be reworded to read: "The Committee considered at its fifth meeting the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference. However, due to disagreement on item IX, the Committee was unable to adopt it as a whole."

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 1.25 p.m.

48. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said that an understanding had been reached among delegations of the non-aligned group, who wished to propose the following new wording for paragraph 7:

> "The Committee considered at its fifth meeting the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference. However, due to disagreement on item IX, the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the report as a whole."

49. In reply to a question from the CHAIRMAN, Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) agreed that that wording could be interpreted as meaning that the Committee had failed to reach consensus on the technical part as well as on the substantive part of the report. His proposed solution would mean that the debate could be reopened by any delegation when the draft report reached the next stage of consideration. He believed that that practice had already been established in Conference negotiations. However, given that part of the report had already been fully discussed, he did not think that it would be difficult to adopt the report. The text to be used for item IX should be the original text proposed by the delegation of Nigeria, as amended by the representative of Egypt, with specific mention made of South Africa and Israel, reading as follows:

> "The Conference expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and that the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the non-proliferation Treaty régime.
>
> "The Conference notes the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further notes the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

50. The CHAIRMAN said that, since the use of the words "report as a whole" proposed by the representative of Indonesia implied that paragraph 7 itself had not been agreed upon, the proposed amendment should read "... was unable to adopt the substantive part of the report as a whole".

51. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) proposed that, in order to clarify the situation, the word "following" should be inserted, so that the final part of the sentence would read "adopt the following substantive part of the report as a whole".

52. Mr. JACOBY (Canada) said that, although in the interests of consensus the proposed solution might have to be sufficient, he wished to point out that much progress had been made in the informal discussions regarding item IX and that no delegation had said that it wished to block the language of the revised version, although some had reservations in that regard. It would therefore be regrettable to return to the language of the original text produced by the delegation of Nigeria. His delegation therefore favoured the use of the text read out by the representative of Nigeria at the current meeting.

53. The CHAIRMAN said that the view of the Canadian delegate would be recorded, but he did not think that that proposal would produce a consensus. However, he urged delegations to continue to work towards a consensus on item IX. The Committee's consideration of the report was therefore concluded. After an exchange of courtesies, the CHAIRMAN declared that the Committee had completed its work.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

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